Before proceeding to this topic, it is worth reminding readers of the main milestones in the history of South Africa. The process of creating a racial state in South Africa began in the 18th century. Dutch colonists-Boers-turned the local population into slaves, and also brought slaves from their possessions in what is now Indonesia and from other parts of Africa. As a result of their mixing with whites, an ethnic group of "colored people"was gradually formed. Since 1880, parties of emigrants from India, recruited to work on sugar plantations in Natal, have been arriving in Durban. Thus, more than a century ago, four major racial groups emerged in South Africa: Africans, who made up the majority of the population, whites, "colored" people, and Indians. The colonial authorities, and then the ruling circles of the Union of South Africa created in 1910, which became a dominion within the British Empire, generally adhered to the principle of segregation. The Parliament and Government of South Africa (since 1961-the Republic of South Africa) consisted only of whites.

In 1948, the National Party (NP) came to power in the Union of South Africa, declaring a policy of "separate development" of various racial groups-the so-called apartheid. Resistance to harsh racist laws was led by the African National Congress (ANC), which soon after its ban was forced to switch to the use of an armed form of struggle.

In December 1961, a new organization, Umkonto ve Sizwe (Spear of the Nation), which later became officially recognized as the armed wing of the ANC, declared its existence in a series of sabotage bombings. Its commander was a prominent ANC figure, Nelson Mandela. After making a trip abroad on behalf of the Congress in 1962 to mobilize support for the ANC, Mandela returned illegally to South Africa, but was soon captured by the police in Natal. And in July 1963, the police arrested a group of other prominent leaders of the Congress and the Umkonto organization, who were soon sentenced along with Mandela to life in prison. Under these circumstances, the leadership of the ANC and Umkonto passed to the part of their leaders who were in exile. Over the years, they have made generally unsuccessful attempts to send trained personnel and weapons to the country. The "cordon sanitaire" that separated South Africa from independent African states remained in place until the mid-1970s, when the military and political situation in southern Africa changed dramatically.

A turning point in the struggle of Africans for their rights was the uprising in the black suburb of Johannesburg-Soweto (where up to two million people lived), which began after the police shooting of a peaceful demonstration of schoolchildren on June 16, 1976. After this event, thousands of young Africans left South Africa and joined the ranks of the ANC, primarily as Umkonto fighters. resumed and ras-

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expanded operations on South African territory. The success of the armed actions of this organization, in addition to achieving purely military goals, demonstrated the vulnerability of the regime, created a psychological climate that contributed to the rise of mass political struggle. At the same time, the international movement against apartheid was expanding; Western countries were also forced to impose sanctions against the Pretoria regime, although limited.

South African popular pressure, combined with the support of the international community, as well as the ANC's military actions at home, forced the ruling National Party to change both its leadership and its course. Addressing the opening session of the South African Parliament on February 2, 1990, President F. De Klerk announced the lifting of the ban on the activities of the Congress, the South African Communist Party and a number of other organizations. Mandela and other ANC leaders were released from prison. Preliminary and then official negotiations on a political settlement began, culminating in the approval in November 1993 of the draft interim constitution of South Africa, which was to be put into effect after the general elections. The term of its validity was limited to two years, and during this time a new, permanent constitution was to be developed. To this end, in addition to exercising its normal functions, the Parliament was to constitute itself as a Constituent Assembly consisting of 490 members (400 deputies of the National Assembly and 90 senators). An important part of the compromise reached was that the Constituent Assembly was bound by constitutional principles that could not be violated in drafting a permanent constitution. They included, in particular, the guarantee of the preservation of private property. It was this circumstance, reinforced by the adoption of the "Bill of Rights", that largely ensured the acceptability of a political settlement for the majority of the white population. It thus largely maintained its position in the South African economy, although it relinquished most of its political power [Asmal, 1995, p. 13].

