The first years of the twenty-first century in Africa were marked by the creation of a new continent - wide institution, the African Union (AU), which replaced the Organization of African Unity. The founders of the AU see it as a tool for comprehensive progressive development of the member countries, their political, social and economic integration in order to overcome backwardness. This strategic direction was reflected in the adoption of the long-term New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) program, which aims to ensure the region's sustained economic growth based both on its own strength and capabilities, and on expanded effective assistance from the countries of the North. Among other things, NEPAD has marked a significant conceptual shift by African leaders in their approach to development issues. A shift towards recognizing, first, our own primary responsibility for Africa's results and development prospects. Secondly, the previously virtually hushed-up inability to independently stop the further marginalization of the majority

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countries of the continent in the globalizing world economy. Meanwhile, in the face of real circumstances, the initial euphoria of the African political class associated with the birth of AU - NEPAD soon gave way to a more mundane assessment of their capabilities and prospects. The article examines some of the main components of the situation that preceded the new partnership project, and that in which NEPAD is at the end of its fifth year of existence.

THE POVERTY TRAP

Africa, as you know, is far from homogeneous in economic terms. Most of its countries are located in the sub-Saharan, least developed part of the continent (Sub-Saharan Africa, SAA). From the south, they are "supported" by South Africa, which has the highest development indicators. The northern Arab sub-region is relatively prosperous. The socio-economic relationship of these three parts of Africa can be seen from the following data (Table 1).

Table 1

Key development indicators for Africa, 2002

1

Population, million people

GDP

millions of dollars.

GDP per capita, USD

Ratio to average African GDP per capita, %

All of Africa

831.8

553502

650

-

%

100

100

North Africa

142.6

237340

1644

252.9

%

17.1

42.9

FSA (excluding South Africa)

643.9

216344

307

47.2

%

77.4

39.1

SOUTH AFRICA

45.3

104242

2600

400.0

%

5.4

18.8

-----

Source: African Development Indicators .., 2004. Tables 1-1, 2-5.

More than 3/4 of the African population and less than 40% of GDP - this is the socio-economic "weight" of the FSA in comparison with 17% and 43% of North Africa, respectively, and 5 and 19% of South Africa. The average per capita income of a "tropical" African is more than five times less than in the north of the continent, and eight and a half times less than in South Africa. This means that the bulk of Africans live on less than one dollar a day per person, far below the so - called poverty line, and in the region as a whole-on less than two dollars. Given the social inequality, the living conditions of the majority of the population appear in an even darker light.

The average figures do not eliminate, of course, the well-known, sometimes sharp cross-country differences. But the overall picture is clear enough. How has it changed over the past decades in comparison with other regions of the South? According to the United Nations [Human Development..., 2001, p. 10], in the last quarter of the last century, the average annual growth rate of gross product per capita was (-)1% in Sub - Saharan Africa, 0.3% in the Arab countries, 0.7% in Latin America and the Caribbean, 2.3% in South Asia, in the East Asia and Pacific region - 6%. The decline in per capita income thus occurred against the background of its growth in other developing countries. This process continues into the new century. In 2001, only 16 of the 39 CAA countries experienced a slight increase in per capita income; in the rest, it stagnated or declined. The greatest regress was observed in the Congo (Kinshasa), Angola, and Sierra Leone. -

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onet, Zimbabwe, Comoros, Burundi, Togo [Marches tropicaux, 2004, N 3038, p. 194]. In 2002, according to the UN Human Development Index, which is based on data on life expectancy, adult literacy, education system parameters, and per capita GDP, 29 of the 36 countries with the worst indicators were African.

Let us remind you that the Millennium Declaration, adopted by the United Nations in 2000, calls among the main goals of the international community to halve by 2015 the number of people living on less than one dollar a day and reduce by two-thirds the mortality rate of children under the age of five. For Africa, these goals are also included in the AU - NEPAD documents. However, in the current situation, their achievement is more or less possible only in the northern sub-region and some countries of the southern one. In sub-Saharan Africa, the process is reversed. Here, the number of people living on less than one dollar a day increased from 164 million (42% of the population) to 314 million (49%) between 1981 and 2001, and poverty is compounded by the AIDS pandemic (70% of all HIV-infected people in the world) and the widespread spread of a number of other diseases, including malaria and tuberculosis.

