We present our reflections on the economic situation and prospects of the developing world in the foreseeable future, which are based on the materials of one hundred of the most economically significant countries, which account for more than 99% of its total GDP and population. The main focus is on the modification of the conditions and mechanisms of belated, catching-up industrialization, which is the most important tool and driving force of their economic (and social) rise. Hence the appeal to new, not yet sufficiently clarified, aspects of globalization. Moreover, a number of detailed studies have appeared in recent years to fill this gap. More attention is also being paid to the regional features of the industrial revolution in the developing world, which have significantly affected the overall configuration, dynamics and technological component of this fundamental process, its current results and medium-term prospects.

In the twenty-first century, the development of individual developing countries and their totality cannot be adequately represented and understood outside the global global context. The density of international economic, financial, informational and human contacts is so high that for almost all developing economies, global development conditions play a decisive role in relation to domestic conditions.

It is advisable to speak about globalization in a broad and narrow sense. In a broad sense, globalization means the intensification of cross-border economic interaction. Under the influence of scientific and technological progress and the growing institutional homogeneity of the world economy, transport, information, organizational and any other types of communication costs in the world are significantly reduced, which leads to a faster growth of cross-border flows of goods, finance and capital, which increasingly link national economies together. Globalization in a narrow sense should be understood as the process of forming a single global economy capable of operating in real time on a global scale.

In the terminology of economics, this process is based on the absolute (ideally) mobility of the main factors of production-knowledge, capital and labor, as well as the products of labor - goods and services. National economies, more precisely, bounded by state borders of the territory, act as more or less standardized cells of the global economic matrix. However, it is based on the globalization of the activities of enterprises and firms.

One of the functional consequences of globalization is that the production costs of individual producers are compared across the entire field of the world economy in real time. According to the figurative expression of the American economist P. Krugman, the value-added chain has become

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It is possible to " cut into pieces "and distribute these" pieces " around the world in such a way as to ensure the lowest possible level of costs in the production of final products and achieve maximum profits. However, and even more importantly, the rapid growth of world trade and the increasingly rapid entry of imports into previously inaccessible and/or heavily protected markets, due to lower transport costs and reduced protectionist barriers, forces local producers to constantly compete with importers.

Equally powerful forces are pulling the global economy together in a single demand-side complex. In the 1950s and 1960s, theorists of development economics, especially Latin American economists, discovered and described in detail the mechanism of the "demonstration effect", which brings the periphery to consumer preferences and standards set by developed countries. Modern telecommunications and mass media technologies are extremely universalizing the style and structure of consumption on a global scale. The growing freedom of consumer choice, stimulated by intensive cross-border migration of the population, also contributes to this. As a result, the global economic space appears not as a platform for the exchange of goods produced by national economies, but as a single space-time continuum in which exchanges take place between globally organized producers and consumers. With a simplified approach, it is assumed that globalization is an open game in which approximately balanced players take part, and the universal rules of the game do not prevent all participants from implementing some individual winning strategy. However, the global economy is a platform where unequal opportunities are demonstrated. Globalization exposes to the utmost extent the diversity of countries that enter into common interaction according to universal rules and feeds the process of their differentiation.

Two points are crucial. First, the inherent characteristics of the countries participating in globalization are significantly different, which initially puts them in unequal conditions. We are talking not only about the accumulated (wasted) characteristics of economic potential in the course of historical development, but also about such specified characteristics as climate, topography, convenient geographical location, population, etc. Secondly, the countries involved in globalization are at different levels of development and differ significantly in the scale and structure of economic activity. activities. Meanwhile, in the context of an unlimited market, the initial inequality in the scale and level of economic activity tends to reproduce. Skewness is a natural result of the very nature of economic activity.

Unlike the industrial revolution that lasted for centuries, which laid the foundation of a man-made civilization, but" managed " to radically transform only a small group of countries, putting them in the position of the world's economic vanguard, the globalization it prepared drew almost all countries of the world into its orbit in just two or three decades. I pulled it in as I found it, and as a result, I multiplied the prerequisites for increasing the unevenness of world economic development.

Based on the differences in conditions and types of development, we have identified two main groups of developing countries: industrial product exporters (EPI) and oil exporters (NE). The remainder of the remaining countries are grouped in the group of others (PRS) on a residual basis, and in some cases two more subgroups with particularly unfavorable conditions for development are distinguished from this array: least developed countries (LDCs) and landlocked developing countries (LLDCs), the majority of which also belong to LDC1. Taking such a grouping as a basis, however, it is not necessary to-

1 The EPI Group includes a maximum of 12 countries, NE-21, LDC-32, LLDCs - 19 countries. However, for specific calculations, the number of countries in groups may vary depending on the availability of relevant statistics.

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There may also be cross-country differences within each of the selected groups that affect their economic dynamics and weight in the global economy. After all, if, for example, the Latin American component is removed from the EPI group, its weight will decrease somewhat, but the dynamics, on the contrary, will increase. But the role of China and India is particularly significant, as they are increasingly influencing the overall dynamics and significance of this group in the global economy and in the system of world economic relations (Table 1).

