The Second World War

The Battle of Stalingrad , the largest battle of the Second World War, largely determined its outcome. Its consequences not only affected the Soviet-German front, but also affected the course of operations on other continents, in particular in Africa and the Middle East. In this publication, an attempt is made to explore how the Battle of Stalingrad affected the course of World War II, on the battles of the German army for the Caucasus in order to reach the Middle East and Africa. The article analyzes the plans of the leaders of nazi Germany to turn Africa and the Middle East into one of the theaters of military operations for the establishment of world domination.

At first glance, the Battle of Stalingrad was not directly related to Africa and the Middle East. But this is not the case. For the Axis powers, Africa and the Middle East were a natural barrier between Germany and Italy on the one hand and Japan on the other, as well as inexhaustible sources of oil. For the allied powers, North Africa and the Middle East were not only areas that protected the British Empire and prevented the unification of the enemy's armies, but also transit points through which weapons from the arsenals of the United States and Great Britain were delivered to Russia, China, and Southeast Asian countries. By retaining it, the allied Powers had a strategic advantage. The loss of it meant the cessation of joint actions of the Allies and sharply worsened the USSR's ability to wage a successful war.

GERMAN STRATEGIC PLANS FOR 1941

When invading the Soviet Union, the German leadership was confident that the war would be short-lived and bring an unconditional victory to the German troops. This, in particular, is the subject of the OKB (Supreme High Command of the German Armed Forces) Directive No. 32 of 19.06.1941. It gives an assessment of the likely situation in the world after the planned defeat of the armed forces of the Soviet Union and states that " Germany and Italy will dominate militarily on the entire European continent." Further, the directive defined the main strategic tasks for the end of autumn 1941 and winter 1941/42. These included, in particular, the fight "against British positions in the Mediterranean Sea and in the Middle East through a coordinated offensive, which is planned to be conducted from Libya through Egypt, from Bulgaria through Turkey, and also, depending on the situation, from Transcaucasia through Iran and Iraq with access to the Persian Gulf at Basra." Rommel's corps from Africa was to join forces in Iraq with the troops advancing from Transcaucasia and create a "closed European-North African bastion" for operations

The article is based mainly on documents of the High Command of the German Wehrmacht (army), published in two books by V. I. Dashichev [Dashichev, 1967; Dashichev, 1973].

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against the United States and England. In mid-May 1941. The OKH (German Land Forces Command) believed that an offensive from Libya to Egypt would require four tank and three motorized divisions [Dashichev, 1967, p. 191, 195, 200-201].

The operation from Bulgaria via Turkey was planned (point b) "to strike the British positions in the Suez Canal area also from the East." According to the directive (point c), after the collapse of the Soviet Union, a motorized expeditionary force will be sent from Transcaucasia to Iraq "in addition to the forces provided for in point b. Paragraph d referred to the use of " the Arab national Liberation Movement... at the right time." Coordination of all activities in the Arab territories was assigned to the "Special Headquarters F".

Paragraph 3 of the directive called for the capture of Gibraltar and the transfer of troops to Spanish Morocco to resume preparations for Operation Felix. During this operation, " the defense of the Atlantic coast of North and West Africa, the seizure of English possessions in West Africa and the territory controlled by de Gaulle are granted to the French." After the capture of West Africa, its naval and air bases are transferred to Germany.

The directive concludes (paragraph h) with a reference to the desirability of simultaneously launching an offensive against Gibraltar, Egypt, and Palestine [Dashichev, 1973, pp. 47-49].

Entering the war with the Soviet Union, the German command expected that victory in Russia would be achieved by August 1941, which would allow the withdrawal of troops from there, reducing their number from 209 to 175 divisions, as well as during November 1941 - September 1942 to capture the Caucasus and ensure the advance to Baghdad.

In the first weeks after the start of the war against the Soviet Union, the German command was optimistic about the situation. The document of June 30, 1941 indicated that an offensive from Libya to Egypt would be launched in the fall. It will involve four tank and three motorized divisions. For the invasion of Iraq through Transcaucasia, it was planned to create a Caucasus-Iran task force consisting of two tank, one motorized, and two mountain rifle divisions (supplement No. 24) [Dashichev, 1967, p.196; Dashichev, 1973, p. 43-44].

On July 3, 1941, the chief of the General Staff of the German Army, General Halder, wrote in his diary:"The operation through Anatolia against Syria, combined with the auxiliary operation from the Caucasus, will be launched after the deployment of the necessary forces in Bulgaria." The German command planned to prepare special formations prepared for operations in the Middle East and Africa. In particular, the OKB directive of 14.07.1941 (item b) stipulated that four tank divisions would be formed for operations in tropical conditions [Dashichev, 1973, p.196, 205].

In July 1941, a "Plan for an offensive through the Caucasus" was developed, which set out to capture the Caucasian oil regions and occupy the passes on the Iran-Iraq border by September 1942 for further advance to Baghdad.

The operation was planned to be carried out in six stages (estimated duration November 1941-September 1942).:

1. Mastering the areas of strategic deployment of forces in the North Caucasus (since November 1941).

2. Deployment of forces for the offensive through the Caucasus (until the end of May 1942).

3. Offensive through the Caucasus in two phases (July 1942).

4. Advance through Transcaucasia to the Araks.

5. Capture the initial positions in the Tabriz and Kermanshah areas for further access to the Iran-Iraq border.

6. Achieving the objective of the operation-capturing the border passes of Revanduz and Khanagan (July 4-6-early September 1942).

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The plan stated that the prerequisite for the second and third stages (the offensive through the Caucasus) is access to the Volga River in the winter of 1941-1942.