It is almost impossible to reverse these trends in any short time frame. According to UN estimates, the Millennium Development Goal set by the AU - Nepad for the absolute poor in Africa cannot be achieved before 2147, and the goal for child mortality cannot be achieved until 2165 [Marches tropicaux, 2004, N 3038, p. 194; 2004, N 3051, p. 971]. And it is not only the depth of the social crisis and the low elasticity of the internal economic, socio-cultural and political factors that caused and supported it. More or less dynamic socio-economic development is also hindered by such objective circumstances as the deterioration of the ecological environment, the narrowness of markets due to the same poverty of the population and the small size of many countries, the current structure of their farms, which determines the nature of foreign economic relations and a thorough dependence on the latter.

This dependence is especially visible in the sphere of trade. The rapid growth of international trade flows in recent decades has sidelined Africa, further marginalizing it. In 1980-2002, the continent's share in world commodity exports decreased from 6% to 2%, and in imports - from 4.6% to 2.1%. One of the reasons for this decline lies in the structure of African exports, which consist of 60% of primary (basic), that is, little or no processed agricultural and mineral products with very low added value (compared to 30% for all developing countries). This "specialization" puts African export revenues in a strong dependence on two factors beyond the control of exporting countries-metereological conditions and fluctuations in world markets. Price volatility and the deterioration of the terms of trade (excluding oil, whose price movements are significantly affected by OPEC and OAPEC cartel agreements) are taking a huge toll on Africa. According to the World Bank, in 1970 - 1997 Africa experienced a real decline in export earnings per capita, while in South Asia it increased 3.6 times, in East Asia-8.7 times, in Latin America - 2.9 times. The total losses of African countries from the deterioration of the terms of trade during this period amounted to about 120% of their total GDP [Can Africa..., 2002, p. 8,21]. The 2004 UNCTAD report contains a characteristic assessment: due to the deterioration of the terms of trade, maintaining the export income of African countries in 2001 at the level of 1997 would require them to double their exports of basic products [Marches tropicaux, 2004, N 3043, p. 491].

The only way to reduce the share of agricultural and mineral raw materials is to diversify African exports to products with greater added value or with greater labor intensity. This particular method will allow you to-

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Table 2

Africa's external debt parameters, 1970-2002

Change in the amount of debt on average by period

1970 - 1979

1980 - 1989

1980 - 198919

2000 - 2002

(USD million)

Total debt

39270

180456

303232

292561

Late payments

648

9102

34284

292561

Completed payments

3347

18591

25 800

23706

(%)

Total debt/export of goods and services

91.0

195.2

234.3

168.6

Overdue payments/export of goods and services

1.5

9.8

26.5

15.1

Completed payments/export of goods and services

7.8

20.1

19.9

13.7

Total debt/GDP

24.2

51.7

65.3

54.6

Overdue payments/GDP

0.4

2.6

7.4

4.9

Payments made/GDP

2.1

5.3

5.6

4.4

-----

Source: UNCTAD secretariat calculations based on World Bank data [EconomicDevelopment in Africa..., 2004].

It has enabled many developing countries to achieve significant results. In most African countries, however, it did not work. For a number of reasons, but most importantly-due to the lack of own and inefficient use of very significant borrowed funds. The poverty trap severely limited the ability to save part of the national income and consequently reduced the rate of accumulation .1 At the same time, the noose of external debt was being tightened, which was being serviced in the same direction.

DEBT LOOP

Africa's external borrowing has steadily increased over the last three decades of the last century, creating a severe crisis that forced Western creditors to create a mechanism to ease the African debt burden in the mid-1990s. In contrast to the debt of middle-level countries, which was formed on the basis of bank loans, the main source of external debt of low-income African countries was the OECD countries and international financial institutions. From just over $ 11 billion in 1970, debt rose to $ 120 billion by the early 1980s. During the period of implementation of structural adaptation programs, its volume reached a peak - about $ 340 billion in 1995. At the same time, the debt owed to international financial institutions increased fivefold, and under bilateral interstate agreements - three times (Table 2). The fact that structural adjustment programs did not provide the growth and development promised by their initiators, UNCTAD notes, meant the continuation of debt degradation in many African countries [Economic Development in Africa.., 2004, p. 8].

