Lebanese Christians are a socially active part of the country's population, and their political participation is evident both in the traditional plane and (especially in recent months) in the form of non-systemic protest movements. External influence on Christian communities is diverse and remains quite strong, which is a disintegrating factor that prevents Christians in Lebanon from effectively participating in overcoming crisis phenomena and taking measures to protect Christianity in the Middle East.

Keywords: Middle Eastern Christians, Lebanon, political participation, religious communities, Lebanese parties, protest movement.

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF LEBANESE CHRISTIANS: AMBITIONS, OPPORTUNITIES AND REALITIES

As Lebanese citizens, Christians remain to be socially active part of country population. Their political participation appears so in traditional plane as apart of extra-systemic protest movements. An external influence on Christian communities is diverse and it continues to be high, acting as disintegrating factor which hinder the Christians of Lebanon to exercise effective steps to overcome the crisis in the country, and in addition, to take steps to preserve Christianity in the Middle East in general in view of obvious current threats.

Keywords: Middle Eastern Christians, Lebanon, political participation, religious communities, political factions of Lebanon, the protest movement.

The political participation of an active segment of Lebanese society-Christians of various faiths (Orthodox, Maronite, Greek Catholic, Protestant, Syro-Jacobite, Syro-Catholic, Assyro-Chaldean, Gregorian Armenian, Armenian Catholic, etc.) - is influenced by the profound restructuring of public relations within Lebanon in the context of a power crisis.

It seems that a clear distinction should be made between the social and political activities of Lebanese Christians, on the one hand, and the political activities of parties that are considered to represent individual religious communities, on the other.

Historically, pro-Baronite parties have been on the crest of the wave of Lebanese Christian "activism" : Lebanese Phalanxes (Kataib), Free Patriotic Movement (LDS), Lebanese Forces (LS), Marada and National Liberal

Alexey Viktorovich SARABYEV-Candidate of Historical Sciences, Head of the Research and Publishing Department of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, alsaraby@ivran.ru.

Alexey SARABYEV - PhD (in History), Head of the Editorial department, Institute of Oriental Studies RAS, Moscow.

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party (NLP). Of course, in the ranks of these organizations there are and always have been representatives of other faiths-Greek Catholics, Protestants, Orthodox, etc., but the basis is made up of Maronites, as a rule, in one way or another connected with specific clans or natives of certain areas of Lebanon. Such confessional and clan affiliation of members of Lebanese parties has long been a hallmark of the country's political system, as, indeed, the basis of confessional political representation, which is the basis of the entire state system of power. It is natural, therefore, that such an indicator as the nature of political contacts between community leaders and key representatives of the relevant parties in Lebanon is often used to assess the state of interfaith relations.

It is necessary to distinguish "institutionalized activism" of Christians from civil political activity: This can be particularly productive for assessing the impact of the Arab Spring protest movements on the situation in Lebanon. Such a theoretical division will mean a departure from the traditional tendency to overestimate the role of young people, who are clearly acutely aware of the shortcomings of the current inert system of internal political relations in segmented Lebanese society - a system that shows little ability to respond in a timely manner to emerging military, economic, humanitarian security threats and, most importantly, to cope with the long-term crisis of the main functions of power-administrative, economic law-making, social security, etc.

The protests against corruption and passivity of the authorities in solving the problems of urban landfills in Beirut, which have become widespread since August 2015, are examples of targeted expression of social activity of ordinary Lebanese. In the wake of these actions, the public protest movement "Talaat rikhatukum" ("You stink" - "You stink") took shape and came to the forefront of political life, bringing together representatives of literally all religious communities in the country. Having emerged as a spontaneous phenomenon, it immediately acquired a more or less organized, but emphatically peaceful character. And this is despite anti-government slogans such as "Some trash should not be recycled" ("Certain garbage should not be recycled") - under the portraits of government members [The Guardian, 24.08.2015], to actions in the buildings of ministries demanding the resignation of the Minister of the Environment and tough measures to suppress demonstrations using tear gas and similar means. The degree of organization of the protest movement is indicated by the fact that street actions were stopped immediately after the appearance of looting during demonstrations (while provocateurs are suspected of discrediting the movement).