Table 1

Share of major groups and individual developing countries in global GDP and in the total GDP of the developing world, %

1950

1980

1990

2000

2005*

2020 y.**

In world GDP

All developing countries

27.8

28.7

31.8

39.5

43.3

51.1

EPI

14.8

15.8

19.7

27.1

30.5

38.6

- China

4.0

3.0

5.4

10.5

13.1

19.3

- India

3.9

3.5

4.3

5.5

6.3

8.2

- the others

6.9

9.3

10.1

11.1

10.8

11.4

NE

3.5

4.8

4.5

4.5

4:7

4.8

Other developing countries

9.4

8.2

7.5

7.9

8.1

7.7

In the aggregate GDP of developing countries

EPI

53.4

54.7

62.1

68.6

70.4

75.6

- China

14.5

10.5

17.0

26.6

30.9

37.8

- India

14.0

12.0

13.6

14.0

14.5

16.0

- the others

24.9

32.2

31.5

28.0

25.0

21.8

NE

12.6

16.7

14.3

11.3

10.9

9.3

Other developing countries

34.0

28.6

30.6

20.1

18.7

15.1

-----

* Rating.

** Forecast. All calculations here, unless specifically specified, are made in so-called international dollars in prices and at PPP 2004.2.

Obviously, when assessing the development of various groups of countries, it should be taken into account that the number of major exporters of industrial products, in fact, includes Indonesia, which is usually formally included in the NE group, but since the early 1990s has been increasingly based in its development on the export of industrial products, which is growing much faster, In 2003, it exceeded $ 30 billion (UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics 2004, Table 4.1 A). Among other countries, the Philippines, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Vietnam, as well as Sri Lanka, Tunisia, Jordan, Costa Rica, and Mauritius, remained such solid and dynamically developing exporters of manufacturing products, which also exceeded the criteria used to determine the composition of the main EPI in the second half of the 1990s. 3.

The tendency to increase the unevenness of development, due to differences in international specialization, is particularly evident when referring to the average per capita indicators. Thus, while the GDP per capita of the entire population of developing countries grew by 4.9 times in 1950-2005, the 12 EPI and 16 NE identified in Table 1 grew by 5.9 and 4.4 times, respectively, and the 32 LDC countries grew by 1.4 times.

2 The authors express their sincere gratitude to G. I. Machavariani, Head of the Methodology and Coordination Group for Predictive Research at IMEMO RAS, and A. S. Tanasova, a member of the group, for their kind input and assistance in calculations.

3 Unaccounted-for EPIS in 1991-2000 accounted for more than 4% of the total growth in the share of developing countries in world GDP.

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Hong Kong (Hong Kong) (which has been a special economic region of the People's Republic of China since 1997), Singapore, Taiwan (which is considered an integral part of the People's Republic of China and is usually included in the so-called Greater China), and South Korea were the pioneers of foreign-oriented development driven by the export of manufacturing products. This choice was due not only to the extreme scarcity of natural resources and small demographic potential, but above all to the rare ambition of the authorities in power, which was constantly fueled by the annoying and at the same time fascinating experience of Japan, on the one hand, and potential external threats, on the other. Thanks to their initial focus on world standards, ably supported by the economic policy of the authorities, they managed to achieve full-scale industrialization in just a few decades and grow to the status of new industrial countries (NIS)4.

Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines first entered the second tier of countries focused on the full development of exports of industrial products. However, due to political instability, the Philippines soon fell out of this cage. The countries of this tier, unlike the NIS, have solid natural resources, which provided them with a relatively safe position on the world market even before the development of industrial exports. Its formation, along with the maturation of the necessary internal prerequisites, was not least ensured by the introduction of a number of simple production facilities and rapidly growing volumes of various auxiliary operations to the territory of these countries. Their belonging to the EPI group was formed and clearly marked only at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s.

In the early 1980s, the group of industrial product exporters included China, which had begun to transform into a market, and which overnight attracted a huge amount of foreign direct investment (FDI), the majority of which was invested in the development of labor-intensive segments of the modern manufacturing industry. And a little later, under the influence of the success of the countries of East and South-East Asia, India, which seemed to have become entrenched in industrial import substitution, also began to improve and increase exports. The dynamization of the economic development of China and India, which account for almost 38% of the world's total population, has transformed East and South Asia into a new pole of growth and economic attraction, which has a tangible impact on the global world economic situation.

Unlike other Asian exporters of manufactured goods, which are directly or indirectly oriented to the American market, the formation of the export orientation of the Turkish manufacturing industry, which began in the 1970s, was mainly due to Western European integration.

In addition to Asia, Latin America's industrial exports are primarily focused on the North American market. However, Brazil and Mexico made noteworthy efforts to promote manufacturing products to foreign markets only when they found themselves in the grip of deep structural and debt crises, which, in the context of unprepared forced liberalization, resulted in the destruction of a significant part of the previously created industrial potential, including those related to the production of technology-intensive and knowledge-intensive products of various levels of complexity.

1. ECONOMIC LIBERALIZATION AND UNIFICATION OF ECONOMIC POLICIES

The rapid expansion of globalization has been made possible by the cumulative effect of a number of fundamental assumptions. Among the most important, first, is a radical improvement and reduction in the cost of all forms and types of international relations.

4 In the second half of the 1990s, this status was reflected in the IMF's regularly published World Economic Outlook.

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communication, which stimulated the intensification of cross-border economic, political and cultural communication. Secondly, technological progress, which paved the way for the development of an intra-industry international division of labor (MRT) based on operational, nodal, and sub-detailed specialization and cooperation in the production of an ever-expanding range of industrial products and services for consumer and industrial purposes, and thereby radically expanded the possibilities of reducing production costs by optimizing its spatial placement, based on based on the comparative advantages of all the countries involved and each of them individually. Third, the unusually active and purposeful policies of such influential international economic organizations as the IMF and GATT-WTO, which are responsible for global monetary, financial, trade and economic regulation and enjoy the unconditional support of the World Bank.

