During the March Day Movement of 1919, the formation of several Korean provisional governments was proclaimed in Korea itself and abroad: in Nikolsk-Ussuriysky (Russia), Shanghai (China) and Incheon (Korea). The most viable and active was the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea in Shanghai, which was established in April 1919. [Kurbanov, 2002, pp. 389-391]. Its successor is the Government of the Republic of Korea, formed in 1948. From the point of view of Russian-Korean relations, the activities of the Provisional Government in Shanghai are notable for the fact that since the end of 1919, the Provisional Government has been working in Shanghai. It established its first contacts with Soviet Russia.

In August 1919, representatives of domestic and foreign anti-Japanese resistance organizations, taking into account the need to create a single center for the struggle for independence, agreed at a meeting in Beijing that the VPRKSH and the authorities created by the Taedong Kunminhwe Society (Korean National Society), which operated in the United States and Russia, would announce their self-dissolution and participate in the formation of a new united Provisional Government. This Government consists of Lee Seung-man, President of the Republic of Korea; Lee Donghwi, Prime Minister and Minister of War; Lee Dong-young, Minister of Internal Affairs; Shin Gyu-sik, Minister of Justice; Lee Si-young, Minister of Finance; and Ahn Chan-ho, Minister of Labor.

However, in the newly formed Provisional Government, there was no unity on the most important tactical issues, first of all on the issue of the government's foreign policy orientation, and methods of organizing the anti-Japanese struggle. Lee Donghwi, adhering to the radical line, advocated the immediate organization of the Korean armed forces-Tonnip Kun (Independence Army), the coordination of Korean partisan detachments in the Russian Primorye and Manchuria (Kando). He believed that the main ally of the Korean liberation movement is Soviet Russia, which can provide not only moral, but also military and financial support. Therefore, Lee Donghwi insisted on sending a delegation of the Provisional Government to Moscow in order to obtain financial support from the Soviet Government. The right-wing, moderate-nationalist wing of the government, led by Lee Seung-man and Ahn Chan-ho, stated that before starting an armed struggle to expel the Japanese from Korea, it was necessary to first gather the necessary forces and resources, train personnel, and only then proceed to organizing an armed struggle. According to Lee Seung-man and Ahn Chan-ho, the United States was the main foreign policy force capable of providing assistance and assistance to the struggle for Korean independence. They advocated achieving Korean independence on the basis of Woodrow Wilson's "14 points", strongly objecting to rapprochement

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relations with the Soviet government and appeals to it for financial support [History of Korea..., 2003, p. 293].

Overcoming resistance from Lee Seung-man and Ahn Chan-ho's group, Lee Donghwi and his associates began efforts to establish direct contacts with Soviet Russia and its Lenin-led government. To this end, they decided first of all to take advantage of the arrival in December 1919 in Shanghai from Japan of A. S. Potapov, a former Russian military agent in Korea on the eve of the Russo-Japanese War.

From the note of A. S. Potapov "On Korea", submitted on December 12, 1920 to the NKID of the RSFSR upon arrival in Moscow from Shanghai, it is clear that just before the beginning of the Russo-Japanese war, " together with his like-minded people, in order to save the independence of Korea, he participated in organizing a special Korean mission to European capitals with petitions for granting Korea neutrality in the impending war. The opening of hostilities caught the mission in Europe, and Korean territory became a theater of war before the issue of neutrality was resolved" [WUA RF, f. 0146, op. 3, p.101, d. 1, l. 119].

Since then, A. S. Potapov has maintained friendly relations with Korean representatives. After the February Revolution of 1917 in Russia, he arrived in the Far East and established ties with the Korean National Council. After its creation in 1919. A. S. Potapov contacted its representatives and in December of the same year arrived in Shanghai, where he joined the active activities of the government and other Korean organizations. He explained to the leaders of these organizations the fallacy of their hopes for the Paris Peace Conference, the League of Nations, and the Entente governments, while at the same time widely propagating the ideas of the October Revolution and convincing them of the need to establish ties with Soviet Russia. Potapov, at the request of the Provisional Government in Shanghai, presented a program (action plan) for organizing propaganda in Korea, China and Japan and for creating underground armed forces.

