Adaptation to the imperatives of globalization and the resulting changes in the global economic order, as one might expect, is particularly difficult and painful in developing countries. These difficulties are obviously based on deep technical, economic and social backwardness, coupled with the resulting increased inertia and resistance of local traditional and semi-traditional socio-economic structures to the modernization process. However, it is not only in difficult objective circumstances. Strange as it may seem at first glance, the complexity of adaptation of developing economies to the requirements of the time is largely due to the policies of developed countries that are part of the world economic vanguard, and international economic organizations under their control, such as the IMF, WTO, and World Bank, designed to maintain financial stability in the world economy and the smooth development of world economic relations, also, promote the rise of countries that occupy the lowest rungs in the global economic table of ranks. A policy that, along with a lack of insight into local specifics and basic miscalculations made in fulfilling the tasks assigned to these organizations, also reflects the ideological and political preferences of international officials who are entrusted with the authority to prepare and make important decisions that sometimes affect the fate of entire countries and peoples. To understand the current situation, it is advisable to clarify some concepts, touch on the policy of these organizations in relation to developing countries and describe in general terms the first results of their development in the era of globalization.

OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE FACTORS OF GLOBALIZATION

If we approach globalization as a modern stage of integration of the world economy, we should probably recognize that this process is initially aimed at maximizing the economic, scientific, technical and cultural interaction of all countries of the world, regardless of their level of development, civilizational affiliation and location. With such an approach, globalization, in the first approximation, could probably be considered as a diversification, expansion, deepening and consolidation of the entire system of world economic and cultural relations, tending to a general planetary, global dimension. Leading international economic organizations define globalization in one way or another. Only the IMF, for example, highlights world trade, transnational financial and technological flows, information networks and the interaction of cultures, while UNCTAD focuses on the globalization of industrial production through international cooperation based on detail, node and operational specialization, based on the comparative advantages of co-workers.-

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operating countries. And on these issues, by the way, there seems to be no disagreement among researchers.

As a rule, disagreements arise when and where, instead of an objective analysis of reality, ideological biases, political sympathies and other extra-scientific interests are brought to the fore, or spectacular but light-weight conclusions and fruitless theorizing, often losing sight of the real reality.

One of the most innocuous examples of this substitution is the rather common identification of globalization with the current stage of internationalization. However, despite their undoubted similarity, these processes are still different in their genesis and real content. Internationalization is, in essence, the brainchild of the industrial revolution, which laid the foundations of a technogenic civilization, which largely predetermined both the content and the general vector of world development, and globalization is the product of the information and communication revolution, which brought it to a qualitatively new level and created the technical prerequisites for the formation of a global economy. Internationalization is not only the development of world economic relations, but also the demonstration of the best of what is produced in different countries. As long as each country's participation in the international division of labor is based on its comparative advantages. And in this role, called the demonstration effect in the literature, internationalization contributes to the modernization of the needs of developing countries, thereby awakening and supporting their desire for development. Globalization, unlike internationalization, does not have its own image-building principle and, in fact, is reduced to a diversified expansion of information, world economic and cultural ties.

Given this, it is hardly legitimate to interpret globalization as a new stage of internationalization. Rather, it should be considered as an additional purely modern form of manifestation of the same phenomenon (two in one), the essence of which is most adequately expressed, perhaps, by the concept of world integrating development (MIR), introduced into scientific circulation by A. S. Solonitsky [Solonitsky, 1995]. In other words, globalization does not replace internationalization, but develops as if in parallel with it, multiplying the channels, forms and methods of world economic and accompanying cultural integration of countries belonging to different civilizational areas and at different stages of socio-economic maturity.

However, in order to better understand how economic globalization occurs in real life, how much developed and developing countries are drawn into it, and what impact it has on them, it is advisable to assess the changes in the dynamics and commodity content of world trade (based on the role of enlarged commodity groups in the reproduction process) caused by radical changes in the content of STP, and at least in general terms touch on the subjective political component of the globalization process. For the globalization of the economy, like any other socially significant process, is realized in the struggle of various economic and political forces for their own, often multidirectional interests, which do not always and not in everything work for the common good. And the lower the level of socio-economic maturity of a country, the wider the field and more opportunities for manifestations of subjectivism in politics, and the more significant the role of the subjective factor in the socio-economic transformations that this country is experiencing. The most striking examples of changes in the development process caused by the ideological and political attitudes of those in power are, on the one hand, Soviet industrialization, and, on the other, the unprecedented economic breakthrough of Japan and the four new states.

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industrial countries (NIS) of the Far East, which have left a noticeable imprint on the general course of world economic history.