The Caucasus was planned to be overcome in three directions by large forces, including motorized ones:

a) by highway along the Black Sea coast through Tuapse, Sukhumi, Kutaisi, Batumi;

b) on the Georgian Military road Vladikavkaz-Tbilisi;

c) along the railway line near the coast of the Caspian Sea through Makhachkala, Derbent, and Baku (Dashichev, 1973, pp. 213-214).

The goals outlined in OKW Directive No. 32 became more specific as the situation on the Soviet-German front developed. After the capture of Smolensk, there were disagreements in the German leadership regarding the main direction of the further offensive. Generals W. von Brauchitsch and F. Halder insisted on the capture of Moscow, while Hitler preferred an offensive in the north and south of Russia. On August 21, 1941, a decision was made based on Hitler's position [Tippelskirch, 1956, pp. 190-191].

Hitler claimed that Moscow was the third most important city in the world. On the first was Leningrad, on the second-the South. At this stage, the prevailing view was that all three targets should be hit simultaneously. Nevertheless, on August 21, 1941, Hitler issued an order stating that the main task of the Wehrmacht before the onset of winter was not the capture of Moscow, but the capture of the Crimea, the Donbass and a rapid advance in the South.

In a note dated August 23, 1941, on the question of continuing operations on the Soviet-German front, Hitler noted:: "It is extremely necessary to reach the areas where Russia receives oil as soon as possible." Therefore, " the problem of Moscow in its significance significantly recedes into the background."

For the operation to capture the Donbass, southern Ukraine and Crimea, the 2nd tank group was allocated. Its turn to the South is first mentioned in the OKW Directive No. 33 of July 19, 1941 and in the supplement to it of July 23, 1941 [Dashichev, 1973, pp. 226,230,234-237].

THROW TO THE CAUCASUS

Germany's plans for a lightning war against the Soviet Union and the defeat of its army within six weeks failed. In the winter of 1941-1942, German troops were stopped and then driven back from Moscow. The leaders of the Wehrmacht transferred their hopes for victory to 1942. The general task was formulated by Hitler on March 15, 1942, speaking in Berlin: "The Soviets will be crushed this summer" (Warlimont, 1963, p. 86; Tippelskirch, 1956, p. 229).

By the spring of 1942, it was obvious that the Germans were unable to launch an offensive along the entire front. There was a problem of choosing whether to attack Moscow or the Caucasus. The capture of Moscow gave a military and political gain, while a rush to the Caucasus could bring additional economic benefits: coal, oil, and grain. A blow to the Caucasus inevitably required the capture of Stalingrad in order to eliminate the threat to the left flank of the German armies advancing on Kuban (Seth, 1959, pp. 29-31).

During the preparation of the operation for the summer campaign of 1942, the German leadership began to discuss with new acuteness the choice of the main target of the offensive - Moscow or the south of Russia. The generals were in favor of capturing Moscow, while Hitler preferred the southern direction [Warlimont, p. 85].

On November 19, 1941, Hitler instructed Halder about the priorities for 1942. In the first place was the Caucasus. The offensive there was supposed to begin in March-April. In the directive of December 8, Army Group South was assigned the task of reaching the lower reaches of the Don and Donetsk. However, even then it was obvious that the available forces are not enough

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On December 23, 1941, Hitler ordered the formation of six new divisions by the spring of 1942 to advance on Rostov and Maikop.

On January 3, 1942, in a conversation with the Japanese Ambassador, Hitler stated that "he intends, as soon as the weather is favorable, to resume the offensive in the direction of the Caucasus." He explained that "this direction is the most important... that it is necessary to go to the oil fields, as well as to Iran and Iraq... It will also help the Arab liberation movement achieve decisive success. Of course, he will also do everything possible to destroy Moscow and Leningrad." Hitler further informed the ambassador that Rommel's army in North Africa would become a strike group making a detour from the south [Dashichev, 1967, p. 367-368; Dashichev, 1973, p. 308-309; Warlimont, p. 85-86].

On March 15, 1942, Hitler, speaking in Berlin, threatened to liquidate the "Bolshevik colossus" in the summer of this year. In March 1942, Goebbels wrote in his diary: "The Fuhrer has a plan that will inevitably lead to victory. He intends to cut off the Caucasus and thereby deal the Soviets a blow at the most sensitive place" [Ziemke, Bauer, p. 283, 286 - 287, 289, 298].

Obviously, for Hitler in 1942, global strategic considerations were important. Putting forward the task of capturing Stalingrad and the Caucasus, he even said at the end of August that victory over Russia was a secondary matter. The main thing is the Middle East [Tippelskirch, 1956, p. 255].

The invasion of the Caucasus opened the way for German troops not only to the Middle East and Africa, but also to the countries of Southeast Asia. Hitler, who dreamed of a German victory flag on many continents, ordered on February 17, 1941, to develop a plan for an offensive through Afghanistan to India. OKH made the necessary calculations. On April 7, 1941, Halder approved a plan to capture Afghanistan "after the victorious Russian campaign." For this purpose, 17 divisions were allocated, including 3 tank and 4 motorized. The invasion of Afghanistan was supposed to be carried out after the capture of Gibraltar, Egypt, and the Middle East [Dashichev, 1967, p. 196; Dashichev, 1973, p. 44; Ibragimbeyli, 1977, p.66, 69, 142-143].

