Author: A. A. Yazkova

Moscow, 1974. Military Publishing House of the USSR Ministry of Defense. 288 pages. The print run is 25,000. Price 76 kopecks.

On the eve of the 30th anniversary of the liberation of Romania from the fascist yoke, a book by Candidate of Historical Sciences A.V. Antosiak was published, which highlights the complex problems associated with the liberation of Romania from fascism, the beginning of the people's revolution in this country and the formation of Soviet - Romanian military and political cooperation at the final stage of World War II. Until now, all these issues have been treated either in generalizing works on the history of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union and the history of Romania, or in special works that focused on the internal processes that took place in Romania at that time and issues of its foreign policy ^.1

In this paper, a successful attempt is made to conduct a comprehensive study of both internal and external factors.-

¹ See, for example, N. I. Lebedev. The Fall of the Antonescu dictatorship. M. 1966; M. M. Minasyan. Liberation of the peoples of South-Eastern Europe. M. 1967; "Liberation of South-Eastern and Central Europe by the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts. 1944-1945". M. 1970; "Liberation mission of the Soviet Armed Forces in the Second World War". M. 1971; " History of Romania. 1918-1970". M. 1971, et al.

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both internal and external, including international, factors that contributed to the liberation of Romania from fascism, its transition to the camp of the anti-Hitler coalition, and marked the beginning of deep revolutionary transformations that led the country to the path of socialism. The book's undoubted advantages include the use of new materials, including archival ones, that support the author's main conclusions.

Throughout his work, A.V. Antosiak pays special attention to the study and coverage of the friendly relations that have long bound the peoples of the USSR and Romania, the formation of traditions of their multilateral cooperation. A huge role in this was played by the revolutionary ties of both countries, which have been especially strengthened in recent times under the influence of the Great October Socialist Revolution. The revolutionary events in Russia had a direct impact on the rise of the social and class struggle in Romania. The protests of the working people in its eastern regions, where at that time the Romanian Front was being held and the million-strong Russian army was stationed, were particularly widespread. Together with Russian soldiers, Romanian workers and peasants participated in revolutionary rallies and demonstrations in November - December 1917. The education of the revolutionary consciousness of the Romanian workers was also promoted by their direct contacts with the revolutionary people of Russia, where some Romanian workers, peasants and soldiers were evacuated during the First World War from the regions that were subjected to German occupation. Many Romanians evacuated in 1917. from Romania to Odessa, Kharkov, Nikolaev and other cities of Russia, they became active participants in the revolutionary events.

The ruling circles of bourgeois-landowner Romania perceived the October Revolution differently. The reaction that prevailed in the country first of all tried to sow distrust among the people towards the Russian revolutionary soldiers. The Russian army, which actually saved the country from complete defeat, was blamed for failures at the front and increasing economic difficulties. Propaganda of nationalism and hostility to Soviet Russia was intended by the reaction to prepare the Romanian people psychologically for the anti-Soviet actions of the ruling circles. In December 1917, the counter-revolutionary Romanian army, in alliance with General Shcherbachev's White Guard troops, began to disarm the Russian revolutionary units. After going on the offensive, it invaded the territory of Bessarabia, where by that time the socialist revolution had won. As the author emphasizes, at the beginning of 1918, Romania, taking advantage of the weakness of the young Soviet republic, seized Bessarabia with the help of international imperialism and liquidated Soviet power there. In the same year, it captured Northern Bukovina, whose People's Veche decided to reunite with Soviet Ukraine.

The documentary evidence presented in the book characterizes the position of the Romanian internationalists, who strongly condemned the aggressive policy of the exploiting classes. One of the leaflets issued in January 1919 by the committee of the Communist group of Romanians in Odessa read: "Romanian soldiers! It is almost a year since the Romanian government sent you to Bessarabia... Why don't the Moldovan people tolerate you? Because the Romanian government didn't send you there as liberators, because you didn't behave like liberators. You have come to establish an order that the people of Bessarabia do not need. In exchange for the freedoms and benefits that the Russian Revolution granted to the peasants and workers of Bessarabia, you established boyar orders there. Yes, comrades! The Bessarabian boyars asked the Roumanian government to send you to Bessarabia to suppress the revolution, which was not to their liking, because the revolution took away their land and handed it over to the entire peasantry, deprived the rich of the privileges of the city and granted all rights to the workers. It is in whose hands you have served as a tool, and what a great evil you have done to this country! " (p. 18).

Repeated protests against the occupation of Soviet Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina by the Royal Romanian troops were also expressed by the Governments of the Soviet republics of Russia and Ukraine, and later by the Government of the USSR.

The book shows how, in contrast to the alliance of Romanian reaction and international imperialism, the alliance of the revolutionary forces of the peoples of the Soviet republics and the advanced strata of the Romanian working class, headed by the Communist Party of Romania (CPR), established in May 1921, developed and grew. "The best representatives of <url>-

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The Mynsk people, despite the terror and the policy of persecution, remained faithful to the traditions of friendship between the peoples of our countries," A. V. Antosyak emphasizes (p.20).