The information and communication revolution has accelerated the development of world economic relations. Thus, in the last three decades of the XX century, which generally coincide with the time of its development, the physical volume of world commodity exports grew almost 4.9 times, while the total GDP of the world economic community increased 2.4 times [ World at the Turn..., 2001; Handbook of Trade..., 1997; UNCTAD. Handbook..., 2002]. At the same time, the dynamics of these two indicators, strange as it may seem at first glance, changed in opposite directions: despite the acceleration of the average annual growth rate of exports in the 1990s compared to the 1970s by 2.4 times (from 2.7 to 6.5%), the GDP growth rate over the same period slowed down by 1.4 times (from 3.6% to 2.6% per year). As a result, taking into account commercial services, the share of world GDP entering the channels of international economic exchange (often referred to as the export quota in professional literature) increased more than 1.9 times in 1965-2000 and reached 23% by the end of the century [ World Development Report, 1991; World Development Indicators, 2002]. It is difficult to say whether this is a lot or a little: there is obviously no definite answer to this question. For some countries, probably not enough, and for others, maybe a lot. It all depends on the specific circumstances. In particular, it depends on how the increased degree of inclusion in the international division of labor has affected the conditions and opportunities for the development of each individual country, various groups of countries and their totality.

The fact is, among other things, that the development of the industrial revolution into the information and communication revolution was accompanied by a sharp decline in the role of primary natural resources in the process of economic development. This transformation is most clearly reflected in the structure of international trade. Suffice it to say that in the last 45 years of the last century, the share of agricultural products in world exports of goods decreased by almost 3.5 times, and mineral and energy raw materials - by 1.8 times. Energy sources remained the most popular raw materials, but their share, including processing into various types of fuel, fell 1.4 times over the same years. The share of manufacturing products, on the other hand, increased by 1.8 times, and machine products-by more than 2 times, including office and communication equipment-by almost 15 times [Globalizatsiya i..., 2003, p. 25; WTO. International...]. The restructuring of world trade is basically connected with the technological re-equipment of the economy of the leaders of technogenic civilization. Developing countries, of course, found themselves in the position of "catching up".

To understand the overall picture of changes in the global economy, one way or another related to the new round of STP, it is appropriate to recall that the transition of the countries of the economic vanguard to the post-industrial phase of development was accompanied by a slowdown in growth rates, which has not been suspended so far. If in the 1960s, at the final stage of industrialization, the average annual growth rate of their GDP reached 5%, then in the 1970s, these rates decreased to 3.1%, in the 1980s-to 2.7%, and in the 1990s-to 2.2% [Mir na rubezhe..., 2001].

They tried to find a way out of the prolonged recession on the path of economic liberalization, which, under the influence of some imperatives of the information and communication revolution and not without the participation of right-wing forces that came to power in a number of countries of this group, was also delayed, but did not provide the desired dynamization of the decaying growth, but only high stability. An important role in encouraging it was assigned to the intensification of world economic relations, including through the accelerated opening of developing economies.

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The ideological and political inspirers of this action were the G7 countries led by the United States, and its main performers were the over-staffed and over-staffed neoliberals of the IMF, IBRD and GATT/WTO, who took advantage of the ongoing monetary and financial difficulties of developing countries. So, in 1981, with the arrival of a new President at the IBRD, U.S.S.R. Clausen instead of one of the greatest authorities on the problems of development X. Chenery was hired as chief Economist by A. Krueger, an international trade specialist known primarily for her research on the role of tariffs and other protective measures in generating additional profits (rent seeking). "While Chenery and his team focused on market failures in developing countries, government measures to improve their markets, and poverty reduction," notes Nobel Prize winner J. P. Morgan. Stiglitz, who was Senior Vice President and chief economist of the World Bank for about three years , says that the state itself has become a "headache" for Kruger. As a result, the solution to the problems of developing countries was reduced to free markets. Because of the new ideological passion, many of the first-class specialists gathered by Chenery left the bank" [Stiglitz, 2002, p. 13].

The transformation of the IMF is particularly significant in this regard. In the 1980s, his original Keynesian focus on compensating for market failures and state participation in job creation was replaced by spells about the omnipotence of the free market, which became part of the new "Washington consensus" - between the IMF, the IBRD and the US Treasury-on the "right" policy towards developing countries, indicating a fundamentally different approach to economic development and stabilization. According to authoritative experts, this notorious consensus was based on an assessment of the situation in Latin America, which had little in common with the situation in other regions of the developing world, and also ignored the experience of world economic leaders themselves. "Most of the industrialized countries, including the United States and Japan," he said. When forming their economies, they relied on thoughtful selective protection of certain industries until they gained sufficient strength to compete with foreign companies" [Stiglitz, 2002, p. 16-17]. No less thoughtfully and carefully, in accordance with the real economic situation, other restrictions on market freedom were then eliminated. Thus, the liberalization of capital markets in Western European countries began only in the 1970s.

Although all three organizations continued to operate in their original areas of competence, their policies towards developing countries are closely intertwined. So, in the 1980s, the World Bank, along with lending to individual infrastructure projects, began to provide broad support to developing countries in the form of structural adjustment loans, which, however, were provided only with the approval and conditions of the IMF, which was promoted to the role of the main conductor of the neoliberal ideas of the United States. These conditions were reduced to the curtailment of the public sector, the elimination of restrictions on private entrepreneurship, and the complete reduction of budget expenditures by refusing to support real production and curtailing social programs. Moreover, virtually without taking into account the specific socio-economic situation and inherent defects in the market in terms of managing the development process.

