At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the relevance of the problems of socio-economic development of the countries of the South not only remained, but also increased due to the expanding inclusion of many of them in the world economy in the context of growing globalization. Studies that consider various aspects of the advancement or, on the contrary, deceleration of the national economies of these countries are of both theoretical and practical interest. They are consistently followed in detail in the publications of most international organizations, especially the OECD Development Research Center. They combine different approaches to identify possible mechanisms for overcoming backwardness and mass poverty, mainly on the African continent.

This review examines three papers prepared by OECD experts: "African Economic Outlook. 2006 - 2007" (Paris: OECD, 2007. 618 p.); "Business for Development. Fostering the Private Sector" (Paris: OECD, 2007. 176 p.); "Financing Development. Aid and beyond" (Paris: OECD, 2007, 151 p).

Sixth edition of the annual Economic Review of Africa. 2006-2007" (1) contains extensive information on the general problems of 31 countries of the continent (86% of the population and 86% of the production volume), as well as brief articles describing the main trends in their national economies. Research "Business for development. Strengthening the private sector " (2) focuses on the promotion of private entrepreneurship, mainly local, in developing countries. But since it is relatively poorly developed, there is bound to be an interest in its interaction with foreign capital, whose position in the African economy has been noticeably strengthened in recent years, including due to the emergence of new players. In the publication " Financing Development. Aid and much more" (3) the main idea is that in the context of a chronic shortage of financial resources, it is necessary to increase the flow of funds from abroad in various forms, and at the same time it is stated that their use is low.

Peer-reviewed research is based on the recognition of experts that positive changes in the socio-economic field have been both slow and uneven. This formulation of the problem is quite routine, its various aspects have been discussed for more than half a century, if we count only the period of political independence. The authors seek to identify what has happened in recent years in the economic situation of African states, and outline possible ways of their further progress. The presented studies combine, according to A. Smith, positive and normative approaches. They state the economic situation that has developed at the beginning of the XXI century, primarily in Africa, and at the same time try to outline those regulatory methods that, in the opinion of experts, can accelerate the approach to modern standards of countries that are significantly behind in their development.

The trend of gradual increase in economic growth rates that has emerged in recent years is very important. If in 1998-2004. They averaged 4% in Africa, then 5.2% in 2005, 5.5% in 2006, and 5.9% in 2007 (estimated); the forecast for 2008 is 5.7%. There was a slight decrease in inflation, although it still remains high, hindering the creation of a favorable investment climate for national and foreign capital: over the same years, it amounted to, respectively 10%, 8.9, 9.1, 9.2, 9.5%. However, these continent-wide averages do not reflect Zimbabwe's disastrous inflation rate

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(about 2000% per annum), mainly due to the economic policy of President R. Mugabe. Most of the statistical indicators for this country are missing.

Experts focus on Africa's lagging behind other regions of the South in the implementation of the UN's Eight Millennium Development Goals (primarily on reducing poverty by half), which should be achieved by 2015. The reasons for this situation given in the Economic Review are not original, and they are repeated in almost all documents of international organizations related to Africa's problems. These include insufficient external funding in the form of aid, weak governance, widespread corruption, and the AIDS pandemic, which affects "all aspects of socio-economic life and leads to a decline in economic growth, production, and social indicators" (1, p. 15). The disease mainly destroys the most productive cohort of the labor force, increases the number of single-parent families and begging children. For example, in Lesotho's main industry - textiles-two-thirds of the employed are affected by the disease. Measures to control the disease are carried out mainly through external funding. During the official visit of US President George W. Bush to Africa in February 2008. It was announced that the allocation under this line will be increased to $ 30 billion in the next 5 years. At the same time, it is noteworthy that the world's poorest countries, located in Africa, doubled their military budgets from 1985 to 2000 and continue to increase them. Constant political instability, typical of relations between many countries of the continent, and bursts of ethnic and religious conflicts cause severe damage to the economy, undermining the already weak technical and human potential of countries. During the conflict in Darfur alone, 200,000 people were killed, and the number of refugees exceeded 2.5 million. [The Wall Street Journal, 04.03.2008].

