In THE DIALECTIC OF SECULARIZATION, Habermas consciously speaks as an unbeliever, addressing both believers and non-believers, although he is primarily referring to the former. In this article, I intend to consciously speak as a believer, addressing both believers and non-believers, but referring primarily to the latter. I will argue that we are currently observing: (1) a very significant departure from the "old" model of a liberal society, in which the separation of the sacred and the secular is maintained and the state is (only) a neutral arbiter, consciously cultivating an attitude of "deliberate public indifference" to the "inner life" of a vast number of (private) associations, the activities of which it must regulate impartially, and (2) the transition to a "new" post-secular model of a liberal society, in which the distinction between the sacred and the secular is maintained and emphasized (the complementary unity of various aspects), and the state must rethink itself and become (also) a statethe post-secular liberal state is an element and part of society, rather than hovering above it, practicing an attitude of deliberate indifference to the inner life of its citizens and their associations. This process, in my opinion, is highly desirable and very late. What we need - and what is fortunately now emerging-is a truly public discourse and a truly public sphere that includes the distinction between the sacred and the secular and allows for a real conversation between believers and non-believers in the same political community.-

For the original, see: Trainor B. Theorising Post-Secular Society / / Philosophy & Theology. 2007. Vol. 19. No. 1-2. Translation and Russian edition rights are granted by the author.

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the Russian community. However, this requires us to complicate our understanding of the liberal state: we should add to the understanding of the state as a "neutral arbiter" - the concept of the state as an "integrating principle" of its society and its "unified" collective life, and thus consider the state as a "unity of differences and in differences", and not as alienated and an independently existing "unity over diversity". It should be noted that a strictly neutral secular liberal state is not a state of its own society, but a state that stands outside and above society, its life and values, not a "community of communities" that encompasses and coordinates the various values and views of its constituent groups and cultures, but an "external" arbiter of those who claim their rights and interests. rights.

The main task of a post-secular liberal state is to become a unifying principle that permeates all aspects of public life. As in the case of the "old" secular liberal state, the "new" post-secular liberal state will continue to maintain a neutral attitude towards ideological issues, allowing them to co-exist without mutual interference, but it will also seek to find their connecting threads. In this respect, it resembles the State of the Christian era. We will first of all (in the first section) pay attention to this similarity, in order to consider what obstacles Rawls (in the second section) and Habermas (in the third section) face when they theorize on the topic of post-secular society. I will then discuss the problems that Habermas and Rawls have when they theorize about public reason from their strictly anti-metaphysical position (section four), and the advantages that arise from a clear and explicit metaphysical position (section five). In the final section, I will insist that the citizens of a modern post-secular State must make new efforts to reintegrate the various fundamental beliefs they share and become members of a unified political universe. I will also briefly discuss how we might approach the difficult task of considering the "striving for unity" characteristic of post-secular society in the most universal way.

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1. Christendom and post-secular society

The emerging post-secular society is in many significant ways similar to the "Christendom"; in this world, the church (the realm of the sacred) played two crucial roles. First, it pointed to the origin and purpose of the political or secular-temporal domain [saeculum = "age"]; in this sense, the church, speaking of the purpose and purpose of the state, on behalf of which governments act, was both above society and above the government and exerted influence (or at least influence). that was her task) to the secular authorities insofar as she acted as a mentor and "reminded" of this purpose. Secondly, the church was also recognized in its secular dimension - as part of a secular (a living sociopolitical whole called "Christian society"), which, like universities and other corporate entities, had a voice in the secular (public/political) space. In this second sense, the church, like any other association, had a legitimate voice, but not political power; its life was inseparable from the life of the wider society, and it had every right to be heard in the public sphere, so that its voice would be properly considered, but in this respect it was a part of the church's own society. it was no different from any other significant social institution or body. From the point of view of the state / government as a living, functioning medieval "community of communities", the church was only one of the communities, although from the point of view of the church as a sacred finger pointing to the divine source (the state) legitimizing the government, it was a unique community with a special "fundamental" role and was universally recognized in this capacity 1.

1. In The Desire for Nations: Rediscovering the Roots of Political Theology (2003), Oliver O'Donovan provides a critical assessment of Christendom that does not ignore the positive features of the Christian era and therefore helps counter the less critical and generally negative assessment of Christendom in works such as Stranger Neighbors (1989). Stanley Hauerwas and William Willimon. In my work "Christ, Society, and the State" (2009), I try to conceptualize our current post-secular society in a way that shows its "empirical similarity" to the Christian world and its "theoretical similarity" to the type of relationship between the secular and the sacred that Martin Luther had in mind in his teaching about the "spiritual world".two realms."

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In this medieval world, the distinction between the secular and the sacred was quite vivid and relevant. As we live in the twenty-first century, it is particularly interesting to understand what we might today call the" fundamental "role that the "sacred" plays in relation to the" secular, "that is, the way in which the" sacred "constantly points to the legitimate foundations of the" secular " in the Christian world. Perhaps we could call this role a "pre-political" role performed by the "sacred", while excluding the idea that God, as the source and goal of society, is" always already " inseparable from the political life of the Christian world, from its ultimate and eternal justification. It is important to note that the "sacred" cannot be understood outside of its contrasting and complementary relationship to the "secular", and vice versa, precisely because of the first role of the "sacred" (justification of the political / secular), and not the second role (its routine participation in the life of a secular society). The routine or mundane relationship of the church (namely, the Catholic Church) with political authorities in the public sphere can generally be understood and expressed by considering the church as one of the communities (a the state - as a relatively autonomous "community of communities"); for this purpose, it is not necessary to refer to the distinction between the sacred and the secular (and to the understanding of the state as ultimately having a divine foundation). In the Christian era, the idea that the state ultimately has a divine foundation was always present as a background to political life and came to the fore only when it was necessary. 2 It is interesting that this is similar to what is happening today. At present, in the West (1) it is increasingly recognized, as never before, that the church exerts its proper influence on the public sphere, that it is a community that plays a legitimate role in the broader community of the state, but at the same time (2) the church is increasingly expected to act through its own influence on the public sphere. an increased presence in the public sphere or otherwise will provide a "sacred" solution to the crisis of legitimacy that Western societies are currently experiencing. Recently, Habermas has been a

2. Interestingly, the same can be said about the fundamental "pattern" of the United States, where the secular state is endowed with a pro-religious meaning (Martin D. A General Theory of Secularization. Oxford: Blackwell, 1978. p. 5) and, unlike France after 1879, where " consistent and mass secularism is opposed to consistent and mass religiosity "(Ibid. P. 6).

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Here is an example of a major contemporary theorist who is attracted to, or at least interested in, this" dual role " of religious faith in post-secular society.