Initially, it was assumed that the IMF would focus only on helping to overcome financial crises. However, due to the continuing need for aid in most developing countries (which, along with the obvious excesses in import substitution, was caused by the dizzying rise in oil prices and the accompanying sharp increase in external debt), the recommendations of the Fund and the World Bank attached to it had a noticeable impact on the economy.-

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economic policy and the real economic situation in these countries. With the collapse of world socialism, many post-socialist countries also became the object of the neoliberal experiment.

A similar transformation of functions, albeit in an implicit form, occurred in the GATT/WTO. Although the decisions of this organization (unlike the IMF and IBRD) are taken at international forums, where each country has only one vote, and new countries ' accession to the WTO is carried out on the basis of agreements with all participating countries. The fact is that during the Uruguay Round of negotiations that lasted for more than seven years, which ended with the transformation of the GATT into the WTO, with some important issues unresolved, the charter of the new organization contained provisions restricting the rights of the state to interfere in the process of economic development. These include bans on the use of export subsidies, customs protection for emerging industries, and the introduction of mandatory conditions for foreign direct investment (FDI) [Dumoulin, 1997; Integration of..., 1992; Report of..., 1996]. When negotiating candidates for WTO membership with its "old-timers", general issues such as these restrictions, of course, are not touched upon. As a result, new WTO members automatically find themselves under the pressure of these restrictions. Thus, if at the dawn of capitalism, the breakthrough of the leaders of man-made civilization into the markets of countries that were lagging behind in their development was often carried out with the help of military force or the threat of its use, now the pressure of leading international economic organizations is most shamelessly used to solve this problem.

Meanwhile, no matter how important the structural reforms that the IMF seeks in exchange for loans are, without a meaningful industrial policy that at least partially compensates for the structural shortcomings of underdeveloped economies, they cannot accelerate industrialization, and therefore reduce the lag behind the economic vanguard. They can't because of low competitiveness, narrow national markets (especially in terms of demand for high-tech industrial products), historically developed specialization in the production and export of low-dynamic product groups, backwardness of local entrepreneurship, low quality of human capital, and weak motivation of capital needed for development. To see this, just look at the geography of foreign direct investment. First, the predominant part of exported capital is still concentrated in the countries of the economic vanguard, and in 1981 - 2000, when the "liberalizing" activities of the IMF reached a special scale, the share of these countries in its accumulated inflows increased from 60.9 to 66.7% [ UNCTAD. World Investment..., 2001]. Second, in the developing world, the main magnet for FDI is not the leaders of liberalization, but countries with effective industrial policies, sustained high economic growth and enviable political stability. These countries, along with South Korea, Taiwan and Singapore, include Thailand, Malaysia, as well as China, India, Pakistan, Turkey, Vietnam and a number of others.

UNDER THE PRESSURE OF MARKET FUNDAMENTALISM

The reorientation of the IMF from initially intended assistance in overcoming economic downturns and making up for market "failures" to the forced opening of underdeveloped economies, together with the corresponding policy adjustments of the World Bank and GATT/WTO, did not provide the associated hopes, but rather complicated, rather than eased, the situation of outsiders of the world economy.

First of all, it is necessary to note the destabilization of many developing economies, which often escapes the attention of the scientific community, not in the last decade.-

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This is due to unjustifiably hasty, poorly prepared market reforms. Thus, in the last quarter of the twentieth century, about a hundred countries suffered from all kinds of crises. Among other things, experts attribute such a high frequency and wide geography to the inadequate policies implemented by international economic organizations in relation to developing countries in the spirit of the Washington Consensus, the negative consequences of which were multiplied and reinforced by the growth of global interdependence.

Privatisation and liberalisation in most countries were carried out under the pressure and patronage of the IMF as structural crises worsened, essentially in exchange for the financial support they needed. However, financial injections alone were clearly not enough to overcome the crises and move to a path of sustainable economic growth. Deep systemic reforms were required with a certain sequence and reasonable speed of their implementation, and, of course, a pragmatic economic policy that was consistent with the realities of life. However, the international economic organizations involved in the reform process of developing countries were guided primarily and mainly by purely ideological considerations. They saw privatization and liberalization as an end in itself rather than a means of social and economic development in these countries. Hence the excessive rigidity and speed of reforms, as well as the unacceptably frequent violations of their necessary sequence. This is also due, not least, to additional economic disruptions and an exorbitant increase in external debt in many developing countries.

In some cases, incorrect recipes for a way out of the crisis, based on neoliberal dogmas, also contributed to this course of events. Among them, the demand for budget and monetary restrictions in the context of an economic downturn, which hardly contributed to a rapid revival of business activity. It is no coincidence that Malaysia suffered the least economic losses among the countries directly affected by the 1997-1998 Asian financial crisis, as it flatly refused to follow the IMF's instructions. It is also characteristic that, despite the geographical proximity and unprecedented onslaught of international speculators, China and Taiwan were practically not affected by the crisis. And if the" invulnerability " of the former is primarily due to the preservation, despite strong pressure, of full state control over all foreign economic operations, then the latter persisted due to the fact that during the implementation of financial liberalization, it promptly attended to the creation of new and modernization of traditional levers of strategic financial regulation [Thurbon, 2001].

