In the complex of problems of socio-economic, political and cultural development of African countries, a prominent place in recent decades (1990 - 2010s) is occupied by the formation of civil society in them. At first glance, the situation in the vast majority of countries in the region does not give grounds for raising these questions in research terms, especially given the Euro-American origin and rather loose content of the concept of civil society itself. Meanwhile, in the South, including in Africa, " new actors have emerged whose membership in civil society is unlikely to be challenged." [Planche, 2007, p. 45].

The purpose of the article is to analyze the general conditions that determine the actual situation in this area of public relations in African countries.

The emergence of civil society organizations in the South was determined by a number of internal and external factors. The first are the weakening of the state in the performance of its basic social functions - a situation in which these organizations became a kind of alternative to the state for the population; the growth of so-called new intermediate elites (lawyers, doctors, journalists, etc.), which caused the creation of various kinds of associations. The second is the end of the inter-bloc cold war, which expanded the political space for civil society organizations; the growing number of international non-governmental organizations that established their offices in developing countries; and the increase in international official assistance to the countries of the South, bypassing their State structures.

Of course, all these processes were also evident in Africa, especially in its poorest, sub-Saharan part. The wave of democratization that emerged on the verge of the 1980s and 1990s in Tropical Africa resulted in the replacement of authoritarian one-party regimes with multiparty ones based on competitive elections, which strengthened the role of representative (parliamentary) authorities, as well as in the general weakening of the state as such in the socio-economic sphere-to a large extent under the" pressure " of neoliberal ideas North.

The democratization of political regimes and the growth of civil activity have not spared the Arab states of Africa. Many civil society organizations appear here as partners of the State; others place more emphasis on human rights issues. A specific feature of the socio-political situation in this sub-region is the rather strong influence of the religious (Islamic) factor and the stability of hierarchical traditions in social relations, which often affects the internal structure and functioning of civil organizations. In Egypt, for example, Islamic organizations refer to themselves as civil society. But the " Islamized "concept of civil society, which is almost unavoidable in Muslim countries, is quite actively opposed by its" secular " interpretation, and the clash of these two concepts is very serious.

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These two trends largely characterize the ideological atmosphere of public life in the Arab part of the continent.

All this has given rise to a large number of studies that have somehow tried on the" clothes " of civil society in Africa, as well as in other countries of the South. African authors do not avoid this topic either. The relevance of the formation of this society is recognized - albeit rather obscurely-in official documents of a number of countries, as well as in the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) program of the African Union adopted in 2001. In Russian African studies, this problem (the possibility/impossibility of the emergence of civil society) was practically first considered in 1994 (VI Conference of African Studies). At that time, the leitmotif of most speeches was to deny such a possibility, although with some nuances of conceptual and country (geographical) order. The elapsed time on a historical scale is an instant, so is it worth revisiting these questions? It appears to be worth it, and here's why.

First, these years were a continuation of a period of significant institutional processes in Africa, related, in particular, to the establishment - whether spontaneous or forced - of neoliberal ideology in the minds of the African political elite. Approaches to questions about the role of the state in social development have changed. Accordingly, the nature of political regimes in many countries has changed - mainly in form, but also in substance, if we take, for example, South Africa. And this cannot but affect the conditions that determine the possible genesis of civil society. In the phraseology of the ruling circles of individual countries and in the documents of the current pan - African "guide to action" - NEPAD-the categories "civil society", "democracy", "human rights" and the like are used not only speculatively, but also often in the form of setting specific goals.

Secondly, all these changes have not yet received, in our opinion, sufficient understanding-in relation to the problems of civil society in domestic African studies.

Before turning to African realities, it is advisable to briefly outline some general issues related to understanding civil society.

CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE STATE

As a phenomenon that is generally recognized in terms of terminology, civil society remains essentially one of the most "non-consensual" concepts in social science. The discrepancies here are numerous. What does this category include and exclude? Take, for example, its fairly common interpretation as a set of voluntarily created organizations whose activities do not relate to either politics (the state-political system) or the market (the economy). In practice, these areas are not separated by a "Chinese wall" from activities related to civil society. If a non-politicized civil society by definition grows up as a counterweight to the state-political system, then what, for example, is closer - to the latter or to the former-small and not so much parties representing the political interests (goals) of certain groups of people, created voluntarily (like civil organizations) and having no chance of mastering political power? power, or become any influential opposition to the existing regime? Or local municipal government bodies that represent the population of grassroots administrative units, are elected by them, are opposed in a certain sense to the central government, but at the same time dependent on the Center, are partially funded by the state and, moreover, are created, unlike civil organizations, not on the principle of voluntariness?