A characteristic feature of the complicated situation was the constant increase in the level of overdue payments, which indicated the inability of borrowing States to meet their debt obligations in a timely manner. In 1995, almost all of the accumulated amount of such commitments, which exceeded $ 41 billion, was attributed to the FSA countries, which included: -

1 At first glance, it seems paradoxical to invest outside the continent, according to some estimates, up to 40% of African savings [Marches tropicaux, 2004, N 3030, p. 2499]. A "of every dollar borrowed... In Africa, between 1970 and 1996, 80 cents were immediately spent-usually on Swiss bank accounts or buying mansions on the Cote d'Azur. Even today, Africans are still paying the price for the profligacy of their former leaders" [The Economist, 2004, p. 12].

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one-fifth of their debt. At the same time, there was a faster growth in overdue payments to official (state and international) creditors, which reflected the ratio of three sources of funds received in 1970-2002: OECD countries (about $ 200 billion, 62.5% of all borrowings), international financial institutions (about $ 80 billion, 25%) and private creditors ($40 billion, 12.5%).

The dynamics of the deepening debt crisis, as can be seen from the above data, was expressed, in addition to the growth of overdue debt payments, in the rapid outstripping of the amount of debt of export incomes of borrowing countries and in a rapid increase in the ratio of this amount to their GDP (from 1/4 in the 1970s to 2/3 in the 1990s). The beginning of the 2010s was marked by a slight decrease in these indicators as a result of measures taken by official creditors. However, this did not mean a sufficiently significant reduction in the severity of the crisis, which cannot be overcome without further steps by the lending party to ease Africa's debt burden.

In general, the African debt profile for the period 1970-2002 is as follows (in millions of dollars) [Economic Development in Africa.., 2004, p. 10]:

Africa

Including:

FSA

North Africa

Amount received

539456

294010

245446

Actual debt service

549135

268302

280833

Remaining amount of debt

295461

210685

84776

Consequently, the amount of borrowing actually paid out (with interest) does not relieve Africa, especially its poorest sub-Saharan region, of an unbearable debt burden. Servicing the remaining debt, including interest on overdue payments, would significantly increase the flow of resources that has already begun to flow back (from poor to rich countries). Huge debt and other external economic imbalances prevented an increase in savings and investment - the first conditions for sustainable development, poverty reduction and real progress towards other "Millennium Development Goals".

Against this background, business and political circles in the North and in international organizations gradually adopted the view that it was necessary to curb the further slide of Africa to the bottom of the world economy. "It is now generally accepted," states the UNCTAD review,"that the continent needs at least a doubling of its economic growth rate, bringing it to 7-8%." This goal is also set out in the NEPAD documents. The main pillar of assistance to low-income countries was defined as debt relief through extending the terms of debt payments (mainly without reducing the amount of debt) and / or writing off debts on bilateral loans under "official development assistance", as well as providing new loans on softened terms. In the period 1975-1998, the Paris Club's creditor states repeatedly announced the possibility of reducing the debt of "the poorest and most indebted countries", but such promises were not implemented.

In December 1996, the Paris Club decided to reduce the debt obligations of the poorest countries by 80% under certain conditions (Heavy Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative) and announced the possibility of reducing their debt to multilateral institutions-the IMF, the World Bank, and regional development banks. Under the terms of the initiative, the debt relief scheme was intended to apply only to the poorest countries, most of them African. The criteria for their selection were, first, 2 - 2.5-fold excess of state (and state-guaranteed) debt revenue from the export of goods and non-factorial services. Second, the debtor country includes-

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It was included in the list of" favorites " only if its debt service payments amounted to at least 20-25% of export revenues. The exact criteria for each country were determined taking into account specific indicators of its economy, the key ones being the level of per capita GDP and the value of exports.

The three years of implementation of the initiative have shown, however, that it has neither saved beneficiary countries from repeated debt restructurings, nor provided them with the resources they need to start real poverty reduction. The range of such countries turned out to be rather narrow, and in general, insignificant debt relief was provided too slowly. Debt service payments significantly exceeded the expenditures of the debtor States on health and education. All this created a certain critical atmosphere around the initiative, which prompted creditors, including the IMF and the IB, to announce in November 1999 that they would increase the amount of write-offs to 90% or more if debt sustainability was "necessary". The main goal was to strengthen the link between" deeper, broader and faster " debt relief and country-specific poverty reduction policies. The thresholds for including countries in the list of recipients of debt benefits were also lowered, the total amount of which increased from $ 12.5 billion in 1998 to $ 39.4 billion in 2002 as part of the increased "initiative" [Economic Development in Africa.. , 2004, p. 15].