The action plan developed by A. S. Potapov was approved by the Military-Industrial Complex and other Korean organizations: the Taedong Kunminhwe Society (Korean National Society), the New Korean Society of Young Koreans, the Korean Society of Young Women, the Korean Patriotic Women's Society and the Christian Society of Young Koreans. Local societies of various Korean colonies in China also joined Potapov's opinion.

A. S. Potapov also managed to unite the efforts of the Provisional Government in Shanghai and Koreans-Russian citizens who support the Korean National Council in the struggle for the liberation of Korea, as well as to reconcile members of the Korean National Congress (Parliament) with the policy of the Provisional Government, some of whom showed a negative attitude towards it. As a token of gratitude for such work, Potapov was presented with a Red Revolutionary Banner with poems inscribed on it, signed by representatives of the Provisional Government, the Korean National Congress, and delegates from Korea and Russia. The verses expressed the following wishes::

Be a bright spring and banish the harsh winter,
Be a mighty sword, strike down cruelty, give the hand of justice,
Be a strong ship, bear away the suffering from the evil wind,
Great success [in serving] the world of the universe

[WUA RF, op. 3, p. 101, d. 1, l. 119].

In addition to the Red Banner with poems, on January 20, 1920, the Premier of the Provisional Government, Lee Donghwi, presented a letter of gratitude to A. S. Potapov, in which he said:-

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It was reported that the "policy program and action plan for the liberation of the Korean people from the Japanese yoke received by the Military-Industrial Complex were accepted for execution, according to your instructions." The letter also expressed the hope that with the assistance of "General Potapov" (as Potapov was called in Shanghai), the Koreans of Russia and Siberia and the entire Korean people would join forces to expel the Japanese from Korea and that in the common struggle against Japan, "Russia and Korea will be able to establish mutually friendly peaceful relations" [WUA RF, op. 3, p. 101, d. 1, l. 3].

Another important result achieved by A. S. Potapov during his stay in Shanghai was the decision of the Provisional Government to send special delegations to Moscow to establish contacts with the Soviet Government. Given the difficulty of communication with Russia in the conditions of civil war and foreign intervention, it was decided to use the Korean revolutionaries located in Moscow. One of Lee Donghwi's secretaries, Han Hyungkwon, an associate of Lee Donghwi in organizing the socialist movement among Russian Koreans, was sent to Russia to contact them.

In the summer of 1920, A. S. Potapov left Shanghai for Moscow. Taking advantage of this opportunity, Lee Donghwi instructed Potapov to pass on the message to V. And a letter to Lenin, written by him on May 24, 1920. In this letter, the full text of which was first published by the Russian historian V. F. Li (Li Wu - hye) [Li, 2000, pp. 214-215], Lee Donghwi gave Potapov the authority to inform V. I. Lenin about the political situation in the Far East, and confirmed the approval by the Provisional Government in Shanghai of Potapov's proposed program of struggle against terrorism. He also appealed to Lenin and the Soviet Government to provide "strong support to the Korean people" in their difficult struggle for liberation. "The political situation in the Far East," Lee Donghwi wrote, " is no doubt known to you from Han-Hyung-won (Han Hyung - kwon. - B. P.), who was sent by me, and the valiant revolutionary leader General Potapov, who is leaving here, will report it in more detail... We deeply believe that you will honor the Korean people with your attention and will not refuse us strong support and assistance. We are confident that you will emerge victorious in your selfless struggle against the capitalist imperialists and the enemies of the peaceful development of mankind " [WUA RF, op. 3, p. 101, d. 1, l. 158].

Han Hyungkwon, mentioned in Lee Donghwi's letter to Lenin, was appointed the Provisional Government's Plenipotentiary Representative in Soviet Russia. Lee Donghwi provided him with a letter (a kind of credentials) addressed to the head of the Soviet government. This letter, written in English, has lain for decades in the archives of the Comintern and is being put into scientific use for the first time. Here is its translation into Russian:

"Shanghai, January 27, 1920.

To His Excellency

To the Prime Minister of the Russian Soviet Government.

Sir,

In an effort to strengthen the friendly relations existing between the Korean and Russian peoples and to establish friendly ties, especially in connection with the entry of Korea and Russia into a democratic era - a circumstance that makes mutual cooperation necessary - the Korean people, through me, send Han-Hyung-won as an Ambassador Plenipotentiary to the Russian people.