The situation is similar with regard to the link between civil society and the economy. Understanding civil society organizations as non-profit organizations, separated from the market, opposed to-

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This includes, for example, the creation of non-profit divisions by firms, but nevertheless connected with their creators and inevitably feeling their condition; the economic demands of trade unions; the activities of chambers of commerce expressing certain economic interests, various kinds of cooperatives, organizations for the provision of micro-loans, mutual insurance societies (mutuelles). A special case is the mass media, which are usually presented as an essential element of civil society and an important factor in its dynamism. Meanwhile, most newspapers and TV channels are profitable businesses, or at least financially subsidized. As for the so-called non-governmental organizations, the register of their services often includes non-free consulting services.

It is also necessary to understand civil society as a sphere of self-organization of society based on solidarity and common values, common interest, striving for the public good, etc. But what is the common interest and public good and how to determine the activity that corresponds to such an interest and the goals of creating such a good? After all, civil society consists of diverse groups with their own specific, often competing goals and their own versions of the public good. Consequently, the movement towards it (the good) can only manifest itself as a tendency that arises with a certain self-limitation of group interests, minimizing their competition and the formation of horizontal, network-type relationships between civil organizations, thereby clearing the social and political space for the formation of a common interest and concretizing the content of the public good [Public Space..., 2008, p. 46].

In conditions of competition or mismatch of group interests, the definition of the common interest and the public good associated with the very idea of civil society cannot take place spontaneously, by gravity. The manifestations of such contradictions are diverse. Trade unions oppose business associations in the fight for social justice; women's and religious organizations face off, for example, on the issue of the right to terminate pregnancy; the idea of protecting the natural environment promoted by environmentalists is confronted with the daily needs of the population, etc. In this regard, it is necessary to note the criticism of the entire concept of civil society. Its implication is that as something that includes "anything and everything", from non-governmental organizations to choral groups, it can both contribute to the democratization of institutions and destroy them. If "citizen expertise," writes Jeremy Mercier in Monde Diplomatique, for example, "which numerous associations wish to conduct, undoubtedly revitalizes democracy, the trees of civil society consultation can close the forest of reactionary politics itself." "Is it surprising," the author goes on to ask, "that this' nebula with unclear contours' has been taken up by the World Bank or the European Union in order to quietly substitute popular sovereignty and the citizens 'vote," etc. [Le Monde diplomatique, Janvier 2008, N 651, p. 23].

This criticism of the" left " is drowned, however, in the prevailing approach to civil society as an element of democracy, despite all the differences of opinion on various aspects. Overcoming contradictions between civil society organizations, identifying a common interest that meets the needs of the entire population in one way or another, even though they care (or should care). these organizations themselves are impossible without a kind of arbitration, theoretically and practically feasible only for the state - of course, one that really strives to ensure social peace, democracy and social progress. In itself, this problem is very complex, and it is much more difficult in countries with backward economies, ethnically and confessionally diverse, which raises the" degree " of corresponding conflict, socially torn into a narrow prosperous minority and a huge distressed majority, and at the same time united to some extent by the tenacious centuries-old traditions of a multi-faceted hierarchy, with a political culture and the behavior of the "upper classes", which significantly complicate the awareness of society

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in general, there is a need for real modernization in all spheres of life. In short, in the majority countries on the African continent.

Here, the necessary state "arbitration" in relations between civil organizations and, consequently, the promotion of the formation of civil society are significantly complicated both by the "innate" socio-economic, socio-cultural and political features of these countries, and especially due to the weakness of the state. The latter manifests itself, firstly, in the mental state of the ruling groups, which concentrate to a large extent, if not primarily, on their own interests and in the low moral and political authority of the state power determined by this; secondly, in the scarcity of resources at the disposal of the state or-with relatively large resources in some countries -in the absence of a single in the nature of their use; third, in the serious economic dependence of African states on foreign aid, on foreign capital, and largely due to this dependence, a constant political and ideological look back on neoliberal development concepts with their pro-market and anti-state orientation. (It is possible, however, that the global financial crisis that broke out in the fall of 2008. This will somewhat cool the ardor of the carriers of such concepts and cause a corresponding adjustment of the economic policies of African states.)

The interpretation of civil society only as a set of formal self-governing organizations that are more or less able to influence the policy of state power, in relation to Africa and other regions of the South, leaves out relatively small local groups that express local specific interests (land, property, etc.), far from the "high matters" of general democratic values, Meanwhile, the very need to address certain issues that affect the interests of not just one, but a group of individuals, and the corresponding collective actions in this direction (various forms of mutual assistance, mutual provision of services) give such mostly informal associations the character of public networks, whose "excommunication" from civil society is illegal.

All the more significant is the existence of informal local networks, especially in rural areas, which form, in fact, the grassroots, basic part of civil society in many African countries. Its "stealth" does not change the case. While remaining fairly stable, this grassroots base is not isolated, of course, from the impact of factors that are minimal in relation to local networks themselves, but generally narrow the possibilities of moving from the rudiments of civil society to its more complete manifestations in socio-economic, political and other aspects.