The Soviet command had some information about these plans. According to General I. V. Tyulenev, commander of the Transcaucasian Front, "the Caucasus also attracted Germans as a gateway to the Near and Middle East, to the countries of Asia Minor, and then to India" (Tyulenev, 1960, p.183). General SM. Shtemenko, who in 1942 was responsible for the Caucasian direction in the General Staff of the Red Army, writes that "by seizing the Caucasus, Hitler's aggression could expand further into Asia" [Shtemenko, p.52].

Intelligence of the Soviet Union quite correctly identified the plans of the German Army for the summer campaign of 1942. On March 18, 1942, the intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army presented a report on the alleged intentions of Germany for the summer, which, in particular, referred to the possible pressure of Germany on Turkey "in order to force it to allow German troops to enter the Caucasus." The report stated that the first goal of the Wehrmacht would be to capture the Caucasus and the Murmansk Railway, followed by the capture of the cities of Moscow and Leningrad. "The solution to these problems," the authors of the report continued, " would be the main strategic goal-isolating the USSR from its allies, depriving it of oil and, if not defeating it, then reducing it to the point where it loses all significance... The center of gravity of the spring offensive will be shifted to the southern sector of the front with an auxiliary strike in the north, while simultaneously demonstrating on the central front against Moscow " [Ziemke and Bauer, 1987, p. 302]. The report makes a very definite conclusion:

"Germany is preparing for a decisive offensive on the Eastern Front, which will first unfold in the southern sector and then spread to the north. For spring on-

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Germany, together with the Allies, will deploy up to 65 divisions... The most likely date for a spring offensive is mid-April or early May 1942" [Great Patriotic War, pp. 116-117].

On March 23, 1942, the state security agencies reported to the State Defense Committee:

"The main blow will be delivered in the southern sector with the task of breaking through Rostov to Stalingrad and the North Caucasus, and from there towards the Caspian Sea. In this way, the Germans hope to reach the sources of Caucasian oil. In case of success of the operation with access to the Volga at Stalingrad, the Germans planned to lead an offensive to the north along the Volga. This summer, the Germans will strive not only to reach the Volga and the Caspian Sea, but will also undertake major operations against Moscow and Leningrad, since their capture is a matter of prestige for the German command" [History of the Second World War..., p.112].

Germany did not rule out that the Russian leadership knew about the German plans for the summer of 1942. In mid-February 1942, the German high command was convinced that the summer offensive would not come as a surprise to the Russians. According to intelligence sources, he knew that back in December 1941 Marshal Timoshenko, commander of the Southwestern Front, suggested that the Germans would launch a new offensive in the south to break through to the oil. The German generals considered it an established fact that the Russians knew about the plans for the German summer offensive, but they were preoccupied with what retaliatory measures the Red Army would take. The general conclusion was that the Russian command, while developing plans for operations for the summer of 1942, had sufficient information about the enemy's intentions.

Based on these considerations, the Red Army command set the task for the troops in May-June 1942 to switch to active defense, and then, after exhausting the enemy and disrupting his plans for a general offensive, in about July to switch to broad offensive operations on the entire front from the Baltic to the Black Sea and achieve a decisive turn in the war in favor of the Soviet The Union. By the end of June 1942, it became clear that these optimistic forecasts were not justified, and the Soviet troops were forced to abandon " active defense "and switch to"strategic defense".

Along with general considerations about the importance of the offensive in the south, Hitler was guided by more specific calculations. He believed that an offensive on Stalingrad would cut the Soviet front in two and cut off the Caucasus from the central regions of Russia (Tippelskirch, 1956, p. IX). He believed that the southern theater of operations had obvious advantages for the actions of the German army. Fewer Soviet troops are concentrated there; the terrain allows for the use of large armored formations. This, in turn, will make it possible to cover and encircle the grouping of Soviet troops. Other circumstances were also taken into account. The seizure of the Donbass, Kuban, Lower Volga, and Caucasus strengthened Germany's military and economic base, deprived the USSR of ties with the outside world through Iran, and allowed it to draw Turkey into the war and launch an insurgency in Arab countries.

OKW Directive No. 41 of April 5, 1942 defined the plans for the summer campaign as follows:"The aim is to completely destroy the remaining forces at the disposal of the Soviets and deprive them, as far as possible, of the most important military and economic centers." To do this, it is necessary, "while maintaining the position in the central sector, to take Leningrad in the north and establish land communication with the Finns, and on the southern flank of the front to make a breakthrough to the Caucasus... All available forces should be concentrated to conduct the main operation in the southern sector with the aim of destroying the enemy west of the Don, then capturing the oil-bearing areas in the Caucasus and crossing the Caucasus Ridge." A deep breakthrough in the Caucasus is the "main operation". Paragraph 4 of the directive specifically stipulated that "the main task of the summer campaign was not to capture Stalingrad, but to capture the city of Stalingrad."-

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warring of the Caucasus with its oil fields". But before the attack on the Caucasus, it was necessary to destroy the Russian armed forces in the area west of Stalingrad [Fatal decisions..., pp. 413-414; Dashichev, 1973, pp. 309, 320-321].

The chief of the General Staff of the SV after F. Halder, Colonel-General K. Zeitzler, assessed the meaning of Directive No. 41 as follows:"When planning the summer offensive of 1942, Hitler intended first of all to capture Stalingrad and the Caucasus." The capture of Stalingrad and the crossing of the Volga allowed, in the opinion of this general, to cut off the main communications of Russia, the seizure of Caucasian oil would cover the needs of the German army for it. As a result, the situation in the east would have undergone fundamental changes, writes Zeitzler, "our hopes for a favorable outcome of the war would have greatly increased" [Fatal Decisions..., p. 195].