Habermas welcomes the growing presence of the "sacred / religious" in the public sphere. He is convinced that we need to bridge the communication gap between "secular speech, which is accessible, according to its own understanding, to all, and religious speech, which depends on the truths of revelation" 3 by creating a public space that would allow communication between all groups (believers and non-believers). Of course, he does not doubt the importance of cultivating a unifying spirit that will not hover neutrally over us and make objective judgments about our religious and cultural differences, but will seek to harmonize them as integral parts of a common political world. He asks the question: "how do we want to see ourselves in the light of the diversity of our cultural lifestyles, our worldviews and religious beliefs in quality... [citizens of States] and as Europeans?"4-and his answer is that a deeper sense of solidarity and shared principles of justice, historically embedded in the way of life governed by the constitution (and practically and concretely real and "alive" in the minds and hearts), must permeate "cultural values"; 5 he insists that "cultural values" should not be allowed to exist. that it is not enough simply to grasp the "moral content of fundamental rights" 6, since such a grasp, even if it is a component of the (purely cognitive) world consensus ,is "sufficient only for the illusory integration of citizens of a politically established world society"7. Habermas is interested in real and genuine sociopolitical integration, not "superficial" integration. He is strongly opposed to the" political extension of the secularist worldview to all people "and believes that non-believers" do not have the right to live in the world."-

3. Habermas J., Ratzinger J. The Dialectics of Secularization. San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2006. P. 42 [Habermas Y., Ratzinger Y. Dialectic of secularization. On Reason and Religion, Moscow: BBI, 2006, p. 64].

4. Ibid. P. 32 [P. 54].

5. Ibid. P. 34 [P. 56].

6. Ibid. P. 34 [P. 55].

7. Ibid.

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We should not fundamentally deny the potential of truth to the religious vision of the world and should not deprive our fellow believers of the right to use religious concepts to contribute to public discussion"8. In this open, "dialogical" society, the main task of Habermas ' post-secular state is to embrace all its religious and cultural differences within the framework of a single, collective and unifying life. In the section entitled "How believers and non-religious citizens should treat each other", he insists that the political integration of believers (members of the religious community) and non-believers should go beyond "a simple modus vivendi".9 He invokes John Rawls 'notion of "inclusivity" to put the final nail in the coffin of (1) the separation of the sacred and the secular, and thus (2) the liberal state as simply a neutral intermediary of religious and cultural differences, and then suggests that Western societies move to a sacred-secular dialectic (a post-secularization dialectic), to a post-secularization dialectic. understanding the "sacred" and "secular" as contrasting but complementary, different but "communicating" aspects of a single political whole (aspects that are always different but always striving for integral unity):

A universalist legal order and an egalitarian social morality must align with the ethos of the community from within in such a way that one follows logically from the other. For this" inclusion " John Rawls chose the image of a module: this module of secular justice should, despite the fact that it is constructed by means of ideologically neutral grounds, fit into the orthodox contexts of justification considered in each individual case.10
Habermas goes further than Rawls, considering that in a post-secular society "there is a recognition of the fact that the" modernization of public consciousness "covers both religious and secular mentality during the transition to a new phase" and requires

8. Ibid. P. 51 [P. 75].

9. Ibid. P. 48 [P. 72].

10. Ibid. P. 49 [P. 72].

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they are required to "take seriously each other's role in discussions on complex social issues" 11.

We have previously noted that, as in the Christian era, the church is now (1) increasingly recognized, as compared to the past, as having a special influence on the public sphere, and that at the same time (2) the church is increasingly expected to provide meaningful help (or a "recipe of principle") in resolving the problem. the crisis of legitimacy in which Western societies find themselves. As we have just seen, Habermas is clear and definite on the first point, that is, he welcomes the increasing presence of the "sacred / religious" in the public sphere, but does so mainly because he expects help in countering the drying up of the cultural/motivational roots of Western societies. In my opinion, the latter, i.e., the cultural and motivational decline of Western societies, is both a cause and a consequence of a deeper crisis of legitimacy, which Habermas is unable to correctly understand, because he mistakenly sees the political / secular space as a completely autonomous sphere that does not require any external justification, whereas the Christian world correctly understood this sphere as relatively autonomous and therefore requiring justification from above. Yet at times, Habermas almost seems to acknowledge the" lack of justification " of current Western societies. In calling for a "complementary learning process"12 between believers and non-believers, Habermas seems to speak on behalf of "those who cannot believe" to "those who can", encouraging them to hold fast to their faith (and proclaim it) in the strength of the foundations (ethical, divine, and metaphysical) of Western liberalism. He says that "in the interests of the constitutional State, all cultural sources on which citizens' awareness of norms and solidarity between them are based should be treated with care " 13, but one may ask what "cultural sources" can mean in this context, other than "what citizens fundamentally believe", " what they rely on their essence as people and as members of a particular state", "what gives them the courage to act politically", and so on.? However, in the" Dialectic of Secularization", it is based on-

11. Habermas J., Ratzinger J. Op. cit. P. 46-47 [P. 70].

12. Ibid. P. 47 [P. 70].

13. Ibid. P. 46 [P. 69].

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He consistently and quite clearly confirms his belief that "legal orders are subject to legitimation by virtue of the democratically formed legal process itself" 14, and this creates considerable difficulties for him in "theorizing" the emerging post-secular state. In short: (1) his (purely) procedural approach is inadequate for the task of justifying a liberal state (secular or post-secular), and (2) he does not understand how serious the consequences for a neutral "secular" liberal state are for the loss of metaphysical/religious foundations. The integral "post-secular" State is precisely a reaction to this loss. This post-secular state, which can be called the "medieval state of Christendom in modern conditions", reintegrates the sacred into the collective life of a liberal society and thereby compensates for the "lack of justification" of a secular (purely procedural and neutral) liberal state. In the following sections, we will address the obstacles that Rawls and Habermas face when they theorize about post-secular society, and these obstacles arise because they fail to understand and recognize that the drying up of Western societies ' cultural and motivational roots is somehow related to their loss of religious/metaphysical foundations.

2. Rawls

In his work "The Theory of Justice" 15 (in the section entitled "Some remarks on moral Theory") Rawls makes an interesting and useful comparison between moral theory and grammatical theory. He says that just as theoretical grammar aims to systematically and internally coherently describe how people speak and use language, as well as their largely implicit and unconscious" knowledge " of grammar, so moral theory aims to achieve an internally logical, conceptual understanding of our everyday moral judgments and shed light on underlying intuitions and beliefs common in a particular society.

14. Ibid. p. 27 [P. 49].

15. Rawls J. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1971 [Ролз Дж. Theory of justice. Novosibirsk: NSU, 1995].

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The general tone and mood of Rawls 'book, as well as his expressed desire to formulate an understanding of justice sub specie aeternitatis, undoubtedly invite readers to consider the light that moral theory sheds as a "universal" light, and the author's presentation of the" Theory of Justice " as a logically consistent theory of our basic moral judgments-as an attempt not just to systematize values and the principles that underlie our life in a liberal-democratic society, but also point out the nature of these locally effective "liberal" principles (tolerance, individualism, etc.), that is, that they are the means and mechanisms that make the universal concrete, or a" systematic " (internally logical) form which our "universal" humanity accepts in a particular context. However, in his later writings, Rawls withdraws his invitation, so to speak, to understand the "Theory of Justice" in this way, and instead we are invited to abandon all attempts to treat the universal aspect of justice as "metaphysical", "a priori", and "foundational"17. The more communitarian Rawls now rejects " universality "in favor of" coherence " as the main criterion of the moral, as well as the central concept of moral theory. However, it can be argued that coherence in itself is a hopelessly inadequate criterion of morality. For it is futile to hope that simply pointing out the existence of some sort of logical coherence in our first-order moral data, or that it can arise with minor modifications, will somehow justify or legitimize our everyday moral judgments. As Scanlon points out, "even if it is possible to detect the internal coherence of our morals,-

16. Rawls J. Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical // Philosophy and Public Affairs. 1985. Vol. 14. No. 3. P. 223 - 251.

