After the events of 2011 Tunisia has taken the path of democratization. Significant support in this process was provided by the transatlantic community, which believes that the "Tunisian model" should become an example for neighboring States. Nevertheless, the political situation in the country remains fragile, and there are serious economic and security problems that threaten the development of the democratic process. The North African state needs the support of the European Union and the United States, which, in turn, have already actively begun to provide it.

Key words: Tunisia, USA, European Union, democratization, "Arab awakening".

US AND EU POLICIES TOWARD TUNISIA: SUPPORT OF DEMOCRATIZATION

After the events of 2011, Tunisia has chosen a democratic path. The Transatlantic Community, which considers 'the Tunisian model' to be an example for neighboring states, has given considerable support in this process. Nevertheless, stability in Tunisia remains fragile; the country has serious problems in the spheres of economy and security, which threaten the development of democratic processes. In this regard, the country needs EU and US support, and they have already started rendering assistance. The article is devoted to the study of the policies of Washington and Brussels in Tunisia aimed at ensuring sustainable democratic development of the country.

Keywords: Tunisia, USA, European Union, democratization, Arab Awakening.

In the past five years, the Middle East and North Africa have been undergoing a major internal transformation caused by the Arab Awakening. Against the backdrop of regional destabilization, Tunisia remains the only oasis of relative stability. Since the events of 2011, the country has chosen a path other than authoritarianism and extremism, namely, democratic development. Over the past few years, Tunisia has held free elections, adopted a new constitution, and resolved political crises through dialogue and compromise.

One of the factors contributing to the success of the "Tunisian model" of democratic transit was the help of the West. The Transatlantic Community provided serious support to Tunisia, which was carried out in three main areas: economy, security and democratic construction. The article sets the goal

Lida Davidovna OGANISYAN-Post-graduate student, Faculty of World Politics, Lomonosov Moscow State University, lidaoganisyan@gmail.com.

Lida OGANISYAN - post-graduate student of Faculty of World Politics, Lomonosov Moscow State University, lidaoganisyan@gmail.com.

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Study the activities of the United States and the European Union aimed at supporting the democratic process in Tunisia through economic and security assistance.

The Arab Awakening, which began in 2010 in Tunisia, soon spread to other countries in North Africa and the Middle East. During the 2011 revolution, Tunisians took to the streets to demand a solution to unemployment and economic reforms. In January, President Ben Ali was forced to flee the country, leaving office. Western leaders, who were reserved in their assessments at the beginning of the revolution, expressed their support for the Tunisian people after the flight of the head of state and called for a rapid start to democratic transformation [Ashton and Fuele, 2011; BBC, 2011].

With the fall of the regime, a gradual political transformation of the state began. Tunisia held its first democratic elections to the National Constituent Assembly (NUS) in October 2011. They were won by the Islamic party Ennahda ("Revival"). It formed a coalition (Troika) with two secular centrist parties, which allowed it to gain a majority in the country's legislature. In turn, the NUS formed a government and appointed a president. Despite expectations that Ennahda's position would contribute to the Islamization of society, the ruling coalition followed a fairly moderate course aimed at democratizing the political system. However, the measures taken by the Government did not help to solve economic problems or reduce the unemployment rate. The failures resulted in several political crises, which led to two changes of government, and a deep polarization of society, accompanied by an increase in political violence [Kuznetsov, 2015, p. 105].

Thus, in February and July 2013, two opposition leaders were killed, which exacerbated the political crisis in the country. Large-scale unrest broke out, and Tunisia's democratic development and stability were threatened: the country was on the verge of civil war [ibid., p. 112]. A crucial role in the country's recovery from the crisis was played by civil society, which is the most developed in the region and is able to influence the ruling groups. The so-called Quartet was formed, which included four organizations: the Tunisian League for the Protection of Human Rights (TLHR), the Tunisian General Union of Labor (VTST), the Guild of Lawyers and the Tunisian Union of Industry, Trade and Crafts (TSPTR). Having a great reputation in Tunisian society, these organizations initiated a national dialogue between the government and the opposition [Bogner, 2015].

During the dialogue, the parties faced serious problems, and the negotiations were very difficult. However, the efforts of the Quartet and the pragmatism of Tunisian politicians played a crucial role in the process of lifting the country out of political instability and returning it to the path of democratic development. As a result, the government headed by Ali al-Arayid resigned and a technocratic cabinet was formed [Kerrou, 2014], and in early 2014, a new constitution was adopted, the most democratic in the region, which significantly expanded the rights and freedoms of citizens [Arieff, Humud, 2015, p. 7-8].