"Official development assistance" is gradually increasing, reaching $ 107 billion in 2005, the highest level since 1992. However, this growth is primarily due to the cancellation of part of the external debt to the poorest countries, in accordance with the initiative of the World Bank and the IMF, announced in 1996 and supported by the decisions of the Group of 8 Out of 40 countries. Of the countries included in this category , about 30 are located in Africa. Real inflows of funds, according to official international indicators, increased slightly. The prospects for the growth of "official development assistance" resources, despite all the promises of the West, seem very vague. OECD experts believe that by 2020, the ratio of this indicator to the GDP of the organization's member countries will not exceed 0.36%, compared with 0.33% in 1980-1992. If we compare the first of these indicators with the fall in the dollar exchange rate, it becomes obvious that the flow of funds in real purchasing power will remain at best unchanged. In 2007, only Nigeria, which received $ 750 million, was among the World Bank's largest borrowers from African countries., one of the most criminalized and corrupt countries in the South, with extremely low per capita income, despite significant oil exports. Private foreign capital flows to the poorest countries are better off. In 2005, it amounted to $ 30.6 billion. compared to 9.6 billion in 2000. It is characterized by a small number of creditors and a focus mainly on a narrow circle of developing countries, primarily traditional oil exporters-Algeria, Morocco, Nigeria, Chad, as well as suppliers of some other raw materials, such as Ghana, which provides 70% of world demand for cocoa beans.

The situation in the vast majority of African countries in terms of the state of the development environment and attractiveness for new investments does not look optimistic. A new feature in the financial sector is the growing volume of Chinese private loans, to a lesser extent Indian ones, but so far they have not changed the balance of power of the main foreign investors in the continent. Such key indicators as the indices of economic freedom and corruption are purely negative, which means that there are no equal opportunities for market participants, weak competition, as well as the stability of traditional norms in interpersonal relations. This facilitates the everyday life of ordinary citizens, for whom they are familiar, but at the same time complicates contacts outside the family, household, and community, hindering adaptation to modern forms of business. Out of a total of 160 countries, African States were ranked last in terms of corruption, indicating a high level of corruption. Chad, Sudan, and Guinea rounded out the list. CTA Corruption-

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It is a system-forming factor that negatively affects all aspects of the socio-economic life of society and weakens the formation of market mechanisms.

The state of infrastructure of the countries under consideration remains without noticeable positive changes, which is backward in comparison even with the States of the South on other continents. This is partly due to the difficulties and high cost of building highways and railways in the desert and mountainous regions of the continent, as well as their long payback period. Recent years have been marked by the desire of national Governments to involve private capital in road construction, but due to the high risks of such projects, this direction of economic policy is developing slowly. Weak infrastructure has led to sharp differences between the coastal and inland regions of the countries. In addition, 15 of the continent's 53 countries belong to the group of landlocked countries, which obviously worsens their economic situation. This resulted in fragmented, limited, and disconnected domestic markets, their low capacity, and difficulties in moving goods, services, people, and capital.

The development prospects of African countries are negatively affected by the state of water resources, their constant shortage in the north of the continent. For example, Egypt is forced to import 97% of the required water, while Central African countries account for 37% of the continent's total water resources. However, the low technical level of the agricultural sector does not allow them to be used productively, and in terms of efficiency, this sub-region shows a decrease in output per agricultural worker compared to South Asia and Latin America.

In sub-Saharan Africa, 70% of the agricultural workforce is made up of women, producing 90% of all its food products. The vast majority of them are employed in the informal sector in the lowest-paid jobs. Their share in wage labor outside the agricultural sector does not exceed 8.5%. In recent years, men have been actively displacing women from the production of commercial crops (maize, legumes, etc.), which further restricts their employment opportunities and income generation. Water use in Africa shows an absolute predominance of the agricultural sector: its share is 68%, households-24%, industry - 8%.