First of all, this is a low level of economic development, which determines the weakness, especially in the industrial sector, of the entrepreneurial stratum of the "middle class" as one of the supporting pillars of civil society; illiteracy (low literacy) poverty of the majority of the population; a huge gap between this grassroots mass, which is daily forced to solve basic survival issues, and the narrow "tops" of society with their a 1a European consumption model; stability of patronage and client relations; belittled socio-legal status of women; ethno-cultural overlap in many countries; interethnic, confessional and social conflicts; "unimportant" attitude of the ruling elites to the real democratization of political regimes; the" weight " predominance of authoritarianism, albeit more or less softened, over political democracy. Taking these factors into account is essential for an objective assessment of the current state and prospects for the development of civil society in African countries.

But even taking into account the predominant network part of civil society in poor countries, the "organizational" interpretation of the latter differs from its broad understanding as a society in which economic and social conditions are more or less effectively ensured.,

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cultural and political rights of citizens (legal regulation in economically advanced countries). Nevertheless, the former is related to the latter, since it implies a movement from the mere existence of civil organizations, which generally do not represent a serious counterweight to the state, to a society with broad and strong democratic foundations.

Strengthening civil institutions, which by definition constitute an important element of democracy, is one of the prerequisites for such a movement. However, this cannot happen despite the "will" of the state, even if it is weakened economically, but retains all the levers of political power, more or less real political control over the life of society, both through the ruling party and through the means of state bodies and structures themselves - the court, police, army, etc. Consequently, the strengthening of the influence of civil organizations is possible only if the state authorities have a "favorable" attitude to this process. In itself, their activities may to some extent contribute to the maturation of this attitude, the formation of pro-civil tendencies in state structures, in the ruling party, and even on the top floor of the state leadership - but here, of course, external pressure played a major role in the reorientation of African leaders to liberal democratic values. Be that as it may, the activity of civil organizations and state policy towards them cannot but be interrelated-positively ("partnership") or negatively ("confrontation"), depending on the specific content of the activities of one and the policies of the other of the parties, but mostly still on the policy of the state as initially stronger (domineering) sides.

ECONOMIC BACKWARDNESS AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Another condition for moving towards a democratic society is the progressive development of the economy, both quantitative (GDP growth) and qualitative (improvement of the sectoral structure, technological base and "human capital"), which ensures an increase in employment and an increase in the standard of living of the population, especially its huge poor mass, so characteristic of most African countries.

The possibility of such development depends on the nature of the State's socio-economic policy. Throughout the post-colonial period, and especially since the 1980s, this policy has been strongly influenced by external factors. Specifically-the scale, content and orientation of foreign aid; the political and ideological influence of its main donors, which was expressed in "instilling" a neoliberal approach to the economy in African leaders, the key element of which is a radical change in the roles of the state and the market (in favor of the latter); the processes of economic globalization, which took on a neoliberal coloring, since the" motor " of globalization there were and still are Western multinational corporations.

The total result of the "work" of these factors was the pronounced economic marginalization of most of the continent's countries, and consequently of the whole of Africa. Its main social manifestations are the chronic poverty of the majority of the population, the growth of unemployment, mass illiteracy, the widespread spread of serious diseases, etc. The deepening of the social crisis, which is dangerous not only for Africa, has caused a well-known reorientation of the policy of the Bretton Woods institutions and Western donors of "official development assistance" from the issues of "structural adaptation" of the economy to the "fight against poverty". In the official approach of international organizations to development issues, adaptation programs, one of the results of which was precisely the escalation of poverty (the human development index in many African countries was lower in the early 2000s than in 1960) [Africa and Development..., 2006, p. 17], gave way to those adopted by the UN in the early 2000s. 2000. Millennium Development Goals..., 2007. The first of them is a reduction in half (from the level of

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1990) by 2015, the proportion of people whose income does not exceed $ 1 per person is less than $ 1 per person. per day, i.e. those living in extreme poverty.

Have the adaptation programmes of the 1980s and 1990s changed the policy priorities of economic development proper, recommended to African countries? Judging by such well-known "recommendation" documents as the reports published in 2005 by the American economist J. R. R. Tolkien, the author of the article is not sure. Sachs (Investing in Development), former UN Secretary-General K. Annan ("In extended freedom"), the Blair Commission ("Our Common Interest"), the answer here is ambiguous. According to many African researchers (Sam Moyo, Sekou Sangare, Don Keith, Zo Randriamara, etc.), while the whole idea of development in these documents is "replaced or subordinated to the discourse of trade and aid"; a "collective amnesia" of the experience of structural adjustment policies pursued under the pressure of the IMF and WB is manifested. In fact, African countries are being asked to do more of the same things that were imposed by the Bretton Woods institutions: deepen market liberalization and privatization, improve "governance" and fight corruption.