The growing need to intensify cross-border economic interaction, driven by the benefits of operational, nodal, and sub-regional international specialization and cooperation, coupled with the vanguard countries ' desire to halt and reverse the slowdown in economic growth that began in the 1970s, turned into a neoliberal (counter)revolution of management ideas on a global scale, which called into question the natural right of the state to correction of market forces in the interests of national development.

Under the pressure of persistent economic imbalances, most of which have their roots in the chronic lag of exports behind development needs, and leading international economic organizations acting as trendsetters, arbitrators and creditors of last resort, developing countries have been forced to make a number of commitments that have made it easier and faster for them to join the globalization processes, but at the same time they have thoroughly narrowed the possibilities of implementing their own intentions and initiatives in the fight against backwardness and economic elevation.

Particularly important is the commitment to maintain the free conversion of national currencies and liberalize transactions on the current (and often capital) balance of payments account, combined with the liberalization of domestic prices and increased openness of the foreign trade sector, which draws national producers of developing countries into global competition in real time. Meanwhile, the number of countries that joined article VIII of the IMF charter, the signing of which opens the current account of the balance of payments in 1970-2005, increased more than 4 times and approached 150.

We should not discount the radical reduction in the arsenal of "legitimate" instruments of state economic policy, due to the liberalization of trade and economic regulation within the framework of the GATT-WTO. The main feature of the agreement establishing the WTO as a successor to the GATT is that the results of all negotiations are presented there in the form of a single package of legal documents, the adoption of which is mandatory for all WTO member countries without any exceptions and reservations. The all - or-nothing principle was a major turn in the organization of international trade.5 Thus, the right of developing countries to various kinds of exemptions in the general rules stipulated earlier in the framework of the GATT was de jure disavowed. All this, taken together, actually puts them in the same position as the vanguard states, while being incomparably less ready for full-scale open competition.

A lot of problems for developing economies with a broad interpretation of this concept are caused, in particular, by the need to combine the norms of internal regulation

5 A well-known Russian expert on international trade problems, I. I. Dumoulin, delicately called this dubious construction a "time bomb" [World Trade..., 1997, pp. 15-16].

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economic activity with general rules for cross-border movement of goods, services and capital, which is provided for in the GATT-WTO charter. This significantly narrows the possibilities of differentiated taxation, the use of subsidies, benefits and other proven tools to stimulate national entrepreneurship, limiting, or even completely blocking selective, targeted support by peripheral countries for strategically important sectors of their economy. Despite and despite the fact that in the initial period of industrialization, the forces of the market formed by it, as follows from the experience of industrialized countries, need not only freedom, but also state support. Restrictions on state regulation are actually introduced under the motto "do not harm your neighbor", if you want to protect yourself from similar actions on his part. The motto, which is based on the postulate of laissez faire, supposedly aimed at ensuring equal opportunities for all participants in the economic process, which, however, due to the initial inequality of partners, cannot be equal by definition.

Regardless of the real reasons behind such prohibitions and restrictions, they constrain rather than facilitate the acquisition by most emerging economies of the new dynamic comparative advantages necessary to advance to higher levels of development and complete industrialization. All the more so when the need to force developing countries to meet the constantly rising standards of the countries of the economic vanguard is increasingly felt. In addition, all these prohibitions and restrictions can be used by developed countries to suppress and / or deter competition from fast-growing emerging economies in strategically important business segments.6

In general, artificially narrowing the scope of state intervention in the economy restricts the ability of peripheral countries to stimulate and regulate their own development based on their national interests, partly blocking the path of their "unscheduled" economic growth from the point of view of world market leaders and leaving both processes "at the mercy" of foreign capital and/or the market element. Meanwhile, the majority of foreign investment in the real economy of the developing world is concentrated in a relatively small group of the most prosperous, successful and strategically important countries for investors. Market factors also work in the same direction. If only because, thanks to more effective technical, technological and socio-cultural potential, such countries, as a rule, adapt better and faster to global trends and development imperatives.

In the 1990s, due to the many failures associated with the rapid, landslide liberalization of emerging economies, a consensus began to form between adherents and opponents of neoliberal orthodoxy, which was based on the recognition of the complementarity of market and state functions, as well as the uniqueness of each individual country, which requires a special approach to its development [Wolfenson, Bourguignon, 2004], the need for which was virtually ignored in the initial phase of liberal reforms due to structural adjustment loans from the IMF and the World Bank7. Meanwhile, the possibility of consensus on the issue of State law

6 Thus, in early 2004, the US administration and Congress discussed the issue of filing a lawsuit with the WTO, demanding that the Chinese authorities declare illegal support for "their" semiconductor industry through a reduction in the sales tax on domestic products, which was qualified as a form of subsidy that violates WTO rules. The real reason for discontent, apparently, was the unusually high dynamics of semiconductor production in China (according to authoritative sources, in 1997-2003, their sales increased almost 4 times and reached $ 27 billion), which poses a potential threat to the US position in the world market of these products. The looming conflict was resolved even before the US formally filed a complaint with the WTO, after the publication of data that in 2003 the share of locally produced semiconductors in China accounted for less than 20% of their total sales [see: Vedomosti, 18.03.2004].