The external debt problem is mostly African in nature, as 34 of the 42 developing countries with particularly heavy debt are located in Africa. At the end of February 2004, 23 CAA States were among those covered by the HIPC Initiative. The overall results of the latter are evaluated cautiously. As noted in the UN Economic and Social Review 2004, they are not sufficient to reduce external debt to the level that is feasible for beneficiary countries [World Economic..., 2004, p. 21]. The measures taken in the context of the "initiative" have, of course, somewhat eased the problem. But they did not lead to its solution, which can only be a much broader, even complete (African position), debt write-offs2 . Under these circumstances, the G8 countries decided at their summit in the United States (June 2004) to extend the initiative until the end of 2006 [Marches tropicaux, 2004, N 3058, p. 1379]. Africans pinned their hopes on the next meeting of the leaders of the eight largest countries (July 2005, Great Britain), one of the main issues of which was to be assistance to African countries.

GOALS AND MEANS

The multidimensional problem of poverty, the debt burden, the general socio-economic backwardness and the need to overcome it formed the background against which the NEPAD program appeared. Let us briefly recall its main goals and means of achieving them, defined in general terms by this long-term, although not having a clear time frame, project.

NEPAD has two main components - political and socio-economic. The first one provides for ensuring security, conflict-free environment, democracy at all levels, quality and "transparency" of state asset management as a prerequisite for sustainable development. The second one focuses on mobiliz-

2 Some Western economists reasonably believe that total debt cancellation may not be the best solution for countries with rich natural resources like the Congo (Kinshasa), which have broad but poorly used development potential. More profitable for such debtors would be the option of converting loans into assets of international investment companies. This would exclude, for example, "wild privatizations", open up access to external capital markets, and gradually create conditions for mobilizing domestic savings for economic development (Marches tropicaux, 2004, N 3030, p. 2499).

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resource allocation (increased savings, access to capital markets, increased foreign aid, domestic and foreign private investment), fixing the following priority development sectors: infrastructure, information technology and communications, education, health, agriculture, diversification of production and exports with improved conditions for entering foreign markets, environmental protection, energy. The preparation and implementation of concrete projects in all these areas should take place in the general process of developing the political, economic, social and cultural integration of the continent's countries. It is personified by the African Union, and the real base is made up of already existing sub-regional integration groups.

Unlike previous pan-African development instruments, including the 1991 Treaty on the African Economic Community, which gave a central role to States, the NEPAD strategy highlights the investment activity of private capital, which should be based on organizational, economic and legal State support. We will discuss the opportunities and general conditions for private investment below, but now we note that the main source of financial injections into Africa remains, as already noted, the so-called official development assistance (ODA) from OECD countries and international financial institutions. The former represent approximately two-thirds of ODA, while the latter represent the rest. In the 1990s, the average annual net amount of ODA to Africa was $ 20.4 billion, including $ 16.2 billion for the MSA countries (excluding South Africa). For them, it was particularly significant, reaching in net terms, that is, after deducting payments for servicing previous loans in the framework of ODA, 9% of GDP (against 4.9% for the whole of Africa) and half of gross investment (against, respectively, 24%) [African Development Indicators. ,., 2004, table. 12 - 1, 12 - 2, 12 - 4, 12 - 9, 12 - 12].

The developers of NEPAD initially defined annual investments under the "partnership" from external sources in the amount of $ 60-64 billion. Soon, this amount was deemed too "bold", as well as the" claimed " 7% GDP growth rate. Nevertheless, the implementation of the program will obviously require a significant increase in external assistance. This is also recognized by ODA donors, although the 0.7% of GDP recommended by the UN in the 1970s and then repeatedly mentioned in international documents by most OECD countries has not been achieved. Moreover, net ODA to Africa has declined in recent years, both in total and especially per capita terms. From 1992 to 2001, its volume decreased by more than a third (from $ 24.9 billion to $ 16.2 billion), and in per capita terms it doubled - from $ 40 to $ 20. [World Economic..., 2004, p. 285, 299].

This issue took a turn in March 2002, when the United States and the European Union announced their intention to increase their aid spending. In 2003, the average ODA rate for OECD countries that were members of the Development Assistance Committee was 0.41% of their gross product, compared to 0.33% in 2000. At the same time, only four of the Committee's 21 member States (Denmark, Luxembourg, Norway and Sweden) met or exceeded the 0.7% norm [World Economic..., 2004, p. 57]. The most" tight-fisted " countries were the United States (0.14%), which in the future, unlike large European countries , 3 "did not say a word about reaching 0.7% at any time in this century [The New York Times, 25.04.2005].