Agriculture remains the mainstay of massive poverty and chronic unemployment. "The agricultural sector is a parking lot for the poor," states The London Economist [The Economist, June, 2001, p. 12.]. The rural population has objectively become a reserve for mass migration, a constant influx to cities. Unfortunately, the problem of urbanization, which in the countries of the South is many times larger than the scale known from the history of the industrialization period of Western countries, has remained outside the scope of peer-reviewed studies.

Comparing the structure of GDP in African countries is complicated by differences in its components: in some cases, trade is shown as a separate item, in others it is included in services, etc. Most countries are characterized by a limited share of industry and a swollen sphere of traditional services, which, in turn, can be divided into different items. The well-known curve of S. Kuznets with the sequence of changes in the shares of sectors and employment in GDP derived by him has now been replaced by a noticeable advance in the tertiary sector, where services based on financial and information and communication technologies (ICT) are coming to the fore. On the contrary, in African countries they are represented by a huge state apparatus and traditional services. Extractive industries are developed with an export orientation. For example, in Algeria, the oil industry accounts for 45% of GDP, services-34%, agriculture - 8%, manufacturing - 5%. This ratio is even more pronounced in Gabon, a relatively new oil-exporting country: oil - 51%, agriculture - 3.6%, industry - 1.7% of GDP, the rest - various types of services.

In countries with a weak hydrocarbon resource base, agriculture remains the main economic sector. For example, in Mali, the share of this sector in GDP is 40%, industry-10, services-about 50%. An exception is Mauritius, which has managed to organize special export zones for the production of ready-made clothing with the participation of large foreign capital, thereby bringing the share of industry in GDP to 19%, but in this country services significantly predominate, accounting for 55% of GDP.

A distinctive feature of the foreign trade of African countries remains a narrow range of exports - 49% of all their exports are oil. It is also among the priority goods in a number of countries: in Algeria's exports, its share is 67%, Angola-95, Equatorial Guinea and Niger-

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rii - 92%. Raw cotton accounts for 55% of Benin's exports, 84% of Burkina Faso's, and 88% of Botswana's exports are diamonds. These are the most eloquent indicators, while the majority of the continent's exports are based on two or three goods, which entails a close link between national economies and world market prices, concomitant subordination to changes in the market environment, and high volatility of income for both the state and the private sector. Unprocessed products account for 62% of all exports from the continent's least developed countries. Fluctuations in world prices, which occur approximately every three years, injure the economies of low-income countries that are not able to adapt quickly. These include virtually the entire sub-Saharan Africa region, which is characterized by massive poverty and is moving very slowly to overcome it. In 1990-2002, its level decreased only slightly - from 44.6% of the population to 44%.

It could be assumed that due to the clear upward trend in world prices for food products, not to mention the prices of raw hydrocarbons, gold, copper, alumina, and iron ore, the foreign exchange earnings of African countries will increase and the financial position of exporters will strengthen. However, this is contradicted by the experience of such countries as Nigeria, Chad, and Gabon, which export oil at high prices, but have not achieved an improvement in their socio-economic indicators. Against this background, the conclusion of the OECD experts is logical: "The analysis shows that the instability of poor countries is a key factor in their exclusion from international financial markets" (3, p.61). It would be more accurate to speak about their role as objects, not subjects, in global financial flows.

Such negative results are caused by total corruption, which is closely linked to export and foreign exchange transactions and permeates the economic fabric of most African countries. But this is only part of the problem. The American sociologist V. Reno suggested that corruption in African countries should be considered "democratized" because of its massive and especially "grassroots" nature, i.e. bribery of police officers and minor officials, who are connived at by the state, thus compensating them for low wages. This explanation is no worse or better than others, but it does not change the fact that corruption has become a significant obstacle to the development of healthy businesses, especially small and medium-sized businesses that do not have real means and methods to protect their interests, compared to large foreign capital.