Lebanon's "democracy" is being severely tested. Among the factors that have the most destructive impact on the Lebanese democratic model, four are identified, in particular:: 1) not all communities and political groups view the same phenomena as threats, and this polarizes society along confessional lines; 2) confessional elites rely on external forces in their struggle for power and are therefore divided in terms of their foreign policy orientations, which creates the risk of external interference; 3) demographic changes,such as the emergence of a political crisis in the region. emigration, the inability to compromise and distrust of communities towards each other predetermine the preservation of a static political system; 4) the lack of institutional arbitration mechanisms makes the outcome of negotiations on major political issues dependent either on consensus or on external intermediaries who can provide such mechanisms [Fakhoury, 2014, p. 242].

However, both the institutional and social-initiative forms of political activity of the Lebanese provide a kind of "dynamic stability" even in the conditions of a deep systemic crisis, surrounded by war-torn neighboring territories, in the situation of periodic local actions of extremists in the city itself.

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Lebanon and terrorist attacks in its cities (for example, the twin suicide bombings in Beirut on 12 November 2015, for which ISIS claimed responsibility) [The Guardian, 13.11.2015].

Lebanese Christians are aware that in the event of a direct military invasion and the seizure of at least part of the country's territory by Islamists, they may become the first victims. This is evidenced by attacks on monasteries and parishes in Syria and Iraq. Ordinary citizens take seriously warnings such as those inscribed on the walls of churches in Tripoli: "The Islamic State is on the way", "We are coming to kill you, servants of the cross" [Orontes, 2.09.2014], and are not inclined to underestimate the danger. They often do not understand the carelessness of politicians (representing Christians in power structures), whose actions are more like bargaining for profitable posts. The measure of distrust of" residents of political Olympus " among Christians is growing.

The influence of spiritual leaders - heads of the respective churches, authoritative church figures and preachers-on the political and social views of Lebanese people remains high. For example, the social and political activity of the Patriarch of the Maronite Church, Ghasrallah Boutros Sfeira, increased markedly by the beginning of the twenty-first century, and since 2011 the new Patriarch of Bishara Boutros ar-Rai has further expanded the participation of the Patriarchate in Lebanese politics (see Sarabyev, 2011).

Political participation of Lebanese Christians can be considered as their influence on the process of making responsible decisions through political parties represented in Parliament and the Government; as initiatives of clergy and flock at the parliamentary level; and as non-systemic political activities of social movements and organizations.

Electoral reform remains an important issue for Lebanon. In 2013, the resolution of this issue became a condition for the extension of parliamentary mandates. Due to its unresolved nature, the parliamentary elections scheduled for November 2014 were postponed, which served as the basis for another extension of the powers of people's deputies. The law on elections has not yet been adopted, and the parliamentary corps formed in June 2009 has remained the same by 2016.

Long before the elections scheduled for June 2013, Christian politicians began receiving proposals for electoral reform. Back in September 2011, a meeting of Christian politicians was held in Bkerk under the chairmanship of Patriarch Bishara ar-Rai, where the draft electoral reform was discussed. The leaders of four pro-Macaronite parties (M. Aoun, S. Jaaja, A. Gemayel and S. Frangier) pointed out the need to make the representation of Christians in power structures more significant. During the meeting, the draft Election Law presented by Information Minister Eli Ferzli, known as the Orthodox Assembly's proposal, was discussed. According to Arda Arsenyan Ekmekji, a Lebanese scholar and member of the Electoral Law drafting commissions, this proposal was approved by many Christian politicians [Ekmekji, 2012, p. 14].

In October 2011, Lebanese Interior Minister Marwan Charbel (Maronite) he proposed his own version of the Electoral Law, the main points of which provided for two-stage voting: the election of two candidates in the first stage, who are then voted on a proportional basis in each district; consolidation of districts and reducing their number to 10-14 so that they do not coincide with the borders of the existing 26 Lebanese kaz (districts) and 6 governorates (regions); introduction of a 30% quota for female deputies [Mashru kanun..., 2013]. However, a more than twofold reduction in the number of districts was not supported by the majority of deputies. Many Christian deputies were not prepared for such a reduction, since in this case a larger number of their candidates depended on the votes of Muslim voters. However, both President M. Sleiman and Prime Minister N. Mikati supported M. Charbel's proposals [Naharnet, 1.04.2012].

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Later, the coalition of political parties "March 14" (hereinafter - M14) proposed the creation of 50 districts in which two or three deputies would be elected on a proportional basis, but it was rejected by the majority of parliamentarians, primarily Christians, who believed that the proportional voting system reduces their chances of winning.