17. Cm. Rawls J. Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical. In the introduction to this paper, he states the following: "Here I will offer some general comments on how I now understand justice, which I have called' justice as honesty '(this is discussed in my book 'Theory of Justice'). I do this because it may seem to some that this concept depends on philosophical attitudes that I would like to avoid, for example, attitudes towards universal truth or an essential view of human nature and identity. My task is to explain that such an understanding would be wrong" (p. 223).

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However, there may still be a nagging doubt that this is the case. They may simply be a set of socially imposed reactions that may be mutually related, but they are not judgments that can be said to be right or wrong. "18 The" best", so to speak, that communitarian political thinkers can achieve is to show that our actions are not necessarily correct. the main moral beliefs form some sort of internally coherent system, but this is a rather dubious, if not meaningless, exercise if the goal is not to show (which is clearly not the goal for them) that each moral belief - in its place and when it is guided in practice-represents a "concrete universal". or a "universal that is concretized", and that the coherence of our concrete beliefs is itself a "unifying form" of the" good "(agathon, the absolute), recognized by us, acting through us, and locally deposited in the depths of our own being; otherwise, it is not at all clear how the coherence of our moral beliefs "legitimizes" them".

What the" communitarian " Rawls is trying to do, but what I think he simply cannot do , is localize, relativize, and de-universalize the "Theory of Justice" (and, of course, justice itself), while continuing to argue that it is perfectly possible to consider a particular set of political and social institutions as "just." He says that a publicly acceptable political concept of justice (note the clumsiness and unnaturalness of this expression in comparison with just "justice") "creates a publicly recognized point of view, by which all citizens can consider before each other whether their political and social institutions are fair".19 However, under the words "are fair", the term "are fair" is often used to refer to the concept of "justice". Rawls, who abandoned universality as a moral criterion, can now only mean "appear fair to them" or "are seen as fair from their point of view and in the context of their history and traditions." If someone asks: "But are these social and political institutions really fair-

18. Scanlon T. Contractualism and Utilitarianism//Utilitarianism and Beyond/Sen A. K., Williams B. (eds.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982. P. 106.

19. Rawls J. Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical. P. 229.

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Does the mere fact that they are acceptable from our local, publicly recognized point of view make them so?", in which case Rawls can only answer (and he does in the article "Justice as Honesty: Political, not Metaphysical") that such questions are based on certain metaphysical premises, correctness or otherwise. which he prefers not to discuss, and that in his conception of justice he methodically avoids any controversial metaphysical statements. Similarly, if someone asks: "Is our understanding of human nature and identity, which is so important for our understanding of justice, a genuine insight?" and if the questioner is interested in a live discussion on this issue, then he will simply be discouraged by Rawls's answer-a communitarian that there is simply no answer to this question.

Of course, Rawls rejects the simple and clear universalist / metaphysical belief that individuals are carriers of absolute value, in favor of the view that a certain idea of the individual is usually widespread within a particular culture and this idea, no matter what happens empirically, gives rise to some consequences for the formulated theory of justice. It is regrettable that Rawls refused to intellectually support the belief that our culture, to the extent that it can claim to be a concrete (and relative) realization of the (absolute) good - that this culture can be justified before the court of humanity. On this important issue, he conceded too much to his communitarian critics, arguing that "moral objectivity should be understood in the sense of a properly constructed social point of view that everyone can accept", and that "the concept of justice is justified not by the fact that it corresponds to the order that preceded us and we inherited, but by the fact that it It is consistent with our deep understanding of ourselves and our aspirations, as well as our understanding that in the context of our history and traditions embodied in our social life, it is the most reasonable doctrine for us."20
20. Rawls J. Kantian Constructivism and Moral Theory//Journal of Philosophy. 1980. P. 518. With this passage in Rawls in mind, it is at least surprising to read Habermas ' next remark: "Of course, Rawls does not want to confine himself to the fundamental normative beliefs of a particular political culture: even the current Rawls, with Richard Rorty's permission, has not become a contextualist."

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I would like to emphasize here that the simple philosophical advantage of the metaphysical statement that "individuals are the carriers of absolute value" is that it is a statement with which our fellow human beings may well disagree; it is a controversial truth-based metaphysical statement that, if discussed, can be used in the course of a discussion. the latter "Rawls-communistist" refers to the widespread empirical belief that "individuals are the carriers of absolute value" in a frankly descriptive manner. It simply describes or denotes what is happening at the moment (empirically or as a "cultural fact"). in a particular culture of a particular time. Instead of addressing the problem of the" justification deficit " of a liberal society, this communitarian approach simply ignores or evades the problem, because it requires a sense of legitimacy in our society.It is not a reminder of the truth (even debatable and subject to change under the influence of criticism from the point of view of universality) of our cultural beliefs, their acceptability in the face of the judgment of our common humanity, but rather a reminder of the fact that we have these beliefs or that we share them. If we consider post-secular society as a response to the "lack of justification" and the loss of cultural roots in Western societies, then the early Rawls (universalist and hidden metaphysician) will be much more useful as a thinker whose work is a theoretical contribution to understanding post-secular society, that is, to post-secular efforts to gain a renewed sense of legitimacy and " self-belief". Thus, although Habermas rightly draws our attention to the importance of the late Rawls ' idea of "inclusiveness" for thinking about post-secular society, yet as long as this inclusiveness is "de-universalizing" and is seen as a characteristic of a society understood as self-founded and cut off from the light of criticism from the point of view of universality, the theoretical utility of this concept is still limited., without any doubt, is close to zero. The same is true of Habermas ' thought, as we will see later.

См. Habermas J. Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls's Political Liberalism//The Journal of Philosophy. 1995. Vol. 92. P. 120.

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3. Habermas

Habermas believes that Rawls, whether intentionally or not, "shares the concept of justice that belongs to the ethics of the good, one that is more consistent with Aristotelian or utilitarian approaches than the theory of rights that he develops and which comes from the concept of autonomy"21.For Habermas, the "ethics of the good" is untenable because it presupposes a metaphysical search for what is essentially good and truly ethical, as well as a search for criteria and methods that would reduce the risks and potential for error associated with such a search. I will now argue, as I have already done elsewhere, 22 that what Habermas sees as untenable and incorrect in the Aristotelian and utilitarian approach is just right, correct, and useful, despite other defects in these approaches, but the main point here is that Habermas resolutely rejects these approaches as metaphysical and chooses the path (in my opinion, unconvincing and ultimately unacceptable), indicated in the following passage, where it subjectifies "good" and objectifies "right":

Norms allow you to decide what to do, and values allow you to decide which behavior is most desirable. Recognized norms impose equal and non-exclusive obligations on those to whom they are addressed, while values express a preference for the benefits that specific groups seek. If norms are met in the sense of fulfilling generalized behavioral expectations, then values or benefits can be realized or acquired only through purposeful action. Moreover, norms give rise to a double attitude to their validity, which means that they are said to be legal or illegal: to statements of ought, as assertive statements, we can only answer " yes "or" no " - or refrain from judging. Values, on the other hand, fix relations of preference, which mean that some goods are more attractive than others: therefore, we can

21. Habermas J. Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason: Remarks on John Rawls's Political Liberalism//The Journal of Philosophy. 1995. Vol. 92 P. 114.