By April 11, 1942, the General Staff of the SV developed an offensive plan for the Caucasus on the basis of Directive No. 41. (This operation was originally codenamed "Siegfried". However, Hitler, faced with difficulties in implementing the Barbarossa plan, began to avoid the great names from German history and changed the code "Siegfried" to "Blau" on April 5, 1942, and "Braunschweig"on June 30.) The beginning of the operation was scheduled for the end of June [Varlimont, 1963, p. 88; Dashichev, 1973, p. 312; Ziemke and Bauer, 1987, p.336].

The operation began on June 28, 1942. In two divergent strategic directions, the 17th Army, as well as the 1st and 4th panzer armies, were attacking the Caucasus, and the 6th Army was attacking Stalingrad. During the fighting, it became clear that "the fate of the Caucasus will be decided at Stalingrad", and therefore the 4th Tank Army was transferred there [Dashichev, 1967, p. 374; Dashichev, 1973, p. 312-313; Results of the Second World War..., p. 127].

The armies advancing on the Caucasus and Stalingrad had 60 German divisions, which covered only 70% of the estimated needs. In this regard, the group was assigned allied formations (Romanians, Italians) - 25 divisions and brigades. But even with them, the size of the group was equal to 70 German divisions, which was also clearly not enough. 35 divisions were allocated for operations in the Caucasus. The intelligence Department of the General Staff of the German Armed Forces, in a note dated June 28, 1942, acknowledged that these forces were not enough to "conduct large-scale operations" [Dashichev, 1973, p. 311; Parotkin, 1961, p. 36].

OKW Directive No. 45 of July 23, 1942 "On the continuation of Operation Braunschweig" repeated the main provisions of Directive No. 41 of April 5, 1942. In particular, it stated: the immediate task is to encircle and destroy the enemy in the area south and southeast of Rostov; to capture the eastern coast of the Black Sea; to capture the area in the area of Maikop and Armavir and reach the passes through the Caucasus Range; to capture Grozny and strike along the Caspian coast to take Baku. At the same time, it was emphasized that during the operation, strikes on oil fields should not be applied, but oil transportation should be paralyzed. "For these operations," the directive stated, "the code name 'Edelweiss' is introduced instead of 'Blau IV'." Army Group B was assigned the task of capturing Stalingrad, reaching Astrakhan, and paralyzing traffic along the Volga. The opcode is "Fischreier" [Dashichev, 1967, p. 374, 388; Dashichev, 1973, p. 325-326; Ibragimbeyli, p. 76, 78, 162-163; Ziemke and Bauer, 1987, p.358-359].

Army Group A was aimed at the Caucasus. By the end of June 1942, Army Group A had 65 divisions, including 45 infantry and 11 tank divisions. It was also assigned 25 Allied divisions. The number of the group was about 1 million Germans, 300 thousand allies, it had 1,900 tanks. It was considered that 14 infantry and 6 tank divisions were fully ready for combat operations [Ziemke and Bauer, 1987, p. 324, 327, 329].

So, according to Directive No. 41, the main task of the 1942 summer campaign is "to capture the oil-bearing areas in the Caucasus and cross the Caucasus Ridge." The same idea was expressed by the Chief of the General Staff of the Army, General Halder, who wrote:

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in the diary: "The goal of the summer operation of 1942, in particular: Black Sea-closed Sea; to reach the line Batumi-Baku. Reach the North Caucasus in early September " [Dashichev, 1967, pp. 379-381].

Directive No. 41 was controversial, the main task of the campaign was called the Caucasus, but most of the troops were thrown at Stalingrad. This duality led to the dispersion of forces and resources [Dashichev, 1973, p. 310].

To hide the purpose of Operation Blau, the Germans stepped up preparations for a mock operation against Moscow (code-named "Kremlin"). Even many German officers believed in it. New maps of Moscow were sent to the troops, meetings of commanders of different levels were held, reconnaissance flights of aviation and the deployment of reconnaissance groups were intensified.

On July 19, 1942, Commander of the 6th Army, F. A. Paulus received Hitler's order to take Stalingrad. His army was separated from the city by 120 km. At the end of August 1942, German troops approached Stalingrad. However, contrary to expectations, it was not possible to take the city on the move. Persistent battles unfolded.

Faced with fierce resistance at Stalingrad, the German command took measures to transfer reinforcements there. On July 20, 1942, General A. Jodl, chief of Staff of the operational leadership of the OKB armed forces, recognized that the fate of the Caucasus would be decided at Stalingrad, and demanded that part of Army Group A's forces be transferred there. General V. List strongly objected to this, calling it an" adventure "to rush to the Caucasus with "weak forces". Nevertheless, on July 31, 1942, Hitler ordered the transfer of a significant part of Army Group A's forces to Stalingrad. According to Directive No. 45, General Goth moved three corps to Stalingrad, and Army Group B was reinforced with four German and four Romanian divisions. On August 1, 1942, the 4th Panzer Army launched an offensive on Stalingrad, turning northeast from Tsimlyanskaya and Remontnaya. Paulus and his 6th Army planned to launch an offensive from the Kalach area on August 8 [Ziemke and Bauer, 1987, pp. 363-365, 382].

On October 1, 1942, the German offensive on Stalingrad was completely exhausted. The generals acknowledged that the capture of the city was postponed until reinforcements arrived. On October 6, Hitler "confirmed that the complete occupation of Stalingrad was the main task of Army Group B." He suspended the movement to Astrakhan and returned the 14th Panzer Division to Stalingrad [Ziemke and Bauer, 1987, p. 397, 458].

