On April 26, 1994, in the first general election in South Africa's history, in which both black and white people participated, the union of democratic forces, consisting of the African National Congress (ANC), the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the South African Communist Party (SCCP), won a landslide victory. This union won 62.5% of the vote, gaining a majority in Parliament. Forces that reflect the interests of the vast majority of the country's population have come to power. The defeat of the powerful apartheid system, which was rooted in all the pores of South African society, was due to a number of factors, including the consolidation of protest social movements.

The goal of the democratic organizations was not only to eliminate the apartheid system, but also to develop a modern political consciousness among black South Africans, who, after the mass repressions of the early 1960s, for the most part considered resistance impossible and therefore remained in a state of political apathy. Special attention should be paid to the repeated public statements of the ANC leadership that the strategy of the liberation struggle was based on four main components: armed struggle, activities of underground structures of the ANC, international solidarity and legal mass political struggle.

All these forms were complementary and, taken as a whole, formed a powerful system. However, the most notable was the legal struggle. In contrast to armed and clandestine activities involving hundreds, possibly thousands of people, legal democratic organizations have engaged hundreds of thousands of people in the struggle against apartheid, and at times, during the most powerful upheavals of the struggle, millions of people. An important role in the mobilization of anti-apartheid forces was played by community organizations, which began to form after the "school children's uprising" in Soweto in 1976, a complex of 26 villages located 18 km southwest of Johannesburg.

Such an institution could arise precisely in the villages where the intelligentsia, employees, and workers returned after work. Work kept them apart. Towns where they were equally exposed to racial oppression brought them together.

REASONS FOR SOCIAL PROTEST

The political activity of the black population of South Africa was due to their discrimination. Inequality was evident in all areas that determine the standard of living: wages, employment, housing conditions, spending on education and medical care.

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In the 1980s, the situation in a number of industries began to change for the better. While in 1970 white miners earned 16.3 times more than black miners, in the 1970s and 1980s economic factors and trade union struggles reduced the wage gap in some sectors of the economy, and the ratio reached 1 : 3 [Davies, O'Meara, Dlamini, 1986, p. 31]. However, for the basic industries, these ratios were worse: 1: 4 in manufacturing, 1: 5 in mining, and 1: 10 in agriculture (South Africa at the End of the Eighties, 1989, p. 203).

In the early 1980s, Soweto workers ' wages increased by 20% in 30 months, but the consumer price index increased by 38%, and this had the greatest impact on low-paid categories of workers [New Nation, 20.2.81]. The cost of living for a black family of 5 people in the mid-1980s was estimated at 440 rand per month [Race Relations Survey..., p. 288]. However, 56% of families in South Africa had an income of less than 400 rand per month, and 40% had an income below 280 rand [Anti-Apartheid News, 15.1.86]. As a result of inflation, the purchasing power of the average black worker fell by 9% in the two years from 1985 to 1987 [A Folder of Facts..., 1987, p. 8].

During this time, taxation has also increased significantly. The contribution to the budget from the trade tax (which increasingly fell on blacks) increased from RAND 2 billion to RAND 8 billion between 1982 and 1987. Individuals contributed 8.2% more to the budget than companies. 10 years earlier, companies contributed almost 30% more to the budget than individuals [A Folder of Facts..., 1987, p. 8].

The level of relative impoverishment of the masses is also evident from a comparison of the growth rates of workers ' wages and the profits of monopolies. Thus, the wages of mining workers increased by 20% in 1981, and the profits of Anglo-American increased by 52% [Sechaba, 22.6.82]. Toyota's profit increased by 420% in 1980 [New Nation, 25.2.81].

Among whites, unemployment was close to zero, while among blacks, according to official data, it was about 17%. However, according to the Institute of Race Relations, the unemployment rate was more than 37% [Race Relations Survey..., 1988, p. 293]. In some black areas, it covered up to 50 to 60% of the working-age population. According to some estimates, up to 6 million people were unemployed in the country as a whole [Race Relations Survey..., 1988, p. 293-296]. If we add to this the extremely low level of social protection of the black unemployed, we can imagine what a powerful potential of protest lay only in this social phenomenon.