22. Trainor B. Christ, Society and the State. Adelaide: Australian Theological Forum/Pantaenus Press, 2009.

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evaluate statements to a greater or lesser extent. The binding force of norms has the absolute meaning of an unconditional and universal duty: what I have to do is equally good for everyone (that is, for everyone to whom the norm is addressed). The attractiveness of values reflects the evaluation and transitive order of goods that are established in a particular culture or have been assimilated by certain groups: important evaluation decisions or higher-level preferences express what is good for us (or for me). Finally, different norms should not contradict each other when they relate to the same group of addressees; they should be coherent with respect to each other - in other words, represent a system. Different values, on the other hand, compete for primacy; because they face intersubjective recognition within a culture or group, they are fluid configurations fraught with tension. Thus, norms differ from values, firstly, in that they are related to the action directed by the rule, and not by the goal; secondly, by a double relationship to their validity, as opposed to the difference of degree characteristic of values; thirdly, by their absolute, and not relative obligation; finally, by the fact that they are based on the rule-directed action, and not on the goal. criteria that systems of norms, as opposed to systems of values, must meet.23

Thus, after subjectifying (or intersubjectifying) the "good" and objectifying "right", as well as disposing of the "ethics of the good", Habermas is forced to consider value judgments (or value judgments concerning what is good) as such, they simply express the preference for goods that specific individuals and /or groups strive for. I specifically emphasize the word "simple" here, because it is not at all clear, and Habermas cannot say what else these judgments express (that is, what else besides subjective preferences). Now, if the values or judgments concerning what is good or valuable are nothing else than that, then there is no reason to think or feel that, in the words of Habermas above, "what I have to do is equally good for everyone." Why do you need it at all -

23. Habermas J. Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason. P. 114 - 115; Habermas J. Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory of Law and Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996. P. 259.

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or to a certain group or society-to be interested in my subjective ideas about the good (and even more so try to promote them), ideas that are ultimately nothing more than my preferences or what is happening in my head, or to be interested in what is considered good in another group or society (that is,what is considered good in another group or society). what's going on in their heads)? The unconditional and universal duty that Habermas mentions makes sense only on the basis of the metaphysical / ontological premise that" value "or" goodness " has a super-subjective, substantial existence that is reflected and subjectively expressed in the circumstances of our lives through our value judgments and actions, even if expressed incorrectly and inadequately.

Habermas 24 blames Rawls for not making a sufficiently strict distinction between acceptability and acceptance. By this important distinction, as I understand it, he means the difference between saying "x must be widely or even universally accepted" and saying "x is actually widely or even universally accepted". This seems to be true, for in connection with Rawls ' theory of justice, he says that "a purely instrumental understanding of this theory is untenable simply because citizens must be convinced by the proposed concept of justice before ... consensus can be reached. The concept of justice should not be political in a bad sense and should lead simply to the achievement of a modus vivendi"25 By emphasizing the word "convinced," Habermas clearly means that Rawls's citizens should recognize (and have their own good reasons for doing so) that the proposed concept of justice should be accepted, because if they have a right to accept the concept of justice, they should there will be only a "purely instrumental understanding of the theory", they will be rationally motivated only to look for ways to somehow reconcile their own selfish interest with the same selfish interests of others. To seek this kind of pragmatic agreement between rival individuals would be to act politically "in a bad way" or to engage in "purely political practice".

Here I would like to point out the irony of the situation when Habermas puts forward such reproaches to Rawls, because the enterprise-

24. Habermas J. Reconciliation through the Public Use of Reason. P. 122.

25. Ibid.

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his own subjectivization of values violates this extremely important distinction between what should be accepted/desired/valued and what is actually accepted/desired/valued, and therefore his own theory remains "political in a bad sense", that is, it leads simply to a modus vivendi. For example, Habermas believes that discursive ethics "considers the moral point of view as embodied in the intersubjective practice of argumentation, which requires participants to idealize the expansion of their interpretive perspectives"26. However, if we ask what this "idealizing extension" means, especially in the light of its subjectivist theory of values, it is rather difficult to understand that this is anything other than the process by which I try to take into account your idea of what is good, and not just my own. However, the subjectivist theory of values suggests that the meaning of this process for me is not to change and refine my understanding of the good in order to bring this understanding closer to the "good as such" (which would be an idealizing extension), but simply to successfully achieve a" working " modus vivendi. How else can this "idealizing expansion" be interpreted in the absence of a "metaphysical recognition" of the real common good that unites us, one that we should all value and desire? Habermas, of course, does not speak at all of the "common good" or "common interest," that is, he does not use expressions that he no doubt (and rightly) sees as hopelessly loaded with metaphysical meaning and too closely linked to the dangerous "totalist" political ontology. Instead, he speaks of a " generalizable interest," that is, one that we can all live with. Similarly, Habermas asserts that Kant's categorical imperative requires us to "will a just principle as a general rule", but insists that as long as we apply this principle "in a monological way, it remains individually separate points of view, from which each of us privately determines what all could will"27. But here again the situation is the same: as long as the truth of the subjectivist theory of values is accepted, it makes no difference how we apply the requirement of the Kantian category-

26. Ibid. P. 117.

27. Ibid.

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whether in a monological way or otherwise, because the acid of subjectivism corrodes the possibilities of ideal expansion, and it remains "individually isolated points of view, from which each of us privately determines what all of us could will."

In general, those who openly deny the need for an (explicitly metaphysical) description of the mode of operation of substantial reason and the value, so to speak, of "reason in itself" or "value in itself" in collective human affairs, nevertheless implicitly and indirectly give such a description. In Habermas 'case, his "hidden" description of substantive value is something like pointing to an"invisible hand." How can radical followers of Adam Smith argue that the rules governing the mechanism of a free competitive market economy are fraught with value (i.e., they produce and contribute to a "good")? in the sense that they act in a way that (in some mysterious way) leads to the best results from the point of view of human well-being in general (the more perfect the "procedural" rules of competition, the "better" the result), and Habermas similarly argues that the rules that apply in an ideal speech situation, they are also fraught with value (that is, they produce "good" and contribute to it) in the sense that they also lead (no less mysteriously) to the best results. from the point of view of the general welfare of the political community (the more advanced the procedural rules of competition, the better the result). So it turns out that the hidden hand operating in Smith's economic market or in Habermas 'political discourse is always the hand of virtue or the instrument of real, independent value, and that what we might call "procedural ethics" is symbiotic with "essential ethics"; the former naturally and spontaneously produces the latter. However, we need to clearly recognize and realize that the hidden hand (of" essential value") moves and directs "back and forth" the discourse of a deliberative political community only to intersubjective agreement, to the extent that its members themselves are oriented towards essential value (i.e., their metaphysically / ontologically real common good), and this happens only because the realization of an essential value is the achievement of intersubjective agreement. However, the unshakably anti-metaphysical Habermas

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he doesn't want to talk about it; he resists admitting that the essence of political discussion is to ensure that there is as much general agreement as possible about what is really best for the political community at a given time, and prefers rather vague talk about how the essence of the discussion is to get the upper hand best argument or best argument (but why "best" or" best " if not to communicate a public good?) or to express generalizable interest, but not (why not?) general interest.