On November 19, 1942, Soviet troops launched a counteroffensive near Stalingrad. On November 23, German troops were surrounded here. Hitler immediately moved a panzer division there from the Caucasus. Then some other units and formations were sent from the Caucasus to Stalingrad. On December 12, 1942, German troops attempted to unblock the 6th Army. On December 21, they were 45 km away from the city, but by December 23, their offensive was stalled [Fateful Decisions..., 2001, pp. 238, 247, 249-251].

According to Paulus, on January 20, 1943, he reported to the command that he was presented with an ultimatum to surrender. In response, the OKH said: "Surrender is excluded" - and offered to resist to the last, in order to " facilitate the creation of a new front in the Rostov region and further north and the withdrawal of the Caucasian army group." On January 30, 1943, Paulus ' 6th Army surrendered [Results of the Second World War..., 1957, p. 127; Dashichev, 1973, p. 382; Shtemenko, 1968, p.63].

The Battle for the Caucasus began on July 25, 1942. Army Group A was to cross from Rostov: Maikop is 270 km away, Grozny is 600 km away, and Baku is 1050 km away. At the first stage of the offensive, German troops achieved major successes. In July, they reached Krasnodar and Stavropol. In the first half of August 1942, they completely captured the Kuban, took Maikop, and reached Mozdok (August 25). The oil industry in Grozny and Baku is under threat. Hitler expected to take Baku by September 25.-

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menko, 1968, p. 55; Tyulenev, 1960, p. 186,222; Fateful decisions..., 2001, p. 145,196-198; Tippelskirch, 1994, p. 286-287; Ibragimbeyli, p. 72, 102; Ziemke and Bauer, 1987, p.366].

On August 4, 1942, the commander of Army Group A, General List, optimistically claimed that his troops would meet no serious resistance on their way to Baku. Great success was expected on the Black Sea coast. If the Germans had succeeded in taking Sukhumi, the defense north of Novorossiysk would have collapsed [Ziemke and Bauer, 1987, p. 370, 372].

On August 16-18, after overcoming the passes of the Main Caucasian Ridge, separate units of the Wehrmacht penetrated into Georgia. On September 5, Hitler ordered an attack on Tuapse after the capture of Novorossiysk. At the beginning of September 1942, Army Group A units were located 24 km from Grozny, 27 km from Gudauta, 30 km from Sukhumi, 60 km from Adler, 7 km from Novorossiysk, and 15 km from Anapa [Ibragimbeyli, 1977, p. 100 - 101,106,154; Shtemenko, 1968, p. 59; History of the Great Patriotic War..., 1967, p. 461].

Intoxicated by the success of the German troops, German propaganda rejoiced. On August 10, 1942, Berlin radio reported: "Events have taken place on the eastern front in the last 24 hours that will have a decisive impact on the outcome of the war. The Soviets have been dealt a new and devastating blow, the consequences of which still cannot be fully appreciated. German troops captured Krasnodar and Maikop" [Grechko, 1976, p. 456]. However, soon the advance of German troops slowed down to 2-3 km per day instead of the previous 50. In addition, the transfer of troops and aircraft from the Caucasus to Stalingrad and Leningrad began.

On September 6, the Germans broke into Novorossiysk, and Hitler ordered to continue the offensive on Tuapse and Sukhumi [Ziemke and Bauer, 1987, p. 373, 375, 377]. But there were not enough forces for a simultaneous offensive on Stalingrad and the Caucasus. In mid-August 1942, the advance of Army Group A slowed down and by the end of the month was clearly stalled. It became obvious that the grandiose tasks assigned to Army Group A could not be accomplished. The troops advanced with difficulty. There were no reserves. Tuapse, Sukhumi, and Kislovodsk were not taken. The Wehrmacht command was faced with a choice: either for the sake of the Caucasus to abandon Stalingrad, or for the sake of Stalingrad to abandon the Caucasus. But Hitler stubbornly insisted on solving both problems. On September 9, 1942, he removed the commander of Army Group A, Field Marshal List, assumed command, and began directing operations in the Caucasus through the headquarters of Army Group A in Donetsk [Ziemke and Bauer, 1987, pp. 377-378]. On September 10, Hitler gave the order to launch an offensive on Tuapse and later on Sukhumi. After completing this operation, it was necessary to take Grozny and move to Makhachkala.

By September 29, 1942, the German offensive in the Caucasus had run out of steam. German units were also stopped at Grozny. In addition, as early as September 10, 1942, in the area of the passes of the Central Caucasus, Soviet troops launched several attacks on German positions and by mid-October captured all of them [Ibragimbeyli, 1977, p. 90, 110-111].

It soon became clear to Hitler that the operation in the Caucasus had failed. By mid-October, the Tuapse-Sukhumi offensive was completely exhausted, and the passes could not be overcome. On October 14, 1942, Hitler issued operational Order No. 1 on the transition to strategic defense in the Caucasus [Tippelskirch, 1956, p. IX]. The order said: "This year's summer and autumn campaigns... completed. Major results have been achieved... The enemy has been driven back to the Caucasus and Don, and the central part of Russia is mostly cut off from the Caucasus regions." The task was set for the winter of 1942/43: to hold the achieved frontiers and "create prerequisites for the continuation of our offensive in 1943 in order to finally destroy our most dangerous enemy" [Dashichev, 1973, p.314, 322].

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At the beginning of January 1943, Soviet troops launched a general offensive against the German group in the Caucasus. Under their pressure, on January 5, 1943, the German units began to retreat hastily. Their situation became critical, taking into account the changed situation near Stalingrad [Mellentin, 1952, p. 179; Grechko, 1976, p. 386; Tyulenev, 1960, p.218,250].

