Keywords: Nigeria, oil, Movement for the Liberation of the Niger Delta, terrorism, amnesty program, conflict

Nigeria is one of the largest oil exporting countries in the world. The country has been producing oil since 1,957, and currently has an estimated $ 31 billion in Nigerian oil reserves. barrels ¹. The largest oil producing companies in Nigeria are Shell, Chevron, Elf, Agip, Texaco ². According to some estimates, over the past 25 years, revenues from the sale of Nigerian oil have reached $300 billion, with 63% of the population having an income of about $1 per ^day3. The main oil-bearing area of Nigeria is the Niger River Delta (DN). The population in this region is approximately 32 million ⁴ and is represented by more than 140 ethnic groups (Ijo, Ogoni, Edo, Isoko, Efik, Itsekiri, etc.) ⁵.

The majority of the NAM population (63%) is under the age of 30, ⁶ with an unemployment rate of 40%, one of the highest in Nigeria. ⁷ Only 25% of the region's population has permanent access to clean water8, and most rural areas lack electricity. Some areas of NAM are cut off from the rest of Nigeria due to lack of roads. A logical conclusion to this picture is the fact that 75% fewer children attend primary school in NAM than the Nigerian average of ⁹.

In the period from 1970 to 2000, more than 6 thousand people were recorded. There are ¹⁰ oil spills (about 13 million barrels ¹¹; the number of spills is growing every year, for example, in 2014 alone, more than 500 spills were recorded ¹²), which led to the fact that in many regions of the NAM, agriculture ¹³ and non-oil industries were almost completely destroyed. In addition, NAM is the most oil-polluted place in the world, and the environment continues to deteriorate there14.

It should be noted that in addition to the Movement for the Liberation of the Niger Delta (ELN), a number of other armed groups operate in the region, for example, the Freedom Fighters of the Niger Delta (BSDN) and the Volunteer People's Forces of the Niger Delta (DNSDN), but it is the activities of the ELN that cause huge losses to oil companies. Thus, between 2006 and 2009, as a result of the ELN attacks on oil production facilities, Nigerian oil exports decreased by a quarter ¹⁵.

Rebel activities in NAM affect not only political and economic processes in Nigeria and West Africa, but also global oil prices.

BACKGROUND TO THE NIGER DELTA LIBERATION MOVEMENT

In the mid-1970s, world prices for "black gold" began to rise, and the Nigerian economy almost completely shifted to oil exports. The predominant development of the oil-producing sector has led to the fact that the region's traditional industries - fishing and agriculture - have suffered significantly, and NAM is currently forced to purchase food, although some time ago it exported it16. In the early 1980s, oil prices fell, which predetermined the economic crisis in the country, which in the NAM was aggravated by the difficult environmental situation. Therefore, it seems quite natural for protest movements to arise in this region, defending the rights of the local population.

The process of escalating the conflict in the Niger Delta can be roughly divided into four stages: peaceful demands (compensation for environmental damage and redistribution of oil production revenues); peaceful protests (for example, boycotting oil wells); partial militarization of the protest as a result of the involvement of the police and army in conflict resolution by oil companies; and the formation of armed groups that use violent methods of fighting ¹⁷.

One of the movements that used peaceful means of resistance was the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (DVNO, Ogoni-an ethnic group of up to 500 thousand people). Its founder and leader was Ken Saro-Wiwa, a well-known Nigerian writer, human rights activist and environmentalist.

The DVNO advocated greater autonomy for Ogoniland (the Ogoni territory), demanded that the Nigerian government start fighting poverty, and fought to improve the environment in the region. DVNO conducted international solidarity campaigns with the struggle of the Ogoni people, and in 1993 organized a non-violent mass protest campaign, during which activists managed to almost completely stop the oil production industry in Ogoniland. As a result, DVNO leaders were arrested, and Ken Saro-Wiwa was executed in 1995.

Despite the repression, a number of other organizations appeared in NAM that fought for the rights of certain ethnic groups. For example, the Movement for the Survival of the Ijo People in the Niger Delta, the Chikoko Movement, the National Forum of the Oron People, the Ijo Youth Council, etc. These movements used the DVNO practice and adopted only nonviolent methods of struggle. This tactic did not bring results. Even after the death of Nigeria's military dictator Sani Abachi (1993-1998) in 1998 and the beginning of democratic reforms in the country, the situation of the population in NAM has not improved.¹⁸ New organizations such as the Freedom Fighters of the Niger Delta (BSDN), the Volunteer People's Forces of the Niger Delta (DNSDN), and others were inclined to take part in armed actions.