The book reveals the significance of the Communist Party's cooperation with the CPSU (b), shows the great help that the Comintern provided to the Romanian Communists during all the interwar years and, in particular, in organizing the struggle against dragging the country into the war and turning it into a satellite of Hitler's Germany. The anti-fascist struggle platform developed by the Romanian Communist Party in January 1941 was based on the recommendations of the Comintern. The decision of the ECCI secretariat, sent to the Communist Party in August 1940, stated that the most urgent task at the present stage should be the struggle "against drawing Romania into war, against turning the country into an appendage of German imperialism, for peace, for close friendship with the Soviet Union" (p.30). But the ruling circles of bourgeois - landowner Romania still managed to draw the country into the war against the USSR. "Their policy was in blatant contradiction with the fundamental national interests, it went against the historically established traditions of centuries - old friendship between the peoples of our countries," writes A. V. Antosyak (p.31).

The result of the criminal policy of the military-fascist elite was the active participation of Romania in the war on the side of Hitler's Germany. Romania turned out to be one of Hitler's most active allies in the war against the USSR:* It fielded up to 30 divisions and brigades that took part in the anti-Soviet campaign up to the Kuban, the Caucasus and Stalingrad. Romanian oil resources covered more than a third of the needs of the German Reich and about 3/4 of the needs of the German fascist army in fuel (p. 35). A regime of looting and terror was established in the territories of Soviet Moldavia and Soviet Ukraine occupied by Romania. One of the Communist Party's documents cited in the book said: "The fascist hordes turned villages and cities of Bessarabia, Bukovina and Ukraine into ruins, they took away all the property of civilians, down to the last piece, they killed women, children and the elderly... The executioner Antonescu made Romanian soldiers and officers accomplices of fascist monsters in committing monstrous atrocities against the people of Soviet Moldavia and Soviet Ukraine " (p. 37).

The war, however, was from the very beginning unpopular with the democratic strata of Romanian society. The book tells about the heroic activities of anti-fascists who fought against fascism and Hitler's war both in Romania itself and in the territory of the Soviet Union - in partisan units and even in the ranks of the occupation armies. Based on a wide range of archival and other materials, the author reveals the significance of the Soviet Union's assistance in creating Romanian volunteer units from among prisoners of war on the territory of the USSR, and covers the role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in organizing the anti-fascist and anti-war struggle of its people in sufficient detail.

His main focus is on a comprehensive analysis of the problems of Romania's liberation from the Fascist yoke. The Red Army entered Romania at the end of March 1944. Since that time, its noble mission of liberating the peoples of Europe from fascism began. On April 2, 1944, the Soviet Government issued a statement outlining the Red Army's liberation goals. The statement once again demonstrated the peaceful nature of Soviet foreign policy, respect for the sovereignty and national independence of other peoples, and dispelled the slanderous fabrications of fascist propaganda about the alleged aggressive goals of the Red Army in Romania. This important document contributed to the intensification of the anti-fascist struggle of the democratic forces of the Romanian people, being a real and convincing evidence of the feeling of friendship between the Soviet people and the Romanian people.

On April 12, 1944, the armistice terms were handed over to the Romanian government, which provided for the restoration of the country's sovereignty and independence, the break of Romania with the fascist "axis" and the joint struggle with the powers of the anti-Hitler coalition against the Nazis and their allies. However, Antonescu's fascist government did not accept these conditions. Hitler's high command was determined to preserve Romania as the most important strategic foothold in the Balkans, and made repeated attempts to dislodge Soviet troops from the north-eastern regions of the country. The Red Army continued its liberation mission with bloody battles. In the cni-

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Here are the materials about the initial period of the liberation of Romania (April-August 1944) that were not sufficiently covered in the literature. A.V. Antosiak tells about the heroism of Soviet soldiers during the liberation of the northern regions of Moldova (by mid-May 1944, the Red Army liberated more than 800 settlements in Romania, where about 400 thousand people lived).

The book reveals the enormous influence that the entry of the Red Army into Romania had on the development of the national liberation struggle of the Romanian people, and shows the enormous work that the Communist Party carried out to organize the anti-fascist struggle. The author emphasizes the importance of the joint activity of the Soviet command and the Romanian democratic forces in exposing the fabrications of fascist propaganda, which instilled nationalist sentiments and fear of the Red Army in the Romanian people. At the same time, the main attention was paid to explaining the statement of the Soviet Government of April 2, 1944, revealing the essence of the peace-loving foreign policy of the USSR, exposing Hitler's policy of enslaving the peoples of Europe, and pointing out the way to restore the national independence of Romania.

The Communist Party prepared the people for armed struggle. However, in the summer of 1944, the balance of forces in Romania was still unfavorable for the start of an anti-fascist uprising. Hitler's command located on the territory of Romania and the regions of Soviet Moldavia bordering it a 900-thousandth army group "Southern Ukraine", which occupied favorable positions with four strips of defensive lines. In addition, formations of German troops consisting of about 60 thousand people were located in the rear areas of the country (p. 70, 79).