In 1986, there were up to 1.7 million people in South Africa who did not have permanent housing and lived in shacks made of cardboard and tin. Even according to official data, the need for housing for all blacks was estimated at 1.4 million houses or apartments. For comparison, the number of whites who needed housing was estimated at 1,479 [Race Relations Survey..., 1988, p. 197-199]. The quality of housing for the black population also left much to be desired. In 1986, 60% of the villages where they lived had no electricity at all. In 217 electrified settlements, 85% of residents were unable to use electricity. Nationwide, only 10% of blacks had access to electricity. The situation was approximately the same with water supply. In Soweto (and this is not the worst of the villages), only 30% of homes had water supply [Race Relations Survey..., 1988, p. 197-199].

Child mortality among Africans in 1982 was 5 times higher (and 13 times higher in Transkei) than among whites [South Africa in the 1980s..., 1986, p. 65]. The incidence of tuberculosis for blacks was 200 people per 100 thousand, for whites - 12 people per 100 thousand. The level of costs per patient in the Johannesburg Hospital was 15 times higher than in the Gazankulu Bantustan hospital [A Folder of Facts..., 1987, p. 13].

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REASONS FOR CREATING IT

By bringing people together according to their place of residence, community organizations allowed them to be brought together regardless of their place of work, age, level of education, religious beliefs, or even (though not always)religious beliefs. from political beliefs. The basis for unity was the fact that the problems of black settlements (high rents, rising prices for municipal services, their poor quality, crime) affected all residents.

Initially, community organizations were formed to address issues that directly affect the interests of residents of settlements: the fight against rising rents, the cost of utilities and transport, and the growth of crime. However, since all these problems were largely the product of the apartheid system, the activities of these organizations quickly became political in nature. In some cases, they were transformed into tools for spreading the ideas of the Freedom Charter, into semi-legal bodies of the ANC, and finally, in the context of the collapse of the local government system, into alternative authorities that united the efforts of youth, women's, religious and other legal mass democratic organizations.

All this was not a random or purely spontaneous phenomenon. Young activists of the liberation movement, faced with the passivity of older generations, quickly realized that the mobilization of parents is possible if the conditions of their daily existence are affected.

The emergence of community-based organizations went hand in hand with the creation of local self-government bodies (MoES), which, in accordance with the reform concept of the Minister of Justice P. Koornhof, were to replace the Bantu Affairs Departments. Recall that one of the main ideas put forward by the Rickert and Wihan commissions was not only to strengthen control over the movement of Africans from rural areas to cities, but also to shift concerns about the improvement of settlements to local self-government bodies. The idea was to split the black population along a new line - between permanent residents of cities and otkhodniks, and for this purpose, in addition to the black bourgeoisie and the black working aristocracy, local black officials were also formed.

The petty bourgeoisie and workers-permanent urban residents-combined with the top bantustans and black local governments in "white" areas could create a "buffer" stratum that would have a special interest in preserving apartheid as a system that grants them additional privileges. According to Sechaba magazine, " the goal of these plans is not to break down existing barriers, but, on the contrary, to create new, more powerful and effective ones. The recommendations of the Wihan and Rickert commissions are aimed at winning over the African urban elite to the white side, which will accept the restrictions imposed on it, otherwise it will face unemployment and starvation in the reserves" [The New York Times, 1979, N 9].

These ideas formed the basis of P. Koornhof's bills on black local government, on the development of black communities, on the orderly movement and residence of blacks. In the first issue of the newspaper "UDF News" in August 1983, the following brief but very succinct description of these bills is given: "...these plans mean tightening the laws on passes. The government wants only one in four Africans to be able to live in cities. Those without a home or job should starve to death in bantustans.

Urban residents should be separated from waste workers. The government will fine citizens who shelter otkhodniks who do not have the right to live in the city. The few Africans who live in cities legally will get a job.

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Residents of bantustans will receive only the remaining jobs. In this way, the government hopes to weaken the unity of Africans.

The traitors will grow stronger. Puppet community councils will receive land and have their own police force. They will also determine who gets homes and who gets kicked out.