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Unfortunately, the tendency to adjust market forces in the interests of national development, aimed at increasing national wealth and meeting the needs of the society "protected" by it, which at one time was actively used and, in fact, continues to be used by the countries of the economic vanguard, is not visible. In such circumstances, recognition of country-specific features, with all the consequences that follow, is largely meaningless. As a result, neoliberal dogmas that ignore the creative potential of the state still limit the arsenal of "legitimate" tools of its economic policy, which played an important role in the industrialization and post-war reconstruction of the avant-garde countries themselves, and then in bringing the four new industrial countries of the Far East to its technical, technological and economic standards.

This approach may help global market forces that primarily work for TNCs and their home countries, but it hardly helps reduce the gap between developing and developed economies. And not only because, contrary to liberal dogmas, the market element, as historical experience shows, in the vast majority of cases does not smooth out, but, on the contrary, worsens the initial inequality, rewarding the strong and infringing on the weak.8

A relatively small group of developing countries, mainly among the EPI, managed to avoid a sudden exposure to the market element, which resulted in significant economic losses, and they were forced to adapt to more or less liberal rules in the process of developing industrial exports, while simultaneously strengthening their monetary and financial position. In addition to the NIS that have met globalization fully armed, China and India deserve special attention in this regard. Apparently, having realized the increased complexity of the world economic situation, as well as their own opportunities and dangers in the transition to new global rules of the game, they did not make unjustifiably abrupt moves either in the privatization of huge state property, or in the so-called withdrawal of the state from the economy, much less its refusal to regulate functions. Thanks to a thoughtful, balanced approach to the reorganization of the economic mechanism, they managed to minimize losses and maintain a consistently high growth dynamics.

The problem, among other things, is that by the time of the intensification of globalization processes stimulated by the development of information and communication technologies, a significant part of developing countries had not yet formed or undermined the mechanisms of self-sustaining growth that had begun to take shape, and many of them had not even reached the status of nation-States. Modern adaptation mechanisms designed to supplement, and perhaps eventually replace, their traditional varieties have also failed to develop. Meanwhile, capital, whose inflow during liberalization is usually associated with hopes for the recovery of lagging countries, immanently tends to more "advanced" and well-established areas of the global economy. You can not discount the fact that in connection with the pe-

7 A convincing critique of the sweeping, purely formal approach of international organizations to liberalizing developing economies, which ignores the specifics and capabilities of individual countries, is contained in the monograph of the 2001 Nobel Prize winner in Economics. Stiglitz (published in Russian translation in 2003), who served for four years as Chief Economist and Vice-President of the World Bank. The problem, in his opinion, is that all three reforms proposed to developing countries in exchange for structural adjustment loans-budget cuts, privatization, market liberalization-were based only on general ideas about the Latin American situation, exceeded reasonable limits and "became an end in themselves, and not a means to achieve a more just and sustainable development." However, they have been implemented unnecessarily quickly and to the detriment of other vital decisions" [Stiglitz, 2002, p. 53-54].

8 For even with a proportional distribution of the total income generated in the process of international economic interaction, a larger part of it goes to the strongest, thereby constantly fueling the trend towards concentration and centralization of capital, followed by the formation of monopolies and oligopolies (including through mergers and unfriendly acquisitions of the weakest), which, crushing free markets, they restrain, or even completely block, life-giving competition.

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with the transition of the avant-garde countries to the post-industrial phase of development, their separation from the countries of belated industrialization has largely acquired a new quality. To its overwhelming superiority in the technical and technological characteristics of the economy, the volume of average per capita income, accumulated national wealth and capital, in readiness and ability to adapt to the challenges of the time, a gap in the stages of socio-economic development was added, with all the resulting differences in the system of values, urgent tasks and approaches to their solution.

As a result, despite the expansion of overall development opportunities, globalization makes it more difficult than easier for developing countries to meet the technical, technological, educational and qualification standards of the economic vanguard. And not only because of the increased difficulties of mutual understanding between the leaders and outsiders of the technogenic civilization and the divergence of their interests, but also because of the noticeable intensification of competition in all spheres and on all floors of the world economy, regardless of their real state, coupled with the inherent asymmetry of development of globalization.

2. INCREASING UNEVENNESS OF DEVELOPMENT

Forced liberalization, together with the unification of economic legislation in developed and developing countries, equalizing the rights of market participants regardless of their nationality, location and field of activity, has contributed to spontaneous cross-country differentiation due to differences in the levels and quality of development (in terms of readiness for its continuation in the changed conditions), complicating the situation of some countries and facilitating the economic rise of others. The vanguard countries did not avoid problems either. But differentiation has left a particularly deep impression on the world's economic periphery. Therefore, when determining the prospects for its development, it is necessary to take into account the growing differences between groups of more or less typologically homogeneous countries. To a first approximation, these can also be large regions on a continental or sub-continental scale, each of which has its own specifics, which are more or less inherent in the countries that make up it.

To get a more complete picture of this process, developing regions can be compared not only with each other, but also with developed ones. Of particular interest in this regard is the comparative dynamics of the manufacturing industry, whose international trade in products is most liberalized. Although it is obviously not only, and perhaps not so much, liberalization as such, but rather the actual technical and technological state in which the manufacturing industry of each region under consideration turned out to be at the time of the current neoliberal turn.