On December 13, 1942, Soviet troops made a breakthrough in the area of the middle Don River and rushed to Rostov. Army Group A was under threat of encirclement. According to General Zeitzler, Chief of the General Staff of the SV, in mid-December 1942, it became clear that the group in the Caucasus would face encirclement if Rostov was captured by the Russians. "Soon we will have to survive the second Stalingrad," this general gloomily stated [Fateful decisions..., 2001, p. 258, 278; Mellenthin, 1952, p. 170].

This breakthrough threatened to encircle and isolate Army Group A. On the night of December 27-28, Zeitzler reported to Hitler: "If you do not immediately order the withdrawal of troops from the Caucasus, a new Stalingrad will arise there." The same opinion was shared by the commander of the 17th Army, who claimed that if the troops were not quickly withdrawn, "we will have to survive the second Stalingrad" [Grechko, 1976, p. 449]. Hitler agreed to the plan for the withdrawal of troops from the Caucasus [Dashichev, 1967, pp. 426-427].

Operational order of the Wehrmacht Headquarters No. 2 of December 28, 1942 read:: "Army Group A, while maintaining its positions along the coast and in the mountains, will gradually begin to withdraw to the "reduced borders", leaving behind a scorched earth" [Dashichev, 1973, p. 367-368].

Instead of a planned retreat, a hasty flight began. With great difficulty, General E. von Kleist managed to get Army Group A across the Don River in its lower reaches. He insisted on its withdrawal, contrary to Hitler's opinion. As a result, the Germans saved the 1st tank and 17th field armies [Fateful decisions..., 2001, p. 257-259; Tippelskirch, 1956, p.264; Results of the Second World War..., 1957, p. 127-129; Dashichev, 1973, p. 371, sn.].

At the beginning of February 1943, the 17th Army consisted of three army corps, one mountain rifle corps and one cavalry corps. In total, ten infantry divisions, four mountain infantry divisions, two light infantry divisions, one tank division, one motorized division, one air field division, and two cavalry divisions operated against the North Caucasus Front. During the retreat from the Main Caucasian Ridge to Krasnodar, the Germans lost 270 tanks, more than 260 guns, and 70 aircraft. Our troops captured 400 tanks, 827 guns, 144 aircraft, and about 10,000 vehicles [Grechko, 1976, pp. 451,457,464-465].

So, the German attempt to simultaneously achieve two goals-to take Stalingrad and break through the Caucasus to the Middle East-failed, because these tasks entailed a dispersion of forces, led to stretched communications and inevitable interruptions in supply [Fateful Decisions..., 2001, pp. 436-449].

Summing up the results of the Wehrmacht offensive in the Caucasus, a prominent researcher of the problem F. Mellentin wrote:

"The German offensive in the summer of 1942 could have led to important results if Hitler had not dispersed his efforts between two main goals: Stalingrad and the Caucasus. As a result, his armies reached the Caucasus, but did not capture the oil fields, reached the Volga to Stalingrad, but did not capture the city. As a result, the Russian armies were not only not defeated, but even managed to carry out a counteroffensive with unprecedented superiority in manpower and equipment." Elsewhere, this author noted: "In the autumn of 1942, Hitler made a grave mistake... The dispersion of forces between the Caucasus and Stalingrad led to the collapse of the entire campaign "[Mellenthin, 1952, p. 145, 291].

Concluding the article on the offensive of German troops in the Caucasus, we should focus on one more aspect of this action - Germany's interaction with opposition forces in the Arab countries of the Middle East and North Africa. I will pay attention to

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mentioned in Directive No. 32 of 19 June 1941 "Special Headquarters F" and its contacts with the liberation movement in Arab countries. They indicate the seriousness of German intentions in the Middle East and Africa and the early preparation for their implementation.

"Special Staff F" was established in May 1941, headed by General of Aviation G. Felmi. It was charged with recruiting indigenous agents for operations in the Middle East and Africa. The headquarters was located in Greece at Cape Suinon and trained scouts and saboteurs from among the Arabs. The staff consisted of 20 officers and 200 non-commissioned officers. Under him, a "288 unit" was created for operations in the desert, which should become the basis of the Arab armed forces loyal to Germany. By August 29, 1941, "Unit 288" numbered 2,200 soldiers. On August 20, 1942, the "Special Headquarters F" was deployed to the "Special Corps F" and transferred to Donetsk. After the capture of Tbilisi, it was supposed to send it to Western Iran and Iraq with access to the Persian Gulf at Basra, in order to connect there with Rommel, advancing from Egypt. By October 3, the six-thousandth corps was concentrated in Donetsk. The 3rd battalion of this corps consisted entirely of Arabs (1 thousand fighters). His soldiers were recruited mainly from among the 10,000 Arabs captured by Rommel's troops in the battles in Libya and Egypt. October 15, 1942 "Special Corps F" for the first time took part in the battles in the North Caucasus. On October 16-17, he fought on the Kuma River. Several Arabs were captured by the Soviets. Along with the Arabic language, the Germans planned to create an "Indian legion" from among the prisoners of war (Ibragimbeyli, 1977, p. 4). 121, 124, 126 - 128, 139, 149 - 150, 153,157, 277].

On June 21, 1941, the OKB approved instructions according to which the" Special Headquarters F "headed by General Felmi became"the central authority on all issues of the Arab world concerning the Wehrmacht." It was supposed to be "included in all planning and all activities on the Arab territory" [Dashichev, 1967, p. 191; Dashichev, 1973, p. 44].