The negotiated Constitution established 11 official languages: Afrikaans, English, Isindebele, North and South Soto, Siswati (Swazi), Shitsonga, Setswana, Chiwenda, Xhosa, and Zulu (Asmal, 1995, p.13). This provision was also preserved in the permanent Constitution of 1996. The President, his deputies and ministers, limited to 27, formed the Cabinet. At the same time, any party that won 20 seats in the Constituent Assembly (that is, received 5% of the vote) was entitled to participate in the "Government of National Unity" in proportion to the number of seats received [Asmal, 1995, p.50]. The distribution of portfolios and the appointment of ministers was carried out by the President after consultation with his deputies and the leaders of the parties that entered the Government [Asmal, 1995, p.52]. The posts of deputy ministers were distributed in the same proportion [Asmal, 1995, p. 56], and this situation could be maintained for five years, that is, for three years after the adoption of a permanent constitution.

In the first general election in the country's history, in April 1994, the ANC won 62.65%, while the former NP won only 20.34%. Almost half as much went to the Inkata Freedom Party (IFP) - 10.54%, based mainly on a part of the Zulus. In addition, the ANC won a majority in the legislative bodies of seven of the country's nine provinces.

On May 9, 1994, the first meeting of the National Assembly was held, and Nelson Mandela was unanimously elected President of the country. The posts of deputy Presidents were taken by T. Mbeki and F. De Klerk. Following this, N. Mandela formed a Government of national unity. The number of seats in it was distributed in accordance with the norms provided for in the Constitution. However, the most important posts are

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ANKH left it behind. A. Nzo, who served as the ANC Secretary General for a long time, became the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and J. Abramovich became the Minister of Defense. Modise, who was previously the commander of Umkonto we Sizwe ,and his only deputy is a white member of the ANC leadership, R. Kasrils, the Minister of Security (police) is a prominent trade unionist, S. Mufamadi, and the Minister of Justice is a prominent former member of the MLF, D. Kasrils. Omar. At the same time, the compromise nature of the political settlement and the ANC's refusal to make radical changes in the economy were reflected in the retention of the post of Finance Minister, which he held in the government of the National Party. Former Foreign Minister P. Botha was appointed Minister of Mines and Energy, leading the NP's" team " in the negotiations. R. Meyer was appointed Minister of Constitutional Development and Provincial Administration. Inkata leader G. Buthelezi was appointed Interior Minister. It should be noted that in South Africa, this position is significantly less important than in most other countries, since the Minister does not report to the law enforcement forces.

On May 24, 1994, Nelson Mandela addressed a joint session of both Houses of Parliament. His speech was mainly devoted to the "South Africa Reconstruction and Development Program" [South Africa Foundation Review, 1994, May / June, p. 2], which became not only the election platform of the ANC and its allies - the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the South African Communist Party (UACP), the South African National Community Organization (SANSCO), which unites citizens, mainly Africans, by place of residence , but also the basis for the government's program of socio-economic development of the country.

April-May 1994 brought to an end not only the four-year period of negotiations on the elimination of apartheid by political means, but also the long-term struggle against it, which was waged in various forms and for several decades by the country's liberation forces. The formation of the first democratic government in the country's history was well received in the world and led to the complete lifting of economic and political sanctions against South Africa, which should have had a positive impact on the country's economy. However, the process of creating a non-racial State in South Africa did not end with the holding of general elections and the creation of a new Government. This only served to establish the legal and political foundations of such a State - a provisional constitution was adopted and a general understanding was reached on this issue between the leading political forces.

The next step in consolidating the country's democratic structure was the adoption of the permanent Constitution of South Africa in 1996, which came into effect on February 4, 1997. It is similar in many ways to the interim constitution, but instead of the Senate, the National Council of Provinces (CNP) was created in accordance with its provisions, designed to coordinate the actions of all regions of the country. There was also no provision in the new constitution on the mandatory appointment to the Government of representatives of parties that received at least 5% of the vote. However, the NP announced its withdrawal from the Government in June 1996, that is, before the five-year term of office expired.

In November 1994, the Program for Reconstruction and Development (PRD), with some changes, was adopted by the Parliament as a law. Its main task in the social sphere was to solve the most acute housing problem by building cheap houses and providing the minimum necessary services (access to drinking water, electrification of settlements where blacks lived - a large part of the country's population). It was also planned to significantly expand access to education and health care for the general public. As a priority, it was supposed to provide 3 million people with drinking water; to build one million residential buildings.

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cheap homes and electrify 300,000 homes, which can be done without significantly increasing costs [South Africa..., 1996, p. 10]. This social orientation of the PRR was largely due to the fact that the original proposal for its adoption was put forward by COSATU.