Many problems in the development of countries located on the periphery of the world economy also arose in connection with the" liberal " dictate of the WTO. And the point is not only in the very truncation of their largely still unsettled state sovereignty of these countries. Because globalization, like any integration process, by definition, implies one or another of its limitations through delegating the rights to make appropriate decisions to certain authorized international organizations or directly to the market. And not even in the obvious inequality of competitive opportunities between advanced and economically backward countries as such. Especially important in this regard are the general lack of market relations in developing countries, the lack or imperfection of the necessary market institutions and the proper experience of market regulation, which significantly increase their vulnerability to the elements of the market, as, indeed, any extraordinary "man-made" events in comparison with the states of the economic vanguard.

The problem is also that during the transformation of the GATT into the WTO, which was carried out on the initiative and under the auspices of world economic leaders, they were not reorganized

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subsidized areas in their own economy that distort the effect of market forces on a global scale, which, among other things, contradicts the original ideological premises of this institution. We are talking about clearly prolonged support for their agriculture and textile industry. Delayed for many reasons. In addition to the natural concern for maintaining a certain level of self-sufficiency in food and employment in the name of social stability and national (food) security, as well as preserving national identity, they also seem to include the desire to retain traditional levers of pressure on developing countries. In short, by pushing their underdeveloped counterparts in every possible way to weaken trade, political and other restrictions on their expansion, the states of the economic vanguard, reinsuring their own well-being, are in no hurry to reciprocate.

This is evidenced, in particular, not only by the existing import quotas for many industrial and food products, starting with sugar and ending with textiles, which are of particular interest to countries in the initial stages of industrialization, but also by the escalation of non-tariff barriers to these and other goods and services that really compete with the local market. production facilities. This also includes large-scale subsidies for Western European agriculture and American agricultural exports, as well as the liberalization of trade in financial services, while simultaneously slowing it down in relation to construction and coastal services, in the production of which a number of developing countries have achieved comparative advantages. Without proper consideration of the interests of developing countries, problems related to the protection of intellectual property rights are also being solved.

The ambiguous impact of the current updated customs regime in developed countries on the modernization of developing economies should not be discounted. With a radical reduction in the overall level of import duties, their historically multi-stage structure, aimed at selectively protecting national markets, remained essentially unchanged. All duties, as before, are divided there into three main categories, based on the place and role of each imported product in the reproduction process. Raw materials purchased abroad are completely exempt from or subject to the lowest duties; all kinds of semi-finished products are subject to medium - level duties (with the partial exception of intermediate products supplied to enterprises of multinational production networks and associations), and finished products are subject to the highest. Similarly, customs tariffs for finished products have also been set up to support the most vulnerable and promising segments of the national market.

Such a customs regime, coupled with the tightening of environmental standards and measures, the general acceleration of scientific and technological progress and the resulting need to "free up" additional economic space for constantly multiplying new types of production, as well as the beginning of "liberal disarmament" of developing countries, contributed to the "movement" to the periphery of the world economy of material and labor-intensive, environmentally dangerous and morally At the same time, it has largely complicated the formation and development of a medium-sized and, even more so, high-tech manufacturing industry there, which initially needs capacious sales markets. The only exceptions were some of its low-productive links, which are part of transnational production complexes, which are the main beneficiaries of the information and communication revolution and are the object of special concern for developed countries. And all this, taken together, superimposed on the immanent capital aspirations for expansion, de-

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it has shaped and undermined the transformative forces of global integration development. As a result, the main benefits of globalization according to the recipes of the Washington Consensus were received, as one might expect, by the "globalizers" themselves. The developing countries that found themselves in the role of "globalized", in fact, got "crumbs from the master's table" on the principle of "Here you are, it's not worth it, it's not worth it for us". And this is not idle speculation of radical anti-globalists, but a real fact of modern history, recorded in a fundamental study of UNCTAD, published in the form of a traditional report of this organization on world trade and development [UNCTAD. Trade and...].

"How so?" - a well-informed reader may ask. Indeed, over the last three decades of the last century, the share of developing countries in world trade in goods increased 1.8 times and reached 32.1%. Moreover, this expansion was mainly due to the production of the manufacturing industry. Their share in the world export of industrial products increased almost 5-fold over the same years (from 5.5 to 26.8%), including in the export of machine-made products, most of which represent particularly dynamic segments of the world market of goods-12-fold (from 2 to 24.3%) [World economy..., p. 95]. In addition, in 1981-1998, the share of medium - tech products in these countries ' exports doubled (from 8.2% to 16.8%), and the share of high - tech industrial products increased almost 2.7 times (from 11.6% to 31%) [UNCTAD. Trade and..., p. 68].