The new order of things here in the Far East, where the interests of the Russian people are under threat, continues to be dominated by the embodiment of capitalist militarism, in the fight against which Your Excellency and the people of Russia have made invaluable sacrifices. Your Excellency is undoubtedly aware of the grave consequences for the well-being of the Russian people that the threat of Japanese militarism and capitalism can have if it is not stopped on the way to hegemony in Asia. In these circumstances, the cause of the Korean people's struggle for

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unity and freedom are inextricably linked to the struggle of Soviet Russia, one of the principles of which is the self-determination of all peoples.

With the assurance of my deepest respect and reverence

Dong Hwi Lee.

Prime Minister

Korean Provisional Government " [WUA of the Russian Federation, op. 2, p. 101, d. 6, l. 41].

This message draws attention to the Prime Minister's solidarity with the struggle of Soviet Russia, which was subjected to intervention by Japan and other powers, and Lee Donghwi's indication that the Korean people and Soviet Russia are closely linked in the struggle against the common enemy - Japanese imperialism.

Han Hyungkwon left Shanghai for Moscow in the spring of 1920 and arrived there (via Siberia) in early June. In this regard, the newspaper Izvestia published an article "Ambassador of Revolutionary Korea", where it was reported that a" representative of the Korean Provisional Revolutionary Government, socialist Hyom-hyun Kuon " arrived in Moscow, and that the Korean government consists of nine people, including two socialists [Izvestia. 17.06.1920]. On June 16, Han Hyungkwon was invited to the first session of the All-Russian Central Executive Committee, where he made a welcoming speech as a representative of the Korean Socialist Party and the Revolutionary Korean Government [Vlast Truda, 02.07.1920].

Upon arriving in Moscow, Han Hyungkwon first outlined the history of the Military-Industrial Complex, its tasks and tactics in the fight against Japan. In a letter to the NKID of the RSFSR dated June 17, 1920, he wrote that after the popular uprising that began in March 1919 in Korea against the barbaric policy of the Japanese government served as a signal for the beginning of the revolutionary movement that swept the whole country, and in connection with the arrest of almost all members of the Central Revolutionary Committee that led this movement, the National Council, which united the Koreans of Siberia and Manchuria, and in Shanghai there was a Provisional Government that sought to rely on Korea itself. When these two organizations began to fight for primacy, their fate was decided by "the powerful voice of the revolutionary inner Korea, which invited both struggling groups to lay down their arms and submit completely to the decisions of the All-Korean Congress, which was held illegally in Seoul in April 1919, and which formed the Provisional Government."

As a result, the Korean National Council and the Provisional Government in Shanghai dissolved themselves and in September 1919 handed over their affairs to the Provisional Government of Revolutionary Korea, which chose Shanghai as its seat. This government, Han Hyungkwon reported, included Lee Donghwi, Lee Seungman, Ahn Changho, Lee Dongyoung, Kim Gyusik, Lee Siyeon, Noh Pyeongning, Park Youngman, Nam Hyeongwoo, and Kim Rip, representing the following organizations: Cheongdoge, the Christian Community, the All-Korean Students ' Union, the Korean Socialist Party, and the United National Bloc, The Korean Independence Struggle Terrorist Union and the Women's Patriotic Union.

Han Hyungkwon's letter went on to say that the Interim Government has the following objectives::

1. Unification of the entire Korean people under the flag of the struggle for independence;

2. Training the armed forces for the coming war of liberation and for the victory over Japan;

3. For the implementation of the above - mentioned tasks-the transfer of power to the free people of independent Korea.

Han Hyungkwon's letter also formulated the tactics of the Provisional Government in the fight against Japan:

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"1. Calling on the masses to disobey the laws of the Japanese Government and the orders of the Japanese General Government in Korea;

2. Calling on the masses to refuse to pay taxes and taxes levied by the Japanese government;

3. Calling on the masses to continue sabotage, boycotts, strikes and other forms of protest and struggle against Japanese violence;

4. Call on the masses to fight mercilessly against the monarchists and nobles who sold the freedom of their native people to Japan;

5. Calling the masses, through agitation and propaganda, to revolt and defend their violated rights;

6. Recruitment and assistance to partisans operating in the northern forest areas of Korea, i.e. in the border areas with Manchuria..."