However, the implementation of the Program was far from an easy task, including due to the fact that the economic situation in South Africa at the beginning of its implementation was extremely unfavorable. Thus, according to the Chamber of Entrepreneurs of South Africa (SACOB) in mid-1994, out of 40.3 million South Africans, more than 17 million lived below the poverty line, and about seven million lived in shacks. At the same time, almost half of the working-age population worked in the informal sector of the economy. Gradually, some pressing problems of the population began to be solved. Thus, according to the data presented in the Parliament in February 1998, 400,000 houses were built during the years of implementation of the PRR, and it was expected that only 700,000 houses would be built by 1999 [ITAR-TASS Daily Bulletin, 11.02.1998]. By mid-1999, one million state housing subsidies had been distributed [Star, 29.06.1999]. It is also important that the South African Government managed to provide drinking water to one million people between April 1994 and January 1997, i.e., in the first three years after the first democratic elections [Business Report, 21.05.1997].

The employment situation remained challenging. Thus, according to official data, only in 1996 33% of the population were unemployed. The commodity sector was able to claim only 53% of the labor force, down from 80% in 1983. Approximately one and a half million people as of the end of 1996 stopped looking for work, as they were desperate to find it [Business Day, 28.11.1996].

In addition, the national currency, the rand, was declining: 1 dollar in January 1998 was 4.89 rand [Pretoria News, 20.01.1998] (for comparison, in October 1994, 1 dollar was 3.31 rand) [Star, 10.10.1994]. Under such circumstances, instead of creating new jobs, their number decreased. Thus, in the five years from 1994 to 1999, 500 thousand people lost their jobs in the private sector alone. [South Africa..., 2001]. According to Sowetan, the largest newspaper in South Africa aimed at African readers, from 1994 to 1999, life improved for only four million black South Africans, and for the rest it significantly worsened [Sowetan, 23.05.1999].

In this context, although the PRR has not yet been implemented, it has actually been replaced by a new program - " Growth, Employment and Redistribution. Macroeconomic Strategy " (abbreviated as RZP, or GEAR in English) [Growth, Employment..., 1996], proposed by the APK for the first time on June 14, 1996 and finally approved by the Government of the country in January 1998. It assigned the role of the main link in the economy to the large private and public sectors, and assumed that with an increase in the welfare of the entire population, the unemployment rate would decrease, the country's income and wealth would gradually be redistributed in favor of blacks in order to narrow the existing gap (on average, per capita incomes of whites are several times higher than those of blacks) and avoid a public explosion with the inevitable violent redistribution of property.

At the same time, the WPP program provided for the rapid development of small and medium-sized production, which would lead to a reduction in unemployment, increase the income of the most disadvantaged strata, and create enterprises owned by Africans. It was also planned to increase tax revenues to the state treasury from 27.2% to 29.0% of GDP, and reduce domestic and external debt [World Development, p. 994-995]. One of the differences between the new program and the PRR was that in the budgets adopted after its approval from 1997 to 2003, the main emphasis was placed on raising taxes for companies and at the same time provided for a reduction in the number of employees.-

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It was aimed at reducing the tax burden for the least affluent segments of society. Spending on the armed forces and the state apparatus was restricted, indirect taxes on gasoline, tobacco, and alcohol were introduced, and tax rates on private companies were raised [Cherkasova, 2000, pp. 186-200].

However, the first results of the implementation of the REA program were unfavorable, and the economy began to experience serious disruptions. Thus, GDP growth declined from 3.2% in 1996 to 1.7% (according to other sources-to 1.8%) in 1997 and to 0.1% in 1998, instead of the planned 3.5%, 2.9%, and 3.8% per year, respectively. (There is no doubt that the Asian financial crisis of 1997 also had an impact here.) At the same time, according to economists ' calculations, in order to significantly reduce the unemployment rate, economic growth of about 5% per year was necessary [South Africa..., 1996, p. 95]. The commodity sector lost 71,000 jobs in 1996, 252,000 in 1997, and 246,000 in 1998. Investment in the private sector decreased from 6.1% to 3.1% and even to -0.7% in 1998 (instead of the predicted 9.3, 9.1 and 9.3%). In 1997, foreign direct investment in industry amounted to $ 1.7 billion, and the export of foreign capital from industry - $ 2.3 billion. Savings among the population decreased from 18% in 1996 to 14% in 1998. The budget deficit increased from 1.3% in 1996 to 2.1% in 1998 [Bond, p. 193]. According to the WIP program, it was planned to create one million jobs by 2000, but about 450,000 people were added to the labor market annually, and unemployment increased accordingly [South African Yearbook..., 1999/2000, p. 17 - 18, 21 - 22].