By the end of the 1970s, the avant-garde countries, having largely completed the industrial revolution, were in the process of transition to the post-industrial phase of development, although at different stages of it. The United States developed faster than others, which had particularly significant reserves for new technologies, and the vanguard was closed by the clearly rebellious countries of Western Europe, which showed, perhaps, the greatest technical and technological inertia in the entire new and recent history. A similar balance of power seems to have developed between the countries of developing Asia and Latin America. But, first of all, both of them were still far from the stage of industrial maturity. Hence, the competition between them was fundamentally different. Second, in this case, the undisputed advantage in industrial growth rates was given to less developed Asia, which initially followed a more meaningful and flexible industrial policy (Figure 1).

At first, liberalization did not bring the expected dividends to its masterminds. However, with the technical re-equipment based on information technologies and moving to the periphery of labor-intensive segments that were losing profitability

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Figure 1 1981-2004

Source: Monthly Bulletin of Statistics, Special Tables for the corresponding years.

The manufacturing industry of the world's leading economies, which seemed to have already completed its mission and was nearing its end, began to gain strength again. North America has been particularly successful in this regard (over 90% of its industrial potential is concentrated in the United States). In 1981-2004, North American manufacturing value added grew by 4.1% annually, compared to 1.1% in Western Europe, 2.0% in Latin America, and 4.6% in the developing world taken as a whole, and in the last nine years of this period, North America also surpassed developing Asia (6.6% vs. 5.5%). which until then had been the undisputed leader of industrial growth for almost a quarter of a century.

Thus, the industrial renaissance in North America coincided with a slowdown in industrial growth in the countries of East, Southeast and South Asia. The reasons for this slowdown obviously lie not only in the completion of industrialization of NIS, which have slowed down their efforts to build up industrial potential and focus on improving it. To a certain extent, this is also a reflection of the depressive impact of the new MRI model on the development of manufacturing in peripheral countries, which complicates the formation of key links of modern industry there, where the main part of added value is created and demand for related products is generated. One should probably not discount the ongoing restructuring of the state-owned industry of the People's Republic of China, which is aimed, among other things, at eliminating the "excesses" generated by socialist construction.

Meanwhile, the manufacturing industry of Latin America, which marked the beginning of the industrialization of the current developing world, almost did not concede the growth rate of the manufacturing industry of developing Asia in the 1970s, and did not adapt to the imperatives of globalization, could not withstand the sharply increased competition with imports and degraded. Since the beginning of the 1980s and almost until the end of the 20th century, the production of industrial products in this region, as once, during the initial period of industrialization, was inferior in terms of growth to the extractive industry, and heavy - to light. At the same time, a significant part of its most "advanced" segments collapsed, and in the course of privatization and sharply tightened budget savings, a number of important research centers with all their best practices were also lost. All this, setting Latin American countries far back, called into question the possibility of completing the industrial revolution there. For the sake of justice, it should be noted that at the same time as the noticeable loss of positions in the production of machine products (excluding auto, and in Brazil also aircraft construction), Latin American countries have made obvious progress in the processing of raw materials and food, and Mexico has also made significant progress in the processing of raw materials and food.

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connecting to the production networks of TNCs through specialization in technically simple, time-consuming operations. This contributed to the long-overdue dynamization of Latin American exports and the improvement of the external economic balance in most countries of the region [Monthly Bulletin of Statistics. Special Tables; UNCTAD. Trade and Development Report 2003, p. 91 - 146]. However, in the era of the "knowledge economy", the growth potential of these revitalized manufacturing segments is quite limited.

In sub-Saharan Africa, which is at an incomparably lower stage of development, the devastating effects of unprepared, almost shock-like liberalization in absolute terms were not so great. But that doesn't change the point. After all, the lost still need to catch up, and start from a lower level is undoubtedly more difficult, especially when you stay in a completely different, essentially obsolete era.

The location of the global manufacturing industry has changed markedly due to increased differences in growth rates, but its location in the developing world has changed particularly significantly. Along with the industrial progress of the four NIS countries that completed industrialization in the last century, the most modern and dynamic industries are concentrated in China. The manufacturing industry of Southeast and South Asian countries is also developing relatively rapidly, while Latin America, which has long been the leader, is increasingly losing its position.

Inclusion in the table. Using data calculated on different price bases allowed, firstly, to increase the length of the period under review and, secondly, to look at the process under study from different angles. The fact is that, according to some very reputable experts, the beginning of the 1970s. The decline in the share of manufacturing in the GDP of developed countries is not due to a relative decrease in industrial production per se, but to a reduction in the cost of industrial products in relation to services. This is confirmed by production indicators when measured in constant prices [see: Vedomosti, 6.12.2005]. In addition, referring to data on production dynamics, calculated, of course, in constant prices, allowed us to find out three noteworthy factors:

Table 2

Share of some developing countries in manufacturing industries worldwide and in the developing world (% and percentage points)*

1980

1990**

2000

2004**

Change for

1980-2000

1990-2004

Share in the global manufacturing industry, %

East Asia**

4

8.4

14

17.6

+10

+ 9.2

Other countries

3

1.9

5

2.2

+2

+0.3

Latin America

7

5.3

5

4.8

-2

-0.5

All developing countries

14

15.6

24

24.5

+10

+9.0

Share of manufacturing in developing countries

East Asia**

29

54.1

58

71.6

+29

+ 17.5

including China

10

14.1

29

29.6

+19

+15.5

Latin America

47

34.0

22

19.6

-25

-14.4

Other countries

24

11.9

20

8.8

-4

-3.1

including LDCs

1.3

1.2

-0.1

* 2004-assessment;

** Figures for 1980 and 2000 are presented in current prices (adapted from: [Lall, 2004], and 1990 and 2004 - in 1995 prices (borrowed from: [International Yearbook..., 2005, Table 1.1].