In the autumn of 2014, parliamentary and presidential elections were held, as a result of which the party of the old secular elite of the times of Presidents H. Bourguiba and Ben Ali, Nidaa Tunis, won, and its leader B. Qaid al - Sebsi took the presidential chair [Kuznetsov, 2015, p.1]. It is noteworthy that the Islamists were not removed from power, on the contrary, they took the second largest number of seats in parliament, formed a coalition with Nidaa Tunis and received ministerial posts [ibid.].

Western countries have enthusiastically welcomed the political transformation in Tunisia. The country was praised and noted as an example of a policy of compromise. The United States and the European Union have expressed hope that the transition process that began after the overthrow of the Ben Ali regime will end with the creation of a democracy-

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a democratic and prosperous Tunisia [Statement by the President..., 2014; Statement by High Representative..., 2014]. But while the political system has gained some resilience and stability, Tunisia faces serious economic and security challenges.

After a brief period of strengthening of the economy in 2012, the growing socio-political instability in 2013-2014 caused a slowdown in economic development. GDP growth, which slowed sharply in 2011, was 3.8% in 2012, and after 2013 it declined to 2.2% in 2015 [Tunisia GDP..., 2001-2015]. Public debt, which has been steadily rising since 2011, exceeded 48% of GDP in early 2014 and reached 52% of GDP in 2015 [Tunis Economic Outlook, 2015]. Unemployment remains extremely high: in mid-2011 it passed the mark of 16%, and by 2015 it had dropped only to 15% [Tunis Overview, 2015]. Given that socio-economic demands were among the main ones during the 2011 revolution, the lack of improvements in people's lives led to serious disappointments.

As for the security problem, it is compounded by a number of factors. First, jihadism is quite popular in some segments of Tunisian society, especially among unemployed young people who have become disillusioned with the revolution [Kuznetsov, 2015, p. 1]. From three to four thousand immigrants from this small North African country joined the ranks of the radical terrorist organization IG (ISIL) [ibid., p. 10]. Secondly, the terrorist threat in the country is extremely high. In September 2012, the US embassy and a school were attacked [Clinton, 2012], in March 2015, 19 people were shot dead by terrorists at the Bardo Museum, and in June, 38 people were killed on the beach, mostly tourists [Booth, 2015]. As a result, there is a narrowing of the tourist flow. According to the Tunisian Ministry of Tourism, 4 million people visited the country from January to September 2015, which is 1 million less than in the same period of 2014 [Tunisia: Fewer tourists..., 2015]. This was a serious blow to the tourism sector of the country's economy. In addition, the instability discourages investors, which the North African state badly needs.

Third, an unfavorable regional context creates additional tension in the country. The Tunisian government faces particular challenges because of its proximity to Libya, which has been plunged into chaos since 2011 and is now on the verge of collapse. The 459-km-long common border provides Tunisian jihadists with weapons, facilitates their contacts with regional terrorist groups, etc. [Moiling and Werenfels, 2014, p. 2]. In addition, Tunisia has received almost a million Libyans [Ghannouchi, 2015], some of whom remain in the country, while others (like Tunisians themselves They are trying to reach Europe via the Mediterranean Sea. Not everyone succeeds: in 2011-2015, almost a thousand people died near the Tunisian coast, before reaching the primary points of influx of migrants - Lampedusa, Sicily, or Malta [Fliess and Ruhle, 2015].

Tunisia is not able to cope with acute security and economic problems on its own, so the country's Government is counting on the assistance of the transatlantic community. Back in 2011, Americans and Europeans firmly stated that the condition for receiving their aid would be the democratization of the state.1 Thus, against the backdrop of regional chaos, Tunisia has demonstrated the ability not only to maintain relative stability, but also to make changes in the political and socio-economic system, which is why it has become the focus of attention of the transatlantic community.

1 The European Union has adopted the "more for more" principle, according to which CU countries that implement more democratic reforms can count on more generous European assistance [The EU's pesponse..., 2011]. On May 19, 2011, the American President gave a speech in which he outlined the role of the United States in the region. Obama stated that a special approach should be applied to each country, depending on the changes that the CoE government is implementing [Statement by the President..., 2011].