3 In the run - up to the last G8 summit (July 2005), the leaders of Great Britain, France, and Germany announced their intention to increase aid to Africa to 0.7% of gross domestic product by 2012-2014. British Prime Minister Tony Blair was particularly active in setting up a special commission in 2004 to develop recommendations for assistance to African countries. In March 2005, the commission presented an extensive report that formed the basis of the British position at the talks of the leaders of eight States.

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Promises to increase aid have consistently been accompanied by indications that African leaders and institutions need to be more accountable for creating the right conditions for integrated development, without which aid may be useless. For example, the European Parliament's" laudable " resolution on NEPAD and the AU, adopted in January 2004, calls for the establishment of clear rules on accountability, transparency, good governance and "participatory" democracy. Special emphasis is placed on the fight against corruption, in particular on the need for rapid ratification of the African Union Convention on this issue, adopted in 2003 [Marches tropicaux, 2004, N 3037].

In the light of the promises of developed countries, the possibility of a more or less substantial increase in their aid to Africa looked quite real, as confirmed by the decisions of the leaders of the Group of Eight countries in July 2005. First, a provision was adopted to fully write off the overdue debt of the " hipic countries "(from the abbreviation SRS). Second, there are increased ODA commitments from donors, which could increase Africa's annual "official development assistance" by $ 25 billion by 2010, more than doubling its 2004 level. At the same time, the G8 decisions contain a promise to "promote the creation of an effective and flexible public administration system", in particular, to ensure greater transparency in public finances in African countries, to fight corruption, etc. [ITAR - TASS, 14.07.2005; Compass, 2005, N 28, pp. 8-9].

While not "reaching" the level that the African side of NEPAD expected, the planned increase in external assistance represents, nevertheless, serious progress in this area. It is difficult to say the same about another channel of promoting the "new partnership" - attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) and increasing the productive activity of local private capital. In NEPAD projects, this channel is even more important than ODA.

Meanwhile, the optimism about FDI seems, to put it mildly, exaggerated. There are, of course, a number of factors that can stimulate the interest of foreign capital in the region. These include the steady demand for African resources in recent years, the declared policy of encouraging local private entrepreneurship in the production sector, and the trend towards a gradual transfer of African currencies from fixed to floating exchange rates, which would strengthen regional trade, economic, monetary and financial integration and improve the conditions for foreign capital. However, all this increases the attractiveness of Africa mainly for portfolio investments, which can leave the stock market at the slightest complications as quickly as they came. The situation with FDI is somewhat different.

According to UNCTAD, direct investment inflows to Africa in 1992-2003 were as follows (USD billion)::

1992-1997 on average per year

1998

1999

2000

2001

2001

2003

To Africa

5.9

9.1

11.6

8.7

19.6

11.8

15.0

Including in the FSA

4.0

6.2

8.6

5.8

14.1

8.1

9.2

-----

Source: [Economic Development in Africa..., 2004, Table 2].

Here, FDI increased much faster during this period than in other regions of the South, but accounted for a very modest proportion of all such investment in developing countries (8.7% in 2003). Nevertheless, the share of foreign investment in Africa's external financing was increasing. If in 1990, FDI (2.5 billion rubles)

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If the amount of "official development assistance" was far less than the amount of "official development assistance", then in 2002 it was not enough. they accounted for 46% of all external resources received.

In principle, the investment field in Africa for private capital is huge, and the profitability of investments is considered to be one of the highest in the world4. However, in most countries of the region, both foreign and local investors face considerable obstacles.

BARRIERS

As a rule, foreign direct investment goes only to those developing countries (or their regions) where there is a set of conditions necessary for successful, that is, sufficiently profitable, activities of investor companies. It includes the availability of rich natural resources, especially those that are in high demand; relatively developed infrastructure; a fairly large sales market where investments are made; the availability of a sufficiently qualified labor force; socio-political and legal stability; and a low level of corruption in local government structures. 5 There are few such countries in Africa. In the absence or weakness of the last five factors, FDI mainly attracts the first one. They are directed mainly to the extractive industry, especially in the oil industry.

In 2003, for example, most of the growth in foreign investment came from oil exploration and production in Algeria, Angola, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Libya, Nigeria, and Sudan. Of the 10 largest recipients of FDI, seven were oil producers (Africa Renewal, 2004, p. 20). But the extraction of oil and other minerals in countries with a generally weak production base usually does little to stimulate the growth of other industries and does not create sufficient impetus for comprehensive economic development. Attracting private capital to agriculture, manufacturing, and services is often hindered by the cumbersome bureaucratic procedure for approving investment projects.