According to the index of economic freedom, the situation in Africa is also constantly characterized by negative indicators. It is obvious that the business environment as a whole does not meet the needs of modern entrepreneurship [for details, see Bragina, 2007]. This is one of the reasons why the African economy remains sharply dichotomous, divided into modern and traditional sectors. Small and especially medium-sized modern enterprises are not numerous, which is why they are often characterized as a missing link in the structure of the economy, the "missing middle": "Today, small and medium-sized enterprises make up over 96% of the total number of enterprises in the OECD countries, providing a growing share of employment from 40 to 70% and over 50% of value added"(2, p. 88). Their narrowness and weakness in developing countries contrasts with the peculiarities of small business in Western countries, which for centuries have been a civilizational characteristic and the basis for the formation of market relations. One of the consequences of this was the lack of" market memory " (World Bank..., 2002, p. 15). This kind of know-how implies the ability to navigate and work in market conditions.

In contrast to the previous years ' surveys, the 2006 - 2007 survey provides data on the transfer of funds from abroad by migrants to African countries for 2000-2004. Although external migration, both legal and especially illegal, is typical of the continent in recent decades, data on its quantitative and qualitative composition are not systematic and do not cover all countries. There is no information about the flow of funds from outside through this channel to Chad, Zambia, Somalia, and Liberia. Transfers have grown significantly and vary significantly by destination country. "Despite significant discrepancies, it is clear that in some African countries transfers reach 15 percent or more of GDP" (3, p. 15). Their growth is primarily due to an increase in the number of Africans traveling abroad to earn money. External migration as a socio-economic category combines the features of traditional and modern societies. So, in the countries of the African continent, the decision to leave is made by the "big ce-

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mya", and women are increasingly sent to work, considering that they are more devoted to the interests of the family and the hope of receiving a transfer of funds from them to the remaining relatives is higher.

Transfers in 2000 and 2004 amounted to: Algeria - 790 and 2460 million dollars, Egypt-2,852 and 3,341, Ethiopia-53 and 134, Gambia-32 and 82, Guinea-1 and 42, Kenya-252 and 355, Mali-73 and 154, Senegal-233 and 511, Tunisia - $ 796 million and $ 1,432 million. accordingly. Transfers to some countries, such as Cameroon, Congo, and Botswana, have declined. These figures hardly adequately reflect the size of transfers, since a significant part of them is received through unofficial channels (hawala), which allows you to save 10-15% of the amount, especially for small transfers. "Based on the reviews, we can assume that informal channels are widely used" (3, p. 38). In Uganda, for example, the funds received in this way are three to four times more than the official ones. Migrant transfers have become a permanent element of support for the standard of living of Africa's poorest people in their countries of origin. Based on a cross-country analysis, experts estimate that a 10% increase in official transfers per capita reduces the share of poor people by 3.5%. Equally important is the beginning of the process of investing these funds in small businesses, including in rural areas.

Between 1995 and 2004, migrant transfers to developing countries increased from $ 58 billion to $ 160 billion, only slightly behind private foreign capital inflows ($107 billion and $ 166 billion, respectively) and noticeably exceeding the size of "official development assistance" ($59 billion and $ 79 billion, respectively). for the same period). The upward trend continued in the following years: revenues from the OECD Development Assistance Committee in 2006 amounted to $ 104 billion, or 0.3% of the total national income of member states, compared with the UN recommended level of 0.7%. This figure is exceeded only by the Nordic countries. In absolute terms, the United States remains the leader ($23.5 billion) and Germany ($10.4 billion) [The Economist, February 2008, p. 106].

OECD experts strongly emphasize the role of private entrepreneurship in economic development, including "all private actors-rich and poor, individuals and legal entities involved in risk-based activities for profit in a market environment" (2, p. 13). While I do not object to such a definition in principle, I still consider it too vague, and the constituent indicators are qualitatively different in scope and capabilities. It is difficult to compare the financial and technical strength of TNCs with backward small enterprises operating in local narrow markets. The share of small and medium-sized enterprises, together with the informal sector, which makes the calculation very conditional, accounted for 60% of GDP and 70% of employment in low-per-capita countries, namely countries on the African continent. The conclusion is quite clear: "Most firms in developing countries are not only small, but also disproportionately large in the informal sector" (2, p.13).