In August 1944. The Headquarters of the Supreme High Command decided to prepare and conduct the Iasi-Kishinev operation, the military and political goal of which was to defeat the forces of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts of the Southern Ukraine Army Group, complete the liberation of the Moldavian SSR and withdraw Romania from the war on the side of nazi Germany, which created favorable conditions for liberation from Hitler's yoke of the peoples of South-Eastern Europe. A. V. Antosyak writes in detail about the preparation and conduct of this largest military operation of the Second World War period, reveals the results and significance of each of its stages, showing that by the end of the third day of the offensive, the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts advanced 60-70 km, capturing a number of settlements, including the cities of Iasi, Ungheni, etc. (p. 98). On August 23, the operational encirclement of the Chisinau group, which consisted mainly of Hitler's troops, was completed. Representative of the Supreme High Command Headquarters Marshal of the Soviet Union S. K. Tymoshenko reported on August 23 at 23.30 to the Headquarters: "As a result of four days of operation, the troops of the 2nd and 3rd Ukrainian fronts today, 23.8, completed the encirclement of the Chisinau group... "(p. 99). Thus, the first and main stage of the Iasi - Kishinev operation was completed. Of the 25 German divisions of Army Group South Ukraine, 18 were surrounded and then eliminated; 20 of the 22 Romanian divisions were also defeated (p. 101). The rear units of the fascist armies located on the defensive lines failed to stop the rapid advance of the Red Army into the depths of Romania.

Under these favorable conditions, on August 23, an armed uprising began in the Romanian capital Bucharest, which resulted in the overthrow of the military-fascist Antonescu regime. The author cites convincing facts of the large and multifaceted activities of the Communist Party, which led the struggle for the overthrow of the anti-popular fascist regime, and shows that the participation of the palace circles and King Mihai in the overthrow of Antonescu was forced. In this situation, in accordance with the plan developed by the Communist Party, I. Antonescu and members of his Government were arrested in the royal palace. On the evening of August 23, the Communist Party's patriotic combat squad arrived there to transport the prisoners to the Communist Party's safe house, where they were held until they were handed over to the Soviet command. A.V. Antosyak analyzes in detail the internal prerequisites that determined the success of the anti-fascist uprising led by the Communist Party, which quickly and efficiently used the conditions created by the Red Army victories. The book reflects a complex political situation-

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Novka in Romania after the armed uprising on August 23. Contrary to the claims of many Western authors who attributed a decisive role to bourgeois-landowner politicians in the events of August 23, the author convincingly shows that the king and his entourage directed all their efforts to prevent further revolutionary transformations. Many pages of the book are devoted to the role and significance of the struggle of the Communist Party of Romania for consolidating the success of the armed uprising, for the cooperation of the democratic forces of Romania with the Red Army during the completion of the liberation of the country from the fascist yoke.

A.V. Antosiak also pays great attention to the problem of the formation of the Soviet-Romanian combat community, introducing a number of new facts that he learned from the documents of the Archive of the Ministry of the Armed Forces of Romania and characterizing the joint combat operations of the Red Army and Romanian military units. In particular, he cites interesting material about the battles for the liberation of Ploiesti and the Prahova oil Valley, where the Red Army met resistance from large German task forces (pp. 130-133). A significant place in the book is occupied by the analysis of subsequent joint combat operations of the Red Army and the Romanian Army, which was under its operational subordination. The author shows how at the final stage of the war, the Soviet and Romanian armed forces developed a common goal - the defeat of Hitler's Germany, and how the commonwealth of Soviet and Romanian soldiers grew stronger in joint liberation battles. Many of them gave their lives in the struggle for the final liberation of Romania. The losses of the Red Army on the territory of Romania from March to October 1944 exceeded 286,000 people. The Romanian army lost 58,000 men killed, wounded, and missing from August to October 1944 (p. 177).

Special chapters of the book tell about the struggle of the Romanian democratic forces against internal reaction, which prevented the democratization of the Romanian army and its more active participation in the anti-Hitler war until the government of P. Groza came to power (March 1945). Under these conditions, the Communist Party, as A.V. Antosyak emphasizes, made every effort to consistently fulfill the allied obligations stipulated in the terms of the Armistice Agreement of September 12, 1944.

The material presented in this paper generally confirms the main conclusion of the author that the correct combination of national and international tasks, loyalty to proletarian internationalism are the most important guarantee of success in the joint struggle. The experience of the military community of the Soviet and Romanian peoples at the final stage of the Second World War clearly demonstrated this.

The work is not devoid of certain shortcomings. A. V. Antosiak's argument in the polemic with Western historians and publicists, who grossly distort the meaning of the August 1944 events in Romania, would be more convincing if he referred to the provisions formulated in modern Western historical and political works, and did not limit himself to a brief mention of books published in 1948-1950. We will also point out some inaccuracies. Romania became a member of the Little Entente not in 1922, as the author writes (p. 19), but in 1921. Poland, on the other hand, had no allied relations with Romania at all within this bloc (p.23).

The publication of A. V. Antosiak's book, which will attract attention not only in the USSR, but also in Romania, is an expression of the growing interest of Soviet historiography in the problems of modern Romanian history and Soviet-Romanian relations.

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