The most famous group was the DNSDN group under the leadership of Dokubo Asari. DNSDN was engaged in oil theft and destruction of oil pipelines. Since 2003, the practice of abducting foreign workers employed in the oil industry has become widespread.

President Olusegun Obasanjo (1999-2007), who won the first democratic elections in Nigeria in many years, continued his policy of protecting oil fields of companies and repressing militants in NAM. In 1999, Government forces almost destroyed the Odi community in Bayelsa State, killing 2,483 people, including women and children.¹⁹ A few days later, the authorities stated that the purpose of the action was to protect the oil production complex located on the territory of community ²⁰.

Another factor that increased tension in the NAM was the creation by the Government of a special military formation consisting of land, naval and air forces-the Joint Task Force (JOG), whose main task was to protect the property of oil workers. The population began to perceive this military unit as an army of invaders.²¹ It can be said that by 2009, the presence of regular army units in NAM was one of the reasons for the further escalation of the conflict.²²

The intensity of the conflict is affected by the widespread use of small arms in ^the region23.

Since 1999, "democratic" changes have been taking place in the country, but they have only complicated the situation in the region, as it is common practice for Nigerian political leaders to arm a part of the population to fight against political opponents.²⁴ Some researchers especially highlight the 2003 elections, during which the arming of Nigerians in some areas became widespread. ²⁵ Such actions of political elites contributed to the development of legal nihilism among the population: unemployed and poorly educated people saw the only way to survive in the use of weapons.

Perhaps another factor that predestined the emergence of the MLD was the arrest in 2005 of two prominent representatives of the Ijo people: Dokubo Asari, the leader of the DNDN, and Dipierre Alamisaig, the Governor of Bayelsa State, mainly inhabited by Ijo. In the same year, the Financial and Economic Crimes Commission investigated the Trust Bank owned by Ebitimi Banigo (ijo). After the check, the bank was closed. All this has led residents of NAM to believe that the federal government is trying to deprive them of political leaders and subjugate local businesses.

Poverty, appalling environmental conditions, the availability of weapons, and the failure of attempts to change anything peacefully contributed to the emergence of a paramilitary radical Movement for the liberation of the Niger Delta in the NAM region.

DODN ACTIVITIES

In 2005, the Movement for the Liberation of the Niger Delta (MLD) emerged in NAM. The aim of the Movement is to reduce oil production in Nigeria to zero and expel foreign oil producers from the country, ²⁶ according to the official representative of the DODN, Zhomo Gbomo. In this way, it tries to force the Government to pay attention to the plight of the region and take measures to improve the environmental situation, combat poverty and develop NAM in general.

The ELN is a network of small armed groups that are loosely linked and often do not even coordinate with each other.²⁷ The movement does not have a general command or leaders known to the general public. The official representative of the DODN is Zhomo Gbomo, who periodically makes statements on behalf of the entire movement, which are sent by e-mail to various organizations. According to the field commanders who laid down their weapons, the man named Zhomo Gbomo does not really exist, and different people can act under this pseudonym.²⁸

The absence of a single well-known leader avoids being eliminated or bribed by the government or oil companies. In other words, the DODN leadership remains virtually invisible to the opposing side, which greatly complicates the government's actions in relation to the Movement. Such an organizational structure makes it possible to unite various groups under the umbrella of the DODN, which can act both independently and on behalf of the Movement. For example, according to Jomo Gbomo's statement, the January 8, 2010 attack on the Chevron Makaraba oil pipeline was authorized by the DODN, but was carried out by fighters from other groups. ²⁹

Another distinctive feature of the DODN is the constantly changing number of fighters. Fighters can move relatively freely from unit to unit, thus gaining various guerrilla fighting skills and strengthening the ties between the units. ³⁰

Public support is essential for the evolution of any armed conflict. Perhaps the main reason for the long-term successful struggle of the DODN remains the sympathy of the NAM population for the tasks of the Movement ³¹. Some researchers claim that almost every resident of the region is ready, in one way or another, to support the struggle of the DODN ³². Sometimes even non-military movements use DODN methods. For example, in 2003 and 2006. The Federated Communities of Ijo movement in the Niger Delta (FOIDN) was involved in the abduction of foreign workers who were used as human shields during one of the FOIDN peace rallies, so that the YPG forces could not open fire on the protesters.