The reason for unemployment was tried to explain the stagnation in the economy in the last years of the apartheid regime. GDP growth in the first years after the change of power and the influx of foreign investment, although not very significant, were expected to reduce the unemployment rate, but this did not happen. The absence of an inverse relationship between economic growth and the decline in the number of unemployed during the scientific and technological revolution dispelled hopes for "automatic" employment growth. Even if the government's plans were implemented, new jobs would not be able to absorb several hundred thousand young people who reached working age every year. At the end of 1997, at least 7 out of 10 young South Africans aged 20 to 29 were unemployed [Citizen, 3.11.1997].

But perhaps the most damning figures for favorable forecasts of the country's economic development showed a direct correlation between the increase in wages and the growth of unemployment in the country. Their increase is a constant demand of trade unions and seems justified, especially when you consider that for every employee in South Africa there are several dependents-close or even distant relatives. But according to the World Bank and a study conducted by Nobel Prize-winning economist Robert Lucas, it was claimed that a 10% increase in the salary of black workers could lead to a 7.1% decrease in the employment rate in South Africa [Business Day, 17.11.1997]. In this context, the largest trade union association, COSATU, in May 1998 blamed the "monetarist" policy and program of the REM for the loss of existing jobs and the inability to create new ones [Business Day, 11.05.1998].

Special mention should be made of the fact that one of the reasons for the high unemployment rate in the country was the massive influx of illegal immigrants to South Africa, primarily from neighboring countries. This increased competition in the labor market and reduced wages, especially in the informal economy. Illegal immigrants came mainly from neighboring countries, in particular Mozambique, whose economy was severely affected by the civil war and direct military operations against it, unleashed by the white government of South Africa. Measures to expel them were taken vigorously. For example, the total number of illegal immigrants deported to their home countries

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from South Africa, only in 1992, there were 82575 people [Citizen, 13.05.1993], in 1993 - 96600 people, in 1995-157 thousand people [Pretoria News, 12.03.1993], in 1997-176 351 people [Star, 30.06.1998], but this did not save the situation. Entrepreneurs willingly used the working hands of immigrants, as the newcomers were willing to work for a meager salary. The exact number of these" illegal immigrants "cannot be determined, but even a "conservative" estimate puts them at 2-3 million, with 70% of them from Mozambique and 25% from Zimbabwe [Star, 6.12.1996].

As early as 1913, a law was passed in South Africa that assigned 87% of the land to white owners. And now the land is still mostly in the hands of white farmers. On average, one white person owned 222 hectares of land, compared to 0.6 hectares for an African. (In other words, the amount of land per person for whites, on average, exceeded this indicator for blacks by 370 times. At the same time, only 4% of black farmers used the means of mechanization in their farms.

The democratic government that came to power in 1994 recognized the need to start redistributing land, although it understood that if ill-considered steps could lead not only to the undermining of agriculture, but also to food shortages. However, without much damage to high-commodity agricultural production, it would be possible to start redistributing primarily unused, as well as low-income land. However, the government did not hurry with the redistribution, and today it can be considered as one of the most significant mistakes of the then leadership of the country.

More than 80% of agricultural land is still in white hands. From 1994 to 2000, only 12,150 people were granted the right to return land forcibly taken from them during the apartheid period, although more than 3.9 million people had already submitted similar requests for the return of land [ITAR-TASS Daily Bulletin, 18.05.2001]. Criticism of the slow and "cautious" land redistribution process has been particularly strong since Zimbabwe began transferring white-owned farms to Africans. Given this experience, the current President of South Africa, Thabo Mbeki, specifically emphasized that in 1999-2001, 29 thousand lawsuits were considered and satisfied, most of them in 2001, which significantly exceeded the figures of 1994 - 2000 [South African Embassy..., 2002].