A government draft was also presented, which provided for majority elections in 13 districts, and an important point in it was the participation in the elections of all "Lebanese by birth living abroad" [Mashrou kanun..., 2012]. This point, however, needed to be detailed, since it could be interpreted in different ways, while the voices of "foreign Lebanese" could play a decisive role in the victory of certain political forces, including Christian ones. This project was also rejected.

As a result, the most discussed proposal remained the "Orthodox Assembly", which was reduced to voting on confessional quotas, i.e. choosing from a list of co-religionists, despite the fact that the whole country would represent one district.

This project was supported by the SPD, and the parliamentary block "Change and Reform" headed by M. Aun tried to pass this or similar projects through the voting procedure. Soon the "Orthodox" project was referred to in the press as the proposal of the "Orthodox-Maronite Assembly".

In early 2013, Kataib and LS unexpectedly supported this project. (It is known that initially both parties were in favor of the proposal of their M14 colleagues to increase the number of electoral districts to 50, which would give advantages to the March 14 Coalition.) However, influential Christian politicians-MP Boutros Harb, head of the National Liberal Party Dori Chamoun, president of the National Bloc Carlos Edde, ex-Minister Michel Khoury and former MP Samir Frangier stated that the PL and Kataib do not constitute a majority in the alliance and cannot express the views of all Christians, and that the Orthodox Assembly project, by increasing the representation of Christians in Parliament, will at the same time create a threat to interfaith peace within the alliance [Hajj, 2013].

In any case, neither Sunni nor Druze lawmakers supported the project, nor did Maronite President Michel Sleiman. In turn, the Maronite Patriarch Bishara ar-Rai, who initially considered it worthy of attention, later reacted cautiously to it, fearing the deepening of social division along confessional lines.

In May 2013, the leader of LS S. Jaajah joined the leaders of the Mustaqbal (S. Hariri) and PSP (B. Hariri) parties. Jumblatt), who rejected the proposal of the "Orthodox Assembly". The project's ideological mastermind, Eli Ferzli, was caustic in the newspaper pages in the sense that Jaaji's position was influenced by Hariri's promise to give up the seats of several "independent" candidates running on the M14 lists to the PL [Al-Safir, 16.05.2013].

Criticism of the project was mainly limited to the fact that its implementation would lead to a deepening of inter - religious contradictions-to the confessionalism of the Lebanese political system. In response to M. Aoun said that he does not see this as a problem, since " confessionalism is at the core of the Lebanese system... and strengthening justice within the system itself will prevent one denomination from dominating another " [The Daily Star, 30.06.2014].

As for the Orthodox community of Lebanon, the political participation of its members did not show unity and was determined by party preferences. In any case, not all Orthodox politicians welcomed the project of the "Orthodox Assembly". Thus, MP Mustaqbal Atef Majdalani said that the draft is dangerous for the country, that the Lebanese Orthodox "disown" it, and that its adoption will have an "ISIL effect" on the parliament: the country will be torn apart from the inside and divided into small states at war with each other [ibid., 27.07.2014].

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Perhaps the most sensational problem of modern Lebanon is the heated debate over the candidacy of the new president of the country (the powers of the former - Michel Sleiman - ended in May 2014). The candidate must be a Maronite, so the struggle is mainly between the main Maronite clans and their supporters. There are several criteria by which politicians assess their prospects in the event of a candidate's victory: their willingness to defend the positions of support groups in the future; the possible distribution of key positions in the government and law enforcement agencies that they will adhere to; and the nature of their contacts with regional leaders and foreign sponsors.

Initially, the list of possible candidates included such influential people as the commander-in-Chief of the Armed forces Jean Kahwaji, the chairman of the Central Bank Riad Salame, former Foreign Minister Jean Obeid, former Interior Minister Ziyad Baroud, but four leaders of the main Christian parties Michel Aoun (SPD), Samir Jaaja (LS), Amin Gemayel (Kataib) and Souleymane Frangier (Marada).

Heated discussions on the approval of the candidate were connected with the fact that, according to the Constitution, he should stand outside the inter-party struggle and not give preference to any of the parties. But the strongest contenders were just the leaders of the main pro-Christian parties and as president they would not have been able to maintain objectivity.