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The Europeans started implementing a number of projects immediately after the events of 2011 and provided great support to the country so that it did not deviate from its chosen democratic path of development. Americans, after nearly four years of ignoring the country's political achievements, became more active in early 2015, when Secretary of State John Kerry called Tunisia a "ray of light" and promised that the United States would do everything possible to keep that ray shining [Coffman-Wittes, 2015]. Assistant Secretary of State for Democracy, Human Rights and Labor Relations T. Malinowski said during his September visit to Tunisia:: "As a result of the Arab awakening, two models of governance emerged: one Tunisian, the other ISIS. We are deeply interested in ensuring that the first model succeeds and the second fails" [Malinowski, 2015]. According to Malinowski, it is unfair that the burden of change falls on a young democracy, which should be shared by friends and partners, as they pin their hopes on the success of the Tunisian model. Serious economic and security challenges must be overcome with external assistance [ibid., 2015].

In February 2011, after a heated debate, MEPs came to the conclusion that it was necessary to send a special delegation to Tunisia to study the situation and review the European policy in the region in order to bring it in line with the new realities [Danilov..., 2012, p.418]. Declaring its solidarity with the Tunisian people, the EU expressed its readiness to support the country. In September, the European Commission approved a program of measures against Tunisia. It was decided to allocate additional funds for the development of civil society, for the creation of new jobs, etc. It was also mentioned the need to resume negotiations on expanding the partnership between the EU and Tunisia, concluding a trade agreement in the future that would provide for the liberalization of agricultural ties, on migration, mobility and security [EU response..., 2011].

2011-2013 through the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) 455 million euros were allocated to Tunisia, of which 62% - to stabilize the economy and support the democratic transition [Tunisia Social Assistance..., 2015]. As part of the Support to Partnership, Reform and Inclusive Growth2 program, the country received 155 million euros in 2011-2013 [ibid.].

In 2014-2015, the EU provided financial assistance in three main areas: socio-economic reform to ensure inclusive growth, support the process of democratic transition, and promote sustainable development. During this period, the country received 234 million euros. In 2014-2020, it is expected to allocate from 725 to 886 million euros to it [ibid.]. Moreover, according to the "more-for-more" principle, Tunisia received additional funding through "umbrella funds" as a reward for democratic reform: in 2014 - 50 million euros, in 2015-71.8 [ibid.].

Overall, Tunisia receives about 70% of official development assistance from the European Union and its members. France is a key donor, accounting for about 30% of the total funds allocated to Tunisia. The country receives substantial financial assistance from Spain, Germany and Italy. EU states have launched a number of programs aimed at political and economic transformation [Kausch, 2013, p. 15-16].

In March 2014, the EU and Tunisia signed a partnership agreement on the movement of citizens from one country to another (Mobility Partnership). &

2 This program was adopted in September 2011. Its goal was to respond to the acute socio-economic challenges faced by the partner countries of the South Mediterranean region and support them in their transition to democracy. According to the decision of the European Commission, the support provided through the SPRING program was to be carried out in accordance with the previously developed principle of "more for more", which would contribute to the implementation of democratic reforms and the construction of democratic political institutions [Delivering..., 2015].

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It was designed to ensure effective management of migration flows, including by simplifying the procedure for granting visas. The Europeans pledged to support the Tunisian authorities in their efforts to ensure the protection of refugees and asylum seekers. Thanks to this partnership, the EU and Tunisia were able not only to develop bilateral relations in the field of migration, but also to jointly respond to the challenges faced by the Mediterranean. In addition, more Tunisians were able to get jobs and get an education in Europe. The parties agreed on mutual recognition of professional and university diplomas. Tunisia became the second country after Morocco with which Brussels signed such an agreement [EU and Tunisia..., 2014].

Another important area of EU Tunisian policy was the development of trade and economic relations. In November 2012 Tunisia received the status of a privileged partner, which meant that Brussels was satisfied with the political, economic and social reforms carried out in Tunisia, and provided preferential access for Tunisian industrial and agricultural goods to the European market [Archick, Mix, 2013, p. 12]. Currently, the EU is a key partner, accounting for more than 60% of Tunisian exports [Trade in goods with Tunisia, 2015]. The idea of Brussels, announced in December 2011, was to sign a deep and comprehensive free trade agreement, which would provide for a higher level of trade and economic relations than traditional agreements, and would help to adapt Tunisian trade legislation to European ones [Delivering..., 2015]. The text of the agreement was actively prepared throughout 2014.

In October 2015, EU Trade Commissioner S. Maelstrom traveled to Tunis, where the first round of negotiations was held. She met with a" Quartet " of civil society organizations that initiated a National dialogue between the authorities and the opposition to bring the country out of the political crisis, for which she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in October 2015. Maelstrom stated: "This prize is well deserved! The Tunisian path to democracy inspires hope in all of us... We must further strengthen ties between the European Union and Tunisia and support the country's progress. Closer trade relations will play an important role" [EU to launch..., 2015].