"The Korean Provisional Government," Han Hyung - kwon concluded the letter, " is convinced that the triumph of Soviet power in the Far Eastern outskirts of Russia and the achievement of Korean independence are closely linked to the fate of Japanese militant imperialism, and flatters the hope that the RSFSR, which supports the liberation movement of the peoples of the East, will provide it with real assistance in its struggle against the Japanese the annexationists, sending me to Moscow, instructed me to establish contact between the Governments of the two revolutionary peoples in a joint struggle with Imperial Japan in order to achieve complete victory over the latter in the shortest possible time through agreements, treaties, etc. " [WUA RF, op.4, p. 108, d. 14, l. 34-35].

In the second letter to the NKID of the RSFSR dated July 5, 1920. Han Hyungkwon specified the instructions of the Interim Government. He wrote that the Provisional Government" considers it necessary to establish contact and reach an agreement with the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic "in order to adequately fulfill the tasks assigned to itself by the course of historical events in order to maximize the development of the partisan movement and other types and means of the revolutionary struggle for the independence of the Korean statehood and for the free life of the long-suffering Korean people on the following issues: points of sale:

"1. Recognition by the RSFSR of the Korean Provisional Government, representing the struggling twenty-million people of revolutionary Korea, as the government of an independent state;

2. The Korean Provisional Government receives a loan of two million taels (Mexican dollars)from the RSFSR;

3. Drawing up a plan for joint action in the fight against the Japanese imperialists if the political situation in the Far East leads to an open war between Russia and Japan;

4. Opening of an instructor (officer) school in Irkutsk for training commanders of the emerging Korean Revolutionary Army " [WUA RF, f. 0146, op. 4, p. 103, d. 14, l. 9].

Han Hyungkwon's letter shows that he proposed to conclude an agreement between the Government of the RSFSR and the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea on a military-political and economic alliance, providing for recognition by the Soviet Government of the VPRKSH, providing it with financial assistance and a joint struggle against Japan.

What was the Soviet government's reaction to Han Hyungkwon's proposal? Due to the unavailability of the documents of many closed collections of the Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation, it is still not possible for researchers to give a definite conclusion on the response of the NKID of the RSFSR to the proposal of the Plenipotentiary Representative of the Provisional Government,

page 54

although Han Hyungkwon claimed that the NKID of the RSFSR accepted his proposals. Archival documents available to researchers indicate that the Soviet government accepted only the second point of Han Hyungkwon's proposals - to provide financial support to the Military-Industrial Complex.

It should be borne in mind that Han Hyungkwon arrived in Moscow and conveyed the proposals of the Provisional Government to the RSFSR People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs at a time when the struggle within this government was continuing between supporters of Lee Donghwi, who were advocating rapprochement with Soviet Russia, and supporters of Lee Seungman and Ahn Changho, who were opposed to establishing any alliance with the Soviet Government and the Bolsheviks. It is the views of Lee Seung-man and his inner circle, in our opinion, that are reflected in the reports of the information service of the Republic of Korea, which rejected the news spread by the Japanese press that " the Koreans and the Russian government have entered into negotiations on an offensive and defensive alliance." It was about a report published in the Japanese newspaper Osaka Asahi (in the issue of October 10, 1920) that the proposed treaty between Soviet Russia and the Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea contained the following provisions::

"1. The Korean government accepts all communist principles and begins propaganda in this direction;

2. The Soviet Government will support the Korean independence movement until the final establishment of a lasting peace in Asia;

3. Korean troops will be allowed to assemble and form in Siberia, and their equipment and uniforms will be from the Soviet Government;

4. Korean troops in Siberia will be under the command of Russian officers appointed by the Soviet Government and will cooperate with the Soviet Army in future operations against the Japanese in Siberia "[Korea and the Bolsheviks, 1984, pp. 6-7].

In order to refute the Japanese newspaper's report, the VPRKS Information Bureau published a special statement in the North China Press dated December 20, 1920, in which it called it "false rumors".