Habermas is equally vague and indistinct in his use of the expression "procedural mind", which he describes in particular as "a mind that puts itself on trial"28. In my view, the latter expression is better understood as the process by which ideas circulate and dissent is expressed by participants in a political discussion, so that one - sided and narrow views can be corrected, enriched and developed-and can become a receptacle for the "fullness of reason" or take their place in the "tapestry of reason". However, Habermas certainly does not mean this kind of "metaphysical involvement" in truth (or Truth); for him, democracy is not a deliberative process by which reason itself (or Reason) gets the maximum opportunity to saturate our political considerations, and goodness itself (Agathon) - to question our values These are often misguided, self-willed, and self-interested ideas about the political good, thereby forcing us to put our stated ideas about the good of our community to the "test" of mutual criticism and helping us to make sure that we are on the path (or not far from it) that leads us to our true collective goal - the common good. At the same time, it is quite clear what Habermas means. It is clear that he does not approve of this kind of intersubjective process, in which competing (but hopefully eventually complementary) ideas about the actual common good of the political community are discussed so that "reason itself" or "good" can prevail and make dynamism - the blood that circulates in the veins - sound and ethical. political life. Instead, it explicitly states that

28. Habermas J. Between Facts and Norms. P. xii.

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"after a century that, more than any other, has taught us the horrors of existing unreason, the last vestiges of essentialist trust in reason have been destroyed," and also supports "the radically anti-Platonic notion that there is no higher or deeper reality to which we can appeal." 29 Thus, according to Habermas, liberal-democratic citizens (and, presumably, post-secular citizens) should stop focusing on truth and reason - and no longer feel justified, fulfilled, completely human and liberal in their search for truth and reason-and instead should recognize that "in the vertigo of this freedom there is no longer any stable place outside of the democratic procedure itself. " 30 Its discursive-theoretical concept does not presuppose "the identity of reason, which is supposed to reveal the underlying homogeneous common interest" 31 or the reality and identity of the unifying popular will. He is adamant that while the intersubjectivity of democratic procedure can provide "glimpses of symmetrical relationships marked by free mutual recognition," at the same time "this idea should not be understood as the totality of a reconciled form of life and projected utopically into the future."32
All this makes us wonder what is the essence or purpose of politics for Habermas, for we must at least strive, if not for the "totality of the reconciled form of life", then at least for a more conciliated form of common life, when "totality" is the ultimate, even the most important, form of social life. even if it's unattainable, it's a goal. What, then, may we ask, is the purpose of his policy? Clearly, this is more than a negative "goal" of avoiding a useless life or leading a "life that is not wasted".33 Moreover, without the basic belief that there is a higher and deeper universal reality to appeal to, we will not be able to achieve the legitimacy of our political systems and actions.

29. Habermas J. Between Facts and Norms. P. xii.

30. Ibid. P. 186.

31. Ibid. P. 185.

32. Habermas J. The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992. P. 145 [Habermas Yu. Philosophical Discourse on Modernity, Moscow: Vse Mir Publ., 2003.

33. Ibid. P. 145 - 146.

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There is also no doubt that Habermas is misleading when he speaks of a mind that simply sees or directly grasps the common interest and the common good, as if we can directly see a mountain or grasp a gorge; traditionally, the common good was understood not as a directly distinguishable"entity" of some kind, but as a "common good" of some kind. as an ontological and ethical requirement, as "an indication of Being in the midst of being" or as "a true state of affairs that does not yet exist in empirical reality, which is announced by its public representatives as a prescriptive political vocation for the political community in order to be embodied in its life." Without a doubt, Habermas insists that the" common "in the" common good "or" common will "can be considered as such only by virtue of the fact that it is achieved through a certain procedure, that is, if it is formed in the process of a free intersubjective discussion, the subject of which is what he calls "the common good".a generalizable interest " 34. But of course it is much more appropriate to talk about the (ethical/ontological) common goodin itself, as inspiring us and forming a common will in us, which is ideal / prescriptive, since it is directed towards the goal that we must achieve by our efforts and which is at the same time relevant, since it forms us or "forms" in us ("ontological" becomes empirical, or " ultimate being/reality " becomes concrete). It is undoubtedly true that in a democratic community of free individuals who accept only the intellectual "compulsion" of the best arguments voiced in open discussion, and who reject any other restrictions on their freedom, the "intersubjective" process is extremely important and is not just a "procedural" means to achieve an (essential) goal. Democratic "leaders" in a supposedly "free" society who attempt to express the common will in the absence of this crucial mediation process of collective self-expression, in fact (and by other means-not by force of argument in an open discussion),

34. См. Habermas J. The Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. 2. Boston: Beacon Press, 1987. P. 92 - 93, 271 - 272; Habermas J. Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Cambridge, Mass.: M. I. T. Press, 1990. P. 65-68 [Habermas Yu. Moral consciousness and communicative action. St. Petersburg: Nauka Publ., 2000].

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"they force citizens to be free." At the same time, however, it should be said that the process of participation in such a discussion, although it is necessary for the formation of a common will (Habermas, I think, in this case would say "some" common will) and, as a rule, corresponds to its task, this process itself is not always sufficient. Habermas rejects Hegel's"highest level of subjectivity of the state" 35 in favor of his own "highest level of intersubjectivity in the spontaneous formation of the will" 36, but there is no doubt that the " intersubjectivity of discussion and participation "can be a" higher level " only in so far as it serves as a conscientious collective intermediary through which the essential (ontological / prescriptive) general will. As Hegel asserts (I think correctly), it is not the process (or not only the process) by which the will is formed, but the universality or generality of the general will itself (that is, this will, when it is revealed to its actual general interest, is oriented towards it and formed by it - the "reason and truth" of its society). it is legitimate for us to use the expression "higher order". As Ratzinger observes of laws passed through perfect procedure and supposedly for the sake of the public interest, " the majority principle leaves open the question of the ethical basis of the law."37. What post-secular society is striving for more consciously and persistently than ever before is a clearer understanding of (1) the metaphysical basis and purpose that legitimizes its existence, (2) its relationship to the Absolute, however understood, and (3) the ontological origin and purpose of its existence. the goals of the temporal "empirical/political" are Truth, Reason, and Goodness.