Soviet intelligence established the presence of an Arab contingent as part of the advancing German troops and assigned it the name "Sonderstab G". The commander of the Transcaucasian Front, General Tyulenev, defined it as " the Afrika Korps... designed to connect with General Rommel, who was operating in Egypt at that time" [Tyulenev, 1960, p. 181]. Another Soviet general, A. A. Grechko, described him in much the same way. In his book, he reports that a special purpose corps was advancing in the reserve of Army Group A. It was intended for operations in the Middle East and connections with the troops operating in Egypt under the command of General Rommel [Grechko, 1976, p. 278]. This opinion was shared by General SM. Shtemenko [Shtemenko, 1968, pp. 70-71].

However, this assessment was not immediately formed. The first reports of scouts spoke of a mysterious unit that moved only at night. Its soldiers were swarthy brown, not at all like the Germans, and spoke an " unknown language." On the sleeve of the soldiers of this unit were "oval badges with the image of a palm tree on yellow sand and the rising sun, a black swastika and a large Latin letter" F "" [Zakrutkin, 1970, pp. 14-15].

The German leadership for several years flirted with opposition forces in the Arab colonies of Great Britain and France. On May 2, 1941, an uprising broke out in Iraq against Great Britain, whose leaders, in the person of Rashid Ali al-Ghailani, turned to Germany for help. On May 21, 1941, the latter decided to send a military mission to Iraq, headed by General Felmi, consisting of 40 officers and non-commissioned officers. But a few days later, Hitler canceled this order [Ibrahimbayli, 1977, pp. 61-63, 125].

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On May 23, 1941, Hitler issued the Middle East directive on military assistance to Iraq. "The forces of the Arab liberation movement,"he said," are a natural ally of Germany in its struggle against Great Britain, and the uprising in Iraq is particularly important." In accordance with this directive, a small air unit was sent to Iraq via Syria (Butler, 1959, p.428).

On May 12, 1941, it became known in London that Axis planes had arrived in Damascus to support the uprising in Iraq. June 8, 1941 Britain has sent troops to Syria and Lebanon to prevent these countries from falling under German control. Thanks to the energetic measures taken, the uprising in Iraq was suppressed on June 1, and on July 12, 1941, the fighting in Syria was stopped [Tippelskirch, 1994, p. 284; Butler, 1959, p. 475, 477, 479, 561 - 567].

It is impossible not to pay attention to the synchronicity of the uprisings in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon with the plans of the German invasion of the Middle East through the Caucasus and Egypt. But even after the suppression of the uprisings in Iraq and Syria, the interest of the Germans in cooperation with Arab nationalists did not weaken. So, on November 28, 1941, Hitler met with the Grand Mufti of Palestine, al-Husseini, the ideological inspirer of the pro-German Arab nationalists. In early December 1941, former Iraqi Prime Minister Ali al-Ghailani arrived in Berlin. He met with Ribbentrop (Ibragimbeyli, 1977, pp. 48,130-131).

H. M. Ibrahimbeyli reports that in the autumn of 1941 a general Arab uprising was being prepared in the Middle East. The signal for this should have been the entry of German troops into Tbilisi (Ibragimbeyli, 1977, pp. 142-149).

STALINGRAD AND THE CAUCASUS-TURNING POINTS OF THE WAR

During the summer offensive of 1942, the Germans achieved major victories on the fronts in the Soviet Union and Africa. But in November, dramatic changes began. On November 3, the British attacked El Alamein, on November 8, Anglo-American troops landed in Algeria and Morocco, and on November 19, Soviet troops launched an offensive near Stalingrad. After November 1942, the Axis powers were on the defensive on all fronts [Ziemke and Bauer, 1987, p. 513].

The conquest of the Caucasus, the invasion of Iran and Iraq, the establishment of contact with the Japanese armed forces, the involvement of Turkey in the war, access to the Middle East and the threat to Africa-all these turned out to be unfulfilled dreams. The summer campaign of 1942 ended in collapse - the defeat at Stalingrad and a stampede from the Caucasus. "An unprecedented military catastrophe was inevitably approaching the German troops of the southern wing of the Soviet-German front" [Dashichev, 1967, p.377-378; Dashichev, 1973, p. 315].

Soviet military leaders highly appreciate the significance of the battle for the Caucasus. General I. V. Tyulenev considers it "one of the largest and most important in its significance not only in the history of the Great Patriotic War, but also in the history of the Second World War as a whole" [Ibragimbayli, 1977, p.3].

General A. A. Grechko, having analyzed the entire course of the battle for the Caucasus, writes that the main goal of the German summer campaign in 1942 was to break through to the Caucasus. "With a breakthrough in the Transcaucasus," notes A. A. Grechko, "Hitler also hoped to draw Turkey into the war against the Soviet Union, unite with Rommel's troops operating in North Africa, and then advance on India" [Grechko, 1976, pp. 361-362]. At the same time, according to the Soviet general, for the German army "it was an adventure to strive for success simultaneously in the Stalingrad direction and in the Caucasus" [Grechko, 1976, p.560].

The victory at Stalingrad and in the Caucasus, according to General A. A. Grechko, thwarted Hitler's plans for "penetration into the countries of the Near and Middle East", in Central and South-East Asia ,and also " facilitated the victory in North Africa.

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General Rommel's army" [Grechko, 1976, p. 146, 164, 559]. General SM. Shtemenko notes that the outcome of the battle for the Caucasus predetermined the failure of Hitler's plans to "open his way to the Middle East" [Shtemenko, 1968, p. 61].