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circumstances. First, the displacement of Latin American countries from this vital segment of the economy slowed down slightly in 2001-2004 (amounting to only 0.3 percentage points), and second, the share of China in the total value added of the manufacturing industry in developing countries increased even more (by 3.7 percentage points), while the share of LDCs decreased (by 0.1 percentage points).

3. FUNDAMENTALS OF LONG-TERM ECONOMIC GROWTH

Among the fundamental factors, demographic changes and export dynamics will be of particular importance in the period under review, along with the accumulation of physical and "human" capital.

A. "Demographic dividend"

In 1951-2000, the countries of the South developed at an average annual population growth rate of about 2.5%, and in 1971-2000-about 2%. In 2001-2005, this indicator decreased to 1.5%, and by 2025 it will fall below 1% (Figure 1). In China, whose demographic development trend is closer to that of developed (excluding the United States) than developing countries, the demographic growth rate fell below the 1% target by 2005, and is projected to be around 0.45% in the period 2005-2025.

Chart 1

Average annual population growth rate, %

Calculated and compiled from: [United Nations Population..., 2002; Maddison, 1995].

Reducing the demographic burden on economic growth will have a significant impact on the dynamics of development of the periphery. Underlying the declining population growth rate is a decline in the fertility rate, or the number of births per woman. Reduced fertility translates into economic growth through two main channels: first, reducing the number of children, reducing the time spent caring for them, helps push women into the labor market; second, reducing the number of families with many children frees up funds that can be spent on other needs, including better education of children.

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Chart 2

Dynamics of the dependency burden ratio (ratio of the population under the age of 15 and over 64 years to the population in the economically active age of 15-64 years), 2000-2050

The UN database divides the world into more developed countries, including developed market economies and former socialist camps, and less developed countries. The latter group almost coincides with the classical developing countries (i.e. excludes some former Soviet republics).

Calculated and compiled from: [United Nations Population..., 2002; Maddison, 1995].

No less, if not more, important from the point of view of economic development prospects is the tendency to increase the share of the population in the working age of 15-64 years, while simultaneously reducing the share of age cohorts of "dependents" - children under 15 years and adults over 64 years. In developing countries, the dependency ratio will decrease by 10 points from 0.62 to 0.52 in 2000-2025 (figure 2). In the largest countries of the modern world, this indicator will decrease even more significantly or remain at an initially low level. In India, it is projected to reach 0.48 by 2025, up from 0.62 in 2000. At the same time, in China, the corresponding indicator will fluctuate around a relatively low level of 0.42 in 2005-2020, but by 2025 it will return to its original position of 0.46.

It seems that the combined effect of lower population growth rates, reduced fertility and dependency ratios, reduced large families, and the like will be generally positive for economic growth in the period under review. According to the calculations of D. Bloom and J. In 1965 - 1990, the "demographic dividend" explains about a third of the growth of per capita GDP in the newly industrialized countries of East Asia (Bloom and Williamson, 1998, p. 419-455). A study of savings in India shows that reducing the dependency ratio by 1 percentage point of GDP is almost as likely to increase private and aggregate savings (Muhleisen, 1997).

It is significant that in parallel with the decline in the dependency ratio in less developed countries, the same indicator will, on the contrary, increase in developed countries (Figure 2). Indirectly, this will push the economic growth of the periphery through two channels: first, through the transfer of productive activity to countries with a high supply of cheap labor; and second, through investing the financial savings of the aging population of developed countries in the development of dynamic centers of economic activity in the developing world.

The AIDS pandemic is also likely to have a significant impact on the demographic situation in a number of countries, primarily in Africa. Regardless of its location

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Figure 3

Relationship between the spread of AIDS and the proportion of the population over the age of 65 (149 countries)

The proportion of carriers of the immunodeficiency virus among the population aged 15-49 years,%. the contribution of the "demographic dividend" to the growth of the average per capita GDP of developing countries in the forecast period may be approximately 0.4-0.5%.

AIDS: Group of death

The ongoing AIDS epidemic is a huge challenge for a growing number of developing countries, mainly in Africa. In 2003, in 21 African countries, the proportion of AIDS cases was at the level of 5% or more of the adult population at the active reproductive age of 15-49 years. In five countries, this figure exceeded 20% (Swaziland - 39%, Botswana-37%, Lesotho - 29%, Zimbabwe - 25% and Namibia - 16%). In four other countries - Zambia, Malawi, Central African Republic and Mozambique - the percentage of carriers of the virus in this age group exceeded 15%.

In the short and even medium term, the AIDS epidemic may not have much impact on economic growth. Botswana, for example, was one of the fastest growing countries in the period 1950-2005. Despite the fact that the country's growth is ensured by the extraction of a unique product - diamonds, which is financed by foreign capital, is carried out at the expense of foreign technologies and is also extremely labor-saving, it is not an exaggeration to say that the growth of this country takes place almost without the participation of its population.