Some authors point to significant differences between the NAM conflict and other similar conflicts, and these differences are suggested as reasons for the support of the militants by the civilian population. First, the partisans practically do not involve children in combat operations.³³ Secondly, there are almost no acts of violence (robberies, robberies, murders) against the local population. ³⁴ Thirdly, the militants do not practice sexual violence against local women (soldiers of government troops and OOG units were seen in this) ^.35

Resistance in NAM is not a matter of just one ethnic group; it can be described as a multi-ethnic movement. According to former DODN commanders, the struggle of the Movement represents the opposition of all the peoples of the Delta to the government and oil companies.³⁶

A paramilitary movement must have sources of funding. In the case of the DODN, the main thing is the sale of stolen oil. Another common way to "earn money" is to get a ransom for abducted foreign workers. It is estimated that the "revenue" from these "activities" for the period from 2006 to 2008 reached $100 million.³⁷ Some units are supported by funds from Nigerian diasporas in other countries38.

The problem of supplying detachments with weapons and ammunition is mainly solved through contacts with international arms dealers. On October ²⁶, 2010, an Iranian ship carrying 13 containers of weapons designed as construction materials and allegedly intended for the MLN39 was arrested in the port of Lagos. Weapons also come from soldiers and officers of the regular army, who sell them to militants from military warehouses. Thus, in 2008, several officers were convicted for selling more than 700 small arms to the rebels between 2003 and 2007 ^.40 Finally, improvised weapons made by the NAM population became widespread during the conflict.

Thus, for a long-term struggle, the DODN has all the necessary conditions: sources of funding, weapons and, perhaps most importantly, support for the local population.

MAIN STAGES OF THE DODN ACTIVITY AND WAYS TO RESOLVE THE CONFLICT IN NAM

The beginning of the active activity of the DODN dates back to 2005, when the Movement's militants blew up Shell oil pipelines. There are two stages in the Movement's activity: from 2005 to 2009 and from 2009 to the present. This division is due to the announcement in 2009 of a state amnesty program for illegal armed groups in NAM, after which there was a certain decline in the ^activity of the MLN41, which is partly due to the fact that from 2010 to 2015, the President of Nigeria was Goodluck Jonathan (ijo) and some rebel leaders had high hopes for his rule. change of position in DN ⁴².

The first period was marked by a great activity of the DODN. A number of high-profile actions were committed, for example, the explosion of oil pipelines in the Okirika and Andoni areas (2005), the explosion of an army barracks in Port Harcourt and an oil tanker base in Warri (2006), an attack on a coastal oil production station (2008) ⁴³, a raid on an oil tanker carrying 4 thousand tons of oil (2009) ⁴⁴. Moreover, the AML has become more active from year to year. In January 2007 alone, 70 people were taken hostage in NAM, and in the whole of 2006, only 50 people were taken hostage.⁴⁵ In March 2009, NAM's oil production declined to 1.6 million barrels per day, compared to 2.6 million barrels in 2006.46 From 2006 to 2009, as a result of its operations, Nigerian oil exports declined by 25% to ³⁰% ^.47

The Nigerian Government has tried to take measures to de-escalate the conflict in the region. A decree by President Obasanjo created the Niger Delta Development Commission, and in 2008 President Yar'Adua (2007-2010) created the Ministry of the Niger Delta, but this did not bring any real results. ⁴⁸ In 2004, the Government managed to negotiate with militant leaders Dokubo Asari (DNSD) and Tom Ateke (NAM Volunteers) to end the conflict. fire. As part of the Arms-Buy-Back program, fighters who handed over their weapons were paid 250 thousand rubles. naira (approximately $1,700 at the 2004 exchange rate) "lifting". About 5 thousand units of various weapons were handed over, but many militants used the funds received to purchase newer weapons.⁴⁹ Both sides violated the terms of the truce, and this led to the fact that the conflict flared up with a new force.

Other West African countries are also taking some indirect measures to resolve the NAM conflict. For example, all States that are members of the Economic Community of West African Countries participate in a programme to counter the proliferation of weapons in region ⁵⁰; this programme also applies to NAM.