The fact is, however, that the observed positive changes in the commodity structure of exports in the developing world actually reflect the achievements of only a very limited group of countries that have managed to achieve particularly significant success in industrialization and have pulled up the aggregate indicators for all developing countries. Indeed, in 1971-2000, the nine most dynamic exporters (including the top four NIS, the three ASEAN countries often referred to as the second tier of NIS, as well as China and Mexico) accounted for more than 9/10 of the total growth in commodity exports in the developing world, and slightly less in exports of industrial products and machinery products. In addition, the ennobling of developing-country exports recorded by standard trade statistics is deceptive in many ways. UNCTAD experts point out that this gentrification was not accompanied by a corresponding increase in industrial production, and therefore did not help to reduce the gap between developed and developing countries in terms of its average per capita volume. The exception was only a limited number of countries, led by the four Far Eastern NIS, which were deeply integrated into the international division of labor even before the collapse of liberalization, which was inspired by the Washington Consensus. At the same time, as the UNCTAD report emphasizes, they do not include "any of the countries that have implemented rapid trade and investment liberalization in the last two decades of the twentieth century" [UNCTAD. Trade and..., p. VII]. The participation of most developing countries in the production of high-tech industrial products is often limited to the simplest assembly operations, which create only a small fraction of the added value contained in their exported products. The majority of it is reified in components and parts that are imported for final assembly and subsequent export, and, of course, goes to those countries where these components and parts are manufactured.

Thus, in 1981-1997, despite the decline in the share of developed countries in world exports of manufactured goods from 82.3% to 70.9%, the share of these countries in value added by the manufacturing industry (measured in current prices), on the contrary, increased from 64.5% to 73.3% [UNCTAD. Trade and..., p. 81]. This actually means that a significant part of the increase in industrial production of states

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the economic vanguard in the period under review was ensured by "optimizing" its structure by transferring assembly plants with low added value to the global economic periphery.

This is not to say, of course, that developing countries have not benefited at all from connecting to transnational industrial complexes. They have received considerable benefits. But these benefits were much more modest than those that went to the leaders of the world economy. First of all, the countries that are in the initial phase of industrialization were the winners. The creation of various types of assembly plants helped them to increase the overall level of productive employment and at the same time to include in the economic turnover such a "comparative advantage" as the cheapness of local workers, which was previously in use. As for the stimulating impact of globalization on the dynamics of industrial growth in the developing world as a whole, it was very weak, especially in comparison with developed countries. While the share of developing countries in world industrial exports increased by 15.9 percentage points (from 10.6 to 26.5%) in 1981-1997, their share in world industrial production increased by only 7.2 points (from 16.6 to 23.8%) [UNCTAD. Trade and..., р.81]. Although developing countries in general "have become an important player in global markets for dynamic products," the UNCTAD report summarizes, "they still account for only 10% of global exports of goods that are highly knowledge-intensive, technologically complex, and / or scale-efficient" (emphasis added). - A. E.) [UNCTAD. Trade and..., p.VII].

The problem is also that various tariff and non-tariff restrictions on the import of industrial products to developed countries, coupled with a ban on the use of some proven industrial policy tools by developing countries, have significantly complicated the promotion of the latter into more productive niches of the world market formed by goods of medium and high technology intensity. Meanwhile, their growing crowding in a rather narrow economic space of cheap labor-intensive operations carries with it a real threat of what is commonly called "fallacy of composition" - a situation that, due to excessive concentration of producers in a limited area of the economy, is fraught with a sharp aggravation of competition, a collapse in prices for competing goods and services, and uncompensated demand for goods and services. deterioration of their terms of trade. In the case we are interested in, such a composition would inevitably lead to a drop in the already meager salaries of those involved in assembly operations and a general aggravation of the employment problem [UNCTAD. Trade and..., p. 113 - 116]. According to UNCTAD experts, "this could undermine development by causing a significant deterioration in the terms of trade and create friction in the global trading system" [UNCTAD. Trade and..., p. 136].

Regardless of the attitude to the above-mentioned facts of interference of developed countries in the general direction of spontaneous market forces, as well as to the motivation underlying this intervention, it seems that we cannot ignore the "distortions" in the distribution of world production caused by it. It should not, if only because such distortions infringe on the interests of "catching up" economies, hinder their modernization and development, and serve as a "bone of contention" between them and developed countries. Moreover, the real reason for the collapse of the WTO conference in Seattle was the refusal of the countries of the economic vanguard to listen to the concerns of developing countries about problems in international economic relations, and not at all the outrages of anti-globalists, which were reported by the media and focused on by rabid adherents of neoliberalism.

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A way out of the impasse was found only two years later, when, faced with the real threat of a complete suspension of the WTO negotiation process, the world's leading economic powers were finally forced to recognize the concerns of developing countries, which they clearly expressed back in Seattle, and in November 2001 at the fourth session of the WTO Ministerial Conference, which was held in in Doha, Qatar, agree to negotiate on issues that concern them. (This agreement was a precondition for the start of the next round of negotiations on improving the global trading system.) Given the background of the issue, it is obvious that we should not exaggerate the significance of these agreements and expect immediate results from them. All the more so because, as the Secretary-General of UNCTAD, Rubens Ricupero, so aptly put it, "we are talking about turning the multilateral trading system towards development (emphasis added). - A. E.). And success in solving it will be judged by the extent to which it will be possible to expand developing countries 'access to markets without limiting their freedom of maneuver in politics" [UNCTAD. Trade and..., p. XI].