Meanwhile, more than 20 years of structural adjustment have led not to real structural changes in the economy, but to an increase in its raw material character and vulnerability to external shocks, economic stagnation and increasing poverty. The failure of structural adjustment programs is now generally recognized, Monde Diplomatique noted in November 2006. They have caused "significant structural damage" to African countries: first, they have weakened the agricultural sector, thereby worsening the situation of two-thirds of the population of sub-Saharan Africa (SAA); second ,they have" flattened " the middle classes, whose rise would eventually open up mobility prospects for the most disadvantaged segments; third, liberal ideology has weakened states extolling fiscal balance, financial liberalization, market opening, privatization, etc. [Le Monde diplomatique, 2006, N 632, p. 12].

The aforementioned African economists reasonably point out that, for all the possible significance of changes in the unfair trade policies of the OECD countries in relation to poor countries, the discussion about freer access of commodity economies to their markets bypasses the main thing - the problem of real economic recovery of laggards. "Nothing... In theory and practice, it does not indicate that a dynamic and strong economy can be created on raw materials, especially agricultural products. If the "access to (external) markets" debate can satisfy those who want to appear to be extending a helping hand to Africa, their goodwill is not worth much, precisely because of their inability to point out the fundamental structural problems that determine the nature of the political economy of African countries and the path of their integration into the global economy... In the absence of a coherent and clear industrial value chain policy, the demand for greater market access becomes a distraction... A consistent industrial policy is the only viable way in which Africa can count on integrating its trade policy with its development strategy" [Africa and Development..., 2006, p. 17, 18].

But let's return to civil society itself. A common, albeit somewhat pronounced feature of the middle class in Africa is the weakness of its economic and entrepreneurial layer, which determines both the low economic opportunities of this social group and its low-profile role in the formation of civil society. Taken as a whole, the middle class includes, of course, not only owners of small and medium-sized enterprises in the production and service sectors, but also senior administrative officials, the intellectual elite, the officer corps, etc. - in different proportions in different countries. Despite all the differences in specific situations, the middle class is the social stratum that is objectively most capable in any country, not excluding the economically backward and politically unstable ones, which are not uncommon in Africa.

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But here, economic backwardness and political instability also reflect the characteristics of the local middle class. First, the economic weakness, its low entrepreneurial potentials; second, the de facto monopoly in political activity, in the formation of power structures. As a result, the middle class of most African countries is much less, if not at all, realized as a generator of a market economy and civil society than as a political class, the human backbone of the political system, a state that is separated from the bulk of the population and in many cases is unable to provide rational, effective management of development processes in political, economic and areas.

The" twofold " - economic and socio-political - weakness of small and medium-sized entrepreneurs can be overcome only in the course of general socio-economic development. Consider the question of the prerequisites and conditions for strengthening the economic and civic role of this social group in the FSA countries - they account for more than % of the population, but less than 2/5 of the continent's GDP - as the least developed part of the region with not very clear prospects for getting out of this state.

The most significant indicator of the backwardness of sub - Saharan Africa is the continued growth of the absolute (as defined by the UN) poor, although their share in the entire population of the sub - Saharan region decreased from 46% to 41% in 1999-2004. [Millenium Developmeent Goals..., 2007, p. 6]. And the FSA is unlikely to achieve the first of the most important goals outlined in the UN Millennium Declaration in 2000 - to reduce absolute poverty by half by 2015. Achieving this goal requires, as is well known, annual GDP growth of 7-8%. In 1998-2006, only five FSA countries (Angola, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Mozambique and Sudan) had such indicators, mainly due to favorable market conditions for their export resources-oil, diamonds, etc. Overall, the region's economic growth rate rose from about 3% during most of the 1990s to 4.6% in 2000-2005, 5.7% in 2006 and in 2007, according to forecasts of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, was expected to reach 6.2% [WorldBank..., 2006, table 2.1]. This growth was supported by the increased export revenues of some countries in the region in recent years. However, the results achieved remain below the necessary "bar", even if it is taken (at the end of the period defined by the Millennium Declaration), it will not ensure the planned parameters of poverty reduction in the SSA.

Real progress in this area is unthinkable without a significant increase in resources, both internal and external, devoted to general socio-economic development and specifically to poverty reduction. UNCTAD estimates that sustained 6% economic growth requires investment amounting to 22-25% of GDP. In 2000 - 2004, the average level of investment in MSA was 18.1% of GDP (pan-African figure-20.7%, in North Africa-25.6%) [UNCTAD. Economic Development in Africa..., 2007, p. 3 - 1].