A major step towards overcoming the conflict was taken in 2009, when the Nigerian Government declared an amnesty for all groups fighting in NAM. The amnesty program provided that for two months (from August to October) militants who surrendered and stopped resisting were not prosecuted. As part of this program, they were promised rehabilitation and reintegration into society. Thus, conditions were created for the return of militants to normal life.⁵¹

The budget of this program in 2009 was $145 million. Rehabilitation was planned for 42 months and was carried out through special government centers located in Rivers and Delta states, while 65 thousand naira (about $450 at the 2009 exchange rate) was spent on the maintenance of one militant who laid down his weapons.This amount was equal to about three monthly salaries of a regular worker at that time. ⁵² That is, participation in the program was attractive from a financial point of view, therefore, and also because of the corruption of the officials responsible for its implementation, a large number of people who were not really members of the DODN or any other paramilitary movement took part in the rehabilitation program.

According to many researchers, about 20 thousand people surrendered under the amnesty between June and November 2009, including well - known commanders-Tom Ateke, Ebikabowei Victor Ben ("General Boiloaf"), Government Ekpemupolo (Tompolo), Somboma Jackrich, Farah Dagogo ⁵³. During the implementation of this program, about 2,700 units of small arms, 3.5 million units of various ammunition ⁵⁴ and even 18 combat boats ⁵⁵ were handed over. Some commanders surrendered along with their soldiers. So, together with Ateke Tom, militants from six of his camps surrendered. It should be noted that some field commanders actually used the amnesty as an opportunity to rest and regroup their forces. For example, commanders Katie Sesse and John Togo surrendered to government forces, but soon resumed fighting.

According to the then leaders of the country, the Nigerian amnesty program was the most successful in the world among its kind. ⁵⁶ There are certain grounds for such statements. For example, in 2013, oil production increased to 2.5 ^million barrels per day57. There was also a decrease in the number of protest actions compared to 2005-2009, ⁵⁸ but many experts considered this relative calm to be temporary.⁵⁹ Moreover, the representatives of the DODN have repeatedly confirmed their readiness to take up arms again.⁶⁰

Some researchers consider the amnesty program to have failed and point to shortcomings in the process of rehabilitation and reintegration of ex-militants as the reasons for this.⁶¹ Rehabilitation centers were poorly equipped, there were interruptions in electricity and water supply, salaries were not paid in time, and this led to the fact that the surrendered rebels did not return to normal life, on the contrary, they were drawn into criminal structures. For example, in November 2009, armed ex-militants attacked the University of Port Harcroft campus, looting people and shops.⁶² In February 2010, the police arrested a group of ex-militants involved in kidnapping. According to some estimates, the crime rate in Rivers State, which has three rehabilitation camps, has increased during the implementation of the rehabilitation program. The reasons are obvious - rehabilitated militants have no place to work and the only way to survive is criminal. At the moment, the region is experiencing a re-mobilisation of recent insurgent forces.⁶³ For example, in 2010, the OOG forces destroyed a militant camp in Foropa (Bayelsa State), while the killed insurgents were found to have certificates of participants in a rehabilitation program.

In our opinion, one of the most important indicators of the inefficiency of the amnesty and rehabilitation program is that its main goal was not achieved - mass oil theft was not stopped (in 2014-up to

180,000 barrels per day ⁶⁴). It was mentioned above that oil production increased to 2.5 million barrels by 2013, but in 2014 this figure decreased to 2.39 million barrels, ^and in the 2015 budget, production is planned at 2.28 million barrels. on day ⁶⁶. Thus, the rate of oil production remains high compared to 2009, although it is gradually slowing down. It can be assumed that one of the main reasons for this slowdown is the activity of the DODN, since since 2010. The movement continues to attack oil industry facilities.

It is necessary to note some changes in his tactics. So, in 2010 (i.e., after the amnesty and the beginning of the rehabilitation program) The DODN carried out 2 terrorist attacks. On March 15, 2010, gunmen blew up a car in Warri in front of a building where the region's post-amnesty development issues were being discussed. The second terrorist attack occurred on October 1, 2010 in Abuja during the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of Nigeria's independence. These attacks, firstly, demonstrated a change in the tactics of the ELN compared to 2005-2009; secondly, they marked the beginning of a new stage of the conflict.