Thus, in addition to developing trade relations in 2014-2015, the main areas of cooperation between the EU and Tunisia were supporting socio-economic development and strengthening civil society institutions [Baeza, 2014]. Brussels provides substantial assistance to civil society, financing more than 50 projects worth 25 million euros and providing considerable funds through the EU Civil Society Development Fund and a number of thematic programs [Tunis Financial Assistance..., 2015].

As in other countries in the region, Tunisians viewed European aid more positively than American aid, although they were unhappy with the exclusion of Islamists from many projects. Thus, during the 2014 election campaign, the United States supported Ennahda, while European governments and donor agencies supported Nidaa Tunis and other secular organizations [Kausch, 2013, p. 15].

Despite the close relations with France, the first official visit of President es-Sebsi to Europe (since 2014) was made in Germany, where the Tunisian head of state expressed gratitude to Chancellor Angela Merkel for supporting Nidaa Tunis in the elections [Woods, 2015]. In March 2015, in an interview with the French magazine Paris Match, he noted that during the elections, Paris supported his rival M. Marzouki. However, even earlier, in April, Es-Sebsi visited Paris, during which he stated that Tunisia is open to cooperation with France in any area from culture to security. According to M. Zaoui, a member of the Nidaa Tunis party, "it does not matter where the first visit of the president was made, since our relations are mainly developing with France" [ibid.].

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Within the framework of cooperation in the field of institution building, the EU uses the following tools: "Twinning", "SIGMA"and " TAIEX". The first and most important one involves cooperation with the partner country to adapt its legislation to the European one and exchange of experience between civil servants. Tunisia is the largest recipient of EU assistance in these areas [Isleyen, 2015, p. 673]. There are more than 16 projects in the country, ranging from environmental protection and education to healthcare and law [ibid., p. 678].

Europeans have done a lot for successful democratic construction in Tunisia. The EU and individual member States advise the country's representatives on a wide range of issues. In most cases, information about their bilateral and multilateral contacts is not available, but the frequency of visits of Tunisian representatives to Europe and Europeans to Tunisia can serve as indirect evidence of this. For example, at the beginning of 2015, a special democratization program was launched under the auspices of the French Government. Hollande frequently visits the country and receives Tunisian representatives. Italy has allocated more than 1 million euros to support the democratization process through the UN Development Program, and German party organizations and the British Westminster Foundation for Democracy are active in the country [Youngs, 2015].

Cooperation with European partners in the field of security is of great importance for Tunisia. The country expects from Brussels not only financial assistance, but also direct support in this area. The new Government, which came to power in the fall of 2014, identified the fight against terrorism as its main task [Munzinger, 2015]. After the March 2015 terrorist attack, President of the Council of Europe Donald Tusk visited Tunisia for security talks, after which he stated: "We must jointly fight regional instability and its critical consequences: terrorism and unregulated migration" [Tusk, 2015].

As part of the EU's common Security and defence Policy, Member States have set up many military and civilian missions aimed at improving border controls, maintaining peace and strengthening security forces. Brussels is interested in Tunisia becoming a model of development for other regional states, so it supports the country on security issues [Barnes and Normaneu, 2015].

In July 2015 (after the terrorist attack in June), 28 EU Foreign Ministers met with Tunisian Prime Minister X. Essid. After her, the head of Brussels diplomacy, Fr. Moghirini noted that problems in this area require urgent solutions, so the EU will expand its cooperation with Tunisia to strengthen internal security and strengthen border controls to counter terrorism, and increase financial assistance in 2016 [Tigber, 2015]. In response, Essid remarked: "The war against terrorism will be a long one, but we will win thanks to our friends" [EU vows new support..., 2015].

In turn, German Foreign Minister Frank - Walter Steinmeier expressed readiness to help strengthen border controls with Libya, which is extremely important to prevent extremists from entering Tunisia. His proposal was supported by the Ministers of Great Britain and France [Germany's..., 2015]. Thus, in conditions when the EU as an organization has restrictions in its security policy, individual European states tend to initiate their own projects. For example, in September 2015, the German police opened a permanent mission in Tunis, which trains Tunisian personnel to fight terrorists and smugglers mainly on the Libyan border and provides assistance in its protection [Lieser, 2015].