The most serious problem directly affecting the economic climate is widespread corruption practices and poor governance. World Bank experts who surveyed the investment environment of more than 3,000 companies in eight African countries between 2001 and 2003 describe corruption as the main obstacle to economic growth. About half of these companies are not sure of judicial support, if necessary, for their property rights. In a recent survey, Transparency International, a non-governmental organization, assessed the level of corruption in 20 African countries on a 10-point scale from 3.6 (Botswana) to 8.4 (Nigeria). The average" mark " was 6.79. In 2003, 11 African countries were among the 25 countries with high and very high corruption. "It is clear, "a Senegalese tax inspector is quoted as saying by the UN-published Africa Regional magazine," that if legal rules can change at any time, if public administration operates on the principle of abuse of power, or if court decisions are slow and irrelevant, FDI cannot be attracted to the country. If corruption is behind all this, foreign investors will turn to other horizons" [Africa Renewal, 2004, p. 21]. The evidence of over-regulation, the London-based Economist notes, is so great that most African governments say they want to simplify it. But in a number of countries, regulatory norms show a kind of "hydrohead": cancellation

4 ECA estimates that Africa's average return on FDI is four times higher than in the seven largest developed countries and twice as high as in Asia [The Economist, 2004, p. 11].

5 " Foreign private sector, very realistic... it invests only if it believes that the probability of making a profit is very high, and the risks are relatively weak. The rest is an illusion, " says the famous French economist P. Moussa [Afrique contemporaine, 2002, N 204, p. 39].

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the most burdensome and "bribe-paying" ones encourage legislators to invent new ones [The Economist, 2004, p. 13].

Corruption practices exist, of course, not only in Africa. But here, in the opinion of many observers, it has acquired an almost institutional character. It is impossible to change it in any short period of time, although the statements of African leaders about the need to eradicate this evil are constantly heard, becoming a kind of ritual in any discussion of NEPAD issues.

Overregulation and at the same time instability of economic procedures as one of the sources of corruption creates difficulties in expanding the sphere of investment activity to manufacturing and other "non - mineral" sectors of the economy of any foreign and local capital. The difference, however, is that the latter in most countries of the continent does not have enough power for such an application, but remains mainly a trading capital, which is very problematic to turn into a production capital. In fact, African capital in manufacturing is mainly represented by small, weak enterprises and to a very small extent by medium-sized enterprises. Meanwhile, only the "middle peasants" could become the basis of a more or less significant manufacturing industry. Operating in an area that is obviously more profitable, with a faster turnover of invested funds and technologically simpler, even large local merchants are not "willing to change places". In terms of economic diversification and, more broadly, the goals of NEPAD, this is undoubtedly a matter of concern for those African leaders who have initiated the new partnership and are seeking to advance it.

Barriers to this path are located not only in the natural economic mentality of foreign and local business entities, but also in the public administration sphere. The implementation of NEPAD (and the process of African integration and strengthening of the AU that is inextricably linked to it) cannot but be directly or indirectly influenced by a number of global and intra-African factors. Among the first are economic globalization, the mechanism of which objectively increases rather than reduces the lag of marginalized extroverted economies; rapid scientific and technological progress, which deepens the gap between its centers and peripheries; and the WTO's policy of eliminating the asymmetry of trade preferences, which is clearly unfavorable for African countries. The latter are expressed, in particular, in the narrow opportunities for increasing inter-African trade, which still does not exceed 10% of the total volume of African foreign trade relations; in the continuing political conflict in some parts of the continent, despite the recent trend towards its weakening; fragile relations and serious contradictions between a number of countries (the problem of using the waters of the Nile, the territorial dispute between Nigeria and Cameroon, etc.); the wariness of small states of the continent in relation to such "centers of power" as South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt.

All this and much more are the real difficulties that stand in the way of creating a "new partnership". Overcoming them requires very serious efforts by both Africa and its northern counterparts. And it can't be fast.

WHAT'S IN THE ASSET?