Such a low level of investment is "to blame" for both the low saving rate - the level of personal income minus all personal consumption expenditures, and the weakness of financial markets that are not able to provide loans to local entrepreneurs. In both respects, sub-Saharan Africa lags behind any other region in the South. According to the World Bank, in 2005 the savings rate here was 17.6% of GDP, compared to 26% in South Asia, 24% in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 42.9% in East Asia and the Pacific. As a result, this rate actually returned to the original indicator of 1960 (17.5%), having passed the stage of gradual growth in 1960-1974-to 24.3%, then - through sharp fluctuations - to almost 26% in 1980; then the "collapse of savings" broke out, falling to less than 15% in 1992 and subsequent quasi-growth to 17.6% in 2005

A clear and acute shortage of internal resources makes the problem of attracting external resources chronically urgent. External sources of financing for investment and current expenditure in African countries - government loans and loans from international financial institutions (IFIs), official development assistance (ODA),

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Foreign direct investment (FDI) and private bank loans were used throughout the post-colonial period. The loans led to a huge external debt of the FSA countries, which created a very difficult problem in relations with creditor states and MFIs. ODA donors (with a few exceptions) were not very eager to provide assistance, especially in the grant part, and the effectiveness of aid use often left much to be desired. As far as FDI is concerned, it is usually too geographically limited and focused on the extraction of more or less scarce minerals to lead to a major increase in employment and poverty reduction.

In these circumstances, there is a need to strengthen the" developing " role of the state, which not only ensures real progress in solving the main economic and social problems, but also contributes to the maturation and strengthening of the civic self-perception of the general population and takes into account their respective initiatives and needs.

Thus, in the context of the prerequisites for the formation of civil society in countries like sub-Saharan Africa, we can distinguish, among others, two essential lines of the social process. The first, socio-economic, involves reducing poverty and improving the standard of living of the population. The second-socio-political-line of development implies strengthening the role of the state in establishing economic, financial and other services necessary for the functioning of production; organizing an institutional system that meets the needs of the socio-political process, including strengthening civil and democratic trends in society. Both a serious adjustment of domestic and global conditions require actions that can only be initiated and implemented by the political leadership of African countries, from the State, both in the country and in the pan-African framework. As UNCTAD experts point out, "the Government must bear the responsibilities of a developing State to help Africa emerge from its stagnation." At the same time, they believe that "increased domestic resources, coupled with increased aid flows, are unlikely to pave the way for salvation from Africa's underdevelopment without a decisive political way out of the neoliberal impasse" [UNCTAD. Economic Development in Africa..., 2007, p. 55, 57].

The concept of "developing states" is based on the experience of the Asian" new industrial countries " (NIS) of the first (Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore) and second (Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia) waves. Its proponents attribute the success of the NIS not to trade liberalization and the accompanying export acceleration (both of which, of course, took place), but to the development strategy and industrial policy defined by the symbiotic relations between the political and bureaucratic elite, i.e., the state leadership, and entrepreneurs.

Are the concepts and practices of developing countries and the experience of NIS applicable to the situation in sub-Saharan Africa? Many authors express doubts in this regard, referring to the low quality of the institutional environment, the corruption and greed of the political and bureaucratic elite, its "immersion" in patronage-client relations, and the inability of sub-Saharan states to develop and implement policies similar to those that ensured the success of NIS. UNCTAD experts describe this position as ideologically biased, based more on the anti-etatist rhetoric of neoliberalism in the 1980s than on an objective analysis of the potential role and effectiveness of the state. They recognize that most African countries are currently unable to develop an adequate development strategy. But not so much because of their own "vices", but because of serious restrictions on their political autonomy, determined by two main factors. First, the dependence on external financing of a significant part - in some countries, more than 50% - of their budgets; secondly, membership in the WTO, and therefore the connection of the "single market" with the EU.

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an obligation", under which a member state is obliged to accept all agreements in force within the WTO, regardless of whether any of them are beneficial to it or not.

Meanwhile, the bet on the" omnipotence " of the market, made in the early 1980s at the insistence of the IMF-WB, gave the FSA countries almost twenty years of economic stagnation and increasing poverty. In this regard, serious criticism in African academic circles of the concept and content of NEPAD as a pan-African development strategy attracts attention. For example, most of the presentations made at an international conference held in April 2002 in Accra by two civil society organizations, the Council for the Development of Social Scientific Research and the Africa branch of the Third World Network, were marked by a well - reasoned critical focus. The Conference noted, in particular, that the neoliberal nature of economic policies embodied in NEPAD is consistent with the nature of structural adjustment measures implemented in the previous two decades. This ignores the negative consequences of this policy for Africa. According to the participants of the conference, the ways of resource mobilization outlined by the New Partnership for Africa's Development program continue the disintegration of African economies, which took place within the framework of structural adjustment programs and WTO rules [Africa and Development..., 2006, p. 275 - 278].