Quantitative estimates of the informal economy are inaccurate, but they also indicate its high share in GDP: Algeria - 34%, Benin-45%, Botswana - 33%, Ghana - 38%, Morocco - 36%, Nigeria - 58%, Zimbabwe - 59% [Schneider, 2002, p. 6]. One of the main reasons for such a structure is rooted in the unfavorable environment for entrepreneurship, its institutional weakness, which is expressed in the dominance of informal relations that distort the rights of ownership and the owner; "neglect of institutional changes is the most obvious disadvantage" (2, p. 55).

Until recently, experts say, while showing some inconsistency, improving business conditions brought only "cosmetic changes, now the development of the private sector is considered significant" (2, p. 21). They appeal to the authority of P. Rosenstein-Rodin, who suggested as early as 1943 that industrialization, which involves the main sectors of the economy, cannot be carried out by purely market methods, and called it a "trap of underdevelopment" (2, p.29). Recognizing the need to strengthen the private sector, the authors of peer-reviewed studies willingly or unwittingly return to the paradox of A. Maddison's liberalism of twenty-five years ago: "We see the true contradiction in the fact that increasing reliance on markets requires a more active role (proactive role) of the state" (2, p.28). In my opinion, this indicates a lack of fresh ideas, that the search for them is proceeding along a well-worn track. With reference to the authority of A. Hirschman, a "new industrial policy" is proclaimed, the goal of which is to solve the problems of economic development by combining many " good elements - firms, local and international organizations."

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foreign professionals, energy points (pockets of vitality) - and backward elements" (2, p. 29), and thus create the missing links in the economy.

As a follow-up to this vague position, in order to strengthen the private sector, it is proposed to connect all elements of society, "not to look for winners and losers, but to focus on system integration" (2, p.30). Clusters and production chains of small and medium-sized enterprises with state participation and increasing the level of technical support at the expense of budget funds and "official development assistance"are named as its integrators. Consultation centers and experts should also be involved in such chains. As an encouraging example, the authors consider the organization of export of mango fruits from Mali to Europe based on the association of small farmers. Without denying the importance of such local attempts, we still have to admit that they are unlikely to have a stimulating effect on the economy as a whole. What is important here is the intention to encourage grassroots activism, to link local production to export opportunities, and the theoretical premise known as development from below.

The private sector, OECD research highlights, now plays a central role in poverty reduction strategies, as it is "the main engine of the economy and employment creation in developing countries" (2, p. 54). This position is repeated almost like an incantation, but the specifics of the poorest countries of the South do not allow for the creation of mass formal employment outside the agricultural sector, given the quantitative growth of the labor supply. According to the World Bank's forecasts, in 2005-2020, the average annual population growth rate in Sub - Saharan Africa will be 1.9% (the highest rate in the world), in North Africa -1.6%, compared with 0.6% in China and 1.1% in India [WorldBank..., 2007, p. 83]. Objective necessity forces the poor to seek employment in the informal economy, which experts describe as a" business for survival " (2, p.54). The applicability of the business category to this type of employment, such as unstable, unstable, extremely low-paid, is questionable. Other consequences of the growth of the informal economy are obvious - national budgets are deprived of tax revenues from this niche, for example, in 22 African countries they do not exceed 10 - 15% of their GDP.

OECD experts strongly support the need for countries on the African continent to engage in a public-private development dialogue. This direction is called differently: in Asian countries, primarily in India, a more precise category is used, in my opinion, public private partnership ("public-private partnership"), which reflects a different, advanced stage of such interaction. It is obvious that dialogue and partnership do not involve state regulation of the private sector, but rather combining efforts on the basis of voluntariness, harmonization,and equality of parties for development. However, the prerequisite for such cooperation must be political will and a capable person (by the standards of developing countries). state (bureaucratic) apparatus. When it comes to countries in Africa, especially sub-Saharan Africa, these fundamentals are clearly weak.