How long negotiations on these extremely complex and highly sensitive issues, which in one way or another affect the vital interests of all participating countries, can take, and when and what their first results may be, probably no one will undertake to judge. Moreover, the attempt to resolve the escalated differences, made two years later (in September 2003) at the next WTO ministerial conference in Cancun (Mexico), ended in complete failure. The conference participants ' dissatisfaction with each other reached such a high pitch that they left the meeting room without even agreeing on the date of the next meeting. Without going into the twists and turns of this, frankly speaking, serious disagreement, let's try to understand the overall results of the development of peripheral countries in the era of globalization, as well as the emerging shifts in the positions of world economic leaders on this issue and, starting from them, slightly look into the foreseeable future.

ON THE THRESHOLD OF THE THIRD MILLENNIUM

The second half of the 20th century, which was marked by radical technical, economic, and socio-political changes on a global scale, dramatically changed the life of the world's economic periphery. The territories and countries forming it, having freed themselves from colonial and semi-colonial dependence, began to form and strengthen their own statehood, trying to put a modern economic foundation under the newly acquired national sovereignty. The main lever of economic modernization of these countries due to age-old backwardness was industrialization. Despite a lot of various congestion and failures, by the beginning of this century, most of them managed to achieve certain, and in some cases very impressive success in this field. Suffice it to say that in 1951-2000, the total GDP of the developing world (in prices and PPP 2000) grew 11 times (against 2.5 times in the previous half-century), industrial production (including extractive industry products) increased 16.3 times and the production of services-12.3 times, while agricultural products grew 4.3 times twice. As a result, its share in world GDP increased 1.8 times (from 22.2 to 39.7%), in industrial production - 2.2 times (from 15.5 to 33.7%), and in service production - 2 times (from 20 to 40.1%) [World Economy..., 2003].

These achievements, however, were largely eaten up by the unprecedented high population growth of these countries, especially in the first post-war decades, when the population boom reached its peak. And the real volume of economic benefits per capita turned out to be much more modest than their absolute growth. Average per capita GDP of developing countries over the same half-century

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industrial production per capita grew by 3.9 times and 5.7 times [World Economy..., 2003]. And since the economies of the vanguard countries also did not stand still, the relative gap in the levels of development of the center and periphery of the world economy (measured by the ratio of their per capita GDP) practically did not change. Moreover, in the first post-war twenty-five years, this gap even increased somewhat. Its decline began only in the 1970s, marked by a sharp slowdown in the economic growth of developed countries. Thus, when measuring the GDP of both groups of countries in prices and PPP in 2000, more accurately reflecting the current state of affairs, it turns out that by the beginning of this century, the average per capita GDP of all developing countries that originally belonged to this group reached 13.6% of the same indicator of the economic vanguard states, against 9.9% in 1970 and 12.2% in 1950 [World Economy..., 2003].

If we exclude the NIS that have already moved to a heavier "weight category", it turns out that the relative gap in the per capita GDP of the two groups of countries has not only not narrowed, but actually increased. In addition, this gap, along with the relative one, also has an absolute dimension, which is incomparably more significant in its significance. Since the initial opportunities for economic growth depend primarily and mainly on the real value of per capita GDP, and not on its ratio to other countries. And the absolute gap between the leaders and outsiders of the global economy, due to the huge differences in the weight of each percentage increase in their per capita GDP, usually grows even when its relative size decreases.

Meanwhile, by the end of the 20th century, this gap in prices and in PPP 2000 had grown by more than 3.4 times and reached almost $ 25,000. But the point is not only, and perhaps not so much, in this frighteningly impressive amount, which, by the way, is more than 6/7 of the weighted average of developed countries, and not even in the inevitability of its further growth, but in the new quality of the gap itself. If before the information and communication revolution, developing countries lagged behind developed ones, roughly speaking, within the framework of one technological era, now, when the leaders of the world economy have already entered the post-industrial phase of development, the overwhelming majority of developing countries are still at the early industrial, or at best mid-industrial, stage of development, although there are some interspersions post-industrial technologies.

There is no doubt that with the advent of the Internet, the opportunities for obtaining new knowledge have increased enormously. But first, the internetization of peripheral countries requires huge (in comparison with their own capabilities) funds and considerable time. Especially if we take into account the unavoidable costs of improving health care and basic living arrangements for the bulk of their population, not to mention the mass of other gaps and omissions. Secondly, as the gap between the development levels of the world economy's leaders and outsiders deepens and the development of its outsiders becomes more uneven,the outflow of the best and most promising specialists from lagging countries is growing. Third, the realization of the creative potential of such specialists in the countries of origin, in order to initiate and accelerate their technical and economic development, requires special attention and non - standard solutions on the part of the state, whose ability to influence the course of development in the country is narrowing. Fourth, the" pursuit " of developed countries by developing countries is significantly complicated by the growing reduction in the life cycle of goods and technologies, which accompanies the acceleration of scientific and technological progress. Finally, it is necessary to take into account its labor-saving effect, which can significantly complicate the socio-political situation in peripheral countries and thereby slow down, or even completely block, the process of their technical and economic rise. Even more so

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that at the turn of the millennium, according to the World Bank's estimate, out of 6 billion There are 2.8 billion people inhabiting our planet. they live on less than $ 2. In other words, they have an income below the international poverty line set by the world community, and $ 1.2 billion per day is not enough. - less than $ 1. In the same gradation, it is equivalent to total poverty [World Bank. Report..., 2001, p. 11]. It is obvious that all or almost all of these people live in developing countries, whose ranks have recently been expanded by former socialist States.