To assess the real significance and relevance of NEPAD, it is advisable to briefly consider, along with the problems of poverty and the debt crisis, the economic situation in recent years, largely determined by external factors. At the beginning of the new century, the annual growth rate of real GDP fluctuated slightly around 3 percent. They were expected to increase in 2003-2005 from 3.3% to 4.7% in Africa as a whole, and from 2.8% to 5.5% in the SSA (excluding Nigeria and South Africa) [World Economic..., 2004, p. 142]. Expectations were based on a slight increase in agricultural and industrial production.-

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It also highlights the growing demand for exported goods and the decline in armed conflicts, which have recently created a situation of extreme instability in several parts of the continent.

In North Africa, economic growth was supported by higher oil revenues (Algeria, Egypt, and Libya) and a corresponding increase in private and public consumption, the lifting of international sanctions against Libya, and tourism revenues (Egypt, Tunisia, and Morocco). In Nigeria, the largest FSA country, economic expectations were linked to rising oil prices and the launch in March 2004 of the National Strategy for Economic Strengthening and Development, aimed at eliminating poverty and expanding employment. The rise in world oil prices has also helped improve the situation in other oil-exporting countries, including new ones (Chad, Equatorial Guinea). In South Africa, economic performance was largely driven by an increase in the rand exchange rate, which, on the one hand, caused stagnation in the mining and manufacturing industries and, consequently, a high unemployment rate (28% in 2003), and on the other, stopped the inflationary process (from almost 13% in 2002 to 1% in 2003).

The current economic situation in the African region thus shows some signs of improvement, which naturally does not eliminate significant cross-country differences in the nature of economic trends. The possibilities of "universalizing" the positive experience of their development largely depend on the situation in international economic relations, especially trade relations, which are of great importance for almost all African countries. Here, the deep contradictions between the North and the South seriously hinder the process of creating conditions of international trade that would help reduce the gap between rich and poor countries. These contradictions even led to the disruption of the Fifth WTO Ministerial Conference (Cancun, Mexico) in September 2003. Later, the negotiations resumed, but the positions of the two groups of countries are still quite far away from a significant convergence.

The essence of the disagreements, as is well known, lies in the fundamental difference in approaches to the issue, first, about the access of developing countries ' export products to the markets of developed countries, and, secondly, about the artificial support of the latter for the competitiveness of their agricultural products. The first is expressed in the fact that the countries of the North maintain various kinds of barriers, tariff barriers and non-tariff barriers that hinder the import of" southern " goods. At the same time, they seek - in the name of "liberalizing" international trade - to increase the openness of developing countries to their exports, while turning a blind eye to the similar needs of the latter 7 . The second is the generous subsidization of agricultural production by developed countries, which allows them to remain competitive with cheaper products of the countries of the South, which constrains their exports8 , often creating a very significant "shortage" of agricultural products.-

6 Customs tariffs on African goods imported into OECD countries are approximately 10 times higher than those in trade between these countries [The Economist, 2004, p. 13].

7 Meanwhile, as the UN review notes, " developing countries need to increase their export opportunities before (emphasis added) they can reduce their level of protection (of domestic markets). It is increasingly clear that reduced levels of protection do not automatically lead to the development of export opportunities and a strong link that ensures rapid economic growth between export sectors and domestic economic activity "[World Economic..., 2004, p. 21].

8 " Rich countries subsidize their farmers up to $ 320 billion a year, not much different from Africa's GDP. Coupled with high tariffs and low quotas on some rural products, this makes it discouragingly difficult to export them to rich countries" [The Economist, 2004, p. 13].

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an increase in "export earnings" with the resulting consequences for weak economies.

The above-mentioned market trends may have something to do with NEPAD (favorable orientation for private investors), but, of course, they are not caused by it. What is the direct asset of this ambitious development program?

Mainly-reduction (arithmetic) of open manifestations of conflict. At the end of the last century, 25 countries experienced armed clashes or serious socio-political unrest. By 2005, their number had decreased to six-mainly due to the UN peacekeeping force, which reached 48,000 people in Africa in August 2004 (more than anywhere else), but also due to the corresponding measures of the African Peace and Security Council, created within the framework of AU-NEPAD [Africa Renewal, 2004, p. 15, 17]. As for other declared goals (expanding the democratic principles of public life, increasing the efficiency, transparency and accountability of management structures, ensuring the independence of the judiciary, improving education and health systems, increasing productive capacity, etc.), here, according to the magazine "Africa Review", we can only talk about "limited progress". A review prepared by the Office of the UN Special Adviser on Africa in June 2004 notes growing efforts to involve civil society organizations and the private sector in the implementation of NEPAD. However, "the nature and scope of such engagement varies greatly" by country, and the program is "still poorly known or understood in many parts of Africa". Some leaders, according to the Africa Review, " go to continental or regional meetings dedicated to NEPAD, but then they cannot tell their own citizens about them... Few African parliaments discuss the plan in detail."