Here are the main points of this statement:

"All those who know the tactics of Japanese politics and diplomacy in recent times, of course, will recall that before the Bolsheviks came to power in Russia, the Japanese in every possible way painted Koreans as the most unsuitable people. Now, having noticed that the Bolsheviks are out of favor with the great powers, the Japanese are trying their best to make the Koreans Bolsheviks. Already at the very beginning of the Korean independence movement in March 1919, Koreans were endowed by the Japanese with such connections with Moscow, as well as with methods of Bolshevik violence. However, it is necessary for the sake of reality to state that Bolshevism or any other "isms" have little success in Korea. Almost 90% of the entire Korean population is a digger; the labor question, as it exists in the great industrial countries of the world, plays no role at all in the social and industrial life of Korea. All the theories of Karl Marx, whose historical prospects make human apprehension pale, will find unfavorable ground in Korea. You can be quite sure that such issues as capital and labor are of little concern to the Korean population. At present, the only important question for everyone is the question of independence" [Korea and the Bolsheviks, 1921, p. 7].

Publishing a statement denying the existence of any objective conditions for establishing ties with Bolshevik Russia, its authors at the same time stressed: "Of course, in the struggle that the Koreans are waging for the restoration of Korean independence, if the Soviet government lends a helping hand, the Koreans will not give it up. However, we are not in any compromising relations, both written and oral, with the Soviet authorities, and all the rumors about any kind of compromise are not clear.

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the idea of Koreans 'ties with the Soviet authorities should be rejected" [Korea and the Bolsheviks, 1921, p. 7].

August 9, 1920 Han Hyungkwon handed over to the Deputy People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs L. Karakhan the "Initial draft budget of the Korean Provisional Government for 1 year", which provides for the Soviet government to provide a loan to the Military-Industrial Complex for the following expenses: 1. For the equipment of the printing house; 2. For the maintenance of employees of the printing house and editors (salary for 1 year); 3. For the purchase of paper for newspapers and brochures (government official papers with a circulation of 40,000 copies) for 1 year; 4. For the maintenance of agents in border, port and central points for the re-shipment and distribution of literature: in Andoen, Seidong and Mukden (China), Vladivostok (Russia), Uiju, Kang, Hveren, Daegu and Chongjin (Korea); 5. For armament, ammunition supply, uniforms, etc. partisan detachments formed at border points, numbering 5,000 people; 6. For the maintenance of government missions in Beijing, Canton, Tokyo, including publishing costs in these cities; expenses for the maintenance of all members and employees of the government; 7. For unforeseen expenses.

The total amount of expenses for 1 year was estimated at 2,000,000 taels or 1,000,000 US dollars [WUA RF, op. 4, p. 103, d. 13, l. 230].

L. I. Karakhan promised to provide assistance to the VPRCS, and at the same time Han Hyungkwon received 400 thousand taels (200 thousand am. dollars), which were sent to Shanghai. But the transfer of the remaining 1,600,000 taels to Han Hyungkwon was delayed. The reason for this was the same ongoing feuds in the Provisional Government and especially the departure of Lee Donghwi from the post of premier of this government in January 1921. Therefore, July 8, 1921 Han Hyungkwon sent a letter to the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs outlining new requests from the Interim Government: "The Korean Provisional Government has authorized me, in the implementation of the four-point proposals submitted by me on July 5, 1920, and made by the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the R. S. F. S. R., to ask you to do the following::

1. Additional disbursement of the remaining amount of a loan made by the Korean Government in the amount of one million six hundred thousand taels (Mexican dollars);

2. Allow the formation of Korean volunteer partisan detachments in the amount of up to ten thousand, for the first time, on the territory of the Far Eastern Republic under the following conditions:: a) including the formed detachments in the People's Revolutionary Army of the Far Eastern Republic and subordinating them to the general Supreme Command of this Republic; b) granting independence to the Korean Provisional Government in appointing command personnel and in internal management in detachments; c) determining the location of partisans with a barrack arrangement, supplying weapons, uniforms, equipment, food and transport;

3. Allow the opening of a military instructor school for training junior command personnel with a location in the center of the location of detachments " [WUA of the Russian Federation, op. 4, p. 103, d. 15, l. 59].