Among the country's social problems, it is necessary to highlight the need to improve health care, in particular, to strengthen the fight against widespread infectious diseases such as AIDS and tuberculosis. An acute shortage of doctors - two thousand in 1996 - was felt in public hospitals. As of the beginning of 1998, out of 22,000 doctors in South Africa, only 3,000 were black Africans [Business Day, 16.03.1998]. University graduates often went to private clinics or left the country. The reasons cited were low wages (in their opinion, and in comparison with Western countries) and the desire to escape from the criminal situation in large cities. Not only doctors were leaving, but also nurses and paramedics [ITAR-TASS Daily Bulletin, 17.01.1996]. The shortage of doctors in the hinterland led to the fact that the government began to invite Cuban doctors to the country. By the beginning of 1998, there were already 341 Cuban doctors working in the country [Star, 26.01.1998], and three years later the number reached 424 people practicing mainly in poor areas of the country. Another 75 doctors were expected to arrive. At the same time, over 200 South Africans studied medicine in Cuba [Business Day, 7.12.2001]. As one of the measures to reduce the emigration of doctors, it was decided that each graduate doctor should work for one year in the specialty in South Africa, and it is planned to increase this period.

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A huge obstacle to the country's development and improvement of living standards, along with unemployment, was another "legacy of apartheid" - the very low educational level of the population, primarily African. According to official data, in the last years of the twentieth century in South Africa, at least 34% of blacks were illiterate or had only completed primary school [South African Yearbook..., 1999/2000, p. 17 - 18, 21 - 22]. Other sources reported that up to 45% of all adult South Africans were practically unable to read and write [ITAR-TASS Daily Bulletin, 28.05.1997]. In 1996, only slightly more than half of South Africa's secondary school students were able to pass their final exams. Of these, only 15% received grades that allow them to become university students [ITAR-TASS Daily Bulletin, 4.01.1996]. Approximately the same figures characterize the situation in subsequent years. At the same time, education costs were still disproportionately low for the less affluent segments of the population. Thus, according to the Business Day newspaper, while the poor accounted for about 53% of the country's population, in 1998 their education costs accounted for 40% of the budget allocations for this purpose. The poorest segments of the population made up about 29% of the population, but only about 20% of the allocated funds were spent on their education [Business Day, 16.03.1998].

In general, despite the difficulties noted, during the five years of the " Mandela rule "(1994-1999), the country maintained a stable political environment, favorable for the beginning, albeit modest, economic recovery (GNP growth averaged about 2% per year). After De Klerk left the post of Deputy President and the National Party withdrew from provincial governments, with the exception of Western Cape Province, where it had a majority in the legislative Assembly, there were concerns that this would lead to major economic and social upheaval. However, this did not happen. Cooperation between the ANC and Inkata national Unity governments was also maintained.

This undoubtedly affected the results of the second general election held in June 1999. With over 66% of the vote, the ANC won 266 seats in Parliament, while Inkata won 34 seats with 8.59% of the vote. The official opposition was the Democratic Party, which won 38 seats (9.55% of all votes compared to 1.7% in 1994). The defeat of the National Party, which added the word "new" to its official name, was more than obvious: after losing 13.13%, it won only 6.87% of the vote (28 seats in parliament). The United Democratic Movement was next with 3.42% of the vote (or 14 seats), created by people who had previously left the ANC and the NP. The right-wing Afrikaner Freedom Front also suffered a serious setback, gaining 0.8% of the vote. The number of its deputies in Parliament has decreased from nine to three. Even weaker was the popular support for the Pan - Africanist Congress (PAC), which represented the interests of the ultra-left blacks-0.71% and three members of Parliament instead of five. A total of 13 parties were represented in the parliament, of which 12 were oppositional [Business Day, 8.06.1999]. The ANC leadership retained the government posts of Inkata as the third-place party in the elections. In addition to maintaining overall stability, the results of the general and then local elections, which were so favorable for the ANC, also contributed to the success of government policy in a number of areas, primarily in addressing social problems affecting the daily life of the African majority.