How did the leaders of the Soviet Union and its ally Great Britain react to Germany's plans for the summer campaign of 1942? J. V. Stalin had information that the plans of the German command included capturing Stalingrad on July 25 and Baku on September 25 [Stalin, 1953, p. 65; Parotkin, 1961, p.31-32]. At the same time, Russian historians admit that the high command of the Red Army incorrectly determined the direction of the enemy's main attack. "Instead of concentrating forces in the zone of operations of the South-Western and Southern fronts... - it is said in the fundamental research about the war, - Stavka continued to strengthen the central sector of the front... covering the direction to Moscow via Tula" [History of the Great Patriotic War..., 1961, p. 404].

As for Great Britain, its generals knew about the plans of the Germans to break through the Caucasus. This topic was discussed by the Joint Anglo-American Joint Chiefs of Staff on March 3, 1942 [Ibrahimbayli, 1977, p. 77]. British generals were seriously concerned that the Germans would cross the Caucasus and break into Iran and the Middle East at the end of August 1942. They did not rule out that at the same time Rommel would force the Suez Canal and invade Palestine, and that German connections from Crete and the Dodecanese (Greece) would enter Syria (Tippelskirch, 1956, p.255).

In mid-August 1942, while in Moscow, Churchill proposed to deploy Anglo-American air forces in the Caucasus in the Baku and Batumi regions. According to Churchill, the goal is to create an "advanced barrier to protect our interests" in Iran (Matloff and Snell, 1955, p. 380, 382).

Commenting on Churchill's proposal, General P. I. Bodin, a representative of the Stavka, in an interview with General Tyulenev in September 1942, said:: "The Allies are trying to take advantage of our difficult situation on the fronts and wrest consent to the deployment of British troops in Transcaucasia. This, of course, cannot be allowed... The hopes of Hitler and the desires of the Allies must be buried" [Ziemke and Bauer, 1987, p. 434; Shtemenko, 1968, p.58].

On October 8, Roosevelt supported Churchill's proposal. However, on December 20, 1942 Stalin rejected this plan "because the critical situation in the Caucasus has passed" (Matloff and Snell, 1955, p. 380, 383, 387).

Moving south and southwest, German forces hoped to capture Iran, Iraq, and Palestine, force the Suez Canal, and occupy North Africa. Heading south-east, the German army hoped to subdue Afghanistan and make contact with Japanese forces in India. As a result of these successes, a completely different military-strategic situation would arise in the world. The Mediterranean Sea would become the inner basin of the Axis powers. Great Britain would be deprived of short and convenient routes to communicate with its colonies and allies in Asia. Germany would have the largest oil fields in its hands. One of the most important corridors for the delivery of weapons to the Soviet Union through Iran would be blocked. These and many other advantages would allow the Axis powers to be more optimistic about a favorable outcome of World War II.

All these hopes were buried by the outcome of the Battle of Stalingrad and the failure of the offensive in the Caucasus. The defeat at Stalingrad and in the Caucasus, coinciding with the failure of the plan to capture Cairo, the Suez Canal and access to the expanses of the Middle East from North Africa, buried Germany's dreams of world domination and became a harbinger of its inevitable defeat. Therefore, it can be argued that the fate of the Middle East and Africa, in particular, was decided at Stalingrad.

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list of literature

Butler D. Big strategy. September 1939-June 1941. Moscow, 1959.

Warlimont V. O strategicheskikh planakh germanskogo komandovaniya na 1942 g. [On the strategic plans of the German Command for 1942]. Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal, Moscow, 1963, No. 11.

The Great Patriotic War, Moscow, 1973.

Grechko A. A. Years of War. Moscow, 1976.

Dashichev V. I. Bankruptcy of the strategy of German fascism. Historical essays. Documents and materials. Vol. 2. Moscow, 1973.

Dashichev V. I. " Top secret. Just for command purposes!" The strategy of fascist Germany in the war against the USSR. Documents and materials. Moscow, 1967.

Zakrutkin V. A. Kavkazskie zapiski 1942-1943 [Caucasian Notes of 1942-1943]. Rostov-on-Don, 1970.

Ibrahimbeyli H. M. The collapse of "Edelweiss" and the Middle East. Moscow, 1977.

History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union. 1941-1945. Vol. 2. Moscow, 1961.

Istoriya Vtoroi mirovoi voyny 1939-1945 [History of the Second World War 1939-1945].

Results of the Second World War. Collection of articles, Moscow, 1957.

Mellenthin F. Tank battles of 1939-1945. Moscow, 1952.

Matloff, M. and Snell, E. Strategic Planning in the Coalition War of 1941-1942, Moscow, 1955.

Parot'kin I. V. O planov letnoi campaii nechko-fascistskogo komandovaniya na sovetsko-germanskom fronte v 1942 g. [On the plans of the summer campaign of the German-fascist command on the Soviet-German front in 1942]. Voenno-istoricheskiy zhurnal, Moscow, 1961, No. 1.

Fatal decisions. The campaign to Stalingrad. St. Petersburg, 2001.

Stalin I. V. On the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union (Reports, speeches, speeches and orders). Moscow, 1953.

Tippelskirch K. History of the Second World War. Moscow, 1956.

Tippelskirch K. History of the Second World War. Vol. 2. SPb., 1994.

Tyulenev I. V. Through three wars. Moscow, 1960.

SEE Shtemenko. The Soviet General Staff during the war. Moscow, 1968.

Seth R. Stalingrad - Point of Return. L., 1959.

Ziemke E. F., Bauer M. E. From Moscow to Stalingrad: Decision in the East. Wash., 1987.

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