To ensure their victory, some candidates suggested changing the election procedure. At the same time, it was argued, in particular, that the change in legislation can strengthen the position of Christians. In June 2014, M. Aoun proposed a constitutional amendment that would allow the President to be elected by universal suffrage in two rounds: in the first round, only Christians would vote, and in the second round, all Lebanese would choose between the two remaining candidates. The idea of the Aun was that each religious community should nominate its own candidates for parliament and vote only for them. It should be borne in mind, however, that the election of Christian deputies, who make up half (64 people) of the parliament, involves Christians who make up less than half of the country's population. Meanwhile, the 2009 elections showed that only half of the Christian deputies were elected by Christians, while the rest received parliamentary mandates with the help of Muslim votes cast for them, since these candidates ran in districts with a large proportion of the Muslim population [Aziz, 2013].

In August 2014, a group of ten deputies from the "Izmenenie I Reforma" bloc proposed to introduce a number of amendments to the Basic Law that provided for the election of the President by universal suffrage, rather than by voting in parliament. These initiatives were not supported by the majority of deputies and drew criticism from political opponents from M14, who saw in them M. Aoun's desire to strengthen his parliamentary bloc.

Patriarch Bishara Boutros ar-Rai called for the early election of the president, and before the parliamentary elections. In this regard, his position coincided with the opinion of the Sunni leader S. Hariri and diverged from the views of M. Aoun, S. Frangier and, possibly, other Maronite politicians who were in a hurry to appoint the president because of the threat of strengthening the pro-Iranian lobby in the parliament of the new convocation. In this sense, the interests of the leaders of the Maronite Church, as well as many other Christians, including Orthodox Christians, coincided with the interests of Sunnis.

As expected, the struggle between M. Aoun and S. Jaajah reached its highest intensity, each of which demonstrated intransigence [Lebanons Self-Defeating..., 2015, p. 13]: the former proved that it was he who enjoyed the greatest electoral support, primarily from Lebanese Christians, and the latter was not inferior to him in his determination to get the presidential post.

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The dialogue between these co-religionist opponents, which began in late 2014, was promising: the Lebanese and international press speculated that if these politicians managed to reach an agreement, the overall political tension would decrease and Christians would be able to play the role of a "bridge between Shiites and Sunnis" and "occupy a new niche" [Akiki, 2015]. It was noted that the opponents managed to agree on an important point of the future electoral law-the possibility of participation in the electoral process of Lebanese emigrants. During the year, regular contacts were established between the two candidates.

At the same time, a dialogue developed between Lebanese Shiites and Sunnis - Hezbollah and Mustaqbal organizations. However, not all experts, including the International Crisis Group, positively assessed this "cooperation", expressing some skepticism about the possibility of joint actions of Shiites and Sunnis. Moreover, they assessed the situation of Lebanese Christians as "difficult" (population decline as a result of emigration, disagreements and schisms), but "not hopeless", since the situation in Lebanon is not as tragic for them as in other countries of the region [Lebanons Self-Defeating..., 2015, p. 15].

The clash of interests of the country's main political forces was observed in 2015 during appointments to top command posts in the security forces. So, in place of the former commander-in-chief of the Maronite Armed Forces, Jean Kahwaji, the then leader of the LDS M. Aoun was looking forward to his son - in-law, a special forces commander, also a Maronite named Shamel Rukoz. However, the Patriarch of Bishara Boutros ar-Rai supported the extension of Kahwaji's term of office, and on August 6, 2015, by decree of the Minister of Defense Samir Mokbel, Zh. Kahwaji was extended for another year. This decision angered the Hezbollah-backed SPD: there was an attempt to disrupt a government meeting, and later threats were made to take Aoun's supporters to the streets in protest.

The issue of appointments to law enforcement agencies is extremely important for Lebanon, as the head of the law enforcement agency can later apply for the highest state post. To do this, first of all, it must take a neutral position in the context of political confrontation. Perhaps this is why Aung promoted Sh to the post of Commander-in-chief. Rukoza, popular in Lebanon and among the groups of the "Lebanese abroad". By the way, the Lebanese at one time wondered: which of the two sons-in-law Aoun is going to appoint as his successor as the head of the LDS - Jubran Basil or Shamel Rukoz? [Al-Akhbar, 6.03.2015]. And in December 2015, comments like "General Shamel Rukoz is an excellent patriotic candidate for the post of president" began to appear on Internet sites [Naharnet, 9.12.2015]. It is clear that the polarization of Lebanese society and the intense competition between Christian politicians are largely due to the fears of Christian communities to find themselves in the position of a political minority [Salamey and Tabar, 2012, p. 13].