If we cynically ignore the humanitarian aspects, then the example of Botswana and some other African countries shows that the reduction in population as a result of the AIDS pandemic formally provides the same "demographic dividend" that was discussed above. It is not surprising, therefore, that the decline in the population as a result of the AIDS pandemic mechanically improves per capita indicators of economic development. Low average life expectancy leads to the fact that there are practically no older generational strata in the population structure (Figure 3), which reduces the burden on family budgets, freeing up resources for other purposes.

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B. Investment in physical capital

All examples of successful development indicate the central role of accumulation in the process of economic growth. Due to deep differences in the levels and types of development, uneven economic and investment cycles, and the efficiency of the corporate sector and public institutions, the relationship between the rate of economic growth and the rate of renewal and accumulation of fixed capital is not linear. Another thing is that, again, the countries with the highest investment growth rates tend to also have high and stable GDP growth rates (Figure 4). In the countries exporting industrial products in 1970-2002, the correlation between the two indicators was 0.71.

Figure 4

Dependence of economic growth rates on investment rates in fixed assets in countries exporting industrial products, 1970-2002

The dynamics of fixed capital investment in different groups of developing countries are fundamentally different (figure 5). In EPI, the rate of accumulation has been steadily growing for the last quarter of a century, with a break in the Asian crisis of the late 1990s, and since the middle of the last decade it has accounted for at least 30% of gross domestic product. In the first years of the new century, in most countries of this group, the norm for-

Chart 5

Dynamics of the rate of accumulation in developing countries (gross investment, % of GDP)

* The high value of the correlation coefficient (determination) R 2 confirms the dependence of growth rates on investment volumes.

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Figure 6

Domestic savings rate in developing countries (% of GDP)

savings increased abruptly to 40% of GDP. Moreover, the jump occurred against the background of very high economic growth rates, which indicates a very intensive expansion and renewal of the production apparatus, mainly in the manufacturing industry, but also in some service sectors, primarily in infrastructure, as well as in the energy sector.

It is important to emphasize that the accelerated increase in investment activity in the EPI, which has maintained high economic dynamics, is based on the growing rate of domestic savings, which has not fallen below 25% since 1982, and has stabilized at 30% of GDP since the mid-1990s (Figure 6). At the turn of the century, this figure skyrocketed to more than 40% of GDP. It is natural to expect that the investment boom of the beginning of the XXI century will transform into high growth rates for a long period. Moreover, the correlation between economic growth and investment in these countries is very high.

The investment process is developing differently in other countries. In the PRS group, and especially in the LLDCs, despite some positive developments over the past five years, the savings rate remains extremely low, about 15% and 10% of GDP, respectively (Figure 6). The savings rate in these groups of countries is approximately the same-15-20% - and in a large number of countries it is significantly higher than the savings rate. This means that the investment process here, and hence economic growth in general, is provided by the influx of resources from outside. (The situation is largely similar in Mexico and Brazil, which represent the EPI of Latin America.)

Especially interesting is the dynamics of the gap between the rate of savings and accumulation in the NE group. As shown in figures 4 and 5, the surge in savings driven by high oil prices since 1999 has not been translated into a proportional increase in investment. Moreover, the rate of accumulation in NE in 2001-2003 remained below the level of the 1990s. While the growth rates of other developing countries, including LLDCs and NE, are higher (sometimes significantly) in the first five years of this century than in the previous decade, the mass of fixed capital investment has been growing faster in recent years in these countries as well. Another thing is that outside the EPI zone, there are basically no signs of investment recovery, not to mention the fact that there is a significant increase in investment activity.

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breakthroughs, which causes instability of economic growth in the long term, making it dependent on market factors.

B. Development of "human capital"

Over the past half-century, huge resources have been devoted by developing countries to the development of "human capital", which occupies a particularly important place among the factors of economic growth. One of the key characteristics of the quality of "human capital" is the state of education. In 2002, the adult literacy rate in the periphery reached 76.7% and even in the countries with the lowest average per capita income exceeded 50% [Human Development..., 2004, p. 142]. Accessible three-level mass education systems contribute to the steady accumulation and improvement of" human capital", which is reflected in the growth of such an indicator as"accumulated number of years of study".

Over the past two decades, efforts to develop "human capital" in most developing countries (especially in successful ones) have multiplied. In 2000, in 58 developing countries for which statistics are available, public spending on education alone accounted for 4.3% of GDP. Between 1998 and 2002, public spending on education as a share of GDP increased in 45 countries, remained unchanged in 5, and only decreased in 16. Some progress has also been made in expanding the student body. Thus, in 1990/1991 - 2001/2002, the share of children attending primary school increased from 80 to 83% [The Millennium Development..., 2005, p. 10].

Since the interdependence between educational efforts and economic growth is not linear, much less automatic, there is no doubt that the accumulation of general and specific "human capital" ensures the progressive development of many peripheral countries, which increasingly includes high-tech industries and services. The most striking example in this regard is the rapid development of the information technology complex in India and Malaysia.

D. Export dynamics

In catching-up economies, unlike developed ones, exports initially play a key role in the development process. Providing a link to the global market, exports have long been the main, often the only source of funds for modernization and development. Forming channels for connecting developing economies with the demands of the world market, exports are still among the most important factors in the development of this group of countries, characterizing it (this process) from the external demand side, fixing their place and role in the MRI and in the world economy.