The perception of NEPAD by business circles is ambiguous. In 2004, a survey conducted by an international consulting firm among 250 company managers in Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda found that only 38% of respondents had a positive view of the prospects for a "new partnership". Almost a third believe that its success is unlikely, the rest found it difficult to answer. Most see poor and corrupt political leadership, wars, and trade barriers as the biggest obstacles to NEPAD. A commentary on the survey results noted that the private sector "recognizes the potential benefits of NEPAD, but it should make more effort to explain its purpose."

For their part, some Governments do not seem to have actually defined their relationship to the private sector yet. As its Chairman, A. Tukur, remarked at the African Business Round Table in June 2004, they" only pay lip service to the important role of the local private sector " and called for policies consistent with such statements [Africa Renewal, 2004, p. 15, 17]. At the same time, it is not uncommon to assess private entrepreneurship as untenable, poorly managed, and internally contradictory.

Against this background, the regional integration process based on the activities of sub-regional groups is somewhat more significant. They are seen as the "building blocks" of the African Economic Community( AEC), whose goals are underpinned by the New Partnership. According to the ECA assessment, based on indicators from eight sectors-trade, transport, agriculture, manufacturing and others - from 1994 (the entry into force of the nuclear power Plant treaty) to 1999 (the last year for which reliable data is available), integration links in Africa are estimated annually

9 For example, the income deficit of African cotton producers caused by agricultural subsidies in developed countries was estimated to be about $ 300 million in 2002. [Marches tropicaux, 2004, N 3043, p. 491].

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they increased by an average of 4.5%. At the same time, cross-country cooperation has developed with different success rates in different sub-regional groups. The southern (SADC) and western (ECOWAS) groups had the best indicators.

At the same time, the presence of more than a dozen "building blocks" of regional integration complicates it due to the membership of most NPP countries in different groups at the same time. Only six of the 53 States are members of one of them, while the rest are members of two or three. This "overlap" has a negative impact on cooperation, meaning, in particular, the dispersion of already scarce resources, human and financial.

In general, we can probably talk about the progress of NEPAD, albeit insignificant. "The problem with NEPAD," said one of its initiators, Senegalese President Abdoulaye Wong in July 2005, "is that nothing real has been achieved yet" [ITAR-TASS, 2.08.2005, AF-2]. African actions in the framework of the partnership were mainly limited to organizing measures, to the establishment of a number of institutions - the Peace and Security Council, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), the executive committee of NEPAD consisting of 20 heads of State, and some others. Periodically, summits are held with the participation of top representatives of not all African countries10, renewing calls for the immediate start of the full implementation of the NEPAD program and ... stating the existence of inter-African contradictions.

The acceleration of economic growth and development is mainly associated with the expectation of a significant increase in external assistance. Whether they will be justified, the future will show. So far, the situation is such that external assistance is driven by the reality of internal changes in Africa, for which many questions remain open. The absence or insufficiency of such changes will not "encourage" the build-up of external support. If the latter does not increase, there is little chance for the continent's countries to make an economic breakthrough, for the optimal implementation of NEPAD, this African project of hope.

list of literature

ITAR-TASS. Moscow, 22.04.2005; 14.07.2005; 2.08.2005.

Compass. 2005. N 28.

Africa Renewal. UN. N.Y., 2004. Vol. 18. N 4.

African Development Indicators 2004. Wash.: World Bank, 2004.

Afrique contemporaine (P.). 2002. N 204.

Can Africa Claim 21st Century? Wash: World Bank, 2002.

Economic Development in Africa. Debt Sustainability: Oasis or Mirage? UNCTAD. N.Y. - Geneva, 2004.

The Economist (L.). January 17th , 2004.

Human Development Report 2001. N.Y.: UNDP, 2001.

Marches tropicaux (P.). 2004. N 3038; 3051.

The New York Times (N.Y.).

World Economic and Social Survey 2004. N.Y.: UN, 2004.

10 The next one (April 19, 2005, Cairo) was attended by 10 presidents, one Vice-president, three prime ministers, 14 ministers, and one ambassador. A total of 29 countries from 53 African Union states were represented [ITAR-TASS, 22.04.2005, AF-4.5].

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