The first years of the new century are marked by a certain economic dynamic in Africa. But it is mainly caused by favorable market conditions in the world market for African countries. Their abrupt reversal since the autumn of 2008 reinforces the objective need for a more active role of the state in solving the problems of development - economic, social, and political, during which only the conditions for the formation and strengthening of civil society arise.

POLITICAL AND SOCIO-CULTURAL BRAKES

Political obstacles to the process of democratization are determined both by the nature of African political elites, their interests and methods of activity, and by the generally low political maturity of the broad masses of the population, as well as by the persistent conflict of interethnic relations in many countries.

The "democratic wave" of the 1990s, which led to a multi - party (often excessively quantitative) system, certainly contributed to the intensification of political life, especially during election campaigns and referendums. However, this political revival was usually ethnoregional: almost all parties were formed on an ethnic and regional basis, despite the official prohibition of such a principle of their formation, and most of them have little or no connection with any non-ethnic organizations. The ethno-regional basis of African parties means not only the politicization of ethnic groups, which is ambiguous in its consequences in the field of interethnic relations, but also in some cases the emergence of centrifugal trends, especially in regions with large natural resources. These multiparty features are rarely neutralized by the existence of a dominant party with the function of consolidating the existing political regime, since it usually represents the interests of the leading (largest) ethnic group in a non-mono-ethnic country.

Another typical factor in the political situation is the widespread corruption of ruling groups. "The understanding of leadership as service is completely absent in most African societies. Political leaders often pose as patrons and fathers of their peoples... they show the mentality of feudal or colonial lords... There are no well-defined procedures for selecting, rearing, and maturing political leaders... Pathetic, incompetent and corrupt leadership has been a defining feature of African politics" [The Journal of Social...,2006, p. 259].

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Such opinions are not uncommon in the mouths of African authors. In unison, they hear the words of South African President T. Mbeki (said, however, before his election to this position) that "representatives of the highest echelons simply parasitize the rest of society" and the need to be vigilant "in the face of the threat of encroachments on African society by this predatory stratum with its social morality, according to which everything in society should be organized materially in such a way as to benefit only a few" [Onyeani, Chika].

African leaders sometimes acknowledge the existence of widespread corruption in the echelons of power, its danger to the democratic process, periodically make calls to combat this evil and even initiate individual anti-corruption actions-most often with close to zero results. It is not surprising that invective against "predatory parasitic layers", such as Mbeki's words quoted above, does not change much.

At the level of purely political relations, the ruling elites in many countries are opposed by opposition elites. The influence of the latter is most significant where there is considerable experience of political or even armed inter-party struggle (Algeria, Egypt, Sudan, South Africa, Botswana, Zimbabwe, and some others). In Muslim North Africa, the strongest component of political opposition is Islamist movements. The nature of their activities depends on the degree of radicalization of their goals, which is largely determined by the specific socio-economic conditions and political course of the ruling groups. The set of variants of relations between Islamist organizations and ruling groups includes the predominance of the moderate Islamist nature of the political regime, which, however, does not exclude some "secular" elements in its structure (Sudan), and a long-term armed confrontation (Algeria in the 1990s). and the first years of the new century), administrative suppression of Islamist organizations and strict control over them (Tunisia), their "integration" into the political regime without turning the latter into an Islamist one (Morocco), rather active and diverse, but still controlled by the authorities, activities of Islamists (Egypt).

In general, despite the enormous political, ideological and cultural significance of Islam in Arab countries, as in other Muslim countries, the influence of internal and external factors (economic development, social shifts, internationalization of economic and political processes, etc.) seems to give rise to a tendency to strengthen a certain (proto -) state of Islam.to a realistic, religiously non - "biased" perception of social existence - true, mainly, but not only, among the intelligentsia, especially the scientific and technical ones. This means generally quite favorable conditions not only for civil organizations (networks) with a certain Islamic "coloring", but also for those who are free from it. It is appropriate to quote here some excerpts from the speech of former Iranian President Mohammad Khatami at the session of heads of State of the Organization of the Islamic Conference in December 1997. " ... In the civil society that we advocate and in which, although it should be built around the core of Islamic thought and culture, personal or group dictatorship or even tyranny is impossible the majority and the suppression of the minority... Our civil society is not a society where only Muslims have rights and only they are considered citizens. All individuals have rights within the framework of the rule of law" [Islam, dialog..., 2001, p. 34, 37]. These passages do not correspond much, of course, to the realities of present-day Iran, but still express the moods of a significant part of society in the Muslim world.