In the light of the above, the claims that it is still possible to bring developing countries up to the level of developed countries seem completely untenable. Especially if we take into account the limited bioresource potential of the planet. At best, only a certain relative convergence of the two groups of countries in this general indicator is possible. The main problem of future socio-economic development and the central task of the emerging new world economic order, therefore, is not to bridge the almost insurmountable gap between developed and developing countries, but to find and implement measures that will help accelerate the modernization of archaic economies of developing countries and put them on the track of expanded reproduction, which can provide a decent life for all to the inhabitants of our planet. The solution to this truly epochal task is complicated by the growing unevenness in the development of peripheral countries, which requires a more thoughtful and differentiated approach to their problems, taking into account the specifics of each country.

A certain idea of the first results of this ambiguous process can be obtained from data on the dynamics of economic growth in the 100 most economically significant countries, which account for more than 99% of the GDP and population of the developing world within its "traditional" borders, without taking into account the replenishment of former socialist countries, as well as the movement of NIS to the group of developed countries (table).

When considering the results of ranking developing countries by per capita GDP growth rates, changes in the quantitative composition of groups that differ in this indicator, as well as in the number of their populations in the selected time intervals, are noteworthy. These changes are based on an abrupt increase in the unevenness of their development. Its first wave was, among other things, associated with the global energy crisis, which in one way or another complicated the economic situation of countries dependent on energy imports, and the second was provoked by forced liberalization, carried out under pressure from international economic organizations. But if in 1971-1985 the number of countries with per capita GDP growth rates exceeding 2% (conventionally taken as the lower limit of relative well-being) increased by 1/3 compared to the previous 20 years, despite the energy crisis, then in the next 15 years it decreased by 1.5 times. Meanwhile, the share of such countries in the total population of the developing world has increased many times. Hence, the emerging economic rise of the developing world in the last three decades of the twentieth century. Along with the top four, NIS was provided primarily and mainly by populous countries with solid initial market potential, led by China, India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and Indonesia. This is a potential that, even at a low level of development, provides greater opportunities for implementing relatively independent economic policies in comparison with small countries.

Especially significant is the economic breakthrough of the NIS, which managed to take advantage of the opportunities for economic dynamization associated with the pre-transition period earlier and better than others.-

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Table

Ranking of the 100 most economically important developing countries by average annual GDP growth rate per capita (1951-2000)

-----

Source: [Mir na rubezhe ..., 2001, p. 376]

assets of the international division of labor. In some ways, these four were just lucky. Yet the phenomenal success they have achieved is all due to them. The point, among other things, is that during the period when the foundations were being laid for a forced offensive against backwardness, they did not experience the annoying neoliberal tutelage. And the recipes of the Washington consensus in their economic policy coincided only with strict concern for maintaining macroeconomic stability. NIS, as recommended by the Washington Consensus, also paid increased attention to export development, but did not rush to reduce import barriers. Foreign trade was eventually liberalized by them, but only gradually as new jobs were created in the export industry. Gradually, in contrast to the recommendations of the Washington Consensus, financial and capital market liberalization was also implemented there. (Although, as noted above, this did not save some of them from the financial crisis.) The main thing is that instead of the forced displacement of the state from the economy recommended by the Washington Consensus, they very successfully took advantage of its creative potential. Extremely effective state policies have played an irreplaceable role in their unprecedented rapid economic rise.

In many ways, a similar policy has been pursued for about a quarter of a century in China, which has shown remarkable prudence and perseverance in protecting its national interests when joining the WTO. And if we look at the list of countries that fell into this category in 1971-2000, we will see that all of them, with the exception of the "exemplary" Chile and a few dwarf countries that fell into the dynamic stream due to favorable economic and political conditions, achieved dynamization of economic growth with the active assistance of the state, although at the same time many mistakes were made. In total, over the last 30 years of the past century, 30 countries have managed to achieve per capita GDP growth rates that exceed the weighted average of the world's leading economies, accounting for 68% of the developing world's population.

At the same time, the per capita GDP of almost three dozen countries, where about 20% of its total population lives, has not grown, but has declined. If we add to the latter group countries with per capita GDP growth rates of less than 1 % per year, we will see that in the final stage of the past century, more than half of our sample of 100 countries with more than 1/4 of the population was among the disadvantaged countries

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the developing world and about 1/5 of the world's total population. These include not only the poorest countries, but also a number of countries with relatively decent GDP per capita by the standards of the developing world. But this does not change the essence of the matter, but only highlights the extraordinary complexity of the situation that has developed by the beginning of this century in the developing world. Perhaps somewhat blurring the overall unfavorable picture is the fact that about 2/3 of the world's population below the poverty and poverty line is concentrated in the five largest developing countries, which have surpassed developed countries in terms of per capita GDP growth over the past 30 years [ The World Bank. Report..., 2001, pp. 11, 302, 303].