NKID RSFSR agreed to issue (in a somewhat reduced form) the remaining amount of the 1920 loan. As for points 2 and 3 of Han Hyungkwon's request for the formation of Korean partisan detachments and the opening of an instructor school for training Korean command personnel, it seems to us that the Soviet government did not need to enter into a special agreement on these points, since Korean partisan detachments were already formed at that time and actively engaged in the struggle against the Japanese interventionists in many districts-

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in the Far East, and instructor courses for training command personnel for Koreans were opened in a number of cities in Siberia as early as 1920.

In this connection, it is interesting to note that on May 20, 1920, on the road from Shanghai to Moscow, Han Hyung-kwon, while in Irkutsk, addressed the chairman of the Siberian Revolutionary Committee I. N. Smirnov with the following proposal: "The Korean Provisional Government, considering it necessary to form detachments of Korean citizens who are now on the territory of Soviet Russia, delegated me to Soviet Russia to negotiate with representatives of the Soviet government about the organization of detachments. As a result, in order to make appropriate use of the Korean cadets currently studying at the 1st Siberian Soviet Infantry Command Courses, I ask for your instructions on the temporary secondment of the latter to the Verkhne-Uda Korean Company, until the issue of mobilizing Koreans and training them in the military system is resolved in Moscow " [Far Eastern Policy..., 1996, pp. 80-81].

The Soviet authorities immediately responded to the appeal of the representative of the Provisional Government in Shanghai. On June 5, 1920, the representative of the NKID of the RSFSR in Irkutsk, the head of the Siberian mission, J. D. Yanson, asked I. N. Smirnov to immediately start executing the request of the Korean representative. He wrote:

"After the liberation of Western Siberia, the Koreans located in these provinces filed a petition through their representatives in the center to organize military instructor courses to train more intelligent Koreans for the command staff of the future Korean Red Army.

According to the information available in the Siberian Mission, this issue was resolved positively as a result of discussions between the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs and the People's Military Commissariat of the Republic.

After this decision, appropriate courses were organized in some cities of Western Siberia. Currently, about 40 people are expected to graduate from the courses.

Representatives of the Korean Communist Section in Siberia, as well as a representative of the Korean Provisional Government, strongly request that the cadets be seconded to Verkhne-Udinsk, where there is a Korean company, until the issue of their permanent assignment is finally resolved... The petition emphasizes the main task of such training - the formation of revolutionary detachments from Koreans located on the territory of Soviet Siberia.

For its part, the Siberian Mission insistently asks for appropriate orders to concentrate all graduated and trained cadets in one of the points of Eastern Siberia for their wide use in the specified purpose. On this issue, the Siberian mission conducts organizational work, the implementation of which is designed to a large extent for these cadets" [Far Eastern Policy..., 1996, p. 85].

In August 1921. Han Hyungkwon, wishing to receive the remaining 1,600,000 taels (800,000 US dollars) from the 1920 loan, submitted an estimate for this amount to the head of the East Department of the NKID Dukhovsky. As a result of a thorough survey of the actual needs of the VPRCS, an agreement was reached between Dukhovsky and Han Hyungkwon to reduce the issue to 1038,500 taels (519250 AML). At the same time, Han Hyung-kwon presented Dukhovsky with another estimate for AM $ 3160000, which, unlike the first estimate, which requested funds for urgent needs of the current moment, provided for expenses for continuing revolutionary work in the next six months and contained articles related to agitation and propaganda, organizing terror and maintaining the partisan movement.

When submitting both estimates to Han Hyungkwon for approval by the NKID, Dukhovsky explained the need for their approval by saying that, according to carefully verified information from comrades coming from China, the Military-Industrial Complex "relies on the Korean revolutionary masses, has constant communication with them and directs the Korean leadership."

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the national revolutionary movement." Referring to the statements of Han Hyung-kwon, Dukhovsky drew the attention of the NKID to the following forms of revolutionary activity of the Provisional Government in Shanghai::

"The Korean Provisional Government publishes newspapers not only in Korea itself, but also in China and the main cities of Europe (London, Paris) and America. The main agitation and propaganda bureau is located in Shanghai, the main bureau is located in London, the League of Friends of Korea is located in Paris, and special magazines are published in Honolulu and Philadelphia. All of this is closely linked to the Korean Provisional Government.

Regarding terror, the Korean Government, taking into account all the positive and negative aspects in its application, last November (1920) organized a joint meeting of Government members and representatives of organizations, at which the overwhelming majority decided to resort to terror, and entrusted the technical implementation of it to the government.