In most countries of Tropical Africa, the opposition has not yet become an organized political force. It is characterized by fragmentation, an ethno-regional basis, patronage-client relations, etc. All this makes it difficult for the opposition to present a united front during election campaigns. One of the rare exceptions is the situation in Zimbabwe, where the "Movement for Democratic Change" has been working for many years.-

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The opposition to the ruling regime has become a very influential force that R. Mugabe's government is forced to reckon with. Opposition movements in South Africa and some other countries are quite active, putting forward both social and ethnic demands. The ethnic card, however, is played with equal care by both the ruling and opposition elites. This was particularly evident in Kenya after the December 2007 elections. Then the opposition's disagreement with the results of the vote resulted in a serious crisis, in bloody inter-ethnic clashes, stopped only by reaching a compromise between the officially winning and losing sides.

As for the problem of the formation of civil society, political practice shows that, to put it mildly, neither the ruling nor the opposition elites in most African states are ready to effectively support this process. The main efforts of both are aimed at coming to power (the opposition) and preserving it (the ruling group). When moving into the category of ruling power, the opposition elite usually "forgets" about the interests of the majority of society, hinders the activities of organizations that disagree with its policies, or even prohibits them, demonstrating their real attitude to political democracy.

The possibilities for the formation of civil society as a kind of measure of a democratic state in both North and Tropical Africa are largely determined by the nature of political culture, that is, that part of the general culture that is directly related to political activity, consciousness and behavior of active social actors, and in one way or another-with economics, law, religion and morality. Most participants in political processes are characterized by traditional ideas about power, leadership, and society, based on long-standing customs, symbols, and norms that are firmly anchored in the consciousness. The priority of communal, clan, tribal, and ethnic solidarity does not exclude, of course, individual and personal interest, but its satisfaction is possible only within the framework and through the efforts of the community or collective.

Such ideas do not remain unchanged, of course, but their basis still remains, largely determining the specific forms, methods and directions of socio-political activity. In the postcolonial period, in the context of political authoritarianism, increasingly deep social stratification, the enrichment of the upper classes of society and the impoverishment of the lower classes, the subsystem of the political culture of the ruling elites was increasingly distinguished from the array of traditional political culture. While remaining somewhat connected with clan solidarity, they also understood the "specialness" of their interests. The unified ruling parties created from the first years of independence with non-party associations (trade union centers, etc.) under their control formed an organic element of the "party-state" system, which practically excluded the possibility of forming autonomous public organizations capable of protecting the rights of segments of the population that were not involved in this system.

However, this authoritarian system had little or no impact on local social structures based on territorial-community and ethnic solidarity. The power elite could not destroy them or considered it unprofitable, believing, perhaps, that they amortize eventual dissatisfaction with authoritarian orders. Be that as it may, these structures (communities, groups of villages) often formed autonomous entities parallel to local administrations. Having certain resources of their own, solving their problems by bypassing the official authorities, by the usual way (discussion), under the leadership of traditional leaders, they actually competed with the "party-state" system. This, of course, was not an open conflict: traditional society had to adapt to some extent to the political conditions created by authoritarian regimes. For example, to coordinate with the official authorities the candidacy of a new leader after the death of the previous one. At the same time, in the traditional rural environment, in contrast to the urban one, there was no need for any civil servants.

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organizations: their human rights and other functions were performed by the community itself, at least if and until it was "touched".

In the 1990s, the formation of civil society by African countries, almost for the first time since independence, was supposed to take some concrete shape, forming, in principle, an integral element of official democratization, initiated at the insistence of the West and under the pressure of mass anti-authoritarian protests of the population. However, this (civil) element in practice was overshadowed by the first multi-party election campaigns, which were strongly influenced by traditional political culture: its canons instructed voters to follow the recommendations of the leaders in their preferences for certain candidates for positions in the executive and legislative branches. A significant role was played by the ethnic factor, which almost always determined the acceptability or unacceptability of candidates for an ordinary African who found himself in front of the ballot box.

The deep social stratification mentioned above, or rather the division of African society into relatively stable social groups of the very rich and the very poor, had no less impact on political processes and political culture. In this complex, multidimensional situation, the formation of a middle class also took place - mainly in the urban environment - but it remains socially and politically very diverse, unstable and economically weak. This state of affairs is also reflected in its political culture, which is "torn" between modernization trends and norms of tribal solidarity, hindering rather than promoting the growth and consolidation of this social stratum, as well as its participation in the formation of civil organizations.

As a result, the deep social divisions inherent in African countries are accompanied by an undeniable, though not always obvious, erosion of the former total domination of traditional political culture, under the influence of which the majority of the population still remains. The solidarities of the communal, clan, patronage-clientele, and ethnic order that embody it cannot but prevent the maturation of a different, civil consciousness that does not "abolish", of course, the components of traditional political culture, but rather stands above them, softens and moderates their priority, imperativeness, and "omnipotence".

Of course, the maturation of citizenship does not depend only on political culture, which in its evolution is itself deeply dependent on non-spiritual, material, and economic factors. Nevertheless, in the current socio-political practice, it is political culture that plays the first fiddle in determining the specific behavior of different layers and groups of society in certain situations. The impact of economic changes on the consciousness and behavior of people affects the influence of already existing, stable, long-standing traditional norms. In the absence of changes for the better, and even more so with the deterioration of the material existence of the broad masses of the population, the dominant role of such norms only increases.