In recent years, researchers Imad Salame and Paul Tabar note, " Many Lebanese have begun to view various political initiatives through a confessional lens. The atmosphere of mutual distrust among Lebanon's faiths became so palpable that it eventually led to a stalemate characterized by political paralysis and social discord. In turn, this stalemate itself fuels suspicion and distrust... and continues to muddy political waters" [ibid.].

At the end of 2015, the ways out of the crisis of power began to be vigorously discussed. Obviously, the result of mutual distrust, which reveals the depth of pessimism of the main Lebanese political players, can be considered the separate offer of the post of president that S. Hariri made to Suleiman Frangieh in the fall of that year. Apparently, the leader of "March 14" decided to cut the "Gordian knot" of the presidential vacuum, betting on his financial power, support for Saudi Arabia and the conciliatory position of this candidate, who, in his opinion, is less ambitious than M. Aoun. This understanding of compromise did not resonate with the majority of Lebanese

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politicians; it was Aoun and Jaaji who were most outraged, as might be expected. Already in December 2015, it became clear that S. Hariri's attempt failed: the way S. Frangier was "nominated" caused serious concern among many Christian politicians [Sarabyev, 2015].

In general, the political participation of Lebanese Christians remains quite high - and not only at the level of state administration and the struggle for power: this is also evidenced by the active discussion of various types of Christians about the future state structure of the country.

Members of the Orthodox community, as well as representatives of other faiths, participate in the work of the Levant Christian Assembly, which responds vividly to regional threats, defends the rights of Christians in the region, demands to stop the looting of monasteries and churches in Syria and Iraq and release Christians abducted by Islamists. The head of the Orthodox Assembly, Michel Tueini, periodically raises the issue of emigration of Lebanese Christians, urging them not to leave their homeland and not to sell their land if possible.

The desire of the Orthodox community of Lebanon to enlist external support is quite understandable. When Islamists looted the Mar Takla Monastery in Maaloula and abducted several nuns, the head of the Lebanese Orthodox Council, Robert Abyad, appealed to the Russian Ambassador to Beirut, Alexander Zasypkin, to protect Christians in the Middle East [Alalam, 21.12.2013]. Metropolitan Niphon (Saikali), representative of the Patriarchate of Antioch in Moscow, has repeatedly expressed his desire to see Russia become more active in supporting the Orthodox and Christians of Lebanon.

The Lebanese Orthodox oppose the idea of federalization not only of Lebanon, but also of any other Arab country, such as Syria. In June 2015, the Orthodox Patriarch of Antioch, John X Yazidji, publicly stated that the creation of separate state entities for Shiites, Sunnis, and Christians would not solve political problems, and therefore would make no sense. On the contrary, it is necessary to support the peaceful coexistence of different faiths within a single State.

These words once again revealed a fundamental difference in the views of Lebanese politicians on the issue of federalization, the idea of which was defended, in particular, by Foreign Minister J. R. R. Tolkien. Басиль1 [The Daily Star, 22.06.2015]. In this regard, we can talk about a turn in the policy of the LDS: after all, not so long ago, the leaders of the Movement agreed with the main provisions of the National Memorandum of the Maronite Patriarchate of February 5, 2014 that "the concept of "coexistence" is neither an accidental nor a temporary motto, but is enclosed in the "heart of Lebanon", where " we met Islam and Christianity" "and that" brotherhood of people of different religions and civilizations is historically possible " [Al-Safir, 5.02.2014; Al-Monitor, 9.02.2014].

A similar opinion was expressed by one of the young leaders of the Kataib party, Sami Gemayel, who was surrounded by M. Aoun. According to him, "it is time to recognize that the constitutional formula by which we have lived for 90 years has failed to unite the Lebanese people." The secret of the success of developed countries (Switzerland, Germany, the United States, etc.), which have experienced social disasters like Lebanon, is allegedly that "they have applied the federal system to maintain pluralism while maintaining unity" [The Daily Star, 22.06.2014].

Issues of regional conflicts and intra-Lebanese disagreements are also actively discussed by representatives of the Melkite community. Thus, at the synod of the Greek Catholic (Melkite) Church in Ain Traz in June 2015, several important statements were made, in particular, the bishops appealed to the powers that can influence the development of the Middle East crisis, calling on them to stop the supply of weapons to militants, stop violence and start rebuilding the destroyed economy right now

1 Since August 2015, the head of the SPD.

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and improvement of the Syrian dioceses, recognize the Palestinian State, etc. The Melkite bishops encourage their fellow Christians to preserve their land and homes in Lebanon and pray "that God will dispel the black cloud hanging over the region and that harmony will be established between Christians and Muslims" [Al-Mustaqbal, 21.06.2015]. The Melkite bishops also appealed to Lebanese officials to speed up the presidential elections and ensure the effective functioning of State bodies, including through dialogue between leaders of religious communities.

A small but very ancient community of Assyrians (Nestorians), numbering about 50 thousand in Lebanon, raises its voice. adherents. For example, in March 2015, parishioners of the Assyrian Church of the East, St. George's Church (from Jdeida), demonstrated in the center of Beirut to draw attention to the problems of Assyrian refugees from Syria (mainly from the Khabur River valley and the cities of Qamishli and Hasakah) and to the fate of Christians in the Middle East in general.

The Assyrians of Lebanon are mainly represented by the Syrian Unity Party (Hizb al-Ittihad al-Suryani fi Suriya; the leader is Ibrahim Mrad).2. It also includes a part of the Syro-Jacobites, who were historically neighbors with the Assyrian community in Syria and southern Turkey. The Jacobite Bishop of the Lebanese Mountains and Tripoli, Georges Saliba, supported the Assyrians 'actions:" We are going through difficult times. We are part of our Syrian nation and we are doing everything we can [for our historical communities]" [The Daily Star, 2.03.2015].

The Lebanese authorities have been very attentive to the problem of Christian refugees-followers of these Ancient Eastern Churches. Against the background of strict restrictions on the number of Syrian refugees to Lebanon, in February 2015, the Interior Minister N. Mashnuk issued a decree (previously coordinated with the Prime Minister T. Salam, the Minister of Social Affairs R. Derbas and the head of the General Security Department A. Ibrahim) on the unhindered admission of Nestorians and Yakovites to the country due to the critical situation that has developed in their areas of residence. As a result, thousands of Assyrian Christians entered Lebanon and were placed with relatives or at the expense of parishes.

Immigration and emigration issues (for Lebanese, including Christians) They are among the problems that are constantly postponed due to the inability of politicians to reach an agreement, which is partly due to confessional and clan differences that characterize the activities of the executive and legislative branches of government. All the more strange are the words of the Patriarch of Lebanese politics Bishara Boutros ar-Rai, uttered in December 2015 at a reception with the Coptic Patriarch Tawadros II, that Lebanon is "a model of coexistence of Christians and Muslims, where the division between religion and state characterizes all spheres of life" [Al-Safir, 12.12.2015]. I would like to hope that this is not just a "good mine with a bad game", but there is little reason for such hopes.

Confessionalism seems to have permeated Lebanese society through and through. The viability of the country's unique socio-political structure rests on a " system of counterweights "that" works " despite its rigidity and archaic nature. But social development requires addressing the factors of social disunity that are paradoxically embedded in the very foundation of Lebanese society. We can agree with researchers who distinguish three levels of confessional disunity: the level of identity and a deep-rooted "narrow-local" mentality; the level of individual communities and parties; and the level of state institutions [Kota, 2012, p. 103].

2 Assyrians from the militant wing of this party, the Syrian Military Council (Al - Majlis al-Askari al-Suryani al-Suri), are fighting against Islamists in northern Syria; in October 2015, the group joined the Forces of Democratic Syria, an alliance of Syrian Kurds with Assyrians and Arabs [Paramilitary..., 2015, p. 17].

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Political scientist Francisco Barroso sees a direct dependence of the strengthening of inter-confessional contradictions and the rise of religious fundamentalism on the development of political confessionalism. However, he attaches particular importance to foreign interference, pointing out that" Lebanon is a good example of how regional and international forces use different communities " to influence Lebanese politics [Barroso, 2014, p. 199]. External influence cannot, of course, be considered the main cause of Lebanese problems, but it undoubtedly contributes to social disintegration in Lebanon.

Finally, we should also take into account the protest potential of young Lebanese people, in whose eyes the usual confessional system is increasingly revealing its shortcomings. The protests observed at the height of the "garbage crisis" in August - September 2015 were a new phenomenon for Lebanon, and none of the political groups managed to "ride" them. Over the past decade, the streets of Beirut have repeatedly been filled with crowds of demonstrators who burned tires or set up tent camps, protested against certain government measures or decisions of parliament, expressed dissatisfaction with the inaction of the government and the irresponsibility of deputies. At the same time, the actions themselves were not directed by any political force.

Perhaps the Christians of Lebanon have finally realized that their representatives, instead of protecting their interests, pursue their own goals and realize their ambitions, relying on the financial power of individual clans, parties and outside help. Therefore, the ongoing crisis of power and new waves of protests, which undoubtedly threaten Lebanese politicians, including Christians, may deprive them of public support and, moreover, permanently banish them from the country's political scene.

list of literature

Paramilitary formations of the Syrian Kurdistan: An Overview, Moscow: IV RAS, 2015.

Mashru qanun al-wazir Marwan Sharbel li-l-intihabat al-lubnaniya 2013 (Draft Law on the 2013 Election of Minister Marwan Sharbel, September 2011) - http://www.interior.gov.lb/DetailsElections.aspx?idn=37.

Mashru qanun al-intihabat al-lubnaniya kama Akarrahu majlis al-wuzara wa'l-Muhal ila Majlis an-nawab bi-mujib marsum 8804 tarikh 1/9/2012 (Draft Law on Parliamentary Elections dated 1.09.2012) - http://www.moim.gov.lb/UI/moim/PDF/newlaw2013_COM.pdf.

Sarab'ev A.V. The Maronite Patriarch acts in the interests of Lebanon's stability / / Novoe vostochnoe obozrenie, 8.08.2011 - http://old.ivran.ru/publications/228.

Sarab'ev A.V. Ambiguous Breakthrough in the Lebanon Crisis / / RIAC, December 18, 2015 - http://russiancouncil.ru/inner/?id_4=7034#top-content.

Akiki V. Lebanese Christians remember former glory // Al-Monitor, 11.01.2015 - http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2015/01/lebanon-christians-aoun-geagea-dialogue-tensions-presidency.html#ixzz31ne3TISk.

Arsenian Ekmekji A. Confessionalism and Electoral Reform in Lebanon. Aspen Institute. Lebanon Renaissance Foundation, Washington (DC), July 2012.

Aziz J. Does Lebanon's Political System Need an Update? II Al-Monitor, 17, 2013 - http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/lebanon-political-system-update-crisis.html##ixzz3TayTDsZf.

Barroso C.F.S. The Critical Geopolitics of the Lebanese Sociopolitical Labyrinth // European Scientific Journal. Vol. 2, Sept. 2014.

Fakhoury T. Debating Lebanon's power-sharing model: An Opportunity or An Impasse for Democratization Studies in the Middle East // Arab Studies Journal. Vol. 22, N 1 (Spring 2014).

Hajj E. Lebanese Electoral Law Shakes Political Coalitions II Al-Monitor, Jan. 14, 2013 - http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/0l/lebanon-electoral-law.html#ixzz3u5emQTDE.

Kota S. Undemocratic Lebanon? The Power-Sharing Arrangements after the 2005 Independence intifada // Journal of Ritsumeikan Social Sciences and Humanities. 2012, vol. 4, N 6 - http://www.ritsumei.ac.jp/acd/re/k-rsc/hss/book/pdf/vol04_06.pdf.

Lebanons Self-Defeating Survival Strategies // Crisis Group Middle East (CGME) Report. N 160, 20 July 2015.

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Nabki Q. The Orthodox-Maronite Gathering (OMG) Proposal: Proportional Representation Meets Sectarian Nomination - http://qifanabki.com/2011/12/22/the-orthodox-maronite-gathering-omg-proposal-proportional-representation-meets-sectarian-nomination.

Salamey I., Tabar P. Democratic transition and sectarian populism: the case of Lebanon // Contemporary Arab Affairs (Routledge). 2012, N 1.

Salamey I. The Crisis of Consociational Democracy in Beirut: Conflict Transformation and Sustainability through Electoral Reform // Urban Sustainability: Perspective. Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2013.

PERIODICALS

Al-Mustaqbal - http://www.almustaqbal.com.

As-Safir - http://assafir.com.

Al-Aklbar - http://al-akhbar.com.

Alalam - http://en.alalam.ir.

Naharnet - http://www.naharnet.com.

Orontes - http://orontes.jimdo.com.

The Daily Star - http://www.dailystar.com.lb.

The Guardian - http://www.theguardian.com.

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