So, although with a delay, the housing program began to be implemented. By 1999, 900,000 homes had been built and $ 1.1 million allocated. subsidies for housing construction. However, another two million families, or 12 million people, were in dire need of new housing. Between 1995 and 1997, the number of homes in the informal sector increased by 653,000 units, but most of them were slums. In 2001, it was targeted-

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The government allocated 3 billion rand to help the poor, increased the amount of child benefits paid by the authorities, and 1,500 km of roads were built under the public works program [South Africa..., 2001]. The Government of Thabo Mbeki, formed in 1999, generally continued the previously chosen path, including the implementation of the RW program, while at the same time paying increased attention to meeting the social needs of the population. Ronny Kasrils, one of the former Umkonto executives who replaced the post of Deputy Minister of Defense in the new cabinet with the portfolio of Minister of Water and Forestry, while in Moscow, emphasized the stability of the country's economic and social development: "By the time we won, South Africa was already in a state of crisis. Of course, we must first seek to strengthen the economy. The main thing for us is to improve people's lives." He further pointed to economic growth of about 2% per year, a reduction in external debt, a decrease in inflation, an increase in capital investment, especially in the social sphere, and the construction of 1.2 million homes and apartments for the poor. Special attention was paid to the development of rural areas, where the most deprived African population lives. R. Kasrils reported that 3.5 million people in villages received electricity, 7 million - access to clean water in conditions of frequent drought, sewage was brought to the homes of 5 million people. person [Information Bulletin of the Embassy of South Africa in Moscow, 2001, No. 6 (November-December)].

Of crucial importance in South Africa was the adoption of the Water Law, which abolished the principle of water ownership by owners of land plots along the banks of rivers (almost always white) and established a system of licensing for water use [Star, 10.06.1998].

South African Finance Minister Trevor Manuel, delivering his annual budget address to Parliament at the end of February 2002, also noted the undoubted success of the Government's economic policy. According to him, the country's economy has been developing steadily, new jobs have been created, and over the past ten years, public spending on social needs has increased in real prices by 35%. GDP increased by 3% in 2002 and is expected to grow to 3.3% in 2003, and in 2005 it will grow by about 4% per year [ANC Today, vol. 3, N 8, 28.02-6.03.2003]. However, the government's optimistic view of the country's socio-economic development is not shared by everyone, both in South Africa and abroad.

The situation is not easy in a country with foreign investment. So, for the period from 1994 to 2000, foreign direct investment in the economy of South Africa amounted to 10-11 billion dollars, that is, about half of the expected amounts [ITAR-TASS Daily Bulletin, 15.03.2001]. Concerns in this regard have been expressed in connection with the new course in the development of mineral resources, which is part of the policy of the South African authorities "granting economic power to blacks" (black economic empowerment, or BEE). Aware that it operates within the framework of a market-based system, and unable (or perhaps even intending) to make significant changes to it, the ANC leadership seeks to equalize the economic opportunities of people belonging to different racial groups by purposefully providing benefits to Africans and (to a lesser extent) "colored" and Indians with equal opportunities. the goal is to create a "black middle class". For example, it was originally planned to concentrate 51% of the mining industry in the hands of Africans within 10 years [Business Day, 9.10.2002]. At the end of 2002, the Government submitted a "Mineral and Petroleum Development Bill" to Parliament for this purpose, although in a somewhat "watered-down" version. Now, within five years, 15% of the entire mining industry should be transferred to the hands of Africans, and in another five years - by the end of 2012 - 26% of mining enterprises should be concentrated in their hands [Business Day, 4.10.2002].

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But there is another point of view on the reason for the upcoming provision of part of the shares to the black majority. In 2002, even according to official data, 35% of Africans and only 5% of whites were unemployed. At the same time, 83% of Africans earned less than 2500 rand per month (for comparison, only 18% of whites had an equally low salary). In 2000, less than 3% of African families had an income of more than RAND 8,000 per month, compared to 52% of white families with the same income. But at the same time, the salaries of the richest Africans were 15% less than their white counterparts, and at the same time, rich blacks received only 18% of dividends from stocks and securities, while wealthy whites received 71% of dividends [Business Day, 23.02.2003]. This allowed critics of the government on the "left" to argue that the partial transfer of shares to black hands was intended, in particular, to increase the income of a few percent of Africans who represented the wealthy elite.