The price of oppression. Africans will be forced to pay for the so-called services and remuneration of municipal councillors out of their poverty-stricken salaries" (UDF News, 1983, August).

Further deterioration of the living conditions of Africans, laid down in the Koornhof bills, created a breeding ground for the strengthening of the resistance movement. The main reasons for the creation of community organizations were the social difficulties described above, corruption and the refusal of local self-government bodies to listen to the opinions of residents of settlements.

The appearance of community organizations, which became a new phenomenon in political life, testified to the end of the period of passivity of the masses, to their transition to offensive tactics. They were able to provide effective resistance to attempts to raise rent or bus fares, and this quickly gained credibility. The South African newspaper SASPU National noted that " community organizations have helped people understand that they can do something in the conditions in which they are forced to live. Recent years have seen expressions of the strength of the people in the united and often creative actions of communities against the authorities "(SASPU National, 1983, August). By 1983, community organizations existed in black townships in all major cities in South Africa (Mogoba, Kane-Berman, and Bethlehem, 1988, p. 9).

ECONOMIC REASONS

Until 1971, black settlements were part of white urban municipalities. So, in particular, Soweto was part of the municipality of Johannesburg, and the village of Kahiso was part of Krugersdorp. Both cities and towns shared a common fiscal base, and thus urban municipalities could redistribute funds for education and public services in favor of towns from local property and income taxes.

In 1971, as part of a program to deepen apartheid, these villages were removed from urban municipalities and placed under the control of the Bantu Affairs Offices (BDS). The general concept of" greater apartheid " was that black settlements in white areas were supposed to play the role of only temporary settlements, some kind of extended dormitories where Africans could live only when their work was in demand in the economy for the benefit of whites. After that, they had to return to their" independent states " - bantustans.

In full compliance with this concept, black Africans had to pay the management costs themselves. Since UDBs could no longer receive funding from white urban municipalities, they could only use local sources of income in black townships. These included rents for land and retail outlets, property taxes and sales taxes. But the main source of revenue was the issuance of licenses for the sale of beer and spirits.

Restrictions on entrepreneurial activity in black townships not only reduced the overall income level of blacks, limiting the revenue base of local governments, but also led to blacks spending most of their money in white cities. That is, by transferring responsibility to black self-government bodies for

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At the same time, the Government deprived them of a revenue base from which to cover the expenses of these bodies.

Black self-governing bodies tried to get government subsidies, or to include them again in white municipalities, or to transfer them the right to issue driver's licenses and receive fines for traffic violations. However, all of this was denied to them. From large sources of income in the hands of local governments, in fact, only the right to issue licenses for the sale of alcohol remained in the hands of local governments. However, these most lucrative sources usually fell into the hands of the heads of administrations and their relatives.

Thus, the main means of increasing the revenue side of the local budget in black settlements was an increase in rent and an increase in the cost of utilities. Moreover, the increases were made immediately for significant amounts and, importantly, without consulting with taxpayers.

Among the first community organizations were the Soweto Residents 'Association and the Port Elizabeth Black Residents' Organization. They played an important role in spreading the experience of such associations throughout the country. At first, at the stage of formation, they did not take a significant part in the national movement. However, as the struggle in the black villages intensified in 1982-1984 - the time of the highest upsurge in the struggle - before the state of emergency was introduced - it was the community organizations that became the bodies that united the efforts of all mass democratic organizations.

According to G. Houston, there are three main periods of activity of community organizations [Houston, 2003, p. 180]. This is the period from 1979 to mid-1984, when they emerged as a form of struggle of the population of black settlements against specific actions of the authorities leading to the deterioration of their living conditions. From mid-1984 to mid-1986, when this form of organization of the black population spread throughout the country, and in some areas there were pockets of "people's power". From mid-1986 to early 1990, the authorities began to crack down on community organizations, while at the same time implementing a program of certain changes in the settlements aimed at weakening the protest movement.

The creation of community organizations took place in different ways. Thus, a number of organizations emerged as a spontaneous form of struggle against the deteriorating living conditions in the villages. As a result of their interaction, the United Democratic Front (UDF) emerged. Some organizations were formed at his call and under the influence (and with the active participation) of activists of mass democratic organizations who were purposefully engaged in spreading new forms of struggle.