Experts suggest that in the framework of such a dialogue, it would be possible to establish the construction of infrastructure facilities, organize so-called global price chains (global value chains), following the example of East Asian countries at the national and international levels, by integrating local enterprises with the help of the state into the delivery networks of goods from producer to consumer. "Participation in them can be a powerful mechanism to help firms in developing countries enter foreign markets and improve their technical and managerial level" (2, p. 69). However, the attempt proposed here to combine globalization with the solution of local problems (glocalization) is accompanied by the remark that the hope for the rapid implementation of creating growth points in the national economies of the South may turn out to be "naive".

As a positive example, the authors use the tourism industry in Mozambique. As part of the poverty reduction plan, this industry, which uses live labor on a large scale, was selected as a priority for receiving state financial support. True, these figures indicate modest success in the industry, but we must take into account that in a country where 19 years of military operations continued, the already weak infrastructure was undermined. Against this background, any attempt to revive the local economy deserves support, if it gives at least a small, but still positive result. More encouraging is the activity in Ghana one of the world's largest compa-

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Cadberry, which announced the creation of a "Cocoa Partnership" in early 2008. It buys a tenth of all the cocoa beans produced in Ghana and, to support the industry, plans to invest $ 87 million in purchasing high-quality seed material and training farmers in modern methods of increasing yields. It is also planned to drill 850 water wells, each of which will facilitate the work of 150 to 200 women and children involved in long-distance water delivery. As part of this program, it is also planned to build schools and libraries. In order to improve the quality of products in Ethiopia, a similar scheme, called "CAFE", was announced by the coffee monopolist "Starbucks" [The Economist, February, 2008, p. 68].

Peer-reviewed publications often refer to the difficulties of financing the private sector, especially small and medium-sized enterprises, from local sources. Unfortunately, this problem, which is relevant for all developing countries, has only been identified, and its analysis has not been carried out. It is known that banking services in this group of countries are used by from 5 to 20% of the population, mainly in urban areas, while in the group of least developed countries the figures are even lower. This is confirmed by the insufficient distribution of bank branches per 100 thousand population, which make up 5-6 branches compared to 31 in the United States. Weak national financial systems and public distrust of banks, partly due to poor literacy, contribute to the continued dependence of small businesses and farmers on local money lenders and other informal financial lenders - sales agents, intermediaries, affluent relatives and neighbors. Their close social ties ensure that they play an important role as sources of funds for the poorest strata, and since this category includes the majority of the population with an income of $ 1-2 per day, we are talking about a huge market for monetary services. Due to objective conditions, it is traditional and only indirectly interacts with modern production.

Microcredit uses collective forms, when borrowed funds are provided to small (10 - 15 people) groups of people under the collective responsibility of paying them off. This principle is now widespread in developing countries, and the founder of the first micro-credit bank (Grameen bank), Mahommad Yunus, received the Nobel Prize in 2006 for his contribution to overcoming poverty in the world.

Almost all plans to overcome poverty are primarily focused on the problem of the inflow of funds from outside. However, it is not only and not so much the size of assistance, but also its effectiveness on the ground. An IMF survey of 107 developing countries found that an increase in official funds flows is accompanied by a reduction in their inflows to national budgets, as the State loses interest in raising funds through its own tax system by receiving external assistance. Trying to find some explanations for this phenomenon, experts refer even to the frequent natural disasters in poor countries that occur every two and a half years.

The authors are trying to find new approaches to fund-raising, especially when it has become clear that it is unrealistic for most African countries to achieve the Millennium Development Goals by 2015.It is a little late to discuss the lack of funds, since half of the time allotted for the implementation of the main tasks of this program has already passed. The proposed ideas do not differ in novelty, there is an impression of a transition period in their search. Writing off debts to the poorest countries can't be considered a solution. Waiting for them to be repaid would be pointless and would only increase tensions between debtor and creditor countries.