Another point where Habermas ' anti-metaphysical attitude has a negative impact on his attempts to theorize on the topic of post-secular society is due to the fact that this attitude prevents understanding the damage to cultural sources of solidarity that was caused by the loss of Western society's metaphysical/ontological and theological roots. He is well aware that " vzaimopro-

35. Habermas J. The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity. P. 40.

36. Ibid.

37. Habermas J., Ratzinger J. The Dialectics of Secularization. P. 60 [С. 84].

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the emergence of Christianity and Greek metaphysics "38 had a profound impact on Western thought and that philosophy in the West "transformed the original religious meaning" of a number of key concepts ("responsibility", "autonomy", "justification", "emancipation"), "but did not eliminate or emasculate it from these concepts"39. He says that "such a salutary translation was the translation of the idea of the God-likeness of man into a similar idea of human dignity, which requires obligatory respect for itself." 40 However, Habermas fails to see that much is lost in this process of" translation", that in the ontological and religious aspects of the expression" child of God "or" image of God "have such depth and essential content, which simply do not exist in the idea of"universal dignity of all people". There can be little doubt that the current high rate of abortion in Western societies is partly due to the fact that the intellectual and cultural spread of the former (the theological and metaphysical belief that the life of every child of God is sacred from conception to natural death) has been replaced by a simple (i.e., "metaphysically empty")one a formality of the second one. In this case, the" loss in translation "is very serious, because it occurs in the course of a degenerative process: from" form as a living channel of the real "(or" form as ontologically real, with prescriptive, practical force in empirical human and political affairs") - to" just form", from the position of the "real", to the position of the "real", to the "real", to the "real", to the "real", to the "real", to the "real", to the "real", to the "real", to the "real", to the "real", to the "real", to the "real", towell-founded" - to the state of "shakiness and manipulability under political pressure". However culturally widespread a popular belief may be (such as the belief in the "priceless dignity of man"), it is weakened if it becomes detached from its theological and metaphysical roots, from its connection with Being as such (no matter how it is understood), and if it becomes "purely political" in the sense of the late Rawls, then it is not the same thing as a popular belief. It is "generally accepted, for any reason, by those who make up a particular political community." As far as fundamental policy principles are concerned, it is important that they are "empirically accepted" because they are considered to be "eternally valid".-

38. Ibid. P. 44 [P. 67].

39. Ibid. p. 44-45 [P. 68].

40. Ibid.

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acceptable", coming, so to speak, directly from the heart of "Truth itself" or from the source and summit of life itself and Being itself.

4. Habermas and Rawls: The Divine / Absolute Public Sphere

Another weakness of Habermas ' anti-metaphysical attitude is that he does not cope with the following difficulty. He wants to attribute an absolute or godlike quality to the "public use of reason" (the correct use of reason in the public sphere) and fully support Rawls ' idea that "reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious or non-religious, can be introduced into public political discussion at any time, provided that they are properly presented." the actual political reasons - and not the reasons put forward exclusively by comprehensive doctrines-are sufficient to support what these comprehensive doctrines introduced [into the discussion] support. "41 However, he faces Paul Whiteman's objection (and takes it seriously) that this is (in my terms, an absolutization or deification of" the values of public reason"Rawls) is unfair to religious people. Whiteman believes that it is a useful activity of churches that encourage "their members to accept democratic values as the basis for making important political decisions and accept democratic institutions as legitimate."42, would be at risk if the requirements of Rawls ' public mind were strictly enforced, and that it is unfair and unwise for believers alone to be required to search the public language for the equivalents of every religious statement they make. Similarly, because " the totalizing trait of such an image of faith, which penetrates the pores of everyday life, is opposed... any rapid transformation of religiously rooted political beliefs to a different level.-

41. Rawls J. The Idea of Public Reason Revisited // The University of Chicago Law Review. 1997. Vol. 64. P. 783.

42. Weithman P.J. Religion and the Obligations of Citizenship. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. P. 91.

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Habermas also takes seriously what he calls the "compelling objection" of Nicholas Walterstorff: "It is characteristic of the religious beliefs of a very large number of religious people in our society that they should base their decisions concerning fundamental questions of justice on their religious beliefs." 44 However, Habermas expresses the following opinion: serious concern when Walterstorff asserts, first, that (in the words of Habermas) he "does not wish to place any restrictions on the political application of religious grounds"45 and, second, that (in my own words) religious worldviews have an absolute ("invulnerable to criticism") quality, which makes democracy, in particular, a state of political freedom. especially in ideologically or religiously divided societies, competition between "rival gods" when the best we can hope for is a kind of pragmatic modus vivendi.46 In my view, Habermas demonstrates an unconvincing reaction to Walterstorff's strategy (in my own words) of de-deifying and de-absolutizing the "public mind" in order to deify and absolutize the "private mind" or, more precisely, " the mind used by citizens and their groups to express concepts and categories of a comprehensive worldview religious or non-religious". Habermas's reaction, or "counterstrategy," is to limit the divinity or absoluteness of the public sphere to formal and "decent" political discourse, as opposed to informal and "savage." He believes that the" multi-voiced complexity "of public voices [47] and the religious contribution to public discussion in its origins are permissible only in the "wild" informal public-political sphere; we should keep in mind, he says ,that "the institutional thresholds between" wild " political publicity and state organizations form a fil-

43. Habermas J. Religion in the Public Sphere // European Journal of Philosophy. 2006. Vol. 14. P. 8 [Habermas Yu. Religion and publicity / / Habermas Yu. Between Naturalism and Religion, Moscow: Vse Mir Publ., 2011, p. 122].

44. Audi R., Wolterstorff N. Religion in the Public Sphere. New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997, p. 105. Between naturalism and religion. p. 122].

45. Habermas J. Religion in the Public Sphere. P. 11 [С. 128].

46. Audi R., Wolterstorff N. Religion in the Public Sphere. P. 160.

47. Habermas J. Religion in the Public Sphere. P. 10 [С. 126].

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and he goes so far as to say-and here the divine and absolute quality attributed to a strict or proper public sphere reaches its climax-that " the rules of procedure in Parliament should give presidents the opportunity to cross out religious positions or excuses from the protocol"49. This is like saying that only those politicians who use filtered," purified " language can enter the realm of "public reason" and participate fully in it (or "worship" its shrine). Instead of attributing a godlike, absolute quality to "public [universal] reason" as in the case of Rawls and Habermas, or to "private [worldview] reason" as in the case of Walterstorff, we should recognize the godlike, absolute quality of Reason itself, considering the demands it makes on us as the only absolute ones and extreme, taking it upon itself to make every effort to understand what it is telling us in our current circumstances, and assessing the relevance of each actual political use of reason (public or private, in the formal or informal political-public sphere) in terms of its agreement with "reason" (or Reason) itself, or its ability to be a concrete expression of the mind. When I say "we" and "us", I mean individuals who act in one sense or another as citizens (as individual electors, as members of the church, as public representatives, etc.).), for there is no sphere in the collective life of the political community that is outside the "light of reason" or that is free from universal criticism. Habermas and Rawls, in essence, strictly restrict the use of political / public reason and the language that is its expression, because they actually propose to ban from the public-political space the use of a language that (1) is a special language of a group of citizens who share a certain worldview, and which (2) is not directly accessible or translatable into Russian. a common and accessible language. In this case, it is assumed that citizens can communicate meaningfully with each other politically, only by meeting in a common public space, where it is used by the state.