In the period from 1979 to 1984, the main motivating factors for the creation of community organizations were economic requirements. However, by mid-1984 there was a qualitative change in the nature of the struggle. Residents of black villages began to use such complex and effective forms of resistance as refusing to pay taxes and rent, boycotts of stores, and general absenteeism from work. The uprising in the Transvaal villages in September 1984 led to a qualitatively new stage-the transition from social protest to open confrontation with the authorities.

The constitutional reforms that the white minority regime began to implement during this period (the creation of a tricameral parliament, where there were no representatives of Africans, and at the same time the introduction of local self-government bodies for blacks) caused a new outbreak of struggle. A characteristic feature of this period was the shift of the center of gravity from local problems to regional and national problems. New forms of struggle, involving previously passive segments of the population, simultaneously led to an increase in the political consciousness of residents of black settlements. People who were previously far from politics, it became more difficult

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it is clear that the inhumane conditions of their life are not determined by the arbitrariness of local authorities, but are a direct product of the apartheid system.

Realizing the effectiveness of community-based organizations, ODF leaders, relying on local activists, set about creating them in areas of the country where they were still absent. At the same time, measures were taken to revitalize organizations that were inactive for a number of reasons, especially in the eastern Cape.

In 1985, a fundamentally new phenomenon emerged - people's authorities in the form of street committees. They emerged against the background of the collapse of the local self-government bodies created by the regime. A power vacuum has emerged in the villages. Under these circumstances, street committees assumed both administrative and judicial functions. It got to the point where the authorities were forced to de facto recognize the street committee systems and interact with them.

Since 1986, brutal repressions and mass arrests of leaders and many activists of mass public organizations have blocked their activities (with the exception of trade unions). More than 20 thousand leaders and activists of the anti-apartheid movement were arrested within a few days after the state of emergency was declared. It was the largest-scale crackdown in South African history. It was followed by numerous lawsuits against the most prominent figures of the movement. Measures were taken to paralyze any possibility of protest on the ground. Curfews and bans on rallies and demonstrations were imposed in a number of villages. The homes of leaders and activists were searched. Army units were brought into the villages to help the police. If the arrested leaders were replaced by new people (which was quite problematic under the state of emergency), they did not have the political and organizational experience and influence of their predecessors.

Simultaneously with the crackdown, beginning in 1986 and continuing over the next year, the authorities conducted a campaign to "win the hearts and minds" of the population of black villages. According to one anti-apartheid activist, "attempts to improve the material conditions in which oppressed black South Africans lived were a direct result of the nationwide uprising in previous years" (Houston, 2003, p. 181). The "winning hearts and minds" program was part of an "all-out strategy" designed to weaken the political struggle against apartheid through economic measures.

"Village regeneration" programs were initially implemented where community and other organizations were particularly strong. These villages were called "strategic bases" in the apartheid regime's terminology, or "fat spots"in the slang of the program managers. It should be noted, however, that the emphasis in the "total strategy" was not on raising the welfare of residents of black settlements, because a real increase in welfare would require expenditures that the regime's leaders were not willing to go to.

SOWETO RESIDENTS ' ASSOCIATION

The population of Soweto in the 1980s was between 2 and 3 million people. Black South Africans from all over the country flocked here in search of work that was easier to find in the vast industrial complex of the Transvaal. Therefore, Soweto ethnically and socially represented the whole of South Africa in miniature. There were neighborhoods where the nascent black middle class lived. There were huge dormitories for otkhodnik workers and vast areas outside the city.-

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built in houses - "matchboxes". Large areas were occupied by squatters ' huts1.

Soweto became famous all over the world after June 16, 1976, the beginning of the "uprising of schoolchildren", which lasted several months. Hundreds of schoolchildren were killed and wounded, and thousands were arrested during the suppression of the uprising. The inevitable result of this revolt was the politicization of Soweto residents and, as a consequence, an increase in their level of organization. On July 21, 1976, representatives of youth, religious, trade union, and community organizations formed the Black Parents ' Association (BPA2) in Soweto. It was assumed that she would be engaged only in helping the families of dead schoolchildren. However, the refusal of the authorities to cooperate with it, even in humanitarian matters, quickly led to the politicization of the Association, strengthening its interaction with student organizations.