References in peer-reviewed papers to proposals for global taxes on the movement of " hot " money, the sale of weapons, and similar actions are of purely theoretical interest, although encouraging calculations are given that the Tobin tax, proposed back in 1972, at a rate of 0.01% would raise $ 17-19 billion, and at a rate of 0.02% - 30-31 billion rubles. As a result, it should be cautiously acknowledged that "some pessimism regarding the political realism of the introduction of such taxes is justified" (3, p.73). The prospects for receiving funds to the Global Fund to Overcome AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis are better estimated, but the figures are not given, only the share of each direction is defined as 50.21 and 29%, respectively. But even here, it is doubtful that further mobilization of funds for these purposes is sufficiently reliable.

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It must be acknowledged that health issues are a priority when it comes to providing international aid to African countries, a traditional area of Western efforts since their political independence. In addition to purely humanitarian aspects, the proximity of the continent to European shores plays an important role here, therefore, the risk of spreading epidemics is real. Increasing migration, especially illegal migration from North African countries to Spain, in order to move to other EU countries by any means, increases the urgency of such a threat.

Health insurance due to poverty occurs only in South Africa, where approximately 46% of all health care costs occur using insurance policies. In other countries of the continent, this is an exclusive privilege of the wealthy stratum. The example of Ghana boils down to the same thing: allocations to health care from foreign donors do not coincide with their distribution to the population in the form of medicines and medical care through local institutions. New donors in this area include non-governmental organizations (NGOs), which number up to 400 in Ghana, and act as agents for implementing donor-funded projects. As you know, the number of intermediaries always increases the risk of misuse of resources. The conclusion from Ghana is not optimistic: "Many poor countries have gaps in their own structures that cannot be filled with financial resources alone" (3, p.107). This is yet another indication of the weakness and corruption of local institutions, for which rent-oriented behavior has become the norm.

Although such definitions as "new approaches", "new actors", and "new policies" are often used in peer-reviewed works, it is difficult to see the actual novelty. This is not a reproach, but rather a statement of the objective difficulties that have developed in the poorest countries of the South, the intertwining of traditional and modern elements in society in general and in the economy in particular. Emerging market mechanisms remain inconsistent with established fundamentals, and growth dynamics are uneven across economic sectors. The pressure on the domestic labor market of unskilled labor is growing simultaneously with the outflow of trained personnel, which does not contradict individual breakthroughs, the emergence of enclaves of modern industries that are developing on the basis of strengthening ties with the world market. For example, such a breakthrough for Kenya was the cultivation of roses for export to EU countries, now meeting 25% of their needs for cut flowers of this species. Rose plantations provide mass employment, in addition, they allow small businesses engaged in packaging, packaging, etc. to grow.

Globalization, which increases the effect of market forces, inevitably limits the scope of national governments. But the main issue remains the behavior of local oligopolistic structures focused on preserving traditional behavior patterns, which imply close intertwining with the ruling circles.

When I finished reading the peer-reviewed studies, I couldn't help but feel dissatisfied. As always, OECD publications contain accurate observations that clearly show the features of processes in African countries. There are many general, well-known propositions in the works, but this is clearly not enough. There is a lack of new approaches to such old problems as poverty, unemployment, the weakness of small businesses, and corruption. However, it is difficult to find solutions when there are many problems and they are intertwined in an intricate knot. You see it again.

list of literature

Bragina E. A. Izmeneniya v strukture biznesa v razvitiushchikh stranakh [Changes in the structure of business in developing countries]. Collection of Articles, Moscow: IMEMO RAS, 2007.

Schneider F. Size and Measurement of the Informal Economy in 110 countries. Canberra, 2002.

The Economist. L., June 2, 2001; February 23, 2008.

The Wall Street Journal, 04.03.2008.

World Bank. Dancing with Giants. China, India and the Global Economy. Washington, 2007.

World Bank. Transition. First Ten Yeas. Washington, 2002.

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