A rather depressing picture of the situation in the country was given in the book by the South African researcher A. Desai "We are poor. Community Struggles in South Africa", published in 2002. According to the author, since 1996, as part of its economic program, the ANC government has reduced taxes on the rich, eased currency regulation, and lowered tariffs on export products. The white elite was allowed to move corporate assets to London. A small black elite - about 300 families-has become super-rich, while at the same time unemployment has reached 40%; and in all basic parameters (life expectancy, mortality, etc.), the standard of living of the poor has fallen sharply. Most of the population lives on 140 rand ($15) a month. Three out of four black children are malnourished, and 40,000 children die each year from diarrhea caused by poor water quality. Only in the province of Kwazulu-Natal, more than 100 thousand people fell ill with cholera. People from rural areas are fleeing to the cities, and children on every street corner are forced to beg, engage in prostitution, petty theft, and as a result, prisons are 170% full (Desai, 2002). 1995-2002 the number of jobs increased by 1.6 million, but during the same period the number of unemployed increased from 1.9 to 4.2 million, i.e. more than doubled. [http://esnews.net.Economy-South Africa].

In South Africa, criticism of the current situation is heard not only from the "left". Cyril Ramaposa, a former trade unionist, then ANC secretary General, and now one of the most successful (and wealthiest) new Africans, warned in April 2001 about the possibility of a serious crisis in the country if blacks did not take advantage of the benefits of democracy, in an environment where 4.4 million whites owned 44% of the national income, and blacks did not take advantage of the benefits of democracy. In 2001, they earned about 15 rand for every 100 rand earned by whites [ITAR-TASS Daily Bulletin, 6.04.2001].

In general, the country's leadership still enjoys the confidence of the majority of both ANC members and the South African population. This was confirmed by the results of the regular congress of the ANC held in December 2002. The entire top leadership of the Congress was re-elected to their posts without a formal vote, as no one put forward additional candidates. But when the ANC Executive Committee was elected by secret ballot, the first place in the list was unexpectedly taken by Finance Minister T. Manuel, who was sharply criticized for his strict "monetarist" policy. Most likely, the rand's sharp appreciation against the US dollar in the second half of 2002, which was about 25%, played in its favor. (There is a view that this was only a temporary increase, and the rand will inevitably weaken later. However, the country's population, sensing that prices for television sets, for example, had fallen by about a quarter, attributed the rand's rise to the Finance Minister and applauded him for it. - G. Sh.). The second place was taken by the above-mentioned S. Ramaposa, who headed the National Union of Miners (NUM) at one time, and in recent years, the National Union of Miners (NUM).-

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He is the leader of a number of large corporations and has become one of the most visible symbols of "giving economic power to blacks". At the same time, the main candidate from among the trade union leaders, the current president of the NUM, Gwede Mantashe, did not get the necessary number of votes to become a member of the ANC Executive Committee [Saturday Star, 20.12.2002].

Thus, the country's leadership once again received "carte blanche" to implement its planned changes, especially since few people doubt the ANC's next victory in the 2004 elections, and, consequently, the re-election of Thabo Mbeki as president of the country.

In conclusion, however, it should be said that, despite the decent economic growth - almost 3% in 2002 [Business Day, 26.02.2003], many problems of South Africa can be successfully solved only with intensive economic development (this requires economic growth of at least 5-6% per year [Business Day, 8.04.2003]) and more active implementation of the policy of reallocation of public funds to the needs of the poor. Otherwise, we can expect an aggravation of the socio-economic and political situation in the country and an increase in social tension.

list of literature

Cherkasova I. V. Yuzhnaya Afrika: strategiya razvitiya posle liquidatsii aparteida [South Africa: Development Strategy after the elimination of apartheid]. Collection of articles. Institute of Africa of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow: Vostochnaya Literatura, 2000.

Asmal K. The Making of a Constitution // Southern African Review of Books. 1995, March/April.

Bond P. Elite Transition. From Apartheid to Neoliberalism in South Africa. L., 2000.

Desai A. We are the Poors: Community Struggles in Post-Apartheid South Africa. L., 2002.

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