Not so massive and effective Associations of black parents have emerged in other cities affected by youth uprisings. Soon they were replaced by new organizations representing, like the Committee of Ten in Soweto, all the inhabitants of the village or suburb. Thus, " so far, the Government has been implementing the Law on Community Councils as a step towards creating a semi-administrative body for Soweto... Soweto residents responded by creating their own instrument of provisional self-government , the Committee of Ten" (Brooks and Brickhill, 1980, p. 110). In other areas, such as the western Cape, religious organizations have played a similar role to the BPA. It was also a new phenomenon that marked the beginning of the active participation of churches in political activities.

A. Brooks and D. Brickhill also highlight another distinctive feature of the Soweto uprising, which was destined to play a crucial role in the development of the democratic movement. They noted that "in seeking a means of self-defense and retaliating against the Government, black communities have turned to a 'weapon' that has remained unused for more than a decade - a political strike. In the six weeks between August and September, strikes were held three times, each time more successfully, extending from Soweto across the Witwatersrand to the Cape Province" (Brooks and Brickhill, 1980, p. 3).

KAHISO

Kahiso is a medium-sized village located about 25 km west of Johannesburg in the Transvaal. It was founded in 1956 to serve the needs of the residents of Krugersdorp and the nearby Chamdor industrial area. By the mid-1980s, the population of Kahiso was estimated at about 60-70 thousand people. In addition, approximately 5 thousand people lived in two dormitories and another 10 thousand were semi-legally housed in huts on plots behind the houses of permanent residents of the village. Squatter settlements did not appear on the outskirts of Kahiso until the late 1980s.

In terms of age and other characteristics, it was an ordinary village in the Transvaal. Therefore, the history and experience of the Kahiso community organization are illustrative for other parts of the country. Almost the same scenario was followed in the vast majority of other villages in South Africa [Houston, p. 157-158].

In Kahiso, where residents were not particularly politically active until the early 1980s, the first step towards self-organization was a sharp increase in water charges. In 1980, the villagers refused to pay their water bills. Local

1 Residents of land plots built up by self-grabbing.

2 Black Parents Association.

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the administration initially threatened to stop the water supply altogether, but then, faced with general discontent, did not dare to do so. However, at the end of the year, the mayor of the village announced his intention to sharply increase the rent. Then the local youth, who already had experience of political organization within student groups, created an initiative group. Its goal was not just to prevent one specific action of local authorities, but to create a structure that could unite the protest moods of the residents of the village. That is, it was about creating a long-term social mechanism.

By this time, there were already examples of community organizations being established in Port Elizabeth and Soweto. Activists of mass democratic organizations traveled around the country, sharing their experience. A very important role in the creation of the Kahiso community organization was played by the pastor of the local branch of the Church of the Apostolic Faith, Frank Chikane, who later became one of the leaders of the ODF, and then the chief of staff of the President of South Africa, T. Mbeki.

The problem in Kahiso, as in many other places, was that older people were wary of youth initiatives. According to tradition, young people should not have claimed the prerogatives of older generations, especially since after the Soweto uprising, which was accompanied by a strong increase in youth radicalism, older people perceived the activities of youth organizations with caution. Therefore, the proposal to create a community organization, coming from young people, would not have been successful. To overcome the distrust of the elders, it was necessary for the community organization to be headed by a person who has authority among all the residents of the village.

The Kahiso Community Organization was established in January 1981 at a meeting of residents of the village in a room provided by the Catholic Church. This was the first case in the history of the village. The event came as a surprise to local authorities. Fearing a harsh and now collective reaction from the population, the authorities decided to cancel the previously planned increase in rent. It is noteworthy, however, that immediately after this decision, the activity of the residents of Kahiso began to decline. People have not yet come to understand that the real essence of their problems is not in the specific decisions of specific officials, but in the general policy of the apartheid regime. This continued until August 1981, when a new rent increase was announced. After that, the Kahiso Community organization became active.