48. Habermas J. Religion in the Public Sphere. P. 10 [С. 126].

49. Ibid. P. 10 [P. 126].

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a common public language, that is, meeting in an elevated realm beyond the nebulous and divided areas of "difference" between them-areas between which communication (the true use of political / public reason) is impossible. However, to recognize the sovereignty of" reason "and its universal presence (ethical and actual, ideal and already embodied, "born" and already "born") in all spheres of society and politics (body politics) - it means to see that its "vertical descent" is an effective guarantee and condition for real (genuine, fruitful and productive) horizontal communication between citizens living in different "ideological universes", and at the same time a "promise" that their differences are the essence of the world. differences within a single political universe. At one time, the "public mind" (horizontal) communication "across " and" over "worldviews requires citizens to rise above their worldview differences and use what can be called "generally understandable and directly accessible public language", quite in the spirit of Habermas and Rawls, but at another time "vertically descending reason" it requires them to speak to each other, so to speak, "from the very core" of their worldview differences, in order to allow these differences to be integrated into the fabric of sociopolitical unity.

Only the genuine openness of various groups (religious, ethnic, feminist, etc.) in a liberal democratic society to the universal and unifying "vertical" descent of" reason " can ensure meaningful, mutually intelligible, productive communication between them and between the different worldview universes in which they live. metaphysical / ontological condition and guarantee of the second (real and effective horizontal communication). The ethic of citizenship does not require the rejection of a language that originates in a particular worldview, but rather the use of such language in a publicly acceptable manner that promotes mutual understanding and aims at universal understanding and the common good. So, for example, a Marxist (or a feminist, or a Christian, or an atheist...), being involved in a public discussion (in a pub or in parliament), is completely free to use concepts and categories taken from the Marxist worldview ("proletariat", "surplus value"), even if they do not know what they are doing.

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if the relevance and usefulness of these terms may not be recognized outside of Marxist (or feminist, or Christian, or atheist...) of the circle, but on the condition that what is said (1) can be understood by those outside the circle concerned, and that (2) the relation of what is said to the common good can be understood. The liberal-democratic ethic of citizenship requires citizens, and especially those who adhere to comprehensive doctrines (religious or non-religious), to make a serious effort to understand" where " other major groups in society come from and why they interpret the common good in the way they do.

5. Habermas and Rawls: Prioritizing Metaphysics

Habermas, Rawls, Wightman, and Walterstorff, each in their own way, believe (with a sense of alarm) that religious citizens are required (which is right and fair, from the point of view of Habermas and Rawls, and wrong and unfair, from the point of view of Wightman and Walterstorff) to translate their religious views into the language of neutral people."secular " terms before they are allowed into the political / public sphere and that they are unfairly placed with burdens that are not placed on non-religious citizens. However, I think Rawls 'and Habermas' concerns are misplaced and can be responded to by drawing attention to the underlying metaphysical meaning of what they are saying. When, for example, they talk about the ethics of citizenship - when Habermas says that "in the case of controversial political issues, [citizens] should seek rationally motivated mutual understanding" 50, or when Rawls talks about "the values of public reason" - it seems to me that we should understand them, meaning primarily metaphysical/the ontological meaning of what is said, or at least not to attach to what is said the fundamentally anti-metaphysical meaning that they both attach. This will allow us to think and talk about the ethical demands of public reason in an equal and equal way (it is always the voice of the same "Reason"). They apply to all citizens (religious and non-religious, adherents of "comprehensive doctrines" or non-comprehensive ones), instead of assuming, in the spirit of Rawls, that ethical standards are not necessarily the same.

50. Habermas J. Religion in the Public Sphere. P. 5 [С. 116].

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citizenship requirements apply to different groups of citizens in an unequal way, which is unfair.

Taking into account the vertical attitude of "reason" and giving Rawls ' words a metaphysical meaning that he avoids, we can see that he is quite correct in stating, as we have seen earlier, that "comprehensive doctrines, religious or non-religious, can be introduced into public political discussion at any time, provided that: that the political reasons themselves - and not the reasons put forward by the doctrines themselves - are properly presented, which are sufficient to justify that they support these comprehensive doctrines introduced [into the discussion]. "51 With this reservation (the"Rawls clause"), political opponents of those who express political views based on comprehensive doctrines will be able to understand - and perhaps even sympathetically-the supposed vertical link between "doctrine-inspired" policy proposals and the voice of"reason "/the common good ("reason's prescription"). Stated intuitions about what "reason" requires from the political community, They are always politically controversial and therefore should be tested by the " cleansing fire "of public discussion, but this kind of cleansing public discussion simply cannot take place if there is no"mutual intelligibility". This, of course, is the very essence and purpose of Rawls ' clause; if expressed in metaphysical terms, it means that openness to Reason is always and everywhere required. Each of us, religious or non-religious, is required by the "prescription of Reason" to pass the universalization test when we make public/political proposals in the first person, that is, from our own (always unique) point of view. It is also clear that this universal openness to Reason and Truth is the metaphysical basis for Habermas 'claim that a democratic constitutional state is" to a certain extent sensitive to truth, " 52 for it is only through the "metaphysical discovery" of a sensitivity to truth at the core of the inner being of each individual/citizen and each group as a "collective individual" - a sensitivity to truth, which is both a "fact" that always has

51. Rawls J. The Idea of Public Reason Revisited. P. 783.

52. Habermas J. Religion in the Public Sphere. P. 18 [С. 138].

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For Habermas, a "certain self - understanding of modernity" is valid and generally possible. 53 What Habermas cannot understand or acknowledge is that "areas where normative arguments alone are not sufficient"54 are not the most important areas of the world. this is a metaphysical space, and that only a metaphysical construction of the public use of reason - (1) as a public discussion concerning the demands of Reason itself addressed to all citizens in specific circumstances, and (2) as an outward expression of the inner need of each citizen to grow in Truth-can ultimately justify a liberal state imposing constitutional norms on its citizens the type Rawls and Habermas are talking about.

At the same time, by putting forward metaphysical premises in this way, we can see the correctness of the critique of the Rawls clause by Whiteman, who argues that it would be unwise to interpret it in the sense that religious citizens should find appropriate equivalents in the public language in order to replace all political statements of religious origin that they make. The attempt to make such a direct, horizontal translation of" religious statements " into the language of publicly available statements, or to find a kind of horizontal correspondence between them, is erroneous and misleading. As we have seen, it is not the rejection of religious language and its (direct, horizontal) translation into a publicly accessible form, but the use of such language in a way that can be understood by all as relevant to the common good and contributing to it - this is what is required for effective communication and ethics of citizenship.

6. Conclusion: striving for unity and identity formation in a post-secular society

Habermas is right when he says that there is now a widespread awareness that it is necessary to renew the cultural sources of solidarity and that the constitutional state should "be free from the cultural sources of solidarity."-

53. Habermas J. Religion in the Public Sphere. P. 18 [С. 139].

54. Ibid. P. 19 [P. 140].

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it is appropriate to deal with all cultural sources on which citizens 'awareness of norms and solidarity between them are based." 55 However, this means that every citizen must stop living (or only living) with his or her fellow citizens in a socially solipsistic universe with its own "comprehensive doctrine" or "private foundations" (religious or non-religious," traditional "or" non-traditional " in their orientation, conservative or radical/feminist). but that all citizens should make renewed efforts to reintegrate their various fundamental beliefs and become members of a single political universe enriched by a healthy diversity of viewpoints. Habermas is optimistic and insightful in his assessment of what this means for believers, but it's not entirely clear what it means for non-believers. For the first (believers) this means that, as he says, "they have the opportunity to influence society as a whole through the political community" 56, but at the same time, he adds, liberal abortion laws impose an "asymmetric" burden of tolerance on them57; for the second (non-believers) this means "self-reflection" and "awareness of the limits of enlightenment [or the limits of Enlightenment]"58. What all this means for the "anti-metaphysical" Habermas is not entirely clear, but for me the" strict requirements " of tolerance imposed on believers by liberal abortion laws must meet the requirement for non-believers (1) tirelessly and constantly seek out sources of social and political solidarity, and (2) recognize (a) that the liberal State cannot justify itself and cannot be justified simply by a procedural and metaphysically neutral justification, (b) that the liberal freedoms and diversity that we value have their source in a deeper and more inclusive unity, which is the most important thing in the world. further research is needed, and (c) that the notion that a liberal state can justify itself autonomously, without any theological or metaphysical basis, ultimately leads to its decline,