The fight is conducted by partisan methods. There are small detachments everywhere inside Korea. Large forces scattered along the valleys of the Yalu and Tyumen-Ula rivers, numbering up to 40,000, have frequent skirmishes with Japanese security detachments " [WUA RF, op. 4, p. 103, d. 14, l. 13-13 ob.].

However, the NKID of the RSFSR, taking into account the restrained position of V. I. Lenin and the Comintern, which was strengthened in connection with the recall of Han Hyungkwon from Moscow in May 1921 by the new government of the Korean Republic headed by Shin Gyusik, decided to release only 200 thousand rubles in gold. Han Hyungkwon received this sum in Berlin from the Soviet representative in Germany [WUA RF, op. 4, p. 103, d. 14, l. 14].

Han Hyungkwon's recall was a consequence of the strengthening of the moderate nationalist right wing led by Lee Seungman and Ahn Changho in the Military-Industrial Complex after Lee Donghwi left the post of Prime minister. The new government leadership dissociated itself from the Plenipotentiary Representative of the Korean Republic sent to Moscow, accusing him of embezzling money released by the Soviet Government and other abuses compromising the Provisional Government, and appointed a supporter, Lee Hyung-hyun, in his place. The new Prime Minister Sin Gyusik informed the People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs G. V. Chicherin by a note dated May 20, 1921.:

"May 20, 1921

To Mr. Chicherin.

To the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs

Soviet Russia.

My dear Sir,

I hereby have the honour to inform your Government that the Hanyeongkeon (B. P. Han) sent to Moscow is unconditionally recalled and instead delegated to Kyung Rey as a Special Representative for Soviet Russia, with all the resulting powers to act in all cases on behalf of the Republic of Korea whenever he sees fit in connection with past events., present and future relations between the Republic of Korea and Soviet Russia.

In addition, we were saddened to learn of the abuses of Hanenkon, who used the good intentions of your Government for private interests and thereby compromised our name; but with full confidence in the talent and integrity of our special Ambassador, Lee Kyung Rey, who is authorized to investigate this fact, we express confidence that our mutual understanding will be reached. I hope that the relationship between the two Governments will be even closer and that with our strong alliance we will be able to jointly carry out the work ahead in Asia.

As a result of the above, we respectfully request that your Government recognize the benefits and privileges that our Special Ambassador, Lee Kyung Rey, may need in the performance of his assigned mission.

Expressing our sincere wishes to you, we remain with perfect respect for you.

Premier Kusic Chin " [WUA of the Russian Federation, op. 4, p. 103, d. 13, l. 12].

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In early September 1921, Lee Hyung-hyun and other members of the new Korean mission arrived in Berlin to proceed to Moscow after receiving their visas. Han Hyungkwon was still in Moscow as a representative of the VPRKSH, the East Department of the NKID had no information about Lee Hyun, and the foreign department of the Central Executive Committee, in a conclusion dated September 2, 1921, spoke out against Lee Hyun's entry into Russia. Therefore, Lee Hyg-hyun was able to come to Moscow only at the beginning of 1922. According to Lee Hyg-hyun's correspondence, during his stay in Moscow until August 1922, nothing significant happened in relations between the Soviet government and the VPRKSH. The new Korean representative was mainly investigating Han Hyungkwon's activities. The NKID of the RSFSR disapproved of this. Lee Hyun's presentation of his credentials to the Soviet Government never took place.

In a note dated February 7, 1922, Lee Hyung-hyun, referring to instructions received from his Government to "investigate Han Hyung-kwon's careless actions," requested that the Korean mission be provided with "accurate information" about his activities, claiming that such information would " pave the way for mutual understanding between the two governments." Lee Hygen attached the following questions to the note to G. V. Chicherin:

"1. At what time did Han Hyungkwon, as an emissary of the Korean Provisional Government, introduce himself to the Soviet Government and establish relations with it?

2. Are the following points of the agreement concluded by Han Hyung-kwon with the Soviet Government (according to Han Hyung-kwon's statements)factual?: a) secret recognition by the Russian Soviet Government of the Korean Provisional Government; b) establishment by the Korean Provisional Government of military schools on the territory of Soviet Russia for training Korean officers; c) supply of weapons and uniforms to the Korean troops by the Russian Government and provision of general material support in the event of a war between Korea and Japan; d) provision by the Russian a loan of two million gold rubles to the Government to support the revolutionary movement against Japan.