The economic and concomitant social degradation of an increased array of developing countries, despite their relatively small share of the world's total population, cannot but alarm the sane part of humanity. Because with the multiplication of their number, the range expands and the number of various potential threats to the well-being of the world community increases. Together with the growing ecological disadvantage, this can call into question the future of modern civilization with all its scientific, technical and socio-economic achievements. And although the lag of the degraded countries of the South behind the leaders of the world economy in terms of human development index is somewhat less than in terms of GDP per capita, this hardly changes the essence of the matter. Because in the conditions of economic hopelessness, the increase in life expectancy and the gap in education rather aggravates, rather than alleviates, the moral and physical suffering of people.

In order to speed up the exit from the vicious circle of poverty, it is necessary, I think, to reconsider some stereotypes and, in particular, to abandon the center-peripheral view of the development process. The point, among other things, is that there is no universal economic optimum by definition. What seems optimal for the global economy as a whole is not necessarily optimal for each individual country, especially if we do not forget about the long term. The idea of optimizing the world economy, which is often present in one form or another in the works of neoliberal economists, implicitly proceeds from the intention to optimize the conditions for scientific and technological progress, the center and main beneficiary of which, as is well known, are the countries of the economic vanguard. And even if free trade were to become a reality and indeed be able to improve the distribution of resources at all levels of the global economic pyramid and in all countries without exception, it cannot by itself ensure or link the accumulation of capital and increase in labor productivity, which are the two main sources of economic growth and development [UNCTAD. Trade and ..., 2001, p. 84].

As the experience of developed and developing countries that have achieved noteworthy success in this field shows, solving problems of this kind necessarily requires active participation in the process of economic nation-state building. Successful development requires not only an efficient market, but also an efficient state that can ensure the formation and support of such a market.

* * *

A fundamentally different world order is needed to restore the economic growth of stagnant and degraded developing countries and take root in expanded reproduction there, allowing for the harmonization of the interests of the entire world community. An order that promotes the multiplication and efficient use of export resources of countries that occupy the lowest levels in the world economy.

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economic table of ranks. We need conditions that allow us to increase the functional openness of such economies with gradual and prudent liberalization of their trade and political regimes, as was recently done in Japan and the Far Eastern NIS, and is now being implemented in China and a number of other countries that followed their example, which largely due to the harmonization of import substitution with the development of export potential states of the economic vanguard began to outperform the population per capita. A similar scheme, by the way, was widely used at one time by most of the countries that are now part of it. With the difference, however, that then it was possible to limit contacts with the world market for years, and maybe even for decades. Now, due to the rapid acceleration of scientific and technological progress, almost any hitch in the development of world economic relations is fraught with interruptions in the mechanism of expanded reproduction.

In essence, we need a different model of globalization, which as an integral part includes the adaptation of the states of the economic vanguard to the urgent needs of the countries of the rear guard and its active well-thought-out support in key areas of development. A model that is designed to optimize the combination of market and regulatory principles in the development of their economic interaction, to block the chaos of both market and archaic elements, knocking the ground out from under the feet of a significant part of developing and transition economies.

The essential components of such a model include: clearing the blockages in the way of interaction between leaders and outsiders of the global economy; accelerating the gradual transfer of manufacturing industry from the center to the periphery, transferring relevant technologies to developing countries and helping to train local personnel, simultaneously opening the markets of developed countries where this industry was located, and-most importantly-fully promoting the development of creative intellectual and spiritual potential of less developed countries.

list of literature

The World Bank. World Development Report. Offensive on Poverty, Moscow: Vse Mir Publ., 2001.

Globalization and Large semi-peripheral countries, Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya, 2003.

Dumoulin N. N. World Trade Organization, Moscow: Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation, 1999.

The world at the turn of the millennium. Forecast of the world economy development until 2015, Moscow: Novy Vek Publishing House, 2001.

World economy. Global Trends for 100 years, Moscow: Ekonomist Publ., 2003.

Solonitsky A. Mirovoe integriruyushchee razvitie [World Integrating Development]. 1995. N 12. pp. 9-12.

Handbook of Trade and development Statistics 199611997. N.Y. -Geneva: U.N. Publication, 1997.

Integration of Developing Countries into the International Trading System. P.: OECD, 1992.

Report of the Conference on East Asian Development: Lessons for a New Global Environment. Kuala-Lumpur, Malaysia. UNCTADAX/Misc. 3.09.04.1996.

Stiglitz J. Globalization and Its Discontents. L.: Penguin Press, 2002.

Thurbon E. Two Paths to Financial Liberalization: South Korea and Taiwan // The Pacific Review. Vol. 14. 2001. N2.

UNCTAD. Handbook of Statistics 2002. N.Y. -Geneva: U.N. Publication, 2002.

UNCTAD. Trade and Development Report, 2002. N.Y. -Geneva: U.N. Publication, 2002.

UNCTAD. World Investment Report 2001. N.Y. -Geneva: U.N. Publication, 2001.

World Development Indicators 2002. World Bank. Wash., 2002.

World Development Report 1991. The Challenge of Development. World Bank. Oxford University Press, 1991.

WTO. International Trade and Development Statistics 2001.

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