In the 1980s and 2003, the share of the developing world's GDP that flows through international economic exchange channels (often referred to as export quota 9) increased from 26% to 35% of gross domestic product (Figure 7). The export quota has grown particularly rapidly in the EPI, where it has increased on average 3.5 times over the past 35 years - from 10% in 1970 to 35% in 2003, including in China-from 2 to 34%, and in India-from 4 to 14.5% of GDP.

The trend value of the export quota for oil exporters is also at a high level of about 40%. If from the mid-1970s to the mid-1980s, refer to-

9 Due to the development of intra-industry MRI, which has ensured that developing countries ' exports are filled with manufactured goods, the bulk of the value added of which is created in the countries where TNCs are based, the concept of export quotas, which implied the share of GDP sold in foreign markets, has obviously lost its original meaning.

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Figure 7

Dynamics of export quotas in developing countries (% of GDP)

The relative importance of exports for this group of countries declined slightly, but by 1995 this indicator recovered to the trend value, and during the commodity boom of the beginning of the new century it reached 45% of GDP. It is no exaggeration to say that the economic success of EPI and, to some extent, NE is due to export growth or, in other words, external demand, which is reflected in the names of both groups of countries. Both have managed to take advantage of the dynamic development of world trade, which grew faster than global GDP in the post-war period, in the interests of national development. The average annual growth rate of exports (in US$ 2000) for all developing countries in 1997-2003 was 8.1%, and with the exception of China, which is rapidly becoming a leading trading power, it was 6.05%. At the same time, exports of manufacturing products grew at a faster pace. According to our rough estimate, in the group of 92 developing countries for which relevant statistics are available, the export of raw materials of NE increased slightly in real terms, and their share in the total exports of the entire group in 1997-2003 decreased from 18 to 12%. The export of EPI increased at an average annual rate of 10.45% due to its high saturation with manufacturing products, while that of China - 19.4% (!). As a result, the share of exporters of industrial products in the total exports of the sample increased from 65% to 74%. Exports from other developing countries outside these two typological groups grew at an average annual rate of 5.3%.

Similarly, exports of services grew in the developing world. However, the difference is that East Asian EPIS initially significantly outperformed their Latin American competitors in terms of the volume of services sold on the global market. While in Latin America, exports of services increased 3.3 times in 2003 compared to 1985, in East Asia - more than 10 times. As a result, the share of Latin America in total exports of services from developing countries decreased from 8.4% to 5.1%, while the share of East Asia increased from 17.6% to 31.9%, with the overall increase in the share of developing countries in world exports of services by 1.2 times [calculated from: UNCTAD Handbook..., 2004, Table 5.1].

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Figure 2. Share of various groups of countries in global oil consumption (%)

Figure 3. Shares of various groups of countries in global oil production (%)

Since East Asian industrial product exporters are the most dynamic part of the global economy, their influence on global economic dynamics increases in proportion to the increase in the global economic weight of these countries, especially in the periphery zone. In recent years, there has been a clear trend towards increasing the influence of EPI on commodity markets, primarily oil. We are mainly talking about China, whose share in global consumption

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Oil production increased from 3.5% in 1990 to 6.2% in 2000 and is expected to reach 10% in 2020 (Figure 2). In general, the share of EPI in oil consumption is projected at 29.1% in 2020, compared to 24.3% in 2000.

According to the IMF forecasts, in 2000-2025, the world demand for oil in physical terms will grow, depending on the calculation options, by 1.6-1.7 times [World Economic..., 2005, figure 4.6], which will require an average annual oil production growth rate of 1.9 - 2.15%. According to the forecasts of the US Department of Energy, the maximum growth rate may be 2.6% [International Energy..., 2005]. In 1990-2000, the growth rate of world oil production was only 1.50%, and in 1980-2000 - 0.90% [BP Statistical Review..., 2005]. This means that in the forecast period, in order to maintain sustainable growth of the global economy, oil production will have to grow significantly faster, which will be reflected in the GDP growth of oil-producing countries.

At the same time, not only traditional OPEC oil exporters, but also new producers of hydrocarbons from other developing countries have a chance of dynamizing economic growth (Figure 3). The share of new producers in the global oil supply has an obvious upward trend. If in 1965 it was only 5.7%, by 2004 it had increased to 19.2%.

(To be continued)

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Vedomosti. 18.03.2004; 6.12.2005. World Trade Organization, Moscow, 1997.

Wolfenson J., Bourguignon F. Development and poverty reduction. Looking Back into the past and Looking into the Future / / World Bank. 2004.

Bloom D. E., Williamson J. G. Demographic Transitions and Economic Miracles in Emerging Asia // World Bank Economic Review. Vol. 12. 1998. N3.

BP Statistical Review of World Energy. June 2005. Human Development Report 2004.

International Energy Outlook 2004. Energy Information Administartion U. S. Department of Energy, Wash. D. C. April 2005.

International Yearbook of Industrial Statistics // UNIDO. Vienna, 2005.

Lall S. Reinventing Industrial Strategy: The Role of Government Policy in Building Industrial Competitiveness. G-24 Discussion paper N 28. April 2004.

The Millennium Development Goals Report 2005. Monthly Bulletin of Statistics.

Muhleisen M. Improving India's Savings Performance // IMF Working Paper. N 97(4). Wash., D. C.: IMF, 1997.

Stiglitz Joseph E. Globalization and Its Discontents. L.: Penguin Book, 2002.

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World Economic Outlook. April 2005.

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