PESSIMISM, OPTIMISM?

Despite all the above-mentioned difficulties, hindrances, and obstacles to the formation of civil society in African countries, the existence and often active activity of many different public associations remains a fact. They emerged at various times, including the colonial period, but mostly after it, on local, African soil, forming the so-called third, or non - profit, sector, as opposed to the state - government and commercial-business. This sector covers a very wide range of actors-from informal networked local groups to voluntary organizations of a formalized, structured type-trade unions, women's, youth, religious, ethnic, corporate, environmental and human rights organizations.-

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and so on. They are usually referred to as "non-governmental organizations" - NGOs. But NGOs themselves are a different type of organization in terms of their origin and main functions. Their conceptual source is connected with the formation of the UN, with its Charter adopted in 1945, which provided for the participation of NGOs in solving economic and social issues. As the liberal-democratic model of the world order was established, the activities of such NGOs extended to developing countries, of course, in line with this model and the policies of international financial institutions.

In the context of the weakening, if not complete nullification, of the "developmental" role of the state in Africa, NGOs that emerged in Western countries (often at the initiative and with the assistance of state administrations) began to be considered as a "social network".: a) a channel for promoting socio-economic development and b) a tool for promoting democracy in" backward " societies. These functions are performed directly by Western and international NGOs, as well as by their branches established in developing countries or their formally autonomous local "copies". Both of these functions, especially the first one, are implemented on the financial basis provided by foreign donors. NGOs for the latter represent such "trump cards" as the ability to reach the poorest population and remote areas, encourage the participation of aid recipients in local public life, strengthen local institutions and opportunities for marginalized groups, flexibility in forms of activity, and low costs [Planche, 2007, p. 55].

Not least is the role of Western NGOs as a tool for strengthening political influence (and at the same time economic positions). countries that are not yet fully sustainable. The United States is particularly active in this area. "To promote its interests, the United States actively uses the mechanism of work of non - governmental organizations," Yu notes. Panasik, showing it on the facts. - NGOs are also a recruitment bench for elites loyal to the United States, a channel for recruiting the elite in the event of a president loyal to the United States coming to power" [NG - scenarios, 28.10.2008]. This practice, however, is natural in today's globalized, politically and economically competitive world, as long as it does not run counter to the norms of international law. It does not seem to disavow the positive aspects of the activities of NGOs themselves, or in a narrow sense, which are one of the segments (in the eyes of the IMF-WB experts - the most important, the main one) of the totality of civil society organizations and networks in Africa.

In most countries of the continent, this totality does not yet constitute any integral, systematic entity that allows it to be regarded as a civil society with an "African face". And it cannot be, because these countries are still far from reaching a certain "decent" level of socio-economic development. A level that presupposes the existence of a relatively strong economy that is internally integrated within country and / or regional frameworks, and has institutional and financial mechanisms for self-development, combined with equal participation in international economic relations. A level that ensures a significant improvement in the material and cultural living conditions of the majority of the population, the creation of effective means of preventing (resolving) social, ethnic and other conflicts, the presence of solid foundations of democracy, etc.

Moving in this direction is a very long process. And is it even possible? There are many skeptics about the future in Africa and beyond. But there are also optimists who do not consider all the obstacles that stand in the way of socio-economic and political progress associated with the formation of civil society insurmountable. It is not yet available in most African countries. But there are numerous, diverse, living sprouts of the process of its formation. They are the source of a generally optimistic vision of the civic future of African societies.

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list of literature

Islam, dialog and Civil Society, Moscow, 2001.
NG scenarios. 28.X.2008.

Public Space, Civil Society and Power, Moscow, 2008.
Africa and Development in the New Millenium. The NEPAD Debate I Ed. by Y.O. Adesina, Y. Graham, A. Olukoshi. Dakar-London-New York-Pretoria. 2006.

International Affairs. Vol. 78. L" 2002. N 3.

The Journal of Social, Political and Economic Studies. Washington D.C. Fall 2006. Vol. 31. N 3.

Le Monde diplomatique. 2006; 2008.

The Millennium Development Goals. Report 2007. UN. N.Y, 2007.

Onyeni, Chika A. The Failure and Parasitic Nature of the Black Middle/Intellectual Class II http://wwwutexas.edu/conferences/Africa/ads/1247.html

Planche J. Societe civile, un acteur historique de la gouvernance. P., 2007.

UNCTAD. Economic Development in Africa. Reclaiming Policy Space. Domestic Resource, Mobilisation and Developmental States. New York-Geneva, 2007.

World Bank. African Development Indicators 2006.

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