One of the reasons for the failure of the amnesty was that the program was not discussed by all interested parties, but was adopted by the government under pressure from oil companies that suffered losses due to the activities of ^the DODN67. At the same time, the main incentive for many militants to participate in the program was the fear of reprisals, which largely predetermined the ineffectiveness of the authorities ' policy in this direction.⁶⁸

The reasons for the failure of the amnesty also lie in the fact that the adoption of the program was not preceded by a military victory of any of the parties to the conflict, ⁶⁹ as well as in corruption and poor organization of the rehabilitation process itself.⁷⁰

A significant drawback is the exclusion of the UN from participating in the settlement of the crisis, at the behest of the Nigerian leadership, who wanted to fully control the process.

Meanwhile, there is another point of view on the inefficiency of the program. Some researchers point out that certain individuals and groups are interested in the ongoing instability in the region and are making efforts to disrupt the peace process. First of all, these are criminal groups of smugglers who transport crude oil or petroleum products to neighboring countries with Nigeria, as well as to countries in Asia, Europe and North America.⁷¹ These structures are engaged in an armed struggle for control over the illegal trade in "black gold". Criminal groups often deliberately provoke conflicts between different NAM communities, as it is easier for them to carry out their activities in an unstable environment. International arms dealers are also interested in escalating the violence. The state is trying to fight the smuggling of oil and weapons, but this fight is ineffective due to the high level of corruption, in which law enforcement agencies are also involved.⁷²

Another source of income for criminal structures is payments from oil corporations in order to "appease" militants, i.e., in fact, companies are trying to buy off criminals. ⁷³ It should be noted that these payments are received by both truly criminal groups and political activists, which greatly blurs the line between them.

Even NAM civilians are interested in continuing violence in the region, as oil spills occur due to terrorist attacks on oil pipelines and mining corporations pay large amounts of compensation to victims, which, in turn, often leads to conflicts between communities over the" ownership " of contaminated territory.⁷⁴

* * *

Despite the efforts of the Nigerian Government to de-escalate the conflict, the crisis in NAM is still very far from over. The amnesty program did not bring the desired results. Meanwhile, there is no denying that the situation in the region improved somewhat in 2013-2014 compared to the previous period.

A complete cessation of violence is possible only if the causes that caused this conflict disappear - the management of the oil industry is reorganized, the ecology of the region begins to recover, and the economy in the NAM is diversified. The situation is aggravated by the fact that political activity is closely intertwined with criminal activity, and it is often unclear whether the primary motive of the insurgents ' actions is the pursuit of their own economic interests or declared political goals. If we take into account the fall in oil prices in 2015 and the full dependence of the Nigerian economy on exports of this product, it becomes obvious that there will be an inevitable reduction in social spending (for electrification, education, job creation, environmental restoration). This will result in an increase in crime (which is already extremely high ⁷⁵) and the addition of radical armed groups to the ranks of NAM residents. Thus, a peaceful settlement in the region is a challenge for many years to come. However, after the presidential elections in 2015, congratulations were sent from the DODN to the new President of Nigeria, Mohammad Buhari⁷⁶, and this gives hope for building a productive dialogue between the authorities and the rebels.

¹ Crude Oil Price: Its Effects on The Economy // Nigerian Oil & Gas - http://nigerianoilgas.com/7p-1308

² Country Analysis Brief: Nigeria // US Energy Information Administration - http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/Nigeria/ nigeria.pdf; Oyefusi A. Oil-dependence and civil conflict in Nigeria // Centre for the Studies of African Economies Series. Oxford, 2007. WPS/2007 - 09.

³ National Bureau of Statistics // UNEMPLOYMENT/ UNDEREMPLOYMENT WATCH Ql 2015 MAY www.nigerianstat.gov.ng/pages/download/294

^{Francis P., Lapine D., Rossiasco P.} 4 Niger Delta. A Social and Conflict Analysis for Change. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Washington. 2011, p. 5.

^{Ibeanu O.} 5 Civil Society and Conflict Management in the Niger Delta. CLEEN foundation. Lagos. 2006, p. 19.

^{Francis P., Lapine D., Rossiasco P.} 6 Op. cit.

^{Alabi T.} 7 Youths' unemployment and crime control: an analysis of Nigerian experience // European Scientific Journal. 2014. Vol. 10, p. 301 - 312.