The successful economic development of Tunisia, without which democratization is impossible, largely depends on the security situation. The failure of the" Tunisian model " of democratic transit will have negative consequences for the political development of the entire region.

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Turning to the United States, it should be noted that before the" Arab awakening", they did not have sufficiently developed trade, economic or military-political relations with Tunisia. During the 2011 revolution, the Obama administration chose to stay away: The White House did not support Ben Ali, but avoided criticizing him. Only after the fall of his regime did President Obama appreciate the courage and dignity of the Tunisian people, call on all parties to renounce the use of violence, and wish Tunisia to quickly embark on a democratic path and hold fair elections [Reaction..., 2011].

Despite the fact that Washington immediately announced its intention to help the country in the process of democratization, the first three years of American policy were rather sluggish. On the one hand, this was due to the lack of appropriate mechanisms and staff, which did not allow for the rapid and effective support of post - revolutionary Tunisia, on the other hand, there were no significant incentives and opportunities for strengthening partnership. According to T. Kofman-Witts, director of the Center for Near East Policy at the Brookings Institution, the Obama administration's lack of support for the Tunisian government says much more about the state of affairs in Washington than in Tunisia. The adoption of ambitious aid programs, intensive political dialogue, and broad trade cooperation have been hampered by severe budget cuts. The State Department and the Agency for International Development (USAID) are unable to make new multi-year commitments to help countries that are not important allies of the United States. Although American officials have for years promised support to Arab countries that are undergoing democratization, this has not been implemented in practice. In this regard, it is not surprising that the Arabs criticize the White House for inconsistency of actions with words [Cofman-Wittes, 2015].

In October 2012, the then Secretary of State H. Clinton said that after the victory of Ennahda in the 2011 elections and the September 2012 terrorist attack on the American embassy in Tunis, many American politicians expressed doubts and concerns about the possibility of democratizing the country. However, a year after the election, Americans witnessed Islamists form a coalition with secular forces and pledge to support the universal rights and freedoms of citizens. And after the terrorist attack, the government increased security at the American embassy and renovated the school. Moreover, the Foreign Minister flew to Washington to publicly denounce the violence and expressed his readiness to take the necessary measures to combat terrorism [Clinton, 2012].

In general, despite Clinton's statements, after the September terrorist attack, a period of cooling of US-Tunisian relations began. The White House accused Tunisia of insufficient protection of the embassy [Arieff, Humud, 2015, p. 14]. As a result, in 2011-2013, American aid was negligible, and the United States looked closely at Tunisia and did not seek to commit itself to a country from which it did not know what to expect.

The successful resolution of the political crisis in 2013-2014 had a positive impact on the image of the homeland of the "Arab awakening", and Washington believed in the possibility of democratizing the country [Hearings..., 2015, p. 3-4]. In February 2014, Secretary of State John Kerry visited Tunisia, where he promised to support its rocky path to democracy. Kerry also announced the start of the U.S.-Tunisian strategic dialogue, the first meeting of which was held in April [Kerry, 2014]. M. Jomaa, then Prime Minister of Tunisia, met with Obama at the White House, where the American president congratulated him on the successful recovery from the crisis and expressed readiness to expand cooperation in the economic spheres Ministry of Education and Culture, Security and Counter-terrorism [Statement by the President..., 2014]. The President's promise became part of the US National Security Strategy for 2015 in the region [National Security Strategy, 2015]. In January 2015 Obama invited the new Tunisian President, B. Caid es-Sebsi, to Washington to discuss further cooperation [Statement by the Press Secretary..., 2015].

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On the eve of es-Sebsi's visit, 60 Tunisian, Middle Eastern and American experts sent an open letter to the US President urging him to support the process of democratization in Tunisia. In particular, they proposed to increase the volume of financial assistance to stimulate economic development and reform the legal system. In addition, according to experts, the Tunisian government needs to be supported in ensuring security [Open Letter, 2015].

In May 2015, the Presidents of the United States and Tunisia met in Washington. After a series of talks, the leaders said that relations between the two countries will be strengthened and a trade agreement is possible. Obama said that the United States would grant Tunisia the status of a "NATO ally", thereby emphasizing the strategic importance of this country [Remarks by President Obama..., 2015]. This status, obtained by Tunisia in the summer of 2015, implies an increase in the volume of material assistance in the field of security, but not the participation of Americans in military operations in the event of a conflict.