55. Habermas J., Ratzinger J. The Dialectics of Secularization. P. 46 [С. 69].

56. Ibid. P. 49 [P. 73].

57. Ibid.

58. Ibid. P. 50 [P. 73].

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and (3) seriously consider the possibility that (a) and (b) may be closely related or even interdependent. Thus, when Habermas says that we should "understand cultural and social secularization as a twofold process of mutual learning, forcing both enlightenment traditions and religious teaching traditions to comprehend the limits of each of these views"59, what he said is perfectly true; however, I would like to point out here that this is also true of the dynamics of cultural and social secularization. or the "meeting of the boundaries" of the sacred and the secular (the "dialectic" of the sacred and the secular) in the Christian era. In both cases, we are not talking about a "border" in the sense of (1) a football field bounded by a rugby field, but a border in the more Hegelian sense of (2) striving above oneself towards oneness with the other, as exemplified by the position of a husband who is bounded by his wife or "denied" by her. "He" is not "his wife"; she is "other" but his "other", and vice versa; there is a mutual and complementary aspiration to "cross the border" in order to achieve transcendent unity.

When theorizing about post-secular society (and especially considering its need for legitimation and a sense of meaningful identity), we must distinguish between questions about "who we are" on the one hand, and "what we do" / "how to do it" - which we have mostly discussed so far - on the other side. The Rawls / Habermas approach helps us deal with the latter, but gives us little to think about the former (concerning issues of identity or what our collective historical experience has made us). Their principle of neutrality, which is expressed, for example, in the fact that "all political decisions made by the State authorities must be formulated and can be justified in a language that is equally accessible to all citizens"60, is perfectly reasonable and does not allow for exceptions when applied to the question of "what to do", and even to the question of "what to do". such controversial issues as abortion and same-sex marriage, but it is inappropriate and unrealistic when it comes to the question of "who are we", which arises in a situation where the changing ethno-religious configuration of a certain people raises the problem of its historical identity.

59. Habermas J., Ratzinger J. The Dialectics of Secularization. P. 23 [С. 43].

60. Habermas J. Religion in the Public Sphere, P. 12 [pp. 128-129]. See also Rawls J. The Idea of Public Reason Revisited. P. 783.

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an inherited sense of identity. The failure to make this elementary distinction has had dire consequences for Western societies, for it has become difficult for us to understand that in order to deal with the question of "who are we", citizens must be reasonable in maintaining symmetrical "expectations of tolerance" from one another; for example, this means that citizens with a "Christian heritage" should be able to do so."a predominantly Christian society may have 'expectations of tolerance' on the part of its Muslim fellow citizens-expectations that are equally reasonable when it comes to Christians in a society with a predominantly Muslim heritage. I think it is reasonable to expect Muslims living in a Western society - with Judeo-Christian roots still publicly recognized and variously valued-to (1) be as tolerant as possible that that society's religious past continues to be an integral part of its identity, and (2) that they will exercise sensitivity and tact in their efforts to integrate (or" instill") aspects of their own religion into the public expression of national identity. (For example, members of significant Muslim minorities in Western societies may have reasonable expectations that their fellow non-Muslims will join them in a public "celebration" of the end of Ramadan.)

Further, it is important to recognize that rituals that we might call "this is us" - such as saying public prayers before parliamentary meetings or celebrating Christmas, Easter, or Good Friday in public-raise an issue of identity that must be dealt with directly. We need to formulate criteria and standards of reasonableness (symmetrical expectations of tolerance) that specifically address these issues, and instead of trying to create an empty, featureless public space (which, unfortunately, was the intention of the US Supreme Court when it banished all historically established forms of representation from the public sphere We should encourage all living ethno-religious traditions that feed the motivational roots of society, and cultivate a culture of mutual respect and tolerance that generates and maintains friendly relations between them.

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Finally, I argued that Habermas ' "dialectic of secularization" - as the title of a book co-authored with Cardinal Ratzinger reads, although the more apt expression is "post-secular dialectic" - is today, in modern conditions, the functional equivalent of the distinction between the sacred and the secular characteristic of the Christian world in the past and its"striving for unity in Christ".. However, figuring out how to characterize this post - secular drive for unity in modern Western societies is not an easy task. It is difficult to find a phrase or unifying slogan to accurately express the main features of this" post-secular "society that Habermas is talking about, or the essence of the society that ideally implements its" secularization dialectic "(or, as I would say, "post-secular dialectic"). It seems to me that, remaining in line with his ideas outlined in the "Dialectic of Secularization", at present the best functional equivalent of "striving for unity in Christ", which characterized the relationship between the sacred and the secular in the era of the Christian world, would be the expression "striving for unity in God and the good", which characterizes the relationship of the sacred/ metaphysical-secular / political in modern post-secular Western societies. The idea of "society in God and the good", of course, must be understood as much as possible in the most catholic and "socially integrative" way, so that it becomes acceptable to the unbeliever Habermas. It is true that the fullness of meaning associated with this expression cannot find universal approval; this meaning can only be accepted by religious people (wholeheartedly) and by the vast majority of "nominal believers" (simply as a fact). However, many components of this meaning may well be accepted by such "principled atheists" as Habermas. I am referring here to the "God-like" quality implied here in the word "good," the sovereign claim it makes to all of us as citizens, and which Habermas, in spite of his strongly anti-metaphysical attitude, seems to me to recognize much more clearly and strongly in the "Dialectic of Secularization" than in his earlier writings. early works. He says, for example, that citizens are expected to " take their rights to communication and participation actively, not only in their own interests ... but also with an eye to the public good.",

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and he notes that this entails the ability to "make sacrifices"61. As a principled atheist, Habermas may reject the expression "in God and the good" in favor of the expression "in the good as God", but he may also be willing to accept the former expression, since it essentially implies for him and his fellow atheists the latter. Also, as we have seen, he is very optimistic in his recognition that the dialectic of secularization presupposes a heavy test for mutual tolerance. Considering that (1) he is quite generous, recognizing that the believer pays a considerable price in a post-secular liberal society by accepting the right to abortion, 62 which for believers is almost tantamount to tolerating the absolutely unacceptable, and that (2) he fully believes in the sociopolitical "unity-in-difference" and accepts the tensions that lead to abortion. it inevitably generates doubts, and that (3) he has a deep and genuine respect for believers with whom he disagrees, Habermas may be willing to pay the "high price of tolerance" that he expects from others in relation to the expression under discussion.

Translated from English by Alexander Kyrlezhev

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