3. When was the above agreement concluded? Is it written or is it left in the form of an oral agreement?

4. Has the Russian Soviet Government allocated 400,000 gold rubles from the amount of the above loan to Han Hyungkwon to be sent to the Korean Provisional Government?

5. Has any agreement other than the above been signed?

6. Has there been any change in the above agreement since Han Hyungkwon left for Shanghai in 1921?

7. Did Han Hyungkwon actually leave his credentials with the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs at your request when he left Moscow for Shanghai in September 1921 (as Han Hyungkwon claimed)?

8. Does your Government confirm the payment of 400,000 gold rubles to Han Hyungkwon and Ko Chanil for their travel expenses on their departure from Moscow to Shanghai in September 1921?

9. Has anyone other than Han Hyungkwon presented himself to your Government as an official from the Korean Provisional Government?

10. Has anyone been delegated on behalf of your Government to the Korean Provisional Government? " [WUA RF, op. 4, p. 103, d. 15, l. 40-41].

NKID RSFSR did not answer all these questions. He refrained from giving the Korean mission an account of his dealings with Han Hyung-kwon. Under these circumstances, on March 20, 1922, Lee Hyung-hyun, complaining that the work of the Korean Mission in Moscow was being hindered and that it could not even pass on its credentials to the Soviet Government, and that Han Hyung-kwon and his associates were "still playing the game of false representation", sent another note to the RSFSR NKID warning that the Korean Mission was not going to be able to What if Han Hyungkwon's" irresponsible intentions "are left unanswered-

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However, if it is not considered necessary, then "very serious misunderstandings" may occur between the VPRKSH and the Soviet government [WUA RF, op. 4, p. 116, d. 36, l. 204-205].

Finally, in a note dated June 6, 1922, Lee Hyun informs V. G. Chicherin that "due to the existing strained relations between the two governments, the Korean Mission is in an awkward position to continue to fulfill its assignment under your Government. In view of this fact, we have no choice but to return to the seat of our Government. Therefore, the Korean mission concluded that it should leave Russia as soon as circumstances permit." At the end of the note, Lee Hyung-hyun asked Chicherin to return Han Hyung-kwon's credentials to the Korean mission [WUA RF, op. 4, p. 103, d. 15, l. 58].

Without receiving the required documents, the Korean mission headed by Lee Hyun left Moscow for Shanghai via Germany. While in Berlin, Lee Hyung-hyun sent Chicherin his last letter to Soviet Russia, where he again asked for the return of Han Hyung-kwon's credentials, as well as correspondence between the Korean mission in Moscow and his government in Shanghai, which was conducted through NKID representatives and which did not reach its intended destination. At the same time, Lee Hyun-hyun stated that he had received instructions from Shanghai to inform the RSFSR NKID: "The Korean Provisional Government and the Korean people do not recognize everything that happened between your government and Han Hyung-kwon as an official representative" [WUA RF, op. 4, p.103, d. 15, l. 64].

Thus, President Lee Seung-man, Prime Minister Shin Gyu-sik and their supporters, who gained the upper hand in the Military-Industrial Complex, departed from the course of rapprochement with Soviet Russia laid down by Lee Donghvi and his associates. As for the Soviet government, it, in turn, after the departure of Li Hygen to Shanghai, also stopped looking for ways to establish relations with the Military-Industrial Complex.

list of literature

AVPRF (Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation). F. 0146.

The power of labor. 2.07.1920.

Far Eastern Policy of Soviet Russia (1920-1922). Collection of documents of the Sibburo of the Central Committee of the RCP (b) and Sibrevkom. Novosibirsk, 1996.

Izvestiya. 17.07.1920.

History of Korea (New reading). Edited by Professor A. V. Torkunov, Moscow, 2003.

Korea and the Bolsheviks / / Bulletin of the Far Eastern Secretariat of the Comintern. 1921, No. 4, February 17.

Kurbanov S. O. Course of lectures on the history of Korea. St. Petersburg, 2002.

Li V. F. Russia and Korea in the Geopolitics of the Eurasian East (XX century). Moscow, 2000.

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