Thus, US-Tunisian relations are developing in the following areas: economy and trade, counter-terrorism and democratization. At the same time, much less attention is paid to the latter direction than to the first two [Kausch, 2013, p. 13]. Since 2011, the United States has provided $ 600 million in financial assistance to Tunisia, of which approximately $ 200 million is spent on security and $ 80 million on democratic reforms [Zelin, 2015, p. 4-5]. In 2016, it is planned to allocate about $ 134 million to Tunisia (twice as much as in 2015), and 60% of this amount will be allocated to the security sector [Arieff, Humud, 2015, p. 2].

Back in August 2014, during the US-Africa summit in Washington, the Obama administration announced that Tunisia would be one of the six key African countries targeted by the new Security Governance Initiative. Tunisia is also one of 11 countries participating in the Trans-Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership program coordinated by the State Department. In 2014 The White House notified Congress of its intention to sell $ 700 million worth of military equipment to Tunisia, including 12 helicopters and 2 military aircraft to fight jihadists [Arieff, Humud, 2015, p. 16]. In April 2015, the Obama administration promised to provide Tunisia with more military equipment, weapons, technical support and training for the Tunisian military, especially border guards [Zelin, 2015, p. 5]. In the spring of 2015, the first batch of promised weapons and equipment arrived in Tunisia, including 52 army all-terrain vehicles and a naval patrol vessel [ibid.].

The US Government provides non-military assistance through the Agency for International Development (AMP) and the Middle East Partnership Initiative (BIP). Through AMR, the United States provides assistance to the development of trade, agriculture, education, and health in Tunisia. Since 2011, the agency has allocated about $ 300 million to support economic growth and democratic reforms [Tunissia, USAID..., 2014]. Within the framework of the BIP, about $ 50 million will be spent. It was allocated to strengthening civil society, supporting political parties, electoral processes, the media, and local entrepreneurship [Arieff and Humud, 2015, p. 16].

In the field of economic development, the Americans have launched several projects aimed at financial stabilization of Tunisia, strengthening the economy, solving employment problems, especially for young people, and attracting investment, which, in particular, is being carried out by the American Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). The Corporation supports projects in the field of renewable energy sources [OPIC, 2015]. There is the Tunisian - American Enterprise Fund, which attracts investments for the development of small and medium-sized businesses, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation, which supports various economic reforms [Hearings..., 2015, p. 3-4].

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Although the United States has a generally negative image in the Arab world, the situation in Tunisia is not critical in this regard. Tunisians spoke negatively about US cooperation with the Ben Ali regime, but on the eve of the revolution, relations between the two countries developed insignificantly and the American presence in Tunisia was hardly noticeable. After the revolution, Tunisians began to show dissatisfaction with the fact that US financial assistance has negative consequences for civil society, and does not contribute to its development, since many Tunisians are now chasing grants, rather than seeking to transform the country [Kausch, 2013, p. 14].

Some European experts believe that the Arab countries did not choose the best time for their "awakening" [Romdhani, Laipson, 2015]. The revolutions occurred at a time when Europe and America were experiencing an economic downturn and were unable to provide the Arab States with significant financial support during the transition period. The high-profile promises made by the transatlantic community at the G8 summit in Deauville in 2011 have not been fully implemented [ibid.]. Moreover, in recent years, the focus of US and EU regional policy has shifted from the Maghreb to the Levant. The main task of the transatlantic and international communities has become the fight against ISIS.

However, even from this situation, Tunisia managed to extract the maximum benefit for itself. As the most successful country in the Arab Awakening, it attracted the attention of many States and organizations that expected the Tunisian model to serve as an example for neighboring States. Along with the European Union and individual European countries (France, Spain, Germany, Italy) and the United States, UNDP, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, a number of Arab States, Japan, and numerous international NGOs have become major donors [Kausch, 2013, p. 12].

In order to make their assistance more effective, Washington and Brussels need to clearly coordinate their policies and avoid duplication of functions. To maintain stability in Tunisia, it is necessary to resolve the Libyan problem, which remains one of the key factors destabilizing the Maghreb [Kuznetsov, 2015, p. 9].

While most of the" awakened " countries are engulfed in chaos, the small North African state is the only one in which we can talk about some kind of stability. The country has managed to demonstrate to the world that it is possible to build a new one on the ruins of the old regime, but another question is how strong and for how long. Tunisia's stability is quite fragile, and the country is torn between democratization and jihadism, so Western support will largely determine which path it will take. On the one hand, it is clear that the Tunisian Government is successfully using relative political stability to attract external financial assistance. On the other hand, Tunisian politicians are trying to avoid the fate of neighboring states: large foreign aid also has negative consequences for countries that are strongly influenced by sponsors.

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