^{Abang S.O.} 8 The Niger Delta crisis and the roles of governmental agencies in Nigeria // African Identities. 2015. Vol. 12, p. 180 - 195.

^{Oyeshola D., Fayomi I., Ifedayo T. E.} 9 Education, Stability and Security in Niger Delta // Democracy and Security. 2011. Vol. 7, p. 1 - 17.

^{Watts M.J.} 10 Petro-Insurgency or Criminal Syndicate? // Economies of Violence. Working Papers. Berkeley. 2008, p. 8.

¹¹ WWF-UK and IUCN Comission on Environmental, Economic, and Social Policy, Niger Delta Natural Resource Damage Assessment and Restoration Project, Phase 1 Scoping Report. Report to the Nigerian Federal Ministry of Environment and Nigeria Conservation Foundation, May 2006 - http://www.ngps.nt.ca/Upload/Interveners/World%20Wildlife%20Fund%20-%20Canada/Nig er_Delta_scoping_report 2006.pdf

¹² oil spills keep devastating Niger Delta // DW - http://www.dw.de/oil-spills-keep-devastating-niger-delta/a-18327732Nigeria: Hundreds of oil spills continue to blight the Niger Delta // Amnesty International - https://www.amnesty.org/en/articles/news/ 2015/03/hundreds-of-oil-spills-continue-to-blight-niger-delta

^{Akinola A.O.} 13 Niger Delta: The Nexus between Militants' Insurgency and Security in West Africa // African Security. 2011. Vol. 4, p. 65 - 80.

¹⁴ Nigerian government and Shell continue to ignore horrendous pollution in Niger Delta // Amnesty International - http://www.amnesty. org/fr/node/48663

^{Obi C.} 15 Nigeria's Niger Delta: Understanding the Complex Drivers of Violent Oil-related Conflict // Africa Development. 2009. Vol. 34, N 2, p. 103 - 128.

^{Davidheiser M., Nyiayaana K.} 16 Demobilization or Remobilization? The Amnesty Program and the Search for Peace in the Niger Delta // African Security. 2011. Vol. 4, p. 44 - 64.

^{Akinola A.O.} 17 Op. cit.

^{Courson E.} 18 MEND: Political Marginalization, Repression, and Petro-Insurgency in the Niger Delta // African Security. 2011. Vol. 4, N 1, p. 20 - 43.

¹⁹ The Destruction of Odi and Rape in Choba, December 22, 1999 // Human Rights Watch - http://www.hrw.org/legacy/press/1999/dec/ nibgl299.htm

²⁰ Ibidem.

^{Nwajiaku-Dahou K.} 21 The political economy of oil and 'rebellion' in Nigeria's Niger Delta // Review of African Political Economv. 2012. Vol. 39, N 132, p. 295 - 313.

^{Courson E.} 22 Movement for the Emancipation for the Niger Delta (MEND) // Discussion Paper 47. The Nordic Africa Institute. Uppsala. 2009, p. 14.

^{Oriota T., Haggerty K.D., Knight A.W.} 23 Car Bombing "With Due Respect": The Niger Delta Insurgency and the Idea Called MEND // African Security. 2014. Vol. 6, p. 67 - 96.

²⁴ Ibidem.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Nigeria's MEND Rebels Threaten Future Attack on Oil Industry // Bloomberg Business - http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-01-27/nigeria-s-mend-rebels-threaten-future-a ttack-on-oil-industry

^{Courson E.} 27 Op. cit.

²⁸ MEND Meet GEJ, says we did not do it... Jomo Gbomo doesn't exist // The Nigerian Voice - http://www.thenigerianvoice.com/ news/35871/1/mend-meet-gej-says- we-did-not-do-it-jomo-gbomo-doe.html

^{Oriola T., Haggerty K.D., Knight A.W.} 29 Op. cit.

³⁰ Ibidem.

³¹ Ibid.

^{Oyefusi A.} 32 Oil and the Probability of Rebel Participation Among Youths in the Niger Delta of Nigeria // Journal of Peace Research. 2008. Vol. 45, N 4, p. 539 - 555.

^{Oriola T., Haggerty K.D., Knight A.W.} 33 Op. cit.

³⁴ Ibidem.

³⁵ Ibid.