CADRES OF COMMUNITY-BASED ORGANIZATIONS

Although the leadership of community-based organizations usually included members of older generations, their main driving force was primarily young people. They were former students who participated in the Soweto uprising and subsequent political events. Until 1976, due to the suppression of political activity and the lack of traditions and experience of struggle, the youth environment was dominated by interests far from politics (primarily music and sports). But since the early 1980s, a political culture began to take shape. Due to the higher educational level, the concentration of young people in schools, colleges and universities, and the absence of the usual fear of the repressive state system for older generations, young people have much faster identified the most effective ways to mobilize and organize the local population.

As a rule, the once-elected leadership of community organizations remained unchanged for almost the entire decade that led to the defeat of the apartheid regime. This circumstance had its own advantage-there was a corps of organizers who had the necessary skills, experience, cohesion, and authority.-

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tet among the population. But this phenomenon prevented the emergence of new leaders. Moreover, after the introduction of the state of emergency in 1985 and the mass arrests of leaders and leading activists of youth democratic organizations (MDO), they were actually beheaded. It took a long time for new leaders to emerge or for leaders who had been arrested during the state of emergency to resume their duties.

In the case of the Kahiso community organization, according to Ineke fan Kessel, the influx of young people into politics went in three main directions. First of all, they were activists of the student organization COSAS 3, then-members of the Inter-Confessional Youth Christian Club, as well as the organization Young Christian Workers. Membership in these organizations was somewhat cross-cutting. That is, quite a few young people were members of two or even all three of these organizations. However, there was no systematic interaction between them. The creation of a community organization helped unite them.

The young leaders had many things in common: the former commitment to the ideas of "black consciousness"; then the transition to the position of the Freedom Charter; rejection of capitalism and belief in socialism as a way out of an unfair socio-economic system; a firm conviction that they are fighting for a just cause.

Religious figures such as Sister Mary Bernard Nkube, a Catholic nun, and Frank Chicane, a pastor of the Church of the Apostolic Faith, played an extremely important role in the formation of community organizations. Both of them later became prominent figures in the national leadership: M. B. Nkube became President of the Transvaal Women's Federation, and F. Chikane became Vice-president of the Transvaal branch of the UDF.

Many leaders and activists of the MDO acted not only legally. Smagaliso Mkatchwa, secretary of the South African Catholic Bishops ' Conference, was also a member of the ANC's underground structure. And Sidney Mufamadi, Deputy General Secretary of the COSATU trade union, was also a member of the regional executive committee of the UDF in the Transvaal province, as well as an activist of the underground structures of the ANC and UACP. It was quite common for the same person to be an activist of one or more legal organizations (for example, community and trade union organizations), as well as a member of the underground structures of the ANC and UACP, and also a fighter of the Umkonto ve Sizwe. However, it was considered that the leaders of the leading mass organizations should not be involved in the underground structures of the ANC, UACP and Umkonto ve Sizwe combat units in order to reduce the risk of reprisals against them.

Although community organizations were created as "non-partisan" associations of citizens, designed primarily to deal with specific problems in the life of black settlements, they inevitably had to become the object of the struggle of various political forces. Depending on whose views prevailed in the area, community organizations expressed their commitment to one or another line. Thus, some groups were influenced by the ideas of "black consciousness" and even the banned Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC). In the western part of the Cape Province, the neo-Trotskyist Unity movement was strongly influenced. However, in the overwhelming majority of cases, due to the sharp weakening of the appeal of the "black identity" ideology by the early 1980s and the transition of most youth organizations to the position of the Freedom Charter, community organizations fell under the influence of charterist ideas and became one of the important pillars of the underground structures of the ANC.

3 Congress of South African Students.

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SOCIAL DIFFERENTIATION AS AN OBSTACLE TO UNIFICATION

It would be wrong to assume that all residents of black villages were equally ready to join the activities of community organizations. Of course, the increase in rents, prices and the decline in the level of public services, the increase in crime, and police brutality affected all residents of the settlements without exception. However, the situation of different categories of residents of settlements was not the same. And this had a significant impact on their political views and attitudes towards the activities of democratic organizations.

Koornhof's reforms had many-sided consequences for the residents of black settlements. There was a significant differentiation of income.

On the one hand, as part of the white Government's reforms, the situation of skilled workers has improved. Especially in view of the growth in the number and influence of trade unions, which have gained the opportunity to seek significant salary increases from employers. At the same time, conditions were created for the development of small businesses. For example, the transport business - fixed-route taxis-began to develop rapidly. As a result, certain categories of blacks were able to significantly raise their standard of living. They could build more spacious and comfortable homes, buy cars and household appliances, and eat better. On the other hand, the bulk of the inhabitants of the settlements were still unskilled workers and people who had casual earnings, and especially the unemployed. It was their political energy that fueled the protest movement in the villages. They made up a significant part of the activists of mass democratic organizations.

NUMBER OF ORGANIZATIONS. STREET COMMITTEES

The number of these organizations is not easy to determine. Since, unlike trade unions, they did not have a fixed individual membership, much less the payment of membership fees, it is hardly possible to determine the exact number of activists of a particular mass democratic organization. However, in South Africa, if the inhabitants of a village formed a community organization, it was assumed that they were all part of it.

The size of the organization also determined its structure. In those of them that united the overwhelming majority of the population of the village, a hierarchical system emerged. It consisted of street committees, which, in turn, merged into microdistrict committees, then into district committees, and so on, up to the village council. Relations between leaders of community organizations and residents of settlements were also built accordingly. There was no strict system for holding meetings. In some places, they were held regularly, with leaders reporting to the residents of the village, and leadership re-elections were held. In other places, once-elected leaders remained in office for many years.

By mid-1985, the idea and practice of direct democracy had become widespread. Street committees began to form in many black communities. They are particularly popular in the Transvaal and the eastern Cape. This phenomenon has led to serious changes in the nature of the political struggle. Participation in national campaigns, such as rent waivers (in 1984 in the Transvaal) or consumer boycotts (in the same year in towns in the eastern Cape), helped to expand the mass base of community organizations and at the same time sharply politicize them.

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By the mid-1980s, Houston estimated that almost all community organizations considered participation in the anti-apartheid struggle as important as solving specific problems. These organizations now not only sought lower rents and improved public services, but also demanded the release of Nelson Mandela and other political prisoners, the withdrawal of the army and police from the villages, and the lifting of the ban on the ANC and other political organizations.

By mid-1985, it was clear that the strategic initiative was beginning to pass into the hands of the democratic forces. After the initial stage of the "protest policy", the UDF moved the fight to the local level and directed its energy against those elements of the government structure that were most vulnerable - local government officials and black police officers. According to the ODF, " the puppet structures staffed by our black compatriots turned out to be the weak link in the chain of our oppression. It is they who have become the focus of our struggle" [Secretariat Report..., 1987, p. 6].

The scale of the struggle is indicated, in particular, by the fact that up to 50 thousand people took part in the funerals of victims of police massacres. For comparison, the ANC had only about 100 thousand members during its highest heyday under the conditions of legal activity in the mid-1950s.

The collapse of local self-government bodies has led to a peculiar vacuum in the management of black settlements. There was a situation when not only municipal councillors, but also the police were afraid to appear in them. Under these circumstances, community-based organizations have increasingly taken over the management functions. In some cases, they assumed the responsibilities not only of local authorities, but also of State authorities: law enforcement groups and "people's courts"began to appear in settlements.

By supporting the ANC's slogan "Make the country ungovernable" and refusing to submit to the government, the residents of the black villages then took the next step - to create alternative local authorities. The strengthening of community organizations as an increasingly influential political force was reflected in the UDF's slogan "From ungovernability to the power of the people"put forward at the end of 1985. The first street committees were established in 1985 in Port Elizabeth, Cradock and Port Alfred. Then, at the end of 1985, to Mamelodi and, at the beginning of 1986, to Soweto.

The structure of alternative government bodies was roughly the same across the country: they were based on "yard" committees that brought together about 20 families. 5-6 " yard "committees formed the "quarterly" one. The street committee consisted of representatives of 6-7 "quarter" committees. Residents of one street elected a street committee consisting of 10-12 people, which met once a week and considered local social, economic and political problems, delegated its representatives to the next level committee (zonal, district), in which residents of up to 25 streets were represented. The executive Community Committee of the entire village was elected at a meeting of representatives of all microdistricts and approved at a general meeting of all its residents. In some villages, up to 25,000 people participated in such meetings (Morobe and Boraine, 1987, p. 7).

Leaders understood the tasks of these structures as follows: "... 1) direct political representation; 2) feedback from management at all levels; 3) dissemination of information about what is happening in South Africa; 4) discussion of tactics and strategies for absenteeism, consumer boycotts and non-payment of local taxes; 5) resolution of local conflicts through the use of the Internet. people's courts; 6) participation in the management of settlements. Street committees also began to work closely with student representative councils... as well as with trade unions and councils of shop stewards" (Morobe and Boraine, 1987, p. 7).

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New forms of activity, in turn, gave an impetus to the political creativity of the masses. According to the ODF, " never before have our villages witnessed such debates, such mass participation, such direct representation, not only from political activists, but also from ordinary South Africans, who have been pushed from side to side like tree stumps all their lives "(Morobe and Boraine, 1987, p. 7)..

This system of public authorities, collectively known as street committees, proved highly effective in the period leading up to the state of emergency. According to the ODF, " real democracy first began to emerge at the street and village levels, when people began to elect structures responsible to them. Street committees were readily accepted by people as their true representatives" [Secretariat Report..., 1987, p. 8].

The development of the street committee system was uneven. In many villages, during the repressions of late 1985 and early 1986, these committees were never established. In rural areas, where young people were mostly politically active, the weakness of women's and community organizations prevented the Front from establishing any significant number of village committees. But, according to T. Karon, it was the street committees and the participation of thousands of local residents in them that gave the democratic movement a truly mass character [Karon]. This marked the end of a period when a limited stratum of activists and leaders made decisions and implemented them. Decision-making now required a broad democratic debate. The leadership of organizations was increasingly promoted from among people who had a real support in the masses.

Thus, community organizations played an extremely important role in mass mobilization of the population of black settlements to fight apartheid. These organizations developed new effective forms of activity that were appropriate to the conditions of South Africa. Together with trade unions, youth and women's organizations, community-based organizations became the backbone of the broad front that led to the defeat of the apartheid system and the creation of a free, non-racial, democratic South Africa in the early 1990s.

list of literature

A Folder of Facts and Figures of South Africa, Human Awareness Programme // Info-87. Johannesburg, 1987.

Anti-Apartheid News. L.

Brooks A., Brickhill J. Whirlwind Before the Storm // International Defence and Aid Fund for Southern Africa. L., 1980.

Business Day. Johannesburg.

Davies R, O'Meara D, Dlamini S. The Struggle for South Africa. Zed Books. L., 1986.

Houston G. Democratic Organisations of South Africa. L., 2003.

Karon T. United Democratic Front. [Manuscript of the book in English].

Mogoba S., Kane-Berman J., Bethlehem R. Sanctions and the Alternatives // South African Institute of Race Relations. Johannesburg, 1988.

Morobe M., Boraine A. Towards a People s Democracy // UDF paper for the IDASA Conference. Johannesburg, May 1987.

New Nation. Johannesburg.

Race Relations Survey 1987 - 88 // South African Institute of Race Relations. Johannesburg, 1988.

SASPU National. Johannesburg.

Sechaba. L.

Secretariat Report to the National Working Committee Conference // UDF pamphlet. National Working Committee Conference. 29 - 30 May, 1987.

Seekings J. The History of the UDF. Johannesburg. 2002.

South Africa at the End of the Eighties // Centre for Policy Studies of the Witwatersrand University. Johannesburg, 1989.

South Africa in the 1980s. State of Emergency // Catholic Institute of International Relations. L., 1986.

The New York Times. N. Y.

UDF News. National Newsletter of the United Democratic Front. Johannesburg.

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