A. B. Letnev, Moscow: Institute of Africa of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2005, 227 p.

In my opinion, in the peer-reviewed collection prepared by the Center for Historical, National and Cultural Studies of the Institute of Africa of the Russian Academy of Sciences, three noteworthy features can be distinguished:

First, the theme of Africa is presented from the unusual perspective of the " key theater of military operations in the first period of the war "(1940-1941), both on the part of the Allies and on the part of the Hitlerite coalition (p.15).

Secondly, we were allowed to hear the voices of many employees of the Institute of Africa of the Russian Academy of Sciences and not only.

And third, the thematic articles are preceded by a foreword by A. B. Letnev, who noted the contribution of our predecessors-I. P. Yastrebova, A. Yu. Shpirt, V. B. Lutsky and others.

The contribution of fellow African historians, economists, geographers and philosophers is valuable, in my opinion, not only for the study of specific (and little-known) events of the Second World War, but also for interesting statements or their own assessments of these events.

I'll start with articles related to a lesser-known contribution to Allied military operations in the south of the continent.

Thus, in the article "The Struggle for Madagascar and the position of the South African Union" (pp. 85-100), V. V. Gribanova not only convincingly links the anti-Hitler policy of the Smuts government with the strengthening of its authority in the country, but also draws an important conclusion that the refusal to cooperate with the Vichy government allowed the South African Union to continue using military bases in Madagascar to control communications in the Cape of Good Hope area and preserve economic and trade interests.-

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This is an important market for the UAS. The firm defense of the Free French right to administer Madagascar prevented Great Britain from using the question of its future fate to put pressure on de Gaulle. Articles by V. S. Baskin and A. V. Pritvorov are devoted to the same area.

In the article "The Union of South Africa helps the allies" (pp. 72-76), V. S. Baskin not only examines the contribution of this dominion to the supply of military equipment and strategic raw materials to the Allies, but also analyzes its participation in direct military operations in East Africa, Ethiopia, and then in North Africa.

I would like to point out in this connection that the UAS's support for the Allies was not so obvious, since the previous history of this dominion turned out to be closely connected with continental Europe (Dutch immigrants), and above all with Germany (Kruger's support).

A.V. Pritvorova, in her article "The Blockade of the South African coast by the Axis Powers "(pp. 77-84), analyzes the military involvement of the South African Army in World War II and describes in detail naval operations in the Cape of Good Hope, a strategically important area for providing the Allies with many components of military operations. At the same time, the creation of the military industry had a positive impact on the overall development of the country and, as the author writes, "led to the emergence of qualified personnel." He concludes that the subsequent policy of apartheid gradually "deprived South Africa of this achievement" (p. 83).

The role of Africa in World War II is discussed in the article by E. A. Glushchenko "British Dominions in battles in the North African Theater "(pp. 39-42). He provides data on the number of military personnel from the British dominions and their participation in battles in the Mediterranean region. The author makes a rather bold conclusion that their active use in that area "in fact, was intended by the Churchill government, and the dominion governments agreed to it" (p. 40).

Yu. N.Vinokurov's article "The Belgian Congo during the War" (pp. 52-59) also deals with the impact of the Second World War on the internal development of Africa. He believes that the Belgian colonial authorities failed to prevent the "awakening of the political consciousness of the Congolese" and "the formation of anti-colonial sentiments in the country" (p. 57).

A. M. Pegushev's article "Military operations in East Africa" (pp. 60-71) is devoted to the interaction of England with its African possessions. His main focus is on Kenya and he draws a conclusion that I will just quote: "So, during the Second World War, British East Africa, especially Kenya, became an important raw material, training and transit military base for Great Britain, a springboard for offensive operations in Somalia, Ethiopia and Madagascar. During the Cold War, Kenya's importance as a link in the mobile defense system of the British Empire increased, and it became a potential strategic and missile base for Great Britain. Since Kenya's independence in 1963, the United Kingdom and the United States have maintained a military presence in Kenya since the 1990s. British military and military training bases are located on its territory, and American rapid reaction forces have been granted the right to use Kenyan airfields and ports of Mombasa " (p. 69). Oddly enough, this finding refutes the claim about the anti-colonial impact of the Second World War on Africa. Not in Kenya, anyway.