^{Courson E.} 36 Op. cit.

^{Oriola T., Haggerty K.D., Knight A.W.} 37 Op. cit.

³⁸ Ibidem.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

^{Agbiboa D.E.} 41 Have we heard the last? Oil, environmental insecurity, and the impact of the amnesty programme on the Niger Delta resistance movement // Review of African Political Economy. 2013. Vol. 40, N 137, p. 447 - 465.

^{Lowrence E.C.} 42 Today we shall drink blood: Internal unrest in Nigeria // Small Wars & Insurgencies. 2011. Vol. 22, p. 273 - 289.

^{Courson E.} 43 Op. cit.

^{Akinola A.O.} 44 Op. cit.

^{Obi C.} 45 Op. cit.

^{Nwajiaku-Dahou K.} 46 Op. cit.

^{Obi C.} 47 Op. cit.

^{Akinola A.O.} 48 Op. cit.

^{Vines A.} 49 Combating Light Weapons Proliferation in West Africa // International Affairs. 2005. Vol. 81, N 2, p. 341 - 360.

⁵⁰ Text of the ECOWAS Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons, Their Ammunition and Other Related Materials // The International Relations and security network - http://www.isn. ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3- le9c-bele-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=106269

^{Onuoha F.C.} 51 Small Arms and Light Weapons Proliferation and Human Security in Nigeria // Conflict Trends. 2011. Vol. 1, p. 50 - 56.

^{Nwajiaku-Dahou K.} 52 Op. cit.

^{Akinola A.O.} 53 Op. cit.

^{Davidheiser M., Nyiayaana K.} 54 Op. cit.

^{Francis P., Lapine D., Rossiasco P.} 55 Op. cit., p. 17.

^{Obi C.} 56 Oil and the Post-Amnesty Programme (PAP): what prospects for sustainable development and peace in the Niger Delta? // Review of African Political Economy. 2014. Vol. 41, N 140, p. 249 - 263.

^{Okonjo-Iweala N.} 57 Overview of the 2013 budget. 2013 - http://www.budgetoffice.gov.ng/bof_2013-update/CME_Budget_ Speechl.pdf

⁵⁸ Timeline of MEND Attacks // Ghana MMA - http://www.ghanamma.eom/news/l/timeline-of-mend-attacks/

^{Davidheiser M., Nyiayaana K.} 59 Op. cit.; Agbiboa D.E. Op. cit.

⁶⁰ Move over Boko Haram, Nigeria's MEND rebels set to restart oil war in Niger Delta // The Christian Science Monitor - http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2011/1030/Move-over-Boko-Haram-Nigeria-s-ME ND-rebels-set-to-restart-oil-war-in-Niger-Delta

^{Davidheiser M., Nyiayaana K.} 61 Op. cit.

⁶² Ibidem.

⁶³ Ibid.

^{Obi C.} 64 Oil and the Post-Amnesty Programme...

⁶⁵ Nigeria's 2014 budget. Tax and economic analyses // PWC Nigeria - http://pwcnigeria.typepad.com/files/nigerias-2014-budget-tax-and-economic-analyses.pdf

⁶⁶ This is The Full 2015 Nigerian Budget Speech (Updated) // Nairametrics - http://nairametrics.com/this-is-the-full-2015-nigerian-budget-speech/

^{Davidheiser M., Nyiayaana K.} 67 Op. cit.

⁶⁸ Ibidem.

⁶⁹ Ibid.

^{Ushie V.} 70 Nigeria's Amnesty Programme as a Peacebuilding Infrastructure: A Silver Bullet? // Journal of Peacebuilding & Development. 2013. Vol. 8, p. 30 - 44.

^{Ikelegbe A.} 71 The Economy of Conflict in the Oil Rich Niger Delta Region of Nigeria // Nordic Journal of African Studies. 2005. Vol. 14, p. 208 - 234.

⁷² Ibidem.

^{Lowrence E.C.} 73 Op. cit.

^{Ikelegbe A.} 74 Op. cit.

⁷⁵ Nigeria 2014 Crime and Safety Report: Lagos // US Department of State. National Bureau of Statistics - https://www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=15799

⁷⁶ MEND congratulates Buhari // Puls.ng - http://pulse.ng/ politics/nigeria-elections-2015-mend-congratulates-buhari-id3620 837.html

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