The Islamic-fundamentalist organizations emerged in Sudan in the late 1940s, but decades passed before the military coup of 1989 and subsequent events forced foreign and domestic experts (Arabists and Africanists) to pay close attention to the phenomenon of Sudanese political. This article critically examines some myths about the period from the late 1980s to the present, inherited from the historiography of the 1990s.

The tone of research on political Islam in Sudan was initially set by the English-language tradition, according to which the country was considered a "center of international Islamism" during the nineties of the last century and represented one of the main threats to civilization and especially to America. Such a seemingly well-reasoned approach to the study of the Sudanese Islamic-fundamentalist movement dominated not only in the world, but also in domestic Oriental studies.

However, towards the end of the century, a turning point was observed in Russian Sudanistics: a new generation of Russian Orientalists, relying on the materials of domestic Sudanistics of the Soviet period and an unbiased analysis of the above-mentioned transformations, developed a fundamentally different approach to the study of socio-political, socio-economic, cultural and ideological transformations of Sudan in the second half of the XX-beginning offundamentalism.

To begin with, it is necessary to determine the key issues of foreign and domestic Sudanistics. First, can we really say with full justification that the "first Islamic republic" existed in Sudan in 1989-1999, or was it a military dictatorship that was common in third world countries and took the form of an "Islamic state" for its own interests [Gallab, 2008, p. 97]? Secondly, do the events of December 1999 - May 2000 mean the complete fiasco of the Islamic Republic of Sudan (IRS) project and the refusal of the ruling Sudanese elite to make any attempts to continue it? And third, how can we classify modern Islamist movements and organizations in this country?

1 Egypt, after the July 1952 revolution, recognized the right of the Sudanese people to self-determination. Elections to the Sudanese Parliament were held in November 1953, and a transitional Government was established in 1954. In August 1955, the Sudanese Parliament decided to permanently terminate the condominium regime, and in the same year, British troops were withdrawn from Sudan. On January 1, 1956, Sudan was declared an independent State. The Muslim-dominated central government in Khartoum refused to fulfill its promises of a federal state, leading to a mutiny by southern officers and a civil war that lasted from 1955 to 1972. The country experienced several military and state coups (1958, 1964, 1969, 1985), however, the regimes that succeeded each other They were unable to cope with the problems of separatism, ethnic disunity and economic backwardness. In 1983, after the central Government introduced sharia law in the South, the civil war between the South and the North resumed. The rebels joined forces to form the Sudanese People's Liberation Army, led by former Colonel John Garant of the Sudanese Armed Forces. After another coup on June 30, 1989, Colonel Omar Hassan al-Bashir came to power, holding it to this day.

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Answering the first of these questions, it is necessary to understand the essence of the changes that took place in the late 1980s and 1990s in Sudan. It should be noted that the events that took place in 1989-1999 can be divided into three periods. The first period (June 30, 1989-October 16, 1993) - the "revolution of national salvation" - was characterized by the dominant influence of the National Islamic Front (NIF) on the political and socio-economic decisions made by the country's leadership. The second one (October 16, 1993 - March 1996) is characterized by growing rivalry between Islamists and the army. The third period (March 1996 - December 1999) shows the decline and collapse of the military-Islamist coalition.

Despite the fact that the coup d'etat of June 30, 1989, which resulted in the establishment of the regime of General Omar Hassan al-Bashir and the most famous ideologue of Sudanese Islamic fundamentalism, Hassan al-Turabi, 2 took place twenty years ago, we still do not have complete and reliable information about all the details and nuances of this coup d'etat officially referred to in Sudan as the" national Salvation Revolution "("Saura al-Inkaz al-Qaumiy"). The role of Islamists in the plot against Sadiq al-Mahdi's government is unclear. Were they its participants, as S. E. Babkin hints, or did the supporters of al-Turabi only inspire the direct performers - three hundred Islamist-minded officers, including 175 paratroopers of the al-Bashir brigade [Babkin, 2000, p. 223]. In addition, there was an assumption, not refuted, but also not confirmed by official Khartoum, according to which the current Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir was an active member of the NIF military organization in the late 1980s [Polyakov, 2000, p. 75; Sudan and Terrorism, 1997, p. 2]. According to E. A. Kudrov, " without reliable documents confirming the military's reliance on Islamists, the conclusion about the Islamist basis of the coup of 1989 can only be made on the basis of the consequences of the coup for the socio-political life of society and the indisputable fact that in the late 1980s the Islamists remained the only real political force in the country and serious influence in army circles "[Kudrov, 2009, p. 28].

Be that as it may, in the period from 1989 to 1996, the position of Sudanese Islamic fundamentalists in the ruling camp was indeed particularly strong. This is confirmed by the fact that, under pressure from Hassan al-Turabi, three of the 12 members of the National Salvation Revolution Command Council (NRC)3, who did not agree with the policy of Islamists, resigned [Levin, 1994, p. 20].

In our opinion, several interrelated reasons led to such a powerful position of the NIF. First, the Sudanese Islamists had accumulated enormous political experience by 1989. For example, their leader at-Turabi was 35 years old by that time.

Hassh Abdallah al-Turabi 2 was born in 1932 in the village of Wad al-Turabi (Al-Gezira district). His father was a Sharia judge and one of the most renowned scholars of theology and Fiqh. In 1951, Hassan al-Turabi entered the Faculty of Law of the University of Khartoum, graduating with a bachelor's degree in 1955. From 1955 to 1957, he studied for a master's degree at the University of London. From 1959 to 1963 he was a doctoral candidate at the Sorbonne. He successfully prepared and defended his doctoral dissertation on the topic "Constitutional understanding of the state of emergency". In 1955. Hassan al-Turabi becomes a delegate to the founding congress of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood Association. Since 1964, he has held senior positions in the Islamic Charter Front( FIH), NIF, the Islamic Arab People's Conference (IANC), the National Congress of Sudan (NCC), and the National People's Congress (NPC).

3 The highest authority in Sudan from June 30, 1989 to October 16, 1993. Immediately after the coup, the RCRC included 15 high-ranking Sudanese military personnel: Brigadier General Al-Bashir, Brigadier General Al-Zubeir Mohammed Saleh, Colonel At-Tijani Adam at-Tahir, Colonel Salah al-Din Muhammad Ahmad Karrar (Officer Colonel Muhammad Al-Amin Khalifa Younis (Chairman of the International and Foreign Relations Committee of the RCRC), Colonel Bakri Hassan Salih, Major Ibrahim Shams Al-Din (Head of the NIF Youth Movement), Brigadier General Usman Ahmad Usman (Head of the Political Committee of the RCRC), Colonel Faisal Madani Moktar, Colonel Abd al-Mahmoud (First Secretary General of the RCRC), Brigadier General Faisal Ali Abu Saleh, Brigadier General Osman Ahmed Hassan, Brigadier General Dominique Kasianou, Brigadier General Ibrahim Nael Adam, Colonel Suleiman Mohammed Suleiman [Sudan..., 1995, p. 822].

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political experience. Secondly, the Front had a solid financial base formed from internal 4 and external revenues, both from legal 5 and illegal 6 sources [Seregichev, 2006, pp. 78-79]. Third, since 1978, when Nimeiri began to pursue a policy of" national reconciliation, "at-Turabi's supporters, taking advantage of the authorities' favor, began to infiltrate the army, police, and state security services, spreading their influence there. Fourth, the military, led by al-Bashir, was impressed by the rigid, military-disciplined structure of the NIF, which had hundreds of armed supporters organized into detachments. In addition, when not everyone in the national army and police were supporters of the new ruling course, al-Bashir and his entourage needed to have reliable paramilitary reserves on hand to prevent a coup. NIF detachments could not be better suited to the role of these very reserves. The number of the Front's militia was 80 thousand people, i.e. it reached 2/3 of the number of the Sudanese armed forces [7]. Gusarov, 2002, p. 208]. Fifth, the general junta recognized the indispensability of Islamic fundamentalists as a partner in the ruling coalition, which significantly increased the latter's ability to influence the country's politics. Relying on the Islamists, the military wanted to move away from the influence, albeit weakened, of traditional political parties, and especially the Al-Ansar and Al-Khatmiyya orders that stood behind them, since they became the pole around which the opposition to the ruling regime united. Sixth, by dressing up in the garb of devout Muslims, the military apparently counted on support for its actions in the form of foreign currency loans from conservative Arab regimes, such as Saudi Arabia and others. This assumption is quite appropriate, given the extremely difficult economic situation in Sudan in the late 1980s.

According to Babkin, in the Sudanese cabinet of Ministers formed immediately after the "revolution of national salvation", the following prominent statesmen of the country were the agents of al-Turabi's policy: Ali Osman Mohammed Taha , the second person in the NIF, where he headed the Front's apparatus, as well as the youth wing, much more radical than the NIF "veterans" wing, headed by samim al-Turabi; Awad Ahmad al-Jazeera; Mahdi Ibrahim Muhammad [Babkin, 2000, p. 224]. The Islamist leader himself did not join the new government, at first being content only with the modest position of head of the IANK, which he himself created in April 1991.

Many works in Russia and abroad are devoted to the period of the" revolution of national salvation". However, their authors overlook the fact that the coup took place on June 30, 1989, and the course of systematic and comprehensive Islamization of Sudan was proclaimed only in January 1991. Thus, contrary to the popular thesis that " having come to power as a result of another military coup in the history of Sudan, Islamic fundamentalists received new opportunities to implement their ideas in practice", the situation in reality was not so unambiguous [Polyakov, 2000, p. 75]. Why did the Sudanese military, already allied with Islamists, wait 17 months before announcing a state program to totally Islamize Sudan?

Perhaps the plan of al-Bashir and his inner circle was simple: to come to power, relying on the NIF, and then, having strengthened his regime, to refuse "services"

4 Membership fees, donations, benefits derived from holding positions in such banks as the Sudanese branch of the Islamic Bank of Faisal, Al-Barak Bank, etc., fees from the Islamized business stratum. Gilles Kepel calls this group of Sudanese businessmen the "pious bourgeoisie" (Kepel, 2004, p. 184).

5 Income from shares of foreign companies received through intermediaries, donations.

6 Arms trafficking, training fees for fighters on Sudanese territory, selling Sudanese diplomatic passports to terrorists, etc.

7 120 thousand people.

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Hasan al-Turabi's Islamists. To do this, the general junta needed reliable alternative sources of funds that could be used to implement large-scale social assistance programs for the most needy segments of the population, 8 which, in turn, would ensure their loyalty to the policies of the new regime. To this end, the Chairman of the RCRC, Omar Hassan Ahmed Al-Bashir, paid official visits in the second half of 1989. Saudi Arabia (July), Libya (August, September), Iraq (August, October), the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (November), Kuwait, Qatar (November). 3. Ahmed visited the United Arab Emirates (July), Oman, Iraq, the Arab Republic of Egypt, Bahrain, Kuwait (July). Another Deputy Chairman of the RCRC, Al-Zubayr Muhammad Saleh, visited Jordan (July), Saudi Arabia (August, November), and Iraq (November). On return visits to Sudan in 1989, the President of Egypt, H. Mubarak (July, December), Commander-in-Chief of the Libyan Armed Forces Yu. Jeber (February) [Sudan, 1990, p. 4]. 354]. However, the effectiveness of these measures was low: financial and material assistance did not flow into the Sudan in a wide river.

Moreover, in 1990, the opposition became more active, having recovered after the coup of June 30, 1989. On the night of April 21-22, 1990, an unsuccessful military coup attempt was made. It was led by Major General Hussein Abd al-Qader al-Qadro 9, Air Force Brigadier Mohammed Osman Hamed Karrar, who was also the governor of the Eastern Province in 1986-1989. In total, 28 officers were found guilty of conspiracy. They were executed on April 24, 1990 [Sudan, 1994, p. 361]. This, albeit unsuccessful, plot seriously frightened the RCMP, whose main support was exclusively the army. Under these circumstances, al-Bashir and his associates were forced to turn to the Islamists for help.

This decisive turn towards the NIF was epitomized by the resumption in June 1990 of the" September " Sharia laws10, suspended immediately after the coup of April 6, 1985, which ended the regime of Jaafar Nimeiri. Finally, the course towards an alliance with fundamentalists took shape on March 22, 1991, when a new version of the "September" laws was introduced. At the same time, the Islamic Fund provided the Sudanese authorities with a loan of $ 440 million for the costs associated with putting the country on the rails of an Islamic economy [Abdou Maliqalim, 1994, p. 68].

Two months earlier, in January 1991, the RCRC had adopted a Sharia Law Program. According to it, the state was considered as a "Muslim community", and Sharia-as its "unified law". Thus, the preservation of the priority of state interests was associated with the idea of preventing a split in the Ummah [Mustafayev, 1994, p.11].

From that moment until 1998 - 1999, under pressure and with the support of Islamists, the RCRC actively enforced Sharia law throughout the country. Those who did not follow the call to pray on Fridays became offenders who were subject to severe punishment. Shopkeepers and other faithful who did not stop working for prayer from 12 to 14 o'clock were punished with a whip. Trading in the markets was banned on Fridays. Separate travel on public transport for men and women was introduced, and the sale of alcohol was prohibited. "Monitoring committees"were called upon to monitor the implementation of these and similar directives of the RCRC. The latter reported on the work done to functionaries from the special department of the SKRNS [Sudan, 2000, pp. 235-236].

8 This was especially true in connection with the difficult economic situation in the country: in 1990, inflation increased by 44.6%, reaching 121.9% by 1991, and the unemployment rate in 1992 was 30% [Annual Report..., 2000. p. 24].

9 Commanded an artillery division under President Nimeiri.

10 On September 8, 1983, President Nimeiri of the Sudan decided to introduce Islamic legislation throughout the Sudan (including Southern Sudan) and replace civil proceedings with Sharia law.

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During this period, the Islamists sought to maximize the concentration of power in their hands and hoped to assign the army the role of an obedient tool for implementing the NIF's program guidelines in all spheres of Sudanese society. The Armed forces, according to the ideologists of the Front, were supposed to become a clear example of Islamic morality and way of life for all other Sudanese. This goal was served by the law on national defense adopted in 1989, according to which young people, including students, were required to perform military service. A key element of military training for new recruits was the ideological training of soldiers and officers, which included teaching the basics of Islam.

The active construction of an Islamic society in Sudan in the first half of the 1990s was accompanied by a campaign of terror within the country. Islamization was carried out in strict accordance with the Iranian model. Not only dissenters, but also educated people were persecuted. All Sudanese newspapers were shut down, and other media outlets were placed under strict control. The new authorities called for a policy of austerity. It was decided to reduce by 20% all government expenditures, except for military ones [Khasan, 2003, p. 41-42]. Subsidized prices for petroleum products and some imported goods were abolished. The staff of state institutions and enterprises underwent significant reductions due to loyalty checks, 11 which led to an increase in unemployment, including among qualified specialists.

What did the future Islamic Republic of Sudan look like to its fierce supporters, led by Hassan al-Turabi? The basis of their system was riba (prohibition of usurious interest), zakat (voluntary donation) and shura (advice). Through the implementation of the ban on usurious interest, Islamization of the banking sector is achieved, as a result of which all bank depositors equally share the success or failure of their bank. Zakat, designed to help poor, financially disadvantaged people, helps to mitigate acute social inequality. The shura is a system that covers the entire pyramid of power: from neighborhoods, villages to the national parliament and the president, while the election of the head of state was supposed to be held on an alternative basis [At-Turabi, 1994, p.33].

According to al-Turabi, the Islamic state "obeys the highest norms of sharia law, which represent the will of Allah. ..The Caliph or any other holder of political power is subject to Sharia law and the will of the people who elected him." Moreover, the NIF leader believed that " a modern Islamic government can, on the basis of sharia, introduce the norms of law and pursue a policy based on Sharia." At-Turabi also believed that "a Muslim state today can determine its system of public law and economy based on Sharia and Ijma." 12
Describing the role of sharia-based legislation, al-Turabi argued that " the highest common goal of religious life unites the private and public spheres; Sharia is the arbiter between public order and individual freedom." For the head of the Sudanese Islamists, it was fundamentally important that " whatever form the executive power takes, its head must always obey Sharia law and the Ijma formulated on its basis." Based on this, al-Turabi argued, "it will be possible to adopt any form or procedure of organizing public life that will be aimed at serving Allah and the goals of the Islamic state, as long as it is not directly rejected by Sharia" (Quoted in [An-Naim, 1999, pp. 52-53]).

11 From 1989 to 1994, 73,000 people were dismissed [Lado, 2000, p. 5].

12 In Sunni Islam - one of the foundations of Muslim law, the unanimous decision of Islamic authorities of a given era on issues not directly settled by the Koran and the Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad. Ijma is presented in commentaries compiled in collections of norms that fill in the gaps in religious legislation.

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More specifically, the outline of the Islamic Republic of the Sudan was outlined in the Sudan Charter: National Unity and Diversity.13 In accordance with its provisions, the Islamic State in Sudan should be built in the form of a "mixed system, including federal and regional elements." In addition, the Charter's drafters emphasized that "The National Islamic Front supports the adoption of a federal system in the constitutional regulation of decentralization in Sudan, with equal treatment for all regions, or special measures for some and through any process of gradual transition to federation" 14 [The Search..., 2002, p. 329, 331].

If we systematize all the efforts of the Sudanese Islamists, we can see that the process of implementing the plans of al-Turabi and his entourage to build a Sudanese Islamic state took place in at least three stages: 1991 - 1994, 1994 - 1996, 1996 - 1999 years

As mentioned above, the first phase began in January-March 1991,15 It is worth adding that the administrative and territorial reform of Sudan was carried out in 1991 as part of the project to create an Islamic State. A four-level structure of government of the country was introduced. The first level was occupied by the central government, the second-instead of 18 provinces united in 8 regions-9 vilayats. The third level was formed by 66 provinces that were part of the vilayats. The fourth level included 281 regions with local government, which were part of the provinces. The reform should expand regional autonomy, as each vilayat is headed by a 16-member governor backed by the vilayat Government, which is responsible for local governance and tax collection. The central government was still responsible for the foreign policy, military and economic spheres [Tikhomirov, 2006, p. 136].

Attention was also paid to financial and economic problems. In 1992, the Sudanese authorities implemented a monetary reform, introducing a new monetary unit-the dinar. Its essence consisted in the exchange of banknotes in denominations of 5 Sudanese pounds and above for new banknotes. The reform was aimed at curbing inflation, lowering market prices, and returning money outside the state's control to the banking system. The Sudanese pound was subject to gradual withdrawal from circulation, which happened after some time [Sudan, 2000, pp. 178-179]. The switch from pounds to dinars, according to the governor of the Bank of Sudan, Seyid Ahmed al-Sheikh, foreshadowed the course of "Islamization" of the economy, since dinars in the historical memory of Muslims are closely associated with the times of the four righteous caliphs.

Sudanese Islamists, following a time-tested tactic, focused their efforts in the early 1990s on infiltrating their supporters in the highest echelons of power. Due to the local specifics, they paid special attention to the country's law enforcement agencies. In 1993, a new service was created to replace the State Security Service, which was disbanded in 1985. Since its creation, it has been closely monitored by the so - called Security Group (GB), a secret department of the NIF responsible for protecting the interests of the Front both inside and outside, including abroad. GB Nafi was headed by Ali Nafi.

The growing success of the Sudanese Islamists was viewed with alarm by the Chairman of the RCRC, Al-Bashir, and his inner circle. They saw this as a direct threat to their positions. However, the lack of forces and resources forced the general junta to put up with the dominance of Islamic fundamentalists in the army, special services and state apparatus.

13 NIF Charter of 1987

14 Which is extremely important for the Southern region.

15 "Program for the introduction of Sharia law" and the entry into force of relevant legislative acts.

16 And his deputy.

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The next step of the NIF towards establishing full control over the domestic and foreign policy of the country was the initiative to dissolve the RCRC. In early 1993, Hasan al-Turabi announced the impending dissolution of the Council. Al-Bashir disavowed this statement. However, on October 16, 1993, the NRC decided to appoint Omar al-Bashir as President of the Sudan and to dissolve itself. Thus, the NIF got rid of the threat of reprisals from the military.

These events marked the end of an important stage in the political history of Sudan - the "revolution of national salvation", which began in 1989. The reason for this was not only the pressure from the Islamists, but also the fact that the SKRNS was no longer needed by the military themselves, who stabilized the situation in the country and wanted to give their regime more power through the transition to a civilian form of government (executive institutions represented by the president and government, as well as the Transitional National Assembly - the Interim Parliament). legitimacy. Thus, the most important outcome of the first period of implementation of the Islamic project was the laying of the basic foundation of the Sudanese Islamic statehood.17
However, the desire of Islamists to unconditionally dominate all spheres of life of Sudanese society and the state created by 1994 a considerable conflict potential in relations between the al-Turabi and al-Bashir camps. Only active actions of the opposition represented by the Unionist Democratic Party (UDP), Al-Umma Party, SND/The crisis and extremely unstable socio-economic situation kept both sides from moving to the open phase of the conflict.

The second stage of construction of the Islamic Republic of the Sudan began in February 1994, when Khartoum implemented a large-scale adjustment of the administrative reform of 1991, which was, in fact, the second administrative-territorial reform since the early 1990s, as a result of which the local legislative and executive authorities received broad powers [Hamed, 2003, p. 116]. From this moment on, Sudan becomes a federation consisting of 26 wilayats. Each vilayat is headed by a governor appointed by the President.18 Thus, the construction of a four-level system of government of the country, which began in 1991, was completed.

The federal authorities are responsible for national defense and security, international relations, judicial proceedings, the Prosecutor General's Office and the bar, citizenship and migration issues, monetary and financial policy, and foreign trade. The vilayats were assigned control over internal administration, tax collection, local health care and education [Hamed, 2003, p. 116].

In general, the reform was completed by the summer of 1994. At the same time, there were no profound changes with the actual delegation of rights to the constituent entities of the federation, since the presidential decree on changing the form of government did not provide for any significant redistribution of powers between the central government and the vilayat authorities. The main goal of the 1991 and 1994 reforms was to reach a compromise between the military-Islamist regime of Omar al-Bashir-Hassan al-Turabi and the local elites (who really control life in the Sudanese regions), whose loyalty was bought and is still being bought by positions in the new bureaucratic system. This goal was largely achieved.

As part of the policy of Islamization of the country's armed forces, a large group of senior officers (up to 1 thousand people) who did not share the views of the Sudanese authorities on the future structure of the country was dismissed from the latter in 1995. In the same year, a similar measure was applied to police officers. The NIF's ideologists planned to replace the state police, which is accountable to the President, with the People's Police, which represents the People's Republic of China.-

17 This applied only to Central and Northern Sudan, as much of the territory in the South was controlled by the Sudanese People's Liberation Movement rebels/Sudan People's Liberation Army (SNOD/SNOA).

18 Vali.

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Battle squads of well-armed frontline activists. The plan was expected to be completed by 1999.

The first half of the 1990s could not have been more favorable for turning NIF 19 into a powerful political force. The Front's highest body was the 20 General Assembly, which consisted of 250 deputies from all parts of Sudan (with the exception of the three rebel-controlled southern provinces). It elected a 60-member 21 Main Advisory Council, which formed the governing bodies of the NIF-the politburo and the secretariat. The number of members of the Front in the mid-1990s can be estimated approximately in the range of 80 to 100 thousand people. All members of the Front were required to complete general education, religious and military training. The NIF had its own paramilitary and intelligence and counterintelligence structures reporting directly to the secretariat. In addition, in order to successfully compete with traditional political parties, the NIF leadership changed the terms of membership in this organization, removing the rigid approach to maintaining the purity of the ranks. Now a tribe, a Dervish order, or a group of people could join this organization, as well as individuals, even if they had previously been supporters of political parties. The main condition for joining membership was recognition of the priority of their loyalty to the National Islamic Front [Polyakov, 2000, p. 80-81; Huband, 1998, p. 153].

After the completion of this stage of the construction of the IRS in March 1996, combined parliamentary and presidential elections were held, the results of which were easily predictable: the hero of the "revolution of national salvation" Omar al-Bashir was elected president of the country, he received 75.5% of the votes of Sudanese voters [Sudan, 2002, pp. 191 - 192]. Representatives of the NIF won the overwhelming majority of seats in the country's parliament, and their permanent leader, Al-Turabi, took the post of Chairman of the National Assembly, the third most important in the country.

Evaluating the results of the second period of creation of the IRS, we can see that the period of 1994-1996 was the time of the highest flourishing of the influence of Islamists and Hassan al-Turabi personally on all the processes that took place in the country. It seemed that just a little bit more and the Islamic Republic of Sudan will become a reality, giving its citizens all imaginable benefits.

However, in reality, the "grandiose" successes in Islamization have resulted in huge expenditures for the authorities to buy the loyalty of a significant part of the population: in 1994, the government adopted a decree on the payment of 2 million families (i.e., approximately 10 million people, 40% of the population) monthly cash benefits in the amount of $ 2. USA [Countries of Africa..., 1999, p. 217]. This was overlaid by the growing struggle between the military and Islamists for influence in the country.

A new socio-political organization, designed to play the role of the ruling party in the country, was assigned to consolidate the situation that developed after the 1996 elections. This organization was the National Congress of Sudan (NCC)22, which brought together the two leading political forces at that time: the military and Islamists. Its leaders were Omar al-Bashir (Chairman) and Hassan al-Turabi (Secretary-General), respectively.

19 According to Al-Turabi, who was interviewed in September 1994, "The National Islamic Front was disbanded not only by law (referring to the ban on party activities imposed immediately after the coup of 30 June 1989 - S. S.), but also in accordance with the decision of the movement itself "(cit. according to: [Elhachmi, 1998, p. 63]).

20 Al-Jamiyya al-amma.

21 Majlis al-shura al-am.

22 According to some experts, the ruling National Congress of Sudan (NCC) is nothing more than "the last incarnation of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood or NIF before the coup of 1989" [Sudan, 2004, p. 6]. The NCC formally emerged in October 1999, but in fact has been operating since 1996. (there is a version that the idea of creating the Congress and the main elements of its structure originated in the first years of the "revolution of national salvation" in 1991 [Sorensen, 2002, p.2].

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Thus began the third and final stage of the construction of the IRS, the main content of which was the struggle of Islamists to deepen the course of Islamization of Sudan, which led them to open conflict with the military led by President Omar al-Bashir.

Two years after the national elections, the country received a new basic law, the fourth in a row.23 The draft constitution was approved by the National Assembly in April 1998 and put into effect on July 1, following a referendum. According to the Constitution, Sudan is a presidential Republic, where sovereignty is delegated to the people by God. 24 However, all supreme power in the country belongs to the President, who is elected for a five-year term. He is the commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, police and other regular units. The Head of State also heads and forms the Cabinet of Ministers (Articles 41, 42, 47). Article 625 contains an indication of the inadmissibility of creating parties on a religious basis. This formulation left the authorities with the ability to repress, if necessary, political organizations of Sudanese Islamists. A ban on alcohol was legalized 26.

Islam is recognized as the state religion of Sudan. Its principles should be protected by all people and "reflected in their daily lives, laws, policies and official work or responsibilities in the field of political, economic, social and cultural activities"27. At the same time, freedom of religion was recognized.28 Zakat, a traditional Muslim levy of money for the benefit of the poor and indigent, was also legalized. 29 The right to form political organizations was proclaimed.30 During the elections to the National Assembly, the previous scheme was maintained: 75% of deputies are elected in ordinary constituencies, the remaining 25% - in special women's, scientific and professional, national communities 31. The sources of legislation 32 are Sharia, the opinion of citizens expressed in a referendum, the Constitution and tribal law 33 [Constitution..., 1998, p. 2 - 4, 6 - 7, 9 - 10, 16, 19, 27 - 28].

Having a majority in the Sudanese parliament, the Islamists, in contrast to the course of the military, who, in order to maintain the stability of their regime, tried to combine Islamization with democratization in the Western manner, 34 pursued a policy of gradually curtailing the power of al-Bashir's team. To this end, by 1999, the Islamists had virtually completely seized power in the pro - presidential party, the National Congress of Sudan. Having thus implemented the first part of its plan to bring all power in the country under its control, the NIF proceeded to the second part of it. It consisted in the adoption of amendments to the constitution that would turn the president into a purely nominal figure, devoid of real levers of power. In particular, it provided for the establishment of the post of Prime Minister, approved by the Parliament, and, accordingly, the transfer of proper powers from the President to him, the introduction of direct elections of state governors.

The first signs of an emerging split in the ruling coalition, which became available to an outside observer, appeared in January 1999. During the year, the confrontation between the military and Islamists intensified. Controlled by supporters

23 Provisional Constitution of 1955, Permanent Constitution of 1973, Provisional Constitution of 1985

24 Article 4 - "Supreme power and sovereignty".

25 "National Unity".

26 Article 16 - "Social morality and unity".

27 St. 18 - "Religion".

28 Article 24 - "The right to religion and conscience".

29 Article 10 - "Zakat and other financial obligations".

30 Article 26 - " Freedom of association and organizations (associations)".

31 Article 67 - "National Assembly".

32 Article 65 - "Sources of legislation".

33 Ural Federal District.

34 This refers to the legalization of many previously banned parties in accordance with the Parties Act of 1998, which entered into force on 1 January 1999.

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Al-Turabi National Congress not only voted in Parliament in the first reading for a package of amendments to the 35th constitution, but also obliged key cabinet members, who are also members of the NCC, to regularly report on the work done to the party's leadership. In addition, at-Turabi's supporters have curtailed the real powers of the chairman of the 36 party to control the executive bodies of the Congress, which turned this post into an insignificant position.

In response, the military went to extreme measures: on December 12, 1999, President Omar al-Bashir issued decrees on the early termination of the powers of the National Assembly and on the introduction of a state of emergency in the country for a period of three months. In fact, December 12, 1999 was a symbolic date for the completion of the IRS under the al-Turabi project, which was ruined by mutual strife between Islamists and the military, who did not want to submit to Islamic fundamentalists. An additional factor that aggravated the confrontation between both camps was the beginning of commercial oil production and export sales in 1998: the Islamists claimed petrodollars, seeing them as a huge resource for completing the construction of the IRS, and the military needed them as a way to ensure the greatest possible loyalty of the population to their regime in order to abandon the support of the Islamists.

Thus, in 1989-1999, Sudan was neither the first Islamic republic nor a military dictatorship disguised as an Islamic state, but was an unsuccessful attempt by Islamists and the military to build this very Islamic state, relying on the regime of the army junta. In this regard, it is possible to reconsider the popular statement in the 1990s that Sudan is one of the hotbeds of international Islamic terrorism, since on its territory American intelligence discovered a whole network of camps for training members of various terrorist groups. According to the US CIA's 1997 data, there were several camps operating in Sudan. These are Al-Halafiyah 37, where members of the Algerian Islamic Salvation Army (IAS) and the Armed Islamic Group (VIG) trained; Aqil al-Awliya, located on the Blue Nile shoal, south of Khartoum, where more than 500 Palestinian, Syrian and Jordanian fighters were stationed; Al-Mrihat, north of Omdurman, where members of the Egyptian Armed forces were based. The Muslim Brotherhood, Gamaat Islamiyya and Vanguard; Muhayyamat al-Mazari, north-west of Khartoum, which serves as a training base for militants of various nationalities [Sudan..., 1997, p. 48]. The Sudanese, while acknowledging the existence of the camps, claim that all this is in the past, and now Sudan is a reliable partner of the same United States in the fight against terrorism.38
Turning to the second question, which concerns the impact of the events of December 1999 - May 2000 on the fate of the IRS, it is worth briefly describing the political situation that developed at that time in the Sudan. On December 12, 1999, President Al-Bashir dissolved Parliament, which was preparing to vote to curtail its powers. At the same time, al-Bashir sought to maintain his political base - the NCC, removing it from the control of Islamists. However, the complexity of the situation was that the removal of Islamists from the structures of the National Congress could lead to its actual collapse. NIF supporters were responsible for organizing the Congress, making the latter an influential political force in the country. As N. Z. Fakhrutdinova notes, describing the NCC, "we are talking about a new model of an Islamic party - a people's party, a kind of cell of Sudanese society" [Fakhrutdinova, 2004, p. 75].

35 Introduction of the post of Prime Minister and direct election of state governors instead of appointment by the President.

36 This position is still held by al-Bashir.

37 25 miles north of Khartoum.

38 According to some reports, although not officially confirmed, there is a large US intelligence center operating in Sudan, and Sudanese intelligence also helped the Americans several times in their operations in Iraq.

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This conflict led to half-hearted decisions at the plenary session of the NCC Advisory Council held on January 24, 2000. On the one hand, following the logic of the development of events, the plenum put NCC Chairman Omar al-Bashir at the head of the NCC Elections and Control Committee, granting him the rights to exercise control over the implementation of the general political line of the Congress, coordination of interaction between the NCC structures and state institutions. On the other hand, the same plenum confirmed that the Secretary General of the NCC, Hassan al-Turabi, still has the right to officially represent the Congress and make statements on its behalf. The Secretary General was also charged with directing ideological and propaganda activities and working with the masses. He retained control over the work of the leadership and ensuring coordination between the various organs of the party. He was also given audit functions in the field of administrative and financial affairs of the party. The ambivalence of the situation, in which the presidential camp won a major victory over the supporters of the National Islamic Front and at the same time had to retain many posts in the NCC, led to the fact that the conflict between the military and Islamists moved to another level.

The denouement came soon enough: in February 2000, the Khartoum headquarters of the IANC was closed, and in May 2000, al-Turabi was dismissed from the post of Secretary General of the NCC. The Islamist leader, taking the president's decision as a personal insult, promised to expel al-Bashir himself from the ranks of the NCC. The authorities ' response to this announcement was harsh and swift: Islamist publications, including Rai al-Shaab, the main newspaper of Sudanese Islamists, were immediately closed in the country.

Left without a party, Al-Turabi in June 2000 created a new political organization with the same goals and objectives - the National People's Congress (NPC). It included the NIF and the political groups that supported it [Seregichev, 2006, p. 139].

It is generally accepted that the IRS project was finally buried in December 1999, when the first public conflict between al-Turabi and al-Bashir took place. Nevertheless, the basic tenets of the Islamists are jealously guarded by the Sudanese state. The reason that the idea of building an IRS is still alive and continues to be implemented is simple: the Islamists in their "green" project managed to embody the aspirations of the political elite of Sudan.39 These aspirations are based on the desire to build an obedient and easily managed society based on the basic principles of the Islamic religion and huge oil revenues. The main question here is only which group under such a scheme will be dominant: the military, Islamists or traditionalists.

It should be noted that it is extremely difficult to draw a clear line between Islamists in uniform and the military itself in the context of Sudanese politics. It is generally accepted that Omar al-Bashir is a military group in power, and Ali Osman Mohammed Taha (Vice-President of the Republic of Sudan) is an Islamist group. Thus, it turns out that the IRS project, authored by Hasan al-Turabi, continues to develop, despite the resignation of its creator and his opposition to the current regime. Outwardly, it no longer bears pronounced Islamist features, 40 but its essence remains unchanged, as this suits both the al-Bashir team and the opposition members from Al-Umma and the UDP who want to replace it.

39 Excluding the ruling elite of South Sudan.

40 This is mainly due to the need to maintain normal partnership relations with Southerners on the basis of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) of 2005, against which supporters of Hasan al-Turabi were actively fighting as part of the People's Defense Forces (YDF). As N. Z. Fakhrutdinova wrote, the SS units were "the vanguard force in the Islamization and Arabization of the southern provinces ... journalists called them mujahideen, i.e., warriors waging jihad, holy war" [Fakhrutdinova, 2004, p. 57].

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The question of the current state of the Islamic project in Sudan can also be put in another way: is it possible in principle to implement a different, non-Islamist project in the country represented by a military dictatorship?41 Unlikely. It is worth considering that both Nimeiri and al-Bashir 42 built an Islamic state in their own interests and used the Islamists, as well as their ideas, in order to stay in power longer.

Turning to the last issue of the article - the classification of modern Islamic-fundamentalist movements in Sudan, we can distinguish at least three categories. First of all, it is a group of Islamists led by President Omar al-Bashir. Their main political body is the ruling National Congress of Sudan party. The second movement is the NOC under the leadership of one of the patriarchs of Sudanese politics, Hassan al-Turabi. The third is the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood .

This list does not include the Sudanese "branches" of Al-Qaeda, as we have not yet been able to find any reliable evidence of their presence in the country. In addition, this classification, of course, does not claim to be definitively "true"; rather, it is only a working scheme for studying the current Islamic-fundamentalist camp in the Sudan, with all its inherent advantages and disadvantages. In particular, despite the fact that the NCC is classified as an Islamist organization in the above classification, it is necessary to understand the specifics of the ruling party of Sudan, which all those who care about good relations with the authorities tend to get into. Not all of them are zealous Islamists, but most often they are tribal elites who have allied themselves with the ruling party for their own interests. At the same time, the main core of the NCC consists of, so to speak, "cadre" Islamists and the military who share their views.

At one time, the NIF was created according to a similar scheme. Thus, according to the Egyptian journalist Mohammed al-Hashimi, the NIF represented "a new coalition between the Islamic movement and a diverse number of tribal and popular figures who pledged to protect and preserve the achievements of the movement against the campaign of secularist political parties and power groups to completely eradicate the Islamic legacy of the Nimeiri regime" [Elhachmi, 1998, p. 9].

Another controversial point in the classification of Sudanese Islamists under consideration may seem to be the absence of Wahhabis in it. However, the latter do not differ much from the supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood or the NCC, and they are often called Wahhabis by foreign journalists and observers.

Summing up, it should be noted that the socio-political, socio-economic and cultural-ideological transformations in Sudan over the past twenty years are twofold. On the one hand, it is possible to note the collapse of the political power of the NIF and its leader Hassan al-Turabi, but, on the other hand, the current government retains the most important foundations of Islamic statehood laid by al-Turabi and his supporters, even in the conditions of the agreement signed with the rebellious South in 2005. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement. It is worth recognizing that Omar al-Bashir managed to do what once cost the life of Anwar Sadat, namely, to "ride" Islam-fundamentalism, adapting it to the needs of preserving power for himself and his regime.

Islam-fundamentalism has presented the current Sudanese leadership with a grave dilemma: by defending the foundations of the IRS, Khartoum risks losing its Christian identity.-

41 For example, parliamentary democracy, of which India is a model in the East.

42 Most famous leaders of the Sudanese military dictatorships.

43 As a basic criterion for constructing this classification, we used the definition of" Islamic fundamentalism", which was developed by the well - known Russian Arabist R. G. Landa: "... the phenomenon of which (Islamic fundamentalism-S. S.) is quite complex and cannot be reduced to terrorism, fanaticism, or even religious extremism. It is much broader than all these concepts and covers the most diverse aspects of spiritual life, culture, religion and, in many cases, the political life of the world of Islam "[Landa, 2005, p. 57].

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An animist South that is ready to reject independence in the 2011 referendum only if a state is built in Sudan based on the values of liberalism, democracy and secularism. The latter currently looks utopian: al-Bashir and his entourage will never abandon the idea of creating an IRS. Therefore, after some time, we run the risk of getting not one, as now, problem Sudan, but as many as two, if not more.

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