I will move on to the more important theater of operations in North Africa for the course of World War II.

V. I. Gusarov's well-motivated article " The role of the Allied Fleets in the defeat of the Italo-German group in North Africa "(pp. 43-52). His approach is interesting because it partially coincides with the views of M. Yu. Frenkel on the key role of the Mediterranean Theater of Operations in the plans of the German (and Italian) command. V. I. Gusarov uses such facts as Hitler's flirtation with the Egyptian King Farouk in 1938 and the creation of the Afrika Korps in 1939 as arguments. During the war, the British fleet, writes Gusarov, dominated the Mediterranean Sea and by 1943, in fact, interrupted the delivery of supplies to North Africa (p. 43).

If, reading these articles by the participants of the collection, I want to agree with their conclusions and assessments, then the statement of M. Yu. Frenkel, made by him in the article "Africa and the Middle East in the strategy of Germany and Great Britain in 1940-1942" (pp. 10-15), as if in 1941-1942. "Africa played a role". one of the key roles in the strategic calculations of the belligerents in the Second World War" (p. 15), seems to me unconvincing, and not only "non-trivial", as in the case of the Soviet Union.

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writes A. B. Letnev (p. 4).All that M. Yu. Frenkel managed to prove was the inclusion of military operations on this continent in the original plans of the German General Staff, which Hitler refused to fulfill back in September 1940 (p. 135).

To confirm the existence of such "plans", I will refer to the work of Prof. R. Holmes of Cranfield University (USA), who quotes a German mountain division soldier who very simply explained the meaning of the German troops 'rush to southern Russia in mid-1942:" First through the Caucasus, then turn the corner, crash into the British rear and say to Rommel: 'Hello, General. And here we are! "" (cit. according to the article by B. G. Petruk " The campaign of the Allied armies in North Africa. The view of the participants of the Battle of Stalingrad " (p. 17). All this is true, but in my opinion, the German plans to use the African continent as a springboard on the way to establishing world domination in the future cannot be used to claim that Africa played a key role in the Second World War.

Even more objectionable are the views expressed by M. Y. Frenkel in his article "The Battle of Stalingrad and Africa "(pp. 102-148). So, he writes :" At first glance, the Battle of Stalingrad had no direct relation to Africa. But this is not the case, because this battle was simultaneously a struggle for the key to the gate that opens the way to the Middle East and Africa " (p. 102). The author spent a lot of time extracting from the archives statements about how the German tanks of the Caucasus-Iran group would move to the Middle East in the winter of 1941 to join Rommel's army in Egypt. Although the study of archival materials conducted by M. Y. Frenkel can serve as confirmation of Hitler's grandiose plans to use the African bridgehead to establish German and Italian domination in the Mediterranean basin (North Africa) and access the Atlantic coast up to Nigeria for a further throw to America (Operation Felix), the question arises: what prevented Africa "play a key role" in World War II? In any case, not the absence of military operations on its territory (Rommel's campaign), but Germany's attempts to implement more realistic goals in the USSR and in the Balkans. This means that "Africa is a ' waste of time'", as stated by the German High Command (p. 142). Nevertheless, I would like to pay tribute to M. Yu. Frenkel's research work on the development and inclusion in the scientific circulation of documents on Africa's participation in the Second World War.

There are shortcomings in every work, and in this case I refer to them the lack of sufficiently reasoned material to prove the claim of A. B. Letnev that one of the "blocks" of problems in the collection will be the topic "world War as an accelerator of decolonization on the African continent" (p. 4). Unfortunately, this topic is in